"We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and display stamina in purpose." - President Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address
Monday Maritime Matters at Chaotic Synaptic Activity on a Medal of Honor recipient who had a big ship named after him.
And it's Maritime Monday 85! over at Fred Fry International with a look at new Canadian ferries and a whole lot more. Oh, and Fred does repeat his earlier question in a new context:
The author of this particular piece of idiocy, a Sarah Flounders, is in way over her head as she tries, on the "Workers World" site - "workers & oppressed peoples of the world unite!" - to let everyone know of the evil intentions of the United States with regard to Myanmar in Myanmar: Washington’s geopolitics and the Straits of Malacca. According to Ms. Flounders, it all about "THE OIL" and control of the Strait of Malacca
What has received little attention in the U.S. corporate media is Myanmar’s geopolitical position and its rich resources. A U.S. base in Myanmar is considered vital for control of the most strategically important sea lanes in the Pacific. *** Hiding behind ‘humanitarian relief’
The U.S. Pacific Fleet moved back into South Asia by providing emergency relief during the Dec. 26, 2004 tsunami near Indonesia.
Using the cover of tsunami relief, the U.S. Navy also moved back into the giant U-Tapao base on the Gulf of Siam in Thailand. This had been a major front-line U.S. base during the Vietnam War, from which the Pentagon launched 80 percent of its air strikes against North Vietnam.
Ms. Flounders notes Chinese concerns, but somehow fails to mention China's efforts in the area, which I have discussed before including in China looks to the sea:
Of particular interest in recent days are the sea lanes China is working to find ways to protect. As you can see from the following (which just reference crude oil shipments) these lanes are heavily traveled. In the... chart, I have marked U.S. allies in blue (yes, Singapore is over-sized) and areas that China is making claims or working to establish relations as red bursts. Note that the red bursts sit athwart the sea lanes.
China is also assisting in building a large naval base in western Pakistan, "China's pearl in Pakistan's waters" as so aptly named in the linked article from the Asia Times:
For China, Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. About 60% of China's energy supplies come from the Middle East, and China has been anxious that the US, which has a very high presence in the region, could choke off these supplies to China. "Having no blue-water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies," points out Tarique Niazi, a specialist in resource-based conflict, in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.
A presence in Gwadar provides China with a "listening post" where it can "monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean", writes Haider. A recent report titled "Energy Futures in Asia" produced by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton for the Pentagon notes that China has already set up electronic eavesdropping posts at Gwadar, which are monitoring maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea.
Drawing attention to China's "string of pearls" strategy, the report points out that "China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives". The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of the "string of pearls".
The other "pearls" in the string include facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and the South China Sea that Beijing has acquired access to by assiduously building ties with governments in these countries.
Wonder why she left China's efforts out of her little piece? Oh, yes, because it's a "worker's paradise."
France takes meaningful action on behalf of the Somali people, as set out here:
U.N. ships carrying aid to Somalia docked under French naval escort on Monday as part of a new strategy to deter pirates threatening food shipments to Somalis suffering from conflict and drought.
The shipments arrived against a background of spiraling violence in the Horn of Africa nation, where at least four people in a refugee settlement were killed when a landmine blast prompted government soldiers to open fire on Sunday.
Aid workers and witnesses in the port of Merka, 100 km (60 miles) south of the capital Mogadishu, said two ships chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) were offloading food supplies with a French warship standing guard offshore.
"I can see two WFP ships offloading food that includes maize, beans, porridge and cooking oil. I can also see a huge warship somewhere off the coast," said witness Yusuf Mohamed. WFP said French frigate Commandant Ducuing escorted MV Rozen and MV Semlow and their combined 3,650 tonnes of aid. The Kenyan-owned ships have, in the last three years, been seized and repeatedly attacked by pirates while carrying WFP cargoes.
"This operation comes at a critical time for the Somali people who have been devastated by some of the worst conflict and drought seen in years," WFP Executive
UPDATE: Meanwhile, possible trouble on a pirate-captured ship, as noted here:
Communication has been lost with a Comoran-flagged cargo ship captured by pirates off the Somali coast last month, raising fears of the crew safety, a maritime monitoring group said on Saturday.
The MV Al Marjan, with 22 mostly Asian crew members on board, was seized on October 19 as it sailed to Mogadishu port from the United Arab Emirates port of Dubai.
"We are worried that the ship has cut communication with the owner and the rest of the world," said Andrew Mwangura of the Kenyan branch of the Seafarers' Assistance Programme.
"This is the second week since it cut communication, which means there are no negotiations going. This is a very bad indicator on the fate of the crew," he told AFP.
The freighter is owned by Shahmir Maritime of Saint Vincent and Grenadines, but operated by Dubai-based Biyat International.
Mwangura explained that "cutting communication" between the pirated vessels and the outside world in the past has been an indication that "something bad" has happened onboard.
"When pirates killed a sailor in Ching Fong Hwa 168, they cut communication. That is why we are worried this time round," he said. *** Mwangura said negotiations were underway to free Japanese tanker, Golden Nori -- believed to be carrying benzene -- that was kidnapped on October 28 with 23 crew members from Myanmar, Philippines and South Korea. Their condition is unknown.
The vessel was sailing from Singapore to Israel when its was seized.
"I expect that the pirates will ask for ransom of more than a million dollars to free the tanker," he told AFP.
The last warship from World War II came home Tuesday to the United States.
It was not a proud battleship, not a mighty aircraft carrier. It was the former LCS(L) 102, a gunboat, a ship so small it didn't even have a name. They called ships like this "mighty midgets" - gunnery support ships that served with honor in the last battles of the war in the Pacific. A San Francisco man and his shipmates saved the little ship and plan to make it a memorial.
