"We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and display stamina in purpose." - President Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address
Once again for 2015 a big hat tip to the ICC International Maritime Bureau for their excellent work in capturing reported attacks on ships. Their work can be found at Live Piracy Map and Live Piracy Report. As they note,
The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) is the world’s only non-governmental, manned centre receiving and disseminating reports of piracy and armed robbery 24 hours a day, across the globe. *** Transparent statistics from IMB PRC is vital to raise awareness and encourage authorities to tackle piracy and armed robbery firmly.
Keeping that in mind, for 2015 here's a look at reported incidents in 2015:
Compare that to 2014:
Once again, these assaults on shipping include a wide-range of acts, from hijackings to "sneak aboard and steal stuff" and perceived threats. Such attacks tend to occur in major shipping lanes and anchorages, such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, but also off the west coast of Africa near major oil ports. IMB guidance on reporting which:
.... follows the definition of Piracy as laid down in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Armed Robbery as laid down in Resolution A.1025 (26) adopted on 2 December 2009 at the 26th Assembly Session of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
The U.S. military is seeking to craft a “new narrative” for the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in part to push back on the growing perception that President Obama does not have a strategy.
Military officials on the Operation Inherent Resolve task force have recently formed a working group to formulate a "new narrative," defense officials told The Hill. Separately, the Joint Staff has drafted its own messaging document.
The steps are preliminary, and are part of a larger effort to better communicate the U.S.'s military strategy amid heavy criticism from Republican presidential candidates who say Obama is losing the battle against the terrorist group.
"To say there's no strategy is just flat out wrong," said Army Col. Christopher Garver, public affairs officer for the Combined Joint Task Force -- Operation Inherent Resolve. "If you want to have a debate about it, that's good, let's talk about it. But there is a strategy," he added.
The new working group will look at "how best to articulate what it is we're trying to do ... and do it in a concise easy to understand way," Garver said.
Ususally you have a "concise easy to understand" articulation of what you are trying to do before - you know - before you start committing forces and that sort of thing.
Something like "smashing ISIS and its fellow travelers into paste" might be a good start. Perhaps that lacks the proper "strategic vision."
Not like announcing fictional "red lines" or opening the door to the Russians to support the guy who you previously asserted needed to "go."
One place to start would be to have some idea how you want things to look when we are done with our mission. See here.
I can't believe that is really so hard to "articulate" without sounding like a Facebook breakup mantra - "It's complicated."
The holiday trend is alive and well at the world’s largest retailer. “Layaway Angels” seem to be coming out of the weeds this season to reignite our holiday spirit. Especially at Walmart. First, Fortune reported that one mysterious donor in Northeast Ohio paid off over $100,000 worth of layaways at two Walmart locations, helping more than 200 customers celebrate Christmas. Then we began to notice this trend popping up in various cities. An anonymous businessman, known only as “Santa B.” (rather than the more familiar “Santa C.”), contributed a total of $158,000 to two Walmart stores in Pennsylvania. ABC 27 reported a $79,000 donation to a Harrisburg location, and KUTV reports the same amount was donated to a Walmart in Mechanicsburg.
Three separate donors gave more than $100,000 each to stores in Florida, Pennsylvania and Ohio. They spent a combined half million dollars. Walmart spokesperson Wyatt Jefferies also said an anonymous donor in Tulsa, Oklahoma, indicated plans to give $25,000 to a store and give $100 gift cards to layaway customers. Toys R Us said mystery donors have given more than $50,000 to seven stores around the country over the past week, settling more than 300 customers’ accounts. Kmart says it’s also received secretive donations to pay down scores of customers’ layaway contracts. The company also partners with a non-profit called Pay Away the Layaway, which accepts donations to buy toys, clothes, coats and books held on layaway. Kmart says more than $60,000 has been put toward clearing balances.
Cassandra Mathews of Hayward was one of the unsuspecting shoppers. She said she's doing the best she can to give her grandchildren a few nice Christmas presents, partnering up with their other grandmother. She says she had to put some things on layaway, paying little by little. Not much, not overboard, but they're going to know it's Christmas," Mathews said, "My grandchildren are 3, 6, and 2 and it's kind of hard to see other children that age, playing outside with something new and they don't have anything." On Tuesday evening, workers took Mathews to the back of the store where some ‘Layaway Angels’ were waiting. "I'm Xia, this is Andre, and Josie and we are volunteering with payawaythelayaway.org and we are here to pay off your layaway for the holidays," said Xia Chekwa, a payawaythelayaway.org volunteer.
