National Maritime Day is May 22

Bush honors Merchant Marine

President Bush hailed the U.S. Merchant Marine Thursday its role in peacetime commerce and war and declared May 22 National Maritime Day.

Say thanks.

"Pirates of the Asiatic"

Nice TV piece on pirates of the Malacca Strait area here:

"People on the island think the pirates are bad people, but what can they do? They're frightened. There's no use in confronting them because they are close to the police. Also, some of the pirates give money to charity. They help community organisations." - Idris, former gang member.

Idris, not his real name, took us to the bay in which the pirate gangs like in wait. He told me there are five to ten people in each gang and three "big bosses" dominate the business - including a close relative.

"He's become a local ecstasy supplier. He also owns a disco and his people are working in Malaysia stealing boats, for which he supplies the funds." - Idris

From here there's a perfect view of Singapore, and the seemingly endless flow of shipping into the Malacca Straits.

"They usually target bigger ships, like tankers. They're after money, hand phones and any other valuables they're carrying." - Idris.

The gangs from this island are essentially sea robbers, picking targets at random. That's bad enough, but ship owners see a growing trend towards larger scale attacks - involving more sophistication and violence. ....The government is planning to bolster its coastal forces, and amid much fanfare has started joint patrols with Indonesia and Singapore - all designed to show their new resolve.

And into this volatile mix has come the Americans - US forces conducting joint exercises with all three nations, and pushing for a bigger role in policing the straits. For Washington is haunted by the spectre of terrorism.

"I think what they're afraid of is something like the USS Cole. That there will be an attack in the Straits of Malacca either against a major boat carrying oil, or against a port facilities that could wreck the economies of places like Singapore." - Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group.

For the moment she sees little evidence to back up those fears. Though there's plenty to show the danger of these waters - an incident map at the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur has the Malacca Strait and surrounding areas bristling like a pin cushion.

Offshore Oil Drilling: Farther out, deeper, more pressure and othr dangers...

From VOA News , some coverage of the Offshore Technology Conference:

Halliburton's Director of Strategic Marketing Eric Johnson says there is little expectation of making major new oil or gas discoveries on land now, so the real action is offshore. "We know that about 70 percent of the known reserves are already locked up in fields that are 30 years old or older. That is what we call mature assets. The exploration that is taking place around the world is primarily taking place in offshore areas."

Eric Johnson says companies are now making major investments in deepwater drilling--going down 3,000 meters below the surface in many cases before reaching the bedrock into which they drill. He describes the process, "As you go deeper into the offshore area, you are dealing with much higher pressure, you are also dealing with higher temperature down in the hole and the enormous pressure on the well itself down-hole in a deepwater situation is terrific."

To make matters worse, the farther platforms are from shore, the more dangers they face from pirates or terrorists.

I'm not sure about the last sentence, since I tend to think the more isolated the platform, the more risk it might face...and maybe that's what was meant.

Anyone ever hear of pirates attacking an offshore drilling rig? Please let me know...

Philippine Navy is 107!

As reported here, the Navy of the Republic of the Philippines celebrates its 107th Year today.

Congratulations!


Philippine flag


Philippine Surface Warfare Badge

HOW WE WOULD FIGHT CHINA

This was recommended to me several weeks ago by From a Singpore Angle but I couldn't find it until NOSI put up a link to it. In any event, from the Atlantic Monthly: HOW WE WOULD FIGHT CHINA. My comments will follow in an update to be posted later.

Update:

...There are many ways in which the Chinese could use their less advanced military to achieve a sort of political-strategic parity with us. According to one former submarine commander and naval strategist I talked to, the Chinese have been poring over every detail of our recent wars in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, and they fully understand just how much our military power depends on naval projection—that is, on the ability of a carrier battle group to get within proximity of, say, Iraq, and fire a missile at a target deep inside the country. To adapt, the Chinese are putting their fiber-optic systems underground and moving defense capabilities deep into western China, out of naval missile range—all the while developing an offensive strategy based on missiles designed to be capable of striking that supreme icon of American wealth and power, the aircraft carrier. The effect of a single Chinese cruise missile's hitting a U.S. carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be politically and psychologically catastrophic, akin to al-Qaeda's attacks on the Twin Towers. China is focusing on missiles and submarines as a way to humiliate us in specific encounters. Their long-range-missile program should deeply concern U.S. policymakers.