The ship sailed through the Golden Gate as deck cargo, riding piggyback aboard a much larger freighter on a 7,900 mile voyage from Thailand.
The mighty midget is too old - it turned 63 this year - and too small - it is only 158 feet long - to sail across the Pacific under its own power.
The LCS was tough enough when it was new. Bristling with guns and rocket launchers, the gunboats were used for close gun support in invasion landings, or as picket ships to protect the fleet from suicide bombers in places like Okinawa.
Now the LCS 102 will be a memorial at Mare Island in Vallejo, the last of the little ships that played a big role in the war.
It was saved for preservation by Bill Mason and his friends, who served on ships exactly like the LCS 102 and never forgot. Mason, who is 82 now, is an emeritus professor at San Francisco State University. He served aboard an LCS for nearly two years, a wartime experience seared in his memory.
"We are not here to glorify what we did," he said. "But we just don't want our ship to disappear."
Mason stood at Lands' End at the San Francisco end of the Golden Gate for four hours to watch his ship come in around 9:30 p.m. Tuesday. The mighty midget was aboard the Da Fu, a heavy-lift ship that flies the flag of Panama, has a Chinese crew and is owned by a company in the Netherlands.
"It was great to see it," said Mason, chairman of a group of LCS veterans who found the last of the little ships, got it turned over to them, and arranged for transportation to the United States.
He likes to talk about the ships. There were 130 of them, all pretty much identical.
They were all built in the last two years of the war and were designed for close inshore artillery support during island invasions. They carried anti-aircraft guns, machine guns and 10 rocket launchers. They were small enough so they could go in close to shore and tough enough to drive off bigger ships.
They served in the Philippines, in the invasion of Iwo Jima, and most notably in the Okinawa campaign.
Tokyo Rose, the famous Japanese radio broadcaster, called them "miniature destroyers." The American Navy called them "mighty midgets."
Mason served on LCS 86. "When I first saw it, I thought, 'It's awfully small. Are we gonna take this thing across the ocean?' "
In truth, the LCS gunboats were smaller and slower than most San Francisco Bay ferryboats.
"We had 65 enlisted men aboard and six officers. We were from all walks of life. I have never been closer to anyone than I was to those men." *** By the summer of 1945, the LCS ships were on duty on the farthest edge of the U.S. fleet, attacking Okinawa. The Japanese were desperate to stop the Americans, so they threw kamikaze suicide planes at them.
Mason can still see those planes coming, can still feel the 20mm guns firing, can still see the burned, dead men on a ship hit by a kamikaze. They had gone alongside to help put out the fires. "I still see those dead guys, frozen in position," he said.
Mason and his shipmates not only had affection for each other, but for their ship.
The ship was their home, the place where they fought, their life. " 'This is our ship,' we thought. 'It's gonna take care of you. It's gonna get you home.'
"That's why they call ships 'she.' It's like your mother."
After the war, life went on for the sailors. They had yearly reunions, but they never forgot those ships. Eventually, they found the LCS 102, serving in the Thai navy. ***
These little ships were meant to do close in support for landing Marines and soldiers. Flat bottomed to allow them to beach and provide direct fire support for the troops going ashore. Not much remembered by the modern Navy, they were the real ancestors of today's Littoral Combat Ship, albeit slower, cheaper and much less expensive (by any measure).
They had a remarkable history, well set out at the "Mighty Midgets" web site here (the site also has excellent photos here) and in articles such as this one written by Gordon Gregory and found in the pages of Sea Classics:
They were ugly as sin and cramped as a monk's purse, but, pound for pound, they packed more wallop than anything afloat," recalls former bluejacket Adam West, Jr., of Knoxville, Tennessee. West was of course referring to one of the oddest fighting vessels to emerge from WWII - the flat-bottomed mini-gunboats known as the "Mighty Midgets," more officially as LCS(L)s, a latewar derivative of the widely used troop hauling beachable transport - the Landing Craft Infantry, or LCI. *** The need for a close-fire support vessel was demonstrated during the assault on Tarawa on 20 November 1944. After the larger ships had shelled the beaches and landing zones to disrupt enemy defense efforts, the landing craft headed for shore to deliver the troops. During the interval when the Naval bombardment had stopped and the troops had landed, the enemy often had time to regroup, and the effect on the Marines was deadly. In order to deliver consistent fire support to protect them, a new type of vessel was necessary. This required the ability to get in close to shore (shallow draft) and sufficient armament to support the landings. Experiments were begun using LCIs with additional guns and rockets. These improvised forward-area modified LCI(Os and LCI(R)S proved to be effective but were only an interim solution to the problem. Fortunately, a more advanced gunboat had been in the planning stages as early as 1942, and the first contracts for the new fire support vessel had been awarded in 1943.
The first of these gunboats, the LCS(L)-1, was launched on 15 May 1944 at the George Lawley and Sons Shipyard in Neponset, Massachusetts. Using the existing plans for the LCI hull, the Lawley yard had designed a new fire support ship, one that was not a modified troop carrier but a true fighting ship. The result was the Landing Craft Support (Large) or LCS(L). Packed with firepower, the LCS(L)s had two twin 40mm guns, four 20mm guns, and four .50-cal machine guns. Mounted in the bow was one of three guns, either a single 3-in/50, a single 40mm, or a twin 40mm. Just aft the bow gun were ten Mark 7 rocket launchers. One writer described LCS(L)s as the most heavily armed of the WWII gunboats, and still another claimed that they looked like the Fourth of July fireworks when they were leading an assault.
One hundred thirty LCS(L)s were produced by three shipyards. In Neponset, Massachusetts, the Lawley shipyard produced 47. In Portland, Oregon, the Albina Engine and Machine Works produced 31, and Commercial Iron Works produced 52.