If you need even more just Google "Kmart Layaway" news or "Walmart Layaway News."
Anonymous gifts to strangers. By those whose hearts are full.
The PHMs were envisioned to be minimally manned and include a mothership for maintenance and support. Manning and crew activities were to be limited to port/starboard watches. Maintenance, logistics, and support were to be provided by a converted LST acting as the mothership. We see, then, that the ships were designed to the same operational manning and maintenance concept as the LCS.
Yeah, give me a couple hundred of these things and I could pose some serious issues to bad guys.
Navy Matters puts the cost of Pegasus at about $900,000 (1975 dollars, I assume) - or about $4 million in 2015 dollars. If one LCS costs $300 million, you could build about 75 Pegasus-like ships for the same amount.
Really, the FF/LCS is not the first Navy ship design that proved to be - uh - less than optimal.
It probably won't be the last.
Let's suppose we ask the question that underlies the size of our fleet: What do we plan to do with it?
If the answer is long-range standoff missions, then it would seem aircraft carriers and their assigned air wings are one part of the answer.
If the answer is killing submarines that might threaten our country or those aircraft carriers, it should be clear that ASW attack submarines are a large part of the answer, along with long-range maritime patrol aircraft and real honest to goodness ASW destroyers.
If the answer is support of forces ashore, then perhaps the new Zumwalt-class destroyers are part of the answer.
USS Pegasus (PHM-1)
If the answer is local sea control in contested waters in narrow straits, inshore, then the answer probably is a force deigned to go into harm's way in those waters. As set out in this 2001 Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe describing a 2000 war game:
The U.S. is at war with China, and U.S. Navy commanders are using a new breed of ship called Streetfighter to sail perilously close to the Chinese coast. There, the small, fast, inexpensive warships -- designed to go into harm's way and, if necessary, be lost -- hunt down Chinese subs and missile launchers hidden among fishing boats and cargo ships. Some Streetfighters are sunk by enemy fire, and casualties are high, but they help the U.S. win earlier than the military pros had projected. *** The Streetfighters existed only on paper. But their performance in that mock battle was enough to convince the war college's director, Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, that a fleet of Streetfighters could give any foe fits -- provided the Navy is willing to endure casualties. "Streetfighter is alive, well and an inevitability," he crowed.
Even then, there were "cautious voices, like a now former CJCS,
Some top Navy commanders have grave doubts. "I look at the Streetfighter concept and worry that we are saying, 'It's OK to lose ships,' " says Vice Adm. Michael Mullen, commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, Va. Others question whether sailors in an all-volunteer force would sign up to serve on the ships, or whether Congress would approve the money to build them.
Yeah, well, the FF/LCS is a lot of things, but it does not appear to be so robust that if confronted by a threat it wouldn't be "expendable." More from Cebrowski:
The 58-year-old admiral immediately homed in on one of the most vexing weaknesses in the current fleet. In the past 10 years, the proliferation of cruise missiles and cheap diesel subs has made it easier for enemies to strike U.S. vessels. A recent General Accounting Office report concluded that the Navy's ability to deal with the threat posed by cruise missiles and diesel subs in coastal regions was "marginal" and that nothing the Navy is currently buying will "provide adequate protection against improved versions of these weapons." To protect its precious ships and crews, the military leadership is pushing them farther and farther out to sea, where they are safer but not nearly as effective. "We've become risk-averse," Adm. Cebrowski says.
Re-read Adm Mullen's comment again to see what Adm. Cebrowski was speaking about.