With an advanced missile program the Chinese could fire hundreds of missiles at Taiwan before we could get to the island to defend it. Such a capability, combined with a new fleet of submarines (soon to be a greater undersea force than ours, in size if not in quality), might well be enough for the Chinese to coerce other countries into denying port access to U.S. ships. Most of China's seventy current submarines are past-their-prime diesels of Russian design; but these vessels could be used to create mobile minefields in the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas, where, as the Wall Street Journal reporter David Lague has written, "uneven depths, high levels of background noise, strong currents and shifting thermal layers" would make detecting the submarines very difficult. Add to this the seventeen new stealthy diesel submarines and three nuclear ones that the Chinese navy will deploy by the end of the decade, and one can imagine that China could launch an embarrassing strike against us, or against one of our Asian allies. Then there is the whole field of ambiguous coercion—for example, a series of non-attributable cyberattacks on Taiwan's electrical-power grids, designed to gradually demoralize the population. This isn't science fiction; the Chinese have invested significantly in cyberwarfare training and technology. Just because the Chinese are not themselves democratic doesn't mean they are not expert in manipulating the psychology of a democratic electorate.

What we can probably expect from China in the near future is specific demonstrations of strength—like its successful forcing down of a U.S. Navy EP-3E surveillance plane in the spring of 2001. Such tactics may represent the trend of twenty-first-century warfare better than anything now happening in Iraq—and China will have no shortage of opportunities in this arena. During one of our biennial Rim of the Pacific naval exercises the Chinese could sneak a sub under a carrier battle group and then surface it. They could deploy a moving target at sea and then hit it with a submarine- or land-based missile, demonstrating their ability to threaten not only carriers but also destroyers, frigates, and cruisers. (Think about the political effects of the terrorist attack on the USS Cole, a guided-missile destroyer, off the coast of Yemen in 2000—and then think about a future in which hitting such ships will be easier.) They could also bump up against one of our ships during one of our ongoing Freedom of Navigation exercises off the Asian coast. The bumping of a ship may seem inconsequential, but keep in mind that in a global media age such an act can have important strategic consequences. Because the world media tend to side with a spoiler rather than with a reigning superpower, the Chinese would have a built-in political advantage.

What should be our military response to such developments? We need to go more unconventional. Our present Navy is mainly a "blue-water" force, responsible for the peacetime management of vast oceanic spaces—no small feat, and one that enables much of the world's free trade. The phenomenon of globalization could not occur without American ships and sailors. But increasingly what we will need is, in essence, three separate navies: one designed to maintain our ability to use the sea as a platform for offshore bombing (to support operations like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan); one designed for littoral Special Operations combat (against terrorist groups based in and around Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines, for example); and one designed to enhance our stealth capabilities (for patrolling the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan Strait, among other regions). All three of these navies will have a role in deflecting China, directly and indirectly, given the variety of dysfunctional Pacific Island republics that are strengthening their ties with Beijing.

Our aircraft carriers already provide what we need for that first navy; we must further develop the other two. The Special Operations navy will require lots of small vessels, among them the littoral-combat ship being developed by General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin. Approximately 400 feet long, the LCS requires only a small crew, can operate in very shallow water, can travel very fast (up to forty knots), and will deploy Special Operations Forces (namely, Navy SEALs). Another critical part of the littoral navy will be the Mark V special-operations craft. Only eighty feet long, the Mark V can travel at up to fifty knots and has a range of 600 nautical miles. With a draft of only five feet, it can deliver a SEAL platoon directly onto a beach—and at some $5 million apiece, the Pentagon can buy dozens for the price of just one F/A-22 fighter jet.

Developing the third type of navy will require real changes. Particularly as the media become more intrusive, we must acquire more stealth, so that, for example, we can send commandos ashore from a submarine to snatch or kill terrorists, or leave special operators behind to carry out missions in an area over which no government has control. Submarines have disadvantages, of course: they offer less of a bombing platform than aircraft carriers, and pound for pound are more costly. Nevertheless, they are the wave of the future, in no small measure because protecting aircraft carriers from missile attack may slowly become a pursuit of diminishing returns for us.

Our stealth navy would be best served by the addition of new diesel submarines of the sort that Australia, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Sweden already have in the water or under development—and which China will soon have too. But because of our global policing responsibilities, which will necessarily keep us in the nuclear-sub business, we're unlikely to switch to diesel submarines. Instead we will adapt what we've got. Already we are refitting four Trident subs with conventional weapons, and making them able to support the deployment of SEAL teams and eventually, perhaps, long-range unmanned spy aircraft. The refitted Tridents can act as big mother ships for smaller assets deployed closer to the littorals.