LCS(L)S were usually involved in the initial beach assault. Attacking the beach in a line, they made two runs, firing multiple salvos of deadly rocket barrages at 1000-, 800-, and 500-yds. After the third rocket barrage, they turned broadside to the beach and fired on targets of opportunity before heading seaward for the next run. On the third run, they were followed by the landing craft. As they approached the shore, they slowed to allow the troopladen boats to pass by and deposit their men on the beaches. The LCS(L)s then continued to fire over the heads of the troops and remained inshore, firing on targets as they became available. On some occasions, they took Marine artillery spotters on board for assistance in locating enemy targets on shore. The Mighty Midget LCS(L)s were active in the campaigns for the Philippines, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Borneo.
In the Philippines, the LCS(Ds attacked shore targets and aided Philippine rebels. Their most disastrous night came on the evening of 16 February 1945, when LCS(Ds 7, 8, 26, 27,48, and 49 were anchored across the mouth of Mariveles Bay, near Corregidor. The ships were attacked by about 20 Japanese suicide boats and suicide swimmers from Corregidor. LCS(Ds 7, 26, and 49 were sunk and LCS(L) 27 damaged. *** "Keep in mind that these bantam warships were emergency-built vessels that totally lacked the armor and survivability features of major warships like cruisers and such. One direct hit could settle our hash in a hurry and down we'd go like a sinker in a tin can. Though we often added portable armor plating around the gun tubs to cut down on casualties when the fun started, believe me, there were a lot safer places for a swabbie to be than on the deck of Mighty Midget when we began our run to an enemy-held shore. Our best defense at that juncture was the howl made by the whooshing rockets we fired en masse in hopes of at least scaring the hell out of the enemy on the beach." *** LCS(Ds were largely involved in leading the assault on the landing beaches at Hagushi, Okinawa, on 1 April 1945. After the initial phase of the invasion had been completed, the ships had two main duties: Skunk patrol and radar picket duty. Skunk patrol involved intercepting Japanese suicide boats that were attempting to ram American Navy ships. Many of the suicide boats went to the bottom under the guns of the Mighty Midgets. The most hazardous duty faced by the LCS(L)s involved radar picket duty. The Navy had set up a ring of radar picket stations around the island, each manned by one or more destroyers, one of which was equipped with a Fighter Director Team. The mission of the picket ships was to pick up incoming air raids from Japan and Taiwan and vector the Combat Air Patrol to intercept them. LCS(Ds were assigned to the radar picket stations as fire support for the destroyers. Soon the picket ships became targets themselves. While serving on Radar Picket Duty, LCS(Ds 15 and 33 were sunk by kamikazes, while 25,31,51, 52,57,88,116,121, and 122 were damaged. LCS(D 119 was hit by a kamikaze while retuning from a radar picket station. LCS(L)-37 was also disabled when she was attacked by a suicide boat.
During the Battle of Okinawa, several LCS(L)(3)s rescued survivors after kamikaze attacks that sank or heavily damaged other ships. For example, on June 10, 1945, after the destroyer William D. Porter (DD 579) was hit by a kamikaze plane and started to sink, LCS(L)(3)s tried to tow the ship to port but failed. The destroyer, which sank about three hours after the kamikaze plane crash, lost no men due to the superb rescue work of the LCS(L)(3)s.*** Even though William D. Porter lost no men, LCS(L)(3) 122 was hit the following day by a kamikaze plane and lost 11 men with the number of wounded totaling 29.
And, as to the quality of men who served on these fighting ships, here's an example:
World War II Congressional Medal of Honor Recipient
Lt. Richard M. McCool Jr., US Navy
World War II Congressional Medal of Honor Recipient Lt. Richard McCool Jr. US Navy
CITATION:
Rank and organization: Lieutenant , U.S. Navy, U.S.S. LSC(L)(3)122. Place and date: Off Okinawa , 10 and 11 June 1945. Entered service at: Oklahoma . Born: 4 January 1922 , Tishomingo , Okla. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of the U.S.S. LCS(L)(3) 122 during operations against enemy Japanese forces in the Ryukyu chain, 10 and 11 June 1945. Sharply vigilant during hostile air raids against Allied ships on radar picket duty off Okinawa on 10 June, Lt. McCool aided materially in evacuating all survivors from a sinking destroyer which had sustained mortal damage under the devastating attacks. When his own craft was attacked simultaneously by 2 of the enemy's suicide squadron early in the evening of 11 June, he instantly hurled the full power of his gun batteries against the plunging aircraft, shooting down the first and damaging the second before it crashed his station in the conning tower and engulfed the immediate area in a mass of flames. Although suffering from shrapnel wounds and painful burns, he rallied his concussion-shocked crew and initiated vigorous firefighting measures and then proceeded to the rescue of several trapped in a blazing compartment, subsequently carrying 1 man to safety despite the excruciating pain of additional severe burns. Unmindful of all personal danger, he continued his efforts without respite until aid arrived from other ships and he was evacuated. By his staunch leadership, capable direction, and indomitable determination throughout the crisis, Lt. McCool saved the lives of many who otherwise might have perished and contributed materially to the saving of his ship for further combat service. His valiant spirit of self-sacrifice in the face of extreme peril sustains and enhances the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.
Lower photo shows damage to LCS 122.
A small salute to the brave men of the LCS(L) ships - giants who manned the "midgets."
UPDATE: YouTube video of welcoming LCS 102 to Mare Island -after some preliminary Boy Scout and Sea Scout intro:
Local Vallejo coverage here. Some info on Mare Island Historic Park Foundation here.
UPDATE2: Photo caption:
Ex-HTMS Nakha (LSSL-751) (NB E1: LCS 102) after completing her transit from Thailand to the United States is tied up at the seawall at Mare Island, Vallejo, CA. in October 2007.
