VertRep

VertRep

Monday, December 22, 2008

Somali Pirates: China sending 3 ships fo anti-pirate patrol

Reported as China joins anti-piracy patrols off Somalia:
A CHINESE navy squadron of two destroyers and a supply ship will leave a naval base in southern China on December 26 on the country’s first major overseas combat deployment and will join coalition forces on anti-piracy patrols off Somalia.

The long-anticipated move was confirmed by defence ministry spokesman Hu Changming, who said the People’s Liberation Army Navy would deploy destroyers, 169 Wuhan and 171 Haikou, and the supply ship 87 Weisanhu, for three months.
One of the PLAN destroyers, 171, is Aegis-like, see here.



The other destroyer 169 is PLAN 052B type, more conventional but with stealth characteristics. It is the sister ship to the one pictured nearby #168.

PLAN supply ship 87 Weisanhu is pictured nearby and provides fuel and other sustainment provisions for the destroyers. In the photo she is shown during operations with the British navy from a couple of years ago.

China's motivation is not surprising, if the following is accurate:
Somali pirates have attacked more than 300 vessels in some of the world's most critical shipping lanes, capturing 40 of them and collecting $40 million in ransom. They are still holding 14, including a supertanker and a ship loaded with weapons, and more than 25 crew members.

The Chinese government said 1,265 of its ships traversed those shipping lanes last year and that 20 percent of them were attacked.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

The SeaBee Way


For all of you enjoying the winter snows!

Somali Pirates: "Multilateral Solution"

Gary Anderson looks at how to fix the Somali pirates issue in a Small Wars Journal op-ed "A Multilateral Solution to Somali Piracy" (pdf):
We need to avoid becoming entrapped in a “let Uncle Sam do it” situation just because we have the world’s largest and most powerful navy which has excess capacity because Iraq and Afghanistan are mostly land wars. This is why we need to avoid those who call for a blockade of Somalia. Blockades are expensive things. The coast of Somalia rivals the size of the American southeastern seaboard, and it took hundreds of Union ships to blockade the Confederacy during our Civil War. We have the only navy in the world that could do such a thing and not one U.S. merchant ship has so far been lost to the Pirates. The Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, Turks, Chinese, and other seagoing nations have much more at stake than we do; this problem is ripe for a coalition solution, and it can be solved; they need to create an effective coalition in order to solve the problem.

The best way to stop the Somali pirates is not at sea through convoys and blockades; we are not dealing with the German High Seas Fleet or even the Confederate Navy here. The best way to do it is to seize and occupy their fishing village bases along the northern coast of Somalia, which the UN resolution authorizes, and then give the locals something productive to do with themselves besides brigandage. This does not need to be done by U.S. Marines, but it will take good troops. The Somalis like to fight and they are entrepreneurial; if they are not given something productive to do once a coalition stops piracy, they will make armed resistance to an occupation force pay as they did from 1993 to 1995.
He's not wrong. But the lack of interest by any civilized nation in occupying even a small part of Somalis leads to the question: "Where will the coalition forces to serve as occupation troops for the fishing villages and act as "martyr magnets" will come from?"

The second major issue would involve sustaining such forces in the field...

Sunday Ship History: The Ship that Almost Sank the President

Despite the common sayings that "You make your own luck" or that "“Success always comes when preparation meets opportunity,” many sailors believe that some ships have good luck and some ships have bad luck. Obviously, you'd rather serve on a "good luck" ship than on the other kind. Of course, with the U.S. Navy in wartime, you aren't given much choice.

Let's take a look at the notorious hard-luck ship USS William D. Porter (DD-579), commonly referred to as the "Willie D."

Willie D was "a 2050-ton Fletcher class destroyer, ... built at Orange, Texas. Commissioned in July 1943, she shook down and conducted routine operations in the Caribbean and western Atlantic until November 1943 .."