The author, Robert D. Kaplan, also points out the value of Guam as a piece of American real estate in the Pacific. While the Japanese tried to use islands as "unsinkable" aircraft carriers during WWII, Guam, in the days of ICBMs cannot be relied on to any such extent. As a base for forward operations by submarines, support ships and long range bombers, it is invaluable.

What set it all up, of course, is set up in this:

...China's rulers may not be democrats in the literal sense, but they are seeking a liberated First World lifestyle for many of their 1.3 billion people—and doing so requires that they safeguard sea-lanes for the transport of energy resources from the Middle East and elsewhere. Naturally, they do not trust the United States and India to do this for them. Given the stakes, and given what history teaches us about the conflicts that emerge when great powers all pursue legitimate interests, the result is likely to be the defining military conflict of the twenty-first century: if not a big war with China, then a series of Cold War—style standoffs that stretch out over years and decades. And this will occur mostly within PACOM's area of responsibility...

Oh. it's sea lanes again.

You know, these things:

1993 lanes


Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington,D.C. (National Defense University, 1996)
(color and bursts added)

2004 lanes


from Straits, Passages and Chokepoints: A Maritime Petroleum Distribution by Jean-Paul Rodrigue Rodrigue. Similar charts exist for other raw materials, such as metals.

(see my earlier post here)

As for Mr. Kaplan's analysis of the for a "3 Navy" US Navy, he's mostly right, and most of it is being undertaken, though I have my doubts about whether diesel submarines will be back in the US inventory anytime soon, especially if our allies already have them...but perhaps some submariners have a different view...

Update2: A 2003 Naval Institute article on the Chinese Navy & its submarines found here

India, China to reopen Stilwell road via Myanmar

Progress? India, China to reopen Stilwell road via Myanmar

China and India are actively working on plans to reopen the Stilwell Road through Myanmar, which would reduce the distance between the two nations from 6,000 km to just 1,300 km, the state media reported on Wednesday.

The Stilwell Road, a strategic supply route between Assam and China's Yunnan province via Myanmar built in the World War II by Chinese and American troops, will soon reopen.

The "6,000 km" distance refers to shipping having to transit the Malacca Strait and other areas to get to China.

Theater bans Fonda movie

A theater owner here is a man after my own heart. I will never know if the movie is any good or not.

Yellow Journalism

Once upon a time, two newspaper owners decided they needed a war to boost circulation (as set out here Yellow Journalism and the Spanish/American War). Most modern journalists think that was bad.

However, those same modern journalists seem quite willing to practice "yellow journalism" to attempt to make their own country's president and the US military look bad. As Bill Rice over at Dawn's Early Light says,

There is commentary aplenty on the Newsweek mess of the false story of Koran flushing at Gitmo.

And he provides some excellent examples.

I just find it somewhat sad that journalism has returned to its "yellow" roots, making stuff up to sway political opinion. Plus ça change (plus c'est la même chose)

Speaking of Sea Lanes: The Bosphorus

Interesting read on the Bosphorus -- a vital sea lane -- from Platts. Bosphorus info

Oil tankers do indeed dominate the issue today. When Montreux was signed in 1936, a 10,000-tonne tanker serving the Black Sea ports was big, and the shores of the Bosphorus itself were green. Today Istanbul has grown from around half a million inhabitants to some 15-mil citizens, its suburbs lining both sides of the twisting waterway, and tankers that may be more than 250 meters long have to navigate tight bends, one of which is located where the strait is less than 700 meters wide...

Map of the Bosphorus:

Results of a collision in the transit lanes:



(Bosphorus map and photo from here)

When I was much younger and lived in Turkey, I transited the Bosphorus on a liner, by ferry and visited some islands in the middle of it. One of my friends lived in a house right along it. What I learned from all that was that it is a narrow, heavily trafficked sea lane. I can well understand the encouragement of pipelines to replace the tankers plying the strait. And the concerns over terrorism.

Update: Another source of info in this choke point is from the US Department of Energy which has this great photo of the strait:

Under the Montreux Convention of 1936, commercial shipping has the right of free passage through the Bosporus and Turkish Straits in peacetime, although Turkey claims the right to impose regulations for safety and environmental purposes.