A little more directly, Galrahn has a couple of posts that ought to get you thinking about the Navy of the future - one on mine warfare and the littoral combat ship and one on the SSGN as a partial(?) alternative to DDG-1000 (as currently thought about) here.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Forces and their irregular sub-elements, such as al Quds (Jerusalem) Force, enact disruptive activities against western interests and sectarian factions. They coordinate extremist group, insurgent, and resistance actions on behalf of the Iranian regime agenda through a chain of command up to the Ayatollah. The IRGC Quds Force trains foreign personnel in Iran and abroad to organize and participate in terrorism and subversion. The Quds force is allegedly the pre-eminent force behind Iran’s involvement in Iraq. Conventional US military or political action in opposition to the Quds, however, has been ineffective against their cloaked operations; autonomous, decentralized, operational networks; and safe havens in Iran.
The US must halt Iran’s meddling in Middle Eastern peace initiatives to ensure regional stability and the security of US forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there are serious obstacles to operations countering Iran. Any attempt by the US military to engage the Quds across Iran’s border would be viewed internationally as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and an attack against Iran. Sanctions and political efforts against Iran have proven to be ineffective. The US must also act swiftly to reduce the mounting pressures of area allies like Turkey from exploiting the Iraqi situation while American hands are tied in the regional commitment.
The proposed solution presented in this report involves an augmentation of SOF along the Iraqi border to thwart illicit arms traffic, infiltration activity, and insurgency support. This solution for the Iraq/Iran border can be applied elsewhere in the region. SOF units have historically provided border security and can again successfully control border traffic. Enhanced capabilities in recon, direct action, information operations, unconventional warfare, and local commerce exchanges—to include animal and drug trade—would further bolster SOF efficacy. More aggressive US “small-war” initiatives can destroy, disrupt, interdict, and deter the elusive Iranian alliances and complex networks supporting Iraq’s civil clashes through their recruitment, motivation, procurement, sanctuary, and funds. It is through these support groups that the Quds and other Iranian elements create the ability to operate against the US.
And, over at Steeljaw's place, some Zoomie does Flight Deck Friday (a prize for slipping by the Navy in the Valour IT competition) with a look at Hustler...
One million houses in Turkey’s biggest city are set to be demolished to make way for safer dwellings as part of efforts by the Greater Istanbul Municipality and the Mass Housing Administration
Despite a title that is simply wrong ("Why Illegal Immigration Doesn't Matter")WaPo piece does raise some interesting points - most of which seem to be directed at the idea that we are creating an immigrant based sub class:
Our current system results from changes begun in the mid-1960s, when the country scrapped its old immigration policy, based on quotas determined by a person's national origin, in favor of broader hemispheric quotas and visa preferences for family members of those already here. The framers of this new system claimed that they were merely tinkering with policy. "Contrary to the charges in some quarters, [the bill] will not inundate America with immigrants," Sen. Edward Kennedy said.
But not only did legal immigration soar by 60 percent in the first 10 years after the reform legislation; the origins of immigration shifted to poorer countries around the world, and many new immigrants arrived with low levels of education and little job training, stranding them in low-paying jobs and slowing their economic mobility. A recent study by Harvard economists George Boras and Lawrence Katz of Mexican immigrants who came here in the 1970s found that after 20 years in the American workforce these workers were still earning about 40 percent less than American-born workers -- a sharp contrast with earlier generations of immigrants, who after several decades here tended to be virtually at par with American workers. The economists also estimated that recently arriving young Mexican workers (and Mexicans make up the largest category of legal immigrants to the U.S.) were starting off with an even bigger wage disadvantage relative to American workers than their predecessors did in the 1970s.
As a result of findings like this, many economists who study immigration don't even distinguish between legals and illegals. Instead, the line of demarcation for them is between low-skill immigrants with little education and better educated, better trained immigrants.
I don't care how hard working you are, it's tough to move up with low skills and not much education, which would seem to maintain a permanent underclass which is a formula for unhappiness.
Korean newspaper reports Korean fishing boat crew maltreated by Somali pirates here.
Four Korean crewmen who were released on Sunday after 174 days of captivity in Somalia with another 20 Asian crew members described their lives in the African country as miserable and hopeless.
``Pirates are entities that have to be eliminated ``The Somali pirates were armed with various weapons including rifles, cannons and other equipment. They did not lag behind any regular armed forces in scale and strength,’’ Han said. ``Among them were several retired military officers. Reportedly, the interim Somali government had designated them as a militia and supported them in secret.’’ *** Noting that its exceptional ability to gather information demonstrates that the African government supports the violent group, Lee Song-ryul, chief engineer of the Korean boats, said, ``We were captured along with other crewmen from Japan, Taiwan, Denmark, Brazil, Italy and India. I guess they have an information source providing them with routes of foreign vessels passing near the region.’’ altogether,’’ said Han Seok-ho, 40, captain of the hijacked vessels, Mavuno 1 and Mavuno 2. He said, “It is hard to express how harshly we were treated,” recollecting his six-month-long incarceration. The town we arrived at right after being hijacked was seemingly the headquarters of the militant group, he said. ``The village was made up of around 300 houses. All residents in the area were sponsors or members of the pirate crews.’’ ***
With one murdered crewmen in the ship's freezer and Somali pirates threatening to execute his son, Captain Xinshen Ling could think of only one thing to do: Threaten to throw himself into the shark-infested waters.
Four pirates immediately rushed to keep him from jumping from the Taiwanese fishing vessel.