The idea of building a new class of small ships had been kicking around at the Naval War College and the Naval Post Graduate School, where retired Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, one of Adm. Cebrowski's former commanding officers, had been playing with some concepts. Adm. Cebrowski had been thinking about the need for a new class of small ship as well. So he and Capt. Hughes put the concept on paper. Because Streetfighters would be cheap -- one design would cost only about $70 million a ship, compared with as much as $1 billion for a new destroyer -- the Navy would be able to buy hundreds for the price of one 10-ship carrier battle group. The ships would operate along crowded coastal waters, hiding in coves and springing out to destroy enemy subs, hunt down mines and disrupt enemy missiles that could more easily target larger, slower ships. After a few days or weeks of heavy fighting, the bigger ships would move in and take over the fight. Some Streetfighters would be lost, and some sailors would die. "Streetfighters must be designed to lose," Capt. Hughes wrote at the time. "If the ships become too costly or too heavily manned, commanders will be unwilling to put them at risk."
I am not sure in this age of near real time satellite imaging that "hiding in coves" might still work, but there is that "quantity has a quality all of its own" thing.
The “New Navy Fighting Machine” promotes a wider mix of ships, in a more numerous fleet, with better-focused capabilities, to meet a range of scenarios in green and blue water environments. The new fighting machine does this within an affordable SCN (Ship Construction Navy) budget ceiling, because the U.S. defense budget already dominates defense spending in the rest of the world. The fleet’s new component is a green water force of small vessels to fulfill the three sea service chiefs’ maritime strategy of collaboration and support of theater security operations now manifested in Navy global fleet stations. The green water force also includes coastal combat forces, and additional reconnaissance for the land and sea side of a littoral. These capabilities are achieved with 10% of the SCN budget.
How many "green water ships? Hughes suggests 240 (+400 inshore patrol craft). Hughes rightly compares the need for a new command to drive developing this green water component of naval power to that that developed Naval Aviation in its infancy. Hughes:
We also show, in rough outline, that the new fighting machine is better suited than the present projection-heavy 313-ship1 Navy to support regional conflicts and, if it should become necessary, to constrain Russian ambitions. Submarines in greater numbers are central to the maritime strategy, but within a constrained budget the larger force cannot be exclusively nuclear powered. We find that diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion not only allow twice as many submarines, but they also nicely complement the SSNs in the critical scenario. Because the United States has not conducted an opposed amphibious landing in nearly 60 years, the new fighting machine emphasizes amphibious lift rather than amphibious assault. We stress the unparalleled success of national sealift in timely delivery of ground forces where needed, when needed, and for as long as needed. It is a national treasure that has received too little attention. We assiduously maintain this strong sealift component in the new fighting machine. The study does not eliminate high-end warships, the individual capabilities of which are unmatched by any other nation in the world. To do so would end America’s maritime superiority. On the other hand, a Navy of only large, multibillion dollar warships will result in a smaller and smaller force that cannot fulfill its roles around the world. Some of those roles, maritime interdiction operations and coastal patrol for example, can be handled by smaller ships in greater numbers.
That 313 number above has now shrunk to 272.
Some are going to debate the building of new frigates or corvettes to boost ship numbers. I suggest instead building the "green water" force using technology that already exists. Further, I suggest building up a corps young officers to drive these new toys hard with some LCDR and CDR supervision.
If you don't think there are some young people who like this idea, see this from 2012 New Navy Fighting Machine in the South China Sea by a couple of then Lieutenants, Dylan Ross and Jimmy Harmon:
This thesis advocates fleet growth as articulated in Hughes' New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) study. Comparisons of the NNFM, the U.S. fleet, and the PRC fleet demonstrate both the disparity facing the American surface forces, and the near parity obtained in the NNFM. CT through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and naval obscurants provide American surface forces increased staying power and tactical advantage. Scouting and communications networking through a theater wide constellation of airships provide the American fleet with persistentsituationalawareness of the battle space, tactical communications with subsurface forces, and improved emissions control (EMCON) measures for surface forces. The distributive properties of the NNFM, combined with this study's CT [counter-targeting] and scouting findings, offer American surface combatants success over the PRC Navy in the SCS scenario.
ANd who wouldn't like to drive one of these:
or be the a squadron CO of 8 or 10 of these:
We could do worse than building a few of these.
In fact, we have done worse. Too bad the PHMs like Pegasus were killed. We could have had 38 years of experience with small fast, heavily armed war ships by now. "Coulda, shoulda."
This is the gateway to resources, research, and analysis the Combating Terrorism Center has produced over the last decade about the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS) or Da`ish, and its predecessors (al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia (AQI), Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin, Hilf al-Muttayibin and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)).