Earlier information on other sea lanes here and here.

Oil Prices, China and India

According to Platts the big Indian and Chinese demand for oil is squeezing the supply and keeping prices volatile:

Oil prices have been notoriously volatile in recent years and 2005 has seen a continuation of this recent trend, whilst prices have established new all-time highs in most energy markets. In fundamental terms, continuing very high oil demand from Asia's powerhouse economies of China and India in particular have squeezed the supply/demand equation. Even as OPEC has pumped out additional oil to alleviate the global supply-demand squeeze, sweet crude benchmark prices in particular have recently soared to approach $60/bbl, with some analysts even anticipating a 'super-spike' to $100/bbl or more. Speculative funds do not yet appeared to have relinquished their interest in energy markets, which adds another strand to the price equation, given the weight of money that such funds can deploy, especially when natural sellers within the oil industry may be holding back. Nervous sentiment continues amongst global traders and end-users as the difficulty of trying to hedge energy prices at such high levels has been compounded by the fear of not doing so, should the direst warnings on price be substantiated.

and don't forget that old devil "refining capacity":

Meanwhile for upstream producers and refiners, these high prices have presented a different kind of dilemma in hedging terms; whether to sell such apparently high prices in forward markets whilst they are available, and which may not be able to be achieved indefinitely, or to adjust their expectations to a 'new paradigm' of permanently high oil prices. The condition and capacity of global refining and pipeline infrastructure may have to wait for funds released by collateral sales of forward energy before the necessary refinements and capacity can be undertaken and thus have any effect in adjusting supply better to continuing high demand.

Find Something That Works, Then Cancel It

Defense Tech reveals an "Alice in Wonderland" tale concerning the missile defense system's one working component here. If the Mad Hatter shows up...don't be surprised.

Update:

The most successful part of the star-crossed missile defense system has been the one based at sea. So, naturally, the Pentagon has decided to cut the program's budget, Defense Daily reports.

Launched from cruisers off the Hawaiian coast, the Standard Missile-3 interceptors have managed to hit their targets in five out of six recent tests. Land-based anti-missiles, on the other hand, couldn't even make it into the air during two recent exercises over the winter.

But never mind all that. The sea-based interceptors have been slated for a $95 million cut. That could keep a key signal processor from coming on line, which might "set back the whole program at least a year," Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-HI) complained in a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing... "Why are we setting aside such a successful program, where the outcome is almost predictable, and spending it on other, riskier programs?"

Update2: Well, one reason for a budget cut may be that we're getting some help:

Missile defense
The Japanese government has agreed to spend some $600 million over five years to help the Pentagon upgrade the Standard Missile-3 interceptor, the heart of the Navy's new sea-based missile defense system.
According to the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, the Japanese funding of the upgrade, expected to begin in 2007, is viewed as a substantial contribution to the Navy missile defense system in the future.
Tokyo has announced its plans to field a sea-based missile defense system on its Aegis battle management-equipped ships in the next six years. It already has bought current SM-3 interceptors, and flight tests of those missiles are scheduled to begin this year near Hawaii.
The new, upgraded missile is known as SM-3 Block II and will increase the size from 13.5 inches in diameter to 21 inches, with bigger motors and warheads. It will have increased range for more lethal capability against enemy ballistic missiles, the officials said.
The new missile "will result in a greatly expanded defended area, and it will be able to counter long-range missiles," one official told us.
The Pentagon at first opposed the upgrade, favoring the smaller-diameter missile for its launch tubes.
Japan faces a threat from North Korea and Chinese missiles and is moving ahead with deploying a defensive missile shield. Its sea-based system will be built on four existing Kongo-class guided missile destroyers plus two new warships. The first missile-defense destroyer could be deployed in 2007. Tokyo also plans to purchase U.S. Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile systems for use on land.
A total of 15 U.S. Navy destroyers and three cruisers will be outfitted with sea-based missile defenses between the end of next year and 2009

(Source Inside the Ring Too early to tell if this is a "Never mind" case, but I'm preparing to say it...

Lack of security clearances jeopardizes maritime security

According to the GAO, even when we know terrorists might strike at a seaport, the threat may not be able to be communicated to the local authorities, as reported here:

"The ability to prevent or respond to a potential terrorist attack at a U.S. seaport may be hampered because federal officials cannot communicate necessary information to local, state and private-sector officials who do not have security clearances, government auditors said Tuesday. The major barrier hindering information sharing at seaports around the country is the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers, the Government Accountability Office said in a new report (GAO-05-394)."