"It was a test. I wanted to see how much the pirates valued me... They know if the captain dies, they will get less ransom," the 47-year-old said in an interview this week, safe in Kenya after the United States (US) Navy forced the pirates to release the Ching Fong Hwa 168 and its surviving crew, who included Ling's 22-year-old son. *** The pirates made off with an unspecified ransom paid by the ship's owner.
But Ling's story has a twist. After even more ransom was demanded, the US Navy stepped in, forcing the pirates to release the Ching Fong Hwa 168 and its surviving crew, who included Ling's 22-year-old son. A Navy spokesperson says such intervention will continue in response to the spike in piracy.
"The worst time for me was the times they took my son ... they used this boy," Ling said, gesturing at the shaggy-haired Linshangyi Ling over the table at a Chinese restaurant in the Kenyan port of Mombasa. "They threatened me, said if I didn't call Taiwan they would shoot my son." *** Ling's encounter with Somali pirates began one sunny April afternoon, when about 15 of them stormed aboard armed with automatic rifles, machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. Ling's crew was unarmed, and one member was shot in the back. He survived, but when negotiations with the ship's Taiwanese owners were going badly, the pirates executed 32-year-old Chen Tao from China.
"He was very unlucky because they just took him at random," recalled Ling, who had worked with Tao for two years. He remembers the young sailor being grabbed out of a lineup, then the six shots that rang out on the other side of the boat.
"We were in shock," muttered the weathered captain, one dragon-tattooed arm reaching up to smooth a sprinkling of white hair. "Just for money they took a life ... they are not human."
The captains and crew of 22 fishing vessels of the Number 66 Fish Complex were left stranded in the Corentyne River on Sunday, after armed pirates relieved them of their gasoline, engine coils and a quantity of fish glue.
None of the crew seem to have been hurt or terrorized, as has happened in the past.
No less than 21 Camerounian soldiers were attacked and killed Monday by suspected pirates on the high sea off the Bakassi peninsula.
While news agencies quoted a source in the Camerounian military as identifying the gunmen as a "suspected militant group from Nigeria," minister of foreign affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, yesterday absolved Nigerian soldiers from the incident.
Fishermen who witnessed the attack at Ibeno said the militants arrived the area in seven speed boats carrying about 50 pirates, attacked the security post at the jetty and engaged military security men in a gun battle.
Nice summary of the African maritime challenge (and the odd position of "not enough ships of the right type" the U.S. Navy finds itself in) here:
Rather, the likeliest engagements for what will become the naval component of the newly-launched U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) will probably take place in the "brown waters" of delta and other riverine environments – if not at anchor in port – or just off of them. This means that littoral waters will be, at least in this theatre, more than the bridge between the Navy's area of responsibility and those of land forces. The Navy, together with the Coast Guard and other support elements, will need to be able to operate across an entire continuum. *** As a first step, the African Partnership Station (APS) in form of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry arrived in Dakar, Senegal, last week at the beginning of a seven-month deployment during which it will be joined by the HSV Swift. Led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe, APS is an international interagency effort – European and African sailors join their American counterparts as well as civilian personnel onboard – aimed at enhancing regional and maritime safety and security in West and Central Africa through assistance in developing maritime domain awareness (MDA, that is, a clear picture of maritime traffic), maritime professionals and infrastructure, maritime enforcement capabilities, legal and regulatory regimes, subregional cooperation, and public awareness of maritime security issues. *** While the most recent attacks from the Somali coast were repulsed through the fortuitous presence of no less than three U.S. Navy destroyers, neither such a robust presence on station nor the relatively less worrisome criminal motivations of the "pirates" will always be the case. The attackers, after all, could have been some of Somalia's al-Qaeda-linked radical Islamists or the naval elements might well have been deployed elsewhere. Thus the incidents should be taken as a salutary reminder of the need to cultivate the capabilities of and relationships with both enduring and new partner states in the geopolitically critical waters off Africa as well as redoubling our own vigilance against the threat of lawlessness on the waters, both deep and shallow.
The tension, as noted by Dr. Pham between the "sea robberies" and vessel hijackings within the territorial waters of a nation (no right to intervene) and those that occur on the high seas ("go get 'em") is one of things that makes this piracy issue so interesting.