Probably more answers there than you have questions.
The evolution of the IS through accident and design led to an organization with the ability to carry out a large number of attacks. From November 2011 to May 2014 (before the IS’s advance into Mosul), the IS self-reported over 19,000 military operations in Iraq alone. The large majority of its attacks were concentrated in Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq, while Shi’a-dominated areas saw comparatively less violence over time. In the short-term, this divide suggests the existence of a natural demographic buffer against expansion by the IS. Over the long-term, the efficacy of this buffer depends on intervening events and actions by other states and groups. Supporting the activities of the IS is a diverse financial portfolio that includes (among other things) oil, donations, and war loot. This diversity provides some insulation against the loss of any individual component. Oil is important to the IS, but certainly not the only source of revenue. This is not to suggest that the group is financiallyimpregnable, but it does mean that a comprehensive strategy that addresses the group’s varied revenue streams is necessary to effectively minimize the IS’s ability to function over the long term. Another area in which the IS has had some measure of success is in its propaganda campaign. This success comes in part because of the fact that the IS’s messages to recruits differs in important respects from that of an organization like AQ. For example, videos put forward by the IS tend to be filled with rank-and-file members whom potential recruits find much more relatable than AQ’s videos full of leadership figures giving speeches. This “relatability,” paired with slick production techniques and military successes on the ground, appeals to a new generation of recruits for the IS. Finally, key to the long-term trajectory of the IS is its ability to provide satisfactory levels of governance to people living under its control. In the short-term, the IS has had some success at providing social services to locals that the Syrian and Iraqi governments failed to provide. This success has resulted in some boost to its overall appeal. However, there is no lack of shortcomings in the area of the IS’s governance. Barring adaptation by the group and a reduction in pressure applied by third-party actors, these failures will only increase with time. Highlighting these failures, together with the negative aspects of the IS’s governance, may undercut support for the group.
... U.S. counterterrorism has moved from a purely operations-centered strategy—for example, assassinating al Qaeda leaders or what the media calls “cutting off the snake’s head”—to analyzing what the Department of Homeland Security describes as “the dynamics of radicalization to violence” or the reasons why some individuals associated with violent extremism commit violence and others do not. This new perspective has roped in government bodies, activists, and data scientists who not only analyze terrorist social networks and messaging patterns, but also transmit counter-extremist narratives. *** In 1960, at the height of the Cold War, Nobel Prize-winning American economist Thomas Schelling introduced the world to his “theory of strategy,” an adaptation of game theory to the world of international relations. In his book, The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling coined the concept of a “focal point” (now known as a “Schelling point”) to describe how individuals and nations reach an agreement when bargaining with each other. The process involves anticipating what the other person or country might do. *** Although Schelling certainly could not have foreseen the application of this idea to defeating ISIS, it is eerily appropriate. If we apply the 16 squares scenario with radicalization, what we are trying to prevent is, in effect, this “psychic moment,” as Schelling calls it, when likeminded individuals all come to check the same box: engage in terrorism. Around 20,000 plus foreign fighters, many of whom grew up in prosperous, democratic countries, have already done so. *** In Schelling’s theory, these individuals would have made their decision through “rational behavior…based on an explicit and internally consistent value system.” For jihadists, that value system is Salafism. Given the fact that most of the world’s Salafis are not violent, however, it cannot be the Salafi ideology alone that encourages violence. Moreover, given that ISIS disseminates a good deal of nonviolent messaging—it recently released its own set of textbooks on geography, history, and Arabic poetry for a course to “educate” future jihadists—it is not violence alone that attracts individuals to its worldview. It is, rather, ISIS’ ability to sell and validate its worldview in light of distinct circumstances that Muslim communities either experience or observe. Specifically, for both those socially and economically disenfranchised by life in the developed world, as well as for those experiencing or witnessing the violent unrest in Syria, ISIS offers the promise of a tranquil and authentic Islamic state, full of opportunity for those who accept its authority.
I don't know about the "tranquil and authentic" thing, but as I have said before, young people who perceive that things are not as they would like are a potentially potent force, as we learned from Hitler and a few hundred other men on a mission -
Inspiring young men to causes bigger than themselves is an old, old story. With lots of unhappy endings.