I have downloaded the GAO report and am reviewing it for an updated posting. Meawhile...perhaps we ought to revise our checkllist of things to accomplish, like listing " get local authorities clearances" as a priority.

Hat tip: The Counterterrorism Blog

Update: The summary of the report finds that communication has been improving, but there is some way to go, mostly through education:

While information sharing has generally improved, a major barrier
mentioned most frequently by stakeholders as hindering information
sharing has been the lack of federal security clearances among port
security stakeholders. The lack of security clearances may limit the ability
of state, local, and industry officials, such as those involved in area
maritime security committees or interagency operational centers, to deter,
prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack. By February 2005—or
over 4 months after the Coast Guard had developed a list of over 350
nonfederal area maritime security committee participants with a need for
a security clearance—28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for the
background check. There were two main reasons why the Coast Guard
had not processed security clearances more expeditiously. First, local
Coast Guard officials said they did not clearly understand their
responsibility for communicating with state and local officials about the
process for obtaining a security clearance. After receiving a draft of our
report, the Coast Guard issued guidelines clarifying the role that local
Coast Guard officials play in the program. Second, the Coast Guard had
not developed formal procedures for using its database on security
clearance applicants to troubleshoot potential problems and take
appropriate management action. As the Coast Guard proceeds with its
program, nonfederal officials could benefit from more information on the
process for obtaining a security clearance. The FBI, which spearheaded a
similar effort (but not specific to ports) to expedite security clearances for
nonfederal officials, found that nonfederal officials were slow in
submitting application forms in part because of the lack of awareness
about the security clearance process, and the agency made specific efforts
to educate local officials about the application process. Similar
educational efforts by the Coast Guard might help clear up any such
uncertainties about the application process. Other barriers to greater
information sharing identified by committee participants included the size
and complexity of ports—factors that are intrinsic to port operations—but
none of these barriers were mentioned as frequently and considered as
important as the lack of security clearances.

Terrorists might exploit merchant marine identification

According to this

"Terrorists can exploit lax identification procedures in the merchant marine to obtain sailors' credentials and stage attacks on ships or ports, a top U.S. Coast Guard official said on Tuesday.
'Merchant-marine documents ... contain virtually no security features,' Rear Admiral Larry Hereth said in written testimony to a Senate commerce, science and transportation committee hearing.
'We cannot, and must not, continue with business as usual in the area of mariner credentialing. The specter of a terrorist obtaining and using a merchant-mariner credential to access and attack vital areas of a strategic port is one that is very real,' he said.
Hereth, the director of port security for the Coast Guard, said his agency was working with the Transportation Security Administration to help implement new identification standards for commercial sailors, but there was no timetable.
Members of the U.S. merchant marine must be U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, foreign commercial sailors need a U.S. visa to disembark from their ships in U.S. ports."

Hey, we can do this. First, establish a timetable. Second....

Lake Charles: LNG Hotbed

According to Maritime Global Net

Lake Charles, Louisiana liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal is the most obvious receiving port for the impending wave of new LNG coming to the US market, according to specialist analyst Steve Johnson, principal of consulting firm Commercial Services Company.

Mr Johnson says: “Start-ups of a number of LNG trains are now ahead of schedule and the volume of new supply expected to enter the market before year’s end continues to increase. The latest tally of additional LNG to begin to flow by the end of 2005 is estimated at 34.4 million tons per year.”

According to Mr Johnson, the Lake Charles terminal’s ability to receive LNG from all suppliers, regardless of heat content, coupled with an eventual import capacity of up to 1.5 bcf/day, make it the anticipated workhorse in the Western Hemisphere. The end effect on the US domestic market will be a significant reduction in the price basis in the western region of Louisiana relative to Henry Hub, especially in the winter months when Lake Charles imports have traditionally been lower.

He says: “Though France and Spain certainly have the appetite to ingest a significant volume of LNG, storage is a limiting factor. And, though there is enough global receiving capacity to absorb the expected onslaught of supply, one must take into account the logistics involved with shipping and scheduling,” Johnson explained. “Available dock space must be sufficiently contiguous to be practical for would-be sellers and this is why we may see discounts given for fully loaded cargoes which require significant waiting time before discharging.”