Latest ONI Worlwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 7 Nov 07) found here. Highlights:
2. PHILLIPINES: Military troops kill suspected pirate and seize boats during a raid, 21 Oct 07, in Batu Pantan, Lagayas, Tawi-Tawi. Western Mindanao Command spokesman, Major Eugenio Batara Jr., said the troops launched the raid following the reported presence of the pirates in Batu Pantan. The raiding troops seized two “jungkong” type vessels believed to be used by the pirates. Local pirates are reportedly operating in the waters of Sulu and Tawi-tawi, victimizing traders and fishermen in the area. They are said to be heavily armed and wreaking fear on the nearby population. Batara claimed the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has also allied themselves with the lawless elements operating in this part of the country and urged the local population to be vigilant and report such kinds of individuals and organizations to the authorities Batara assured the residents in the area that the Western Mindanao Command remains steadfast in its mandate to protect the Filipino people against lawless elements. (LM: Sunstar Zamboanga). *** H. INDIAN OCEAN-EAST AFRICA: 1. Chemical tanker (GOLDEN NORI) hijacked 28 Oct, 70 NM north of Caluula, Somalia, Gulf of Aden. 2. Vessel reported suspicious approach 24 Oct 07, Gulf of Aden. 3. Chemical tanker reported suspicious approach 22 Oct 07, Gulf of Aden. 4. LPG tanker reported suspicious approach, 21 Oct 07, Gulf of Aden. 5. Vessel reported suspicious approach 08 Nov 07, north of Suqutra Islands, Indian Ocean. 6. General cargo vessel (DAI HONG DAN) infiltrated 29 Oct, port Mogadishu, Somalia. 7. Container ship reported suspicious approach 27 Oct 07, Somalia. 8. General cargo vessel (JAIKUR II) fired upon 21 Oct 07, approximately 60NM off the coast near Baraawe, Somalia. 9. General cargo vessel (ALMARJAN) hijacked 17 Oct 07, approximately 10-20NM from Mogadishu, Somalia. 10. Bulk carrier reported being fired upon 18 Oct 07, 200NM off the Somali coast. 11. Vessel reported suspicious approach 18 Oct 07, 155 miles off the Somali coast. 12. Vessel reported suspicious approach 14 Oct 07, 312NM off Mogadishu, Somalia. 13. Container ship boarded, robbed 26 Oct 07, Nacala anchorage, Mozambique. 14. Container ship reported attempted boarding, 26 Oct 07, Nacala anchorage, Mozambique. 15. Fishermen reportedly attacked, robbed by 21 Oct 07, near Katchatheevu, Gulf of Mannar. 16. Container ship boarded, robbed 31 Oct 07, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 17. Sailboat boarded, robbed, crewmembers assaulted 19 Oct 07, Majunga harbour, Madagascar. 18. Chemical Tanker boarded 04 Nov 07, Hoogli river, Sagar roads anchorage, India. 19. Product tanker boarded, robbed 18 Oct 07, at Kandla outer Tuna buoy India. 20. Bulk Carrier boarded, robbed 10 Oct 07, Kakinada anchorage, India. 21. Vessel boarded, robbed 08 Oct 07, in Panaji off the Yermal coast in Udupi district of Karnataka, India. 22. Sri Lanka Navy apprehends LTTE vessels and terrorists 18 Oct 07, in Mannar in northwest of Sri Lanka. 23. Sea battle between Sri Lankan military and LTTE, vessels sunk 13 Oct 07, off Jaffna peninsula, Sri Lanka. 24. LTTE vessels apprehended by naval troops 11 Oct 07, 5km north of Talaimannar, Sri Lanka. 25. LTTE vessel (MATSUSEEMA) reportedly sunk by Sri Lankan Navy 7 Oct 07, Sri Lanka. 26. Tanker boarded, robbed 28 Oct 07, Chittagong anchorage, Bangladesh. 27. General cargo vessel boarded, robbed 12 Oct 07, TSP Jetty, Chittagong port, Bangladesh. 28. Fishing vessel (QUAN YONG 168) boarded, robbed 06 Nov 07 in the evening, near Point Cruz, Taiwan.
The latest ICC Commercial Crime Services (to 12 Nov 07) can be found here. Highlights:
09.11.2007: 0800 LT: 28:41N-049:46E, Persian Gulf. A suspicious craft approached a tanker, underway, from the stern. Master sounded general alarm, increased speed, crew mustered and fire hoses standby. The speed boat closed to 0.1nm, and when it noticed crew alertness, aborted approach and moved away.
08.11.2007: 0400 LT: 13:48N - 053:45E, 65 NM North of Socotra Island, Somalia.C/O onboard a car carrier, underway, noticed an unlit boat at 3NM off the port bow with a speed of 19 kts. The boat reduced speed to match the speed of the vessel. When the craft was about 1nm off master raised alarm, crew mustered and switched on deck lights. At 0430 LT another unlit boat was observed 2NM of port bow of the ship. Both boats altered course towards Socotra at 0445 LT and moved away.
06.11.2007: 2130 LT: 03:55.2N - 099:46.2E, Malacca Straits. An unidentified small watercraft approached a chemical tanker underway. OOW raised alarm, sounded ship's whistle, crew mustered and directed searchlight at the craft. The craft came within 150 metres and aborted the attempt
06.11.2007: 1800 UTC: 22:06N-062:31E: Arabian Sea. A bulk carrier underway detected an unlit suspicious craft, on radar, approaching directly towards own vessel at a speed of 19 knots. Master took all preventive measures to prevent boarding. Suspicious craft reached 0.1 NM from vessel, on seeing crew alertness, the suspicious craft reduced speed and altered course towards another nearby vessel. All vessels were warned on VHF radio about suspicious craft approach.
05.11.2007: 2150 LT: 12:33N – 113:42E: South China Sea. One suspicious boat followed a general cargo ship at a range of 100m for about an hour. Crew mustered and fire hoses with pressurised water jet standby and action taken to prevent any boarding. Later, master informed the Piracy Reporting Centre that the distance between the boat and the ship was increasing. Vessel continued passage to destination port.
The Democrats in Congress have found the "hidden cost" of the Iraq and Afghanistan engagements and it's really, really big, according tothis:
The total cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could balloon to $3.5 trillion over the next decade because of such "hidden" costs as oil market disruptions, foregone investments, long-term health care for veterans and interest payments on borrowed war funding, according to a report released by congressional Democrats on Tuesday.
Well, dog my cat, but I believe this is the first time this particular group of idiots have ever tried to figure out the "hidden cost" of anything.
What about a look at the "hidden costs" of the War of Poverty, which has been going on for what, 40+ years? Economist Thomas Sowell wrote of that noble effort:
The War on Poverty represented the crowning triumph of the liberal vision of society -- and of government programs as the solution to social problems. The disastrous consequences that followed have made the word "liberal" so much of a political liability that today even candidates with long left-wing track records have evaded or denied that designation.
In the liberal vision, slums bred crime. But brand-new government housing projects almost immediately became new centers of crime and quickly degenerated into new slums. Many of these projects later had to be demolished. Unfortunately, the assumptions behind those projects were not demolished, but live on in other disastrous programs, such as Section 8 housing.
Rates of teenage pregnancy and venereal disease had been going down for years before the new 1960s attitudes toward sex spread rapidly through the schools, helped by War on Poverty money. These downward trends suddenly reversed and skyrocketed.