I'm a simple minded guy, so I like fairly uncomplicated ideas about human motivation. It occurs to me that a key motivator for many young, idealistic people is the desire to "make a better world." We see it all the time in environmental activists and other people rallying around some common cause, probably even including those fighting against that part of global warming they attribute to the activities of mankind. Back in the day when I studied such behavior, I grew to really appreciate the "life positions" described in the psychological school of Transactional Analysis (TA) (yes, I know TA has lots of critics, but bear with me here). These life positions are best viewed in a simple chart:
the ok corral (franklin ernst, 1971)
Sure, you say, but so what? It's my theory that many of the "disaffected" youth are not driven by poverty or the shrinking of glaciers in Greenland, but rather are acting out of a feeling superiority - they view themselves, as do many young people, as in a better position to see the bad things in the world and also believe they have the moral and spiritual superiority that allows them to take action to "improve" things (i.e. to change things to make the world as they believe it ought to be). Or, as TA would have it, they feel they are OK, but the rest of us are "Not OK" and they want to help us correct our thinking and behavior. Support for this idea can be found (somewhat tangentially, I admit) here:
. . . a distorted view of the principles of Islam and a violent and criminal interpretation of the obligation of Jihad constitute the main factor of their drive. Statements made in the course of interrogation by arrested terrorists (especially by supergrasses, referred to in Italy as ‘repenters’) as well as ideological documents disseminated internationally on the internet or items seized in the course of various judicial enquiries consistently show that the religious view of the world, obviously in the distorted perspective specific to terrorists, constitutes the main reason for their behaviour, whereas practically no importance attaches to the aspiration to liberate specific occupied territories or oppressed peoples.
However, convenient ‘root causes’ like poverty, illiteracy, backwardness, fundamentalism, authoritarianism are hardly the considerations in sustaining terrorism or in winning recruits (Parashar, 2005). Claude Berrebi in a Rand Corporation study on the root causes of terrorism concluded that “If there is a link between income level, education, and participation in terrorist activities, it is either very weak or in the opposite direction of what one intuitively might have expected”
So, if not poverty, poor education or climate change, what?
Under Transactional Analysis, a person who holds the "I'm okay, you're not ok" life position:
It is a position of persons who feel victimized or persecuted, so victimize and persecute others. • They blame others for their miseries. • Delinquents and criminals often have this position and taken on paranoid behavior which in extreme cases may lead to homicide.
People in this position feel themselves to be superior in some way to others, who are seen as inferior and not OK. As a result, they may be contemptuous and quick to anger. Their talk about others will be smug and supercilious, contrasting their own relative perfection with the limitation of others.
Well, how does a religion that teaches that it is the only truth path, and that non-believers are less than a believer impact a personality like that?
I have an idea that with certain people, under the right conditions may see that the non-believers need to be taught a lesson - to be punished for not accepting the true path - or for their wicked ways.
Couple that with a network and ideology that reinforces that life position and you may just have a terrorist.
The revelation that a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier group could be so vulnerable to a nuclear submarine did not make the mainstream media, and no mention was made by the many attentive defense analysts on this site, so it seems. However, the Chinese defense media does not miss much, especially concerning the capabilities of U.S. Navy carrier groups. In fact, a special issue of 兵工科技 [Ordnance Industry Science and Technology] (2015, no. 8) covered this “event,” featuring an interview with Chinese Submarine Academy professor 迟国仓 [Chi Guocang] as its cover story under the title: “A Single Nuclear Submarine ‘Sinks’ Half of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group.”
There are a whole bunch of caveats, but the need for strong U.S. anti-submarine warfare skills is certainly suggested by the article.
A few of us who spent much of our lives working to ". . . defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . ." either on a full time or part-time basis have undertaken blogs and other activities to share our concerns over the dangers facing the country to which that Constitution belongs.
You will find some of the few of these "milbloggers" and fellow travelers over there on the right side of this blog. Some great milbloggers have moved on, others have taken up the torch.
Some of these concerns we discuss are over the actions, both potential or actual, of foreign nations. North Korea, Iran, China, and a couple of others come to mind.