Navy and Coast Guard Future: Owning the Seas in the Post 9-11 World

For an extensive Heritage Foundation assessment of where the American Sea Services are headed for the near (20-30 years) future, read: Smarter Security for Smaller Budgets: Shaping Tomorrow's Navy and Coast Guard Maritime Security Capabilities.

The likelihood of major combat operations at sea has diminished significantly for the next two to three decades. In its place, maritime security operations against numerous non-military, non-traditional, asymmetric threats—terrorists, criminals, pirates, smugglers, and assorted miscreants—are highly likely. These threats must be defeated, preferably at their origin, or well before they reach America’s shores. This new national security environment places much greater emphasis on maritime security or constabulary operations for the purpose of “good order and discipline” at sea.

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard are among the federal agencies addressing these threats to America’s maritime security. The Navy will conduct increased global maritime security operations in regional coop erative agreements, primarily against the terrorist threat, while still addressing military threats from hos tile nation-states as well as warfighting and deterrence responsibilities for dissuasion, contested access, and power projection[1] purposes. The Coast Guard will concentrate on maritime security operations against terrorist and criminal threats in America’s maritime domain while still addressing its responsibilities for maritime safety, mobility, protection of natural resources, and national defense.

There are some things to iron out:

Despite great commonality in how both services conduct maritime security operations, the Navy and Coast Guard are headed in different directions to provide this capability. The Navy plans to adapt its sophisticated warship, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and the Coast Guard is building purposely designed maritime security ships. In an era that plac es great emphasis on inter-service “jointness” as dem onstrated by the Joint Strike Fighter Program, along with the very real reality of austere defense procure ment budgets, the nation can no longer afford this bifurcated approach to its maritime security...The Navy and Coast Guard are headed in differ ent directions with regard to building ships for maritime security duties. The Navy plans to adapt a future combatant for maritime security duties by altering its new, special-purpose, anti-access com­batant, the Littoral Combat Ship, which is being designed in two variants—a 340-foot, 1,500-ton combatant and a 430-foot, 3,000-ton warship. Both variants will be speedy, optimally manned combatants, designed primarily to perform “focused missions” along the enemy’s coastlines— neutralizing mines and defeating submarines and fast attack craft in relatively shallow coastal waters. Optimized with stealth and command-and-control technologies for focused warfare, and possessing robust self-defense capabilities, a maximum speed of 40 to 50 knots, a 21-day endurance and a 4,500-nautical-mile range at 22 knots, and only around a 1,500-nautical-mile range at high speed, the LCS design uses modular “plug and-fight” mission pay load packages for each mission...The Coast Guard is building two new types of maritime security ships as part of its Integrated Deepwater Project—a 421-foot, 4,200-ton ship and a 350-foot, 3,200-ton ship. With its 12,000-nautical-mile range, 60-day endurance, and 29-knot sprint speed, the “high-end” maritime security ship (WMSL) can provide a security presence throughout America’s maritime domain, as well as operate overseas. The smaller maritime security ship (WMSM), with its 9,000-nautical-mile range, 45-day endurance, and top speed of 28 knots, can also provide a security presence in almost all parts of America’s maritime domain. In a pinch, the WMSM could also deploy to forward areas.

The Coast Guard is currently planning to procure around 33 of these ships: eight large maritime security ships at about $280 million each and 25 medium maritime security ships priced at $200 million each. The Coast Guard is also ensuring that these two classes of ships can operate in the post– September 11 security environment...The Navy and Coast Guard are well aware of each other’s efforts in regard to maritime security capabilities. The two services are focusing their col laborative and coordination efforts not on common hulls, or mechanical and electrical systems, but on C4ISR systems commonality and interoperability. The Navy and Coast Guard want their ships to be able to make use of each other’s onboard and off-board systems when they find their ships working together in a homeland or overseas operation. (From a security standpoint, there are no longer any “home games” or “away games.” Both services see homeland security, homeland defense, and overseas operations as key elements of their “port folios” for the 21st century.) Undoubtedly, their approach is reasonable given the different originat ing context and timelines associated with LCS and Deepwater. However, this de facto joint Coast Guard–Navy approach is not mandated or over seen by Congress...In his 2005 Guidance, Admiral Vern Clark direct ed a strong “belt-tightening” approach, calling for a faster, more agile, and smaller fleet.[36] Admiral Clark clearly recognizes that the Navy’s present acquisition plan is unaffordable. Admiral Clark also knows that building a Navy force set that is designed only to deal with major combat opera tions, given all the other tasks that the Navy faces in the world today, “is the incorrect approach to building the force set of the future.”[37]

