War Plans and Sealift - What if we're not planning a land war in Asia?

I'm experimenting with Substack and put up a post on War Plans and Sealift What if we're not planning a land war in Asia? in response to arguments that our "sealift" capacity is much less than it should be. I assert that it depends on what sealift you need for the strategy you are pursuing.

I’d be looking a more submarines, more fast sealift for those island hopping Marines, more sustainment shipping to keep the fighting fleet at sea, and many more small, fast missile boats to augment the larger fleet.

Give it a read and let me know how it looks.

Strategic Sealift - Issues that Won't Go Away

First up is a very short piece from Defense News which touches on the topic of who ought to pay for some Sealift ships - an argument has been made the the end user - the U.S. Army - might be a good source of funding. See here:

With bills piling up for the U.S. Navy, between manning and training a growing fleet and recapitalizing ballistic missile submarines, an influential Republican lawmaker is wondering if it is time for the nation’s ground force to chip in for its own transportation.

During a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., asked Defense Secretary Mark Esper if the Army should shoulder the financial burden of recapitalizing the aging sealift fleet. In the event of a significant conflict, about 90 percent of the Army’s equipment would be transported by sea. But the sealift fleet charged with performing that mission is woefully unprepared.

“You stated that of the strategic necessities for our nation, that B-21 [next-generation bomber] was responsibility of the Air Force,” Wittman said, referring to an exclusive interview Esper gave to Defense News. “The Columbia-class [submarine] was the responsibility of the Navy.

“Since surge sealift capacity is the ability for the Army to get to the fight, should it not be the Army’s responsibility to fund surge sealift capacity?”

The following touches on the David Larter article linked above.

Of interest are discussions of the need for more ships in the national sealift fleet, especially tankers, as set out in this 2020 piece here:

Buzby, former commander of the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, agreed.

“We need more ships,” he said, adding that a strong case may be made for adding upwards of 50 more vessels.

The maritime administrator also called attention to a shortage of civilian mariners that threatens the nation’s ability to successfully executive a sustained sealift operation. Partly with that in mind, he said the country would benefit from an increase in commercial vessels rather than reserve-status ships (since the vessels themselves would have greater readiness and in turn would facilitate larger numbers of trained crews).

Kaskin advocated expansion of the U.S. Maritime Security Program and also supported an administration proposal to create a similar structure for tankers. He said only a half-dozen American-flag internationally-trading tankers are available for use by the military, and three of those are already leased by the Navy for current operations.

“The requirement that U.S. Transportation Command has shown – and earlier studies have shown – is that we need more than 78 tankers,” he said. “Adding 10 is not going to be sufficient. So, what we really need to do is find ways of utilizing the tankers that we have in the domestic fleet – the Jones Act [ships] – to be able to support wartime operations.”

Here's a 2018 panel discussing Strategic Sealift, featuring Sal Mercogliano as moderator. Actual taking begins around the 4:30 point, so skip ahead. Toward the end, there's another mention of the need for tankers.

As you may gather, the main issue in maintaining a fleet that can do what is demanded of it is money. Money which should be spent wisely with an keen eye on national strategic needs.

Warning Shot: "[T}he rapid depletion of the U.S. commercial fleet size" and a shortage of civilian mariners as threat to National Security

The unique role of the U.S. Merchant Marine in peace and war remains grossly misunderstood by the public at large. The industry’s role during every crisis the nation has faced since its founding days is well documented, but it is either rarely recognized or often forgotten by the citizenry. Its increasingly vital national security role remains a complete enigma to the populace. That part of the Merchant Marine mission and its strategic role in global force projection, along with the maintenance of national security interests worldwide, must become much more widely known and recognized.

This warning from Dr. Sashi Kumar in the paywall protected USNI Proceedings article2018 U.S. Merchant Marine and World Maritime Review is timely and important.

The need for a U.S. merchant marine “capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency” was further emphasized in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and later in the National Security Directive 28 implemented on 28 October 1989. To fulfill this mandate, 61 commercial ships are maintained on five-day readiness status by a skeleton crew at the behest of the U.S. Transportation Command through the Maritime Administration (MarAd) and the Military Sealift Command.  These vessels constitute the logistics backbone for troop mobilization and force projection.
***
Losing from the current fleet any more than two commercial ships and the mariners they employ will impact significantly the Ready Reserve Force’s (RRF’s) capability. Given the voluntary nature of mariner services and the likelihood of all future mobilizations being in a contested and hazardous operating environment, the assumption that all qualified mariners will report when called upon is simply unrealistic. A recent report to Congress identified the need for 13,607 qualified mariners for sustaining the mobilization and commercial operations concurrently under highly optimistic assumptions of no loss of life or property. The identified pool of mariners will therefore provide three to four months of force projection support at best, taking into account the necessary crew rotations.

We have a shortage of civilian Mariners and a shortage of U.S. commercial hulls.

Here's the report prepared by a working group, "U.S. Maritime Transportation System National Advisory Committee
(MTSNAC) and the MWWG in consultation with Coast Guard Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory Committee (MERPAC)and the Committee on Marine Transportation Systems (CMTS)

MARITIME WORKFORCE WORKING GROUP Report to Congress 2017 by lawofsea on Scribd

Keypoint:

The MWWG estimates that 11,768 qualified mariners with unlimited credentials as described above are available to crew the Ready Reserve Force. The number of mariners required to activate the entire
surge fleet as well as operate the commercial fleet concurrently is 11,678 and is documented within this Report. Thus, MWWG estimates that there are sufficient mariners working in the industry to activate the surge fleet if the entire pool of qualified United States citizen mariners identified by MWWG are available and willing to sail when required. This assumption is of paramount importance given the
voluntary nature of mariner service. Should the need for mariner services be prolonged through concurrent sustained sealift and commercial fleet operations, it will necessitate crew rotations and
accordingly, increased demand for additional qualified mariners from the identified subset. Currently the estimated demand for mariners with unlimited credentials under such operating conditions is
13,607. Thus, the Report documents a deficit of mariners with unlimited credentials to meet the national security and force projection needs. The deficit will escalate if actively sailing qualified mariners
from the identified base are unable or unwilling to continue sailing during times of national emergency. It is to be noted that the willingness to sail either commercially or as part of the surge sealift fleet during such times is presently unknown and beyond measurement . . .

Well worth the read, and something to talk to your elected representatives about.

For those of you interested in such matters, a USNI membership is vital. An "online" membership is only $39 a year, and you can find info here.