The murder rate had also been going down, for decades, and in 1960 was just under half of what it had been in 1934. Then the new 1960s policies toward curing the "root causes" of crime and creating new "rights" for criminals began. Rates of violent crime, including murder, skyrocketed.
The black family, which had survived centuries of slavery and discrimination, began rapidly disintegrating in the liberal welfare state that subsidized unwed pregnancy and changed welfare from an emergency rescue to a way of life.
In 2004, after the spending of billions and billions of dollars ($5 trillion?), we made some progress, but:
...about $67.2 billion per year—$57.5 billion in discretionary appropriations and $9.7 billion in mandatory appropriations—and operates programs that touch on every area and level of education. The Department's elementary and secondary programs annually serve more than 14,000 school districts and approximately 56 million students attending some 94,000 public schools and 28,000 private schools. Department programs also provide grant, loan, and work-study assistance to more than 10 million postsecondary students.
That said, it is important to point out that education in America is primarily a State and local responsibility, and ED's budget is only a small part of both total national education spending
You know, over a few years, $67 billion per year could add up to real money. And you still end up with a educational system in which 50% of the students will be below average. And the national total of state and local money spent on education is about $1 trillion per year, so figure the costs of forgone investments, interest and long term health care for teachers (not to mention pensions) and you probably get to quite a number. And we know the education system is broken, because every years there's a new announcement to that effect that also specifies that with just a little more "investment" by the taxpayers, all the students will be above average,in defiance of all logic (see here).
More recently, Congress has been helping us all out by mandating increased use of ethanol, which has had the effect of not lowering gas prices, raising food prices and doing virtually nothing to improve the environment (and it may be making it worse). See here:
Congress has decided to use our tax payer dollars to raise the price of food, increase the cost of motor fuels, and promote global warming. One could make the case Congressional action has also increased malnutrition, hunger, and disease. And why did Congress fund this immoral program? Because our politicians leaders are locked in a nasty battle for political power. It was a politically expedient decision. A pop-culture solution.
Thanks for all the help. Those "hidden costs" are killing us.
Memri TV translates an animated portrayal of the C-802 missile attack on the Israeli warship off Lebanon last year, and the case made for it by one side here.
Soldiers' Angels is offering the following gift to donors who give more than $25 to Valour-IT through the team competition. Donors must use a team button to receive a coin.
After several posts on the fight against the Somali pirates, I have received additional photos of the recent sinking of the pirate skiffs and much more (more details to follow, I hope):
First three are the pirate skiffs being fired on:
Vessel Almarjan:
Captured benzene tanker Golden Nori:
Released fishing boats Mavunos and Ching:
UPDATE: More photos from U.S. Navy assistance to pirated vessels here. Photo captions:
071104-N-3764J-001 INDIAN OCEAN (November 4, 2007) - Security boats from the amphibious dock landing ship USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) prepare to provide rescue and assistance to the recently released Mavuno 1 and 2 after being held by pirates since mid-May as the guided-missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) patrols in the background. (photo immediately above)
071105-N-9999X-002 INDIAN OCEAN (November 5, 2007) - Members of a U.S. Navy rescue and assistance team provide humanitarian and medical assistance to the crew of the Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler Ching Fong Hwa. The vessel had been seized by pirates off the coast of Somalia in early May 2007 and was released Nov. 5, 2007 with U.S. Navy assistance. As part of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy, our maritime forces operate across the full spectrum of operations to extend security, which depends on the free use of the sea. U.S. Navy photo
071105-N-9999X-003 INDIAN OCEAN (November 5, 2007) - Members of a U.S. Navy rescue and assistance team provide humanitarian and medical assistance to the crew of the Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler Ching Fong Hwa. The vessel had been seized by pirates off the coast of Somalia in early May 2007 and was released Nov. 5, 2007 with U.S. Navy assistance... U.S. Navy photo
071105-N-9999X-004 INDIAN OCEAN (November 5, 2007) - Manuvo II gets underway after receiving fuel and stores for transit back to the next port. The Tanzanian-flagged fishing trawlers Manuvo I and Manuvo II were released from pirate control off the east coast of Somalia Nov. 4 after being pirated since May and rendezvoused with the U.S. Navy for humanitarian assistance... U.S. Navy photo
071105-N-9999X-005 INDIAN OCEAN (November 5, 2007) - U.S. Navy Sailors help load lube oil onto Manuvo I prior to it getting underway. The Tanzanian-flagged fishing trawlers Manuvo I and Manuvo II were released from pirate control off the east coast of Somalia Nov. 4 after being pirated since May and rendezvoused with the U.S. Navy for humanitarian assistance... U.S. Navy photo
071105-N-9999X-006 INDIAN OCEAN (November 5, 2007) - Members of a U.S. Navy rescue and assistance team provide humanitarian and medical assistance to the crew of the Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler Ching Fong Hwa. The vessel had been seized by pirates off the coast of Somalia in early May 2007 and was released Nov. 5, 2007 with U.S. Navy assistance... U.S. Navy photo
071105-N-9999X-007 INDIAN OCEAN (November 5, 2007) - Members of a U.S. Navy rescue and assistance team provide humanitarian and medical assistance to the crew of the Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler Ching Fong Hwa. The vessel had been seized by pirates off the coast of Somalia in early May 2007 and was released Nov. 5, 2007 with U.S. Navy assistance... U.S. Navy photo
27 January 1942: 240 miles W of Midway. LtCdr (later Vice Admiral) Elton W. Grenfell's USS GUDGEON (SS-211) is returning to Pearl Harbor from her first war patrol to the Bungo Straits off Japan. Grenfell receives an "Ultra" message advising of the approach of three Japanese submarines (I-18, I-22 and the I-24).**
The I-73 is enroute back to Yokosuka. Her propeller sounds are picked up by sonar off the GUDGEON's port bow. Grenfell, running submerged, spots the submarine and begins his attack. The I-73, with many of her crewmen on deck, is running a straight course and not zigzagging. Grenfell fires three Mark 14 steam torpedoes from 1,800 yards and scores two hits***. The I-73 sinks with all hands at 28-24N, 178-35E.