Admiral Clark wants to reshape the Navy to “handle anti-terror missions as well as traditional naval operations.”[38] One of Admiral Clark’s key lieutenants, Vice Admiral Joseph Sestak, says that “the Navy’s traditional areas of operations—over seas offensive combat operations and homeland defense—are merging.”[39] It almost sounds as if the Navy is reinventing a portion of itself to do Coast Guard missions as it searches for more relevancy and affordability.

With a Coast Guard equipping itself with 33 maritime security ships, with a Navy headed toward placing greater emphasis on homeland and maritime security duties, and in a world plagued with a burgeoning growth in terrorist and civilian maritime threats, the nation can ill afford two sep arate solutions for its maritime security require ments. Full integration between the Navy and the Coast Guard with respect to maritime security capabilities, planning, and operations is warrant ed, especially in light of current and foreseeable budget realities. The Coast Guard and Navy must forge close bonds and blend their respective national elements of maritime power in a collabo­rative way to meet the nation’s maritime security requirements.

Very interesting, and in the budget wars, I hope that serious turf wars don't get in the way of providing the best possible equipment for national security.

UPDATE; Of course, there is that little thing about the Chinese and Taiwan and something about sinking a US aircraft carrier:

Clearly, the X factor for China is potential U.S. intervention. But China’s strategists think they may have the key to overcoming the United States: sinking a U.S. aircraft carrier. Chinese Major General Huang Bin explained the reasoning: “Once we decide to use force against Taiwan, we definitely will consider an intervention by the United States. The United States likes vain glory; if one of its aircraft carriers should be attacked and destroyed, people in the United States would begin to complain and quarrel loudly, and the U.S. president would find the going harder and harder.” China has equipped its advanced Sovremenny-class destroyers with Sunburn supersonic anti-ship missiles -- missiles designed to sink large vessels such as aircraft carriers.

Of course, here are some additional thoughts on the carrier - and who might have to decide to respond...

Another Kind of Service Completely

Over at the The Gun Line SGT B has some suggestions for the Navy's weakest link Pablo Paredes about real courage and honor...

Too bad that Paredes is listening to the wrong crowd instead of to SGT B.

Update: If you haven't heard of Paredes, read Smash's letter to him here.


And, thanks to SGT B, I was directed to Chaotic Synaptic Activity, and both the Sarge and CSA are now on my blogroll. Good ones. And CSA pointed me to Redleg, who joins the roll, too.

Singapore's Navy has USVs: From a Singapore Angle

Rather than repeat his excellent post on a revolution in the Navy way, go visit From a Singapore Angle's RSN USVs and his links for some interesting surface navy stuff.



Tell him I sent you.

Update: The USVs look like pretty impressive force multipliers. I'm beginning to wonder about the bandwidth needed to operate UAV, USVs, SSVs, etc in a hectic battlespace...and who will handle the deconfliction role....

JIATF South: Worth Emulating?

Dr. J Carafano thinks he's seen the future of the war against terrorism and he likes it. Read A Better Way to Fight Terrorism to learn about a truly joint (military sense means more than one service involved) operation that has had some success over a 16 year period.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon often gets saddled with tasks that should be done by other federal agencies. Tsunami relief is just one example. Every problem does look like a nail when all you have is a hammer.

The Pentagon still needs major military commands where we have long-standing military alliances: in Europe and Northeast Asia. Additionally, a military command to support homeland security (Northern Command, a post-9/11 Pentagon initiative) also makes sense.

But the United States should replace other combatant commands with organizations that look more like JIATF South, organized to cover troubled parts of the world that America needs to worry a lot about and focused on transnational threats particular to those regions.

Thus, JIATF South should worry about terrorism, human and arms trafficking, as well as drug smuggling. A task force covering Africa and the Middle East would be concerned with arms smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and infectious diseases. One covering South and Central Asia would be oriented on piracy, human trafficking, terrorism, infectious disease and trafficking in materials need to make weapons of mass destruction.

Defeating terrorism would be a perfect mission for the regional interagency task forces. After all, no part of the government has all the tools or all the information it needs to get the terrorists before they get us. The Key West approach offers a model of how to get more out of the sum of the parts.