Ah, sweet November. Willie D was assigned to a secret mission and then, well, bad luck or poor training and supervision began to meet opportunity.

Before we get to that part of the saga, we first begin with the only U.S. Navy ship equipped with a bathtub.

The new battleship USS Iowa (BB-61) had completed one combat sea patrol when she was ordered into a shipyard for some special modifications, including a bathtub. When the work was completed, Iowa traveled up Cheasapeake Bay unit she met up with a yacht traveling down from Washington, DC, carrying a distinguished guest who was transferred to the battleship. President Franklin Roosevelt was going to travel by sea to a meeting of the Allied heads of state in North Africa. The bathtub was needed because the crippled president couldn't use a shower. After the president was aboard, Iowa headed down to the Atlantic Ocean for the high speed transit.

On her way, the now "Presidential Battleship" picked up some escort destroyers, including the Willie D. Now, as set out here, the Willie D began to earn her reputation as an "unlucky" ship:
The mishaps began in earnest with the mysterious order to escort the pride of the fleet, the big new battleship IOWA to north Africa. The night before it left Norfolk, Virginia, the W.D. Porter successfully demolished a nearby sister ship when she backed down along the other ship's side and, with her anchor, tore down railings, a life raft, the captain's gig and various other formerly valuable pieces of equipment. The Willie Dee suffered merely a slightly scratched anchor, but her career of mayhem and destruction had begun.

The next event occurred just 24 hours later. The four-ship convoy, consisting of the IOWA and her secret passengers, the W.D. porter and two other destroyers, was under strict instruction to maintain complete silence as they were going through U-boat deeding ground where speed and silence were the best defenses. Suddenly, a tremendous explosion rocked the convoy and all of the ships commenced anti-submarine maneuvers. The maneuvers continued until the W.D. Porter sheepishly admitted that one of her depth charges had fallen off the stern and detonated in the rough sea. The safety had not been set as instructed. Captain Walker's fast track career was fast becoming side-tracked.

Shortly thereafter, a freak wave inundated the W.D. Porter, stripping everything what wasn't lashed down and washing a man overboard who was never found. Next, the engine room lost power in one of its boilers. And, during all, the captain had to make reports almost hourly to the IOWA on the Willie Dee's difficulties. At this point, it would have been merciful for the force commander to have detached the hard luck ship and sent her back to Norfolk.

But that didn't happen. The morning of November 14, 1943 dawned with a moderate sea and pleasant weather. The IOWA and her escorts were just east of Bermuda when the President and his guests wanted to see how the big ship could defend herself against air attack, so the IOWA launched a number of weather balloons to use as antiaircraft targets. Seeing more than 100 guns shooting at the balloons was exciting, and the President was duly proud of his Navy. Just as proud was Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Ernest J. King, large in size and by demeanor a true monarch of the seas. Disagreeing with him meant the end of a Naval Career. Up to this time, no one knew what firing a torpedo at him would mean!

Over on the Willie Dee, Captain Walter watched the fireworks display with admiration and envy. Thinking about career redemption and breaking the hard luck spell, the captain sent his impatient crew to battle stations, and they began to shoot down the balloons that, missed by the IOWA, had drifted into the W.D. Porter's vicinity.

Down on the torpedo mounts, the W.D. Porter's crews watched, waited and prepared to take practice shoots at the big battleship, which, even at 6000 yards seemed to blot out the horizon. Torpedoman Lawton Dawson and Tony Fazio were among those responsible for the torpedoes and for ensuring that the primers (small explosive charges) were installed during actual combat and removed during practice. Dawson, unfortunately, forgot to remove the primer from torpedo tube number three.

Up on the bridge, a new torpedo officer ordered the simulated firing and commanded. "Fire one," "Fire two," and finally, "Fire three." There was no "Fire four." The sequence was interrupted by a whoooooshhh - the unmistakable sound made by a successful armed and launched torpedo.

Lt. H. Seward Lewis, who witnessed