Some anxiety arose with the increase in trans-national groups who have declared "war" on the United States and its form of government. Or, perhaps, on the "life style" of its people. Some more came with the increase in sea piracy off failed states - a threat that should have pointed out the vulnerable nature of sea-going global commerce and the need for strong naval forces to keep the sea lanes open and free. People simply don't know or forget how much commerce flows by sea.
Other concerns crop up because of what former and current military and civilian planners see as disconnects between the tools provided to war fighters (weapons systems - ships, airplanes and ground-pounder stuff) and the needs of the end users and the cost to the country. E.g. Is the F-35 worth the cost? Is the LCS worth anything as a warship? Three Zumwalt-class "destroyers" the size of a WWII battleship? Really? What about the A-10? Can bombing bring something like ISIS to its knees?
Questions are raised about the priorities of the Defense Department. CDR Salamander has a regular Thursday feature Diversity Thursday in which he documents the problems arising from a "diversity industry" which has levered its way into the DoD and made appearance seemingly more important than performance. Want a discussion about the failure of naval leadership and lack of trust in that leadership? See what the Skipper wrote.
Given this, it is with a great deal of interest that I read Sarah Hoyt's Ring The Bell about another question of priorities of the media and the powers that be. In her world, "ringing the bell" was to, in the words of the old "progressive" (read "coomunist") song, If I Had a Hammer:
... ring out danger, ... ring out a warning . . .
Which song,according to the link at Wikipedia, was
The song was first performed publicly by Pete Seeger and Lee Hays on June 3, 1949, at St. Nicholas Arena in New York at a testimonial dinner for the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States, who were then on trial in federal court, charged with violating the Smith Act by advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government.
The irony, as you will see, is that Ms. Hoyt nails the media:
Our media by and large learned Marxism in their “best colleges” and therefore are blind to the dangers of totalitarian regimes of the left. And therefore haven’t been very good at sounding the alarm, even when the world-divorced philosophies of the left destroyed our society. They would have delivered us hand-tied to the Soviet Union if only the Soviet Union had been coherent enough to win. Balked of their victory, they’d happily deliver us to ISIS even though, REALISTICALLY, they should oppose everything ISIS stands for, including oppression of gays and women. BUT our elites REALLY don’t like us. They’re not going to ring the bell.
Sort of like listening to "For What It's Worth" in light of today's PC world:
Only it's step out of line and get an IRS audit. Or a bunch of protesters demanding your firing and proposing "re-education" for those who disagree with them and their world view.
Which gets me back to the defense of the Constitution including its amendments.
We need to stand up against those who would attempt to transform things like freedom of speech and independence of thought into something that the "government" has graciously bestowed on us and which can be taken away if our thoughts and speech displease some crowd. Freedom of religion - not granted by the government - but protected from the government (and the mob) by the First Amendment. Gun ownership? Not granted by the government, but protected from the government by the Second Amendment. Freedom of speech? Not granted to us by the government, but protected from the intrusion of government.
In sum, we need to continue to fight back against those who would "happily deliver us to ISIS." One of the best weapons is mockery of their self-righteousness, their priggery and their exceptionally shallow understanding of either freedom or the threats to it.
So, if the right to bear arms is important to you, engage in your First Amendment right to associate with others to reject efforts to restrict that right. Join the NRA. Write letters to your elected representatives. Call lying politicians liars.
Oh, and more of this:
How do you design a game that has practical tactical application to the naval tactician? Even more ambitious, how do you make one accessible and understandable with the goal of making it a mobile wargame for eventual use by sailors and warfare commands. For today's show we will discuss one of the projects of the CNO's Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), the game "Fleet Battle School." Our guests to discuss this game, gaming in general, and its practical application will be three individuals involved in the project; LT Matthew Hipple, Paul Vebber and Chris Kona. Chris Kona is a warfare analyst at Naval Undersea Warfare Center. A former submarine officer in the U.S. Navy, he was project lead for the CRIC’s Fleet Battle School wargame project. Paul Vebber is a retired SWO CDR who is a life-long hobby wargamer. He was one of founders of Matrix Games, the premiere publisher of computer wargames, working with them until their merger with Slitherine games. He currently works for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Mission Area Director for Undersea Warfare as Asst. Director for Concept Development, Wargaming, and Experimentation.
Join us live if you can (or pick the show up later by clicking here). Or pick the show up later on our iTunes page here.