It does work, once you get a common language developed.

Latest (to May 16) Piracy Report from ICC Commercial Crime Services

Latest (to May 16) Piracy Report from ICC Commercial Crime Serviceshere, mostly small time thefts. However, this is interesting:

13.05.2005 at 0110 LT in position 05:13N - 098:06E, Malacca straits.
Armed persons in an unlit 7m craft approached a general cargo ship underway. D/O took evasive manoeuvres but craft came into contact at port side causing damage to ship's hull. D/O sounded whistle and called craft on VHF ch 16 but received no response. No boarding took place.

(D/O=Duty Officer).

Mobile Security Detachment 25 Deploys to U.S. 5th Fleet

MSD 25 was established Sept. 17, 2004, under the new Mobile Security Squadron 6, a growing expeditionary force responsible for anti-terrorism/force protection for the Navy’s assets overseas. MSD 25 completed its Final Evaluation Problem (FEP) mid-April 2005, certifying it as fully qualified and ready for deployment.

While deployed, MSD 25 will report to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. 5th Fleet for a variety of force protection taskings, which may include protecting Iraqi oil platforms and other high value assets.

(source) The MSD 25 team is part of the Navy's new Martime Protection Force Command (MFPC):

...The [MFP] command’s mission is to provide forces to protect Navy units and other assets that are outside secure installations or facilities. Elements of the new command are protecting oil terminals in Iraq, for example, and it will be responsible for the security and protection of Navy ships that drop anchor at some foreign ports.

Included in the MFPC are some diverse units that it makes sense to tie together:

Capt. Mark E. Kosnik, selected to be the first commander of MFPC, will direct the force structure of existing naval coastal warfare squadrons (including inshore boat units and mobile inshore undersea warfare units), explosive ordnance disposal units, expeditionary salvage (diver) units and the recently created Navy Mobile Security Force detachments. With a budget of approximately $52 million, he will supervise the training of more than 5,000 naval coastal warfare sailors and 2,000 sailors from explosive ordinance disposal and expeditionary salvage units.

MFPC is not intended to provide security at installations that have resident security forces. “Expeditionary” and “mobility” are key descriptors of the command’s mission.

“When there is a requirement for a high-value asset [to be deployed] outside the traditional security of installations, then it’s our mission to provide protection,” Kosnik told Sea Power.

The force to be protected could be a ship — such as a Military Sealift Command logistics ship in a foreign port not frequented by Navy visits — or a high-value aircraft — such as an executive transport carrying VIPs or a P-3 surveillance aircraft — staged to a remote airfield with no resident security forces. Protection of maritime facilities such as Iraqi oil terminals from sabotage and direct attack also fall within the mission of mobile security force detachments and naval coastal warfare squadrons.

As an old MIUWU (Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit) sailor, I like the concept...especially as it points toward the future:

Kosnik said the implementation of the Sea Basing concept, a part of the Sea Power 21 strategy of Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark, is likely to increase the role of MFPC forces. Mobile sea bases, such as prepositioning ships operating away from established ports, may require more protection from hostile small craft and divers.

MFPC will be working with Fleet Forces Command in the latter’s active-reserve integration studies. At issue is the possibility of shifting the naval coastal warfare squadrons from the reserve to the active force structure, Kosnik said.

MIUWU/Coastal Warfare has long been mostly a reserve function, where it makes sense to have a core of people ready to deploy and the units were among the Navy Surface Reserve's prime units. Many reserve admirals came up through the MIUWU chain...I'm not sure it will be an attractive career path for active duty personnel, but given an expanded mission, perhaps there is too much demand for it to remain mostly reserve...Navy League Sea Power

Update: Here's a picture of the TSQ-108 Radar Sonar Surveillance System used by MIUWU units in performing shore based littoral force protection work:



During Desert Storm the MIUWU community worked with the US Coast Guard's Port Security Units as the PSU's "eyes" to compliment the PSU "teeth". More info on the PSUs here. The PSU used "Raider" boats armed with machine guns to perform their duties. A typical Raider boat looked like this:



The close cooperation between the MUIWU and the PSU in Desert Storm included co-location:



However, the Navy has now developed its own boat units, the Inshore Boat Units (IBU) which are also part of the MFPC.

Maritime Force Protection Command site

More info on Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal here.