The first U.S. submarine to patrol off the Japanese homeland after Pearl Harbor.
In April 1943, she contributed to the guerrilla war being waged against the Japanese in the Philippines when
... she landed six trained guerrilla fighters and 3 tons of equipment for the guerrilla movement on Panay 30 April.
Guerrilla operations had started in the Philippines after Bataan and Corregidor had fallen:
... a number of U.S. Army officers conducted guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines in the Philippines. Colonel Russell Volckman, who later would play an important role in the birth of Special Forces, escaped from the enemy and formed a Filipino guerrilla band in northern Luzon, which by 1945 consisted of five regiments. Major Windell Fertig, a reservist, raised his own guerrilla force that ultimately totaled some 20,000 fighters.
These harassing actions were encouraged by General MacArthur, who saw that resupply of these partisan forces could be performed by submarines, as set out here.
As part of this effort, Gudgeon loaded up some important cargo:
Anyone happening to glance towards the American fleet-type submarine USS Gudgeon (SS-211) during the night of Sunday, 27 December 1942, as she lay moored to the dock at Fremantle, Australia, might have observed an unusual sight. Seven mess boys boarded the submarine, saluted the colors, and then immediately proceeded down the hatch. No sooner were they below decks than Gudgeon, captained by LCDR William Stovall, Jr., slid away from the dock and quietly maneuvered out to sea.
The “mess boys” were in fact disguised Filipino soldiers and intelligence officers, led by Major Jesus Villamor, U.S. Army. Two days earlier, Gudgeon’s crew had loaded her with a ton of equipment specially ordered for the mission their passengers were about to embark upon. Gudgeon’s top- secret task: to deliver the soldiers and their gear to Mindanao and Panay, two key Philippine islands, to help bolster the Philippine guerilla forces resisting the Japanese occupation, without being detected.
*** After departing Fremantle, Gudgeon set out towards her destination on Mindanao, running on the surface but diving regularly only to maintain her trim and to avoid Japanese patrols. As they approached the archipelago, Major Villamor informed LCDR Stovall that there was a change in plans. Villamor had apparently received intelligence just before departing Fremantle that Japanese patrols had increased in the original landing area. The new destination was on the island of Negros. Furthermore, Villamor announced he and his men would not use the 18-foot dinghy that had been lashed to the exterior of the boat for the beach landing, but would rather put ashore in the inflatable rafts they had practiced with. Stovall was not pleased with these last-minute revelations, especially since he could have taken a shorter route to Negros, and the now-unneeded dinghy had adversely affected his diving characteristics. However, he agreed to the changes, provided that periscope reconnaissance of the shore proved the landing could be made safely for both the landing party and the submarine. The first night, high winds and seas prohibited approaching the original landing site, so the submerged Gudgeon moved quietly along the coast into the next day, scanning for a new location. That night, another likely choice was negated after a number of mysterious lights suddenly appeared on the beach. Subsequently, one of Villamor’s men identified them as Filipino night fishermen. Finally on the third night, 14 January 1943, a deserted beach was identified, and Villamor successfully loaded his men and supplies into the rafts and landed ashore. *** In all, 19 submarines participated in a total of 41 secret missions to the Philippine Islands, beginning with Gudgeon’s run in late December 1942. The last officially recorded guerrilla run, by USS Stingray (SS-186) on New Year’s Day, 1945, took place between the re-invasion of the Philippines at Leyte Gulf on 20 October 1944 and the liberation of Manila on 4 February 1945. Of the conventional submarines, only Stingray participated in more than two runs (her total being five), and the two transport submarines, Nautilus and Narwhal, were the true workhorses of the operation, with six and nine operations respectively. In the course of the campaign, U.S. submarines delivered 331 people, evacuated 472, and delivered some 1,325 tons of supplies to the Philippines.
Gudgeon completed 11 war patrols but never returned from her 12th. According to this, Gudgeon met her fate through an air attack:
USS Gudgeon (Lt.Cdr R.A. Bonin) was sunk 18 April 1944 by a G3M "Nell", an IJN aircraft of the 901st Air Group on A/S patrol, 166 nautical miles south-east (bearing 132°) from Iwo Jima, position 22º52'5"N, 143º32E. The pilot claimed to have sighted a surfacing sub and in the attack scored direct hits on the bow and the conning tower with 2-250 kg (550 lb) bombs, leaving a gaping hole in the centre section. A column of oil was thrown into the air and the sub sank quickly, followed by a heavy under water detonation. *** There is little doubt at this point that Gudgeon met her fate south-east of Iwo Jima on April 18th.
Commander, Submarine Force Pacific Fleet has more here, but is less inclined to pinpoint the position of her loss. The note does, however, point out her outstanding record:
During her first eleven patrols, GUDGEON was a most active submarine. She sank 25 ships, for 166,400 tons, and damaged 8 more, for 41,900 tons. She started for the Empire but four days after the attack at Pearl Harbor, and there sank a freighter and a submarine. By sinking the Japanese submarine I-73 on January 27, 1942, GUDGEON became the first United States submarine in history to sink an enemy combatant’s ship.
The site "On Eternal Patrol" has a complete list of the crew lost serving in Gudgeon. Offer up a salute to those brave men - heroes of the Silent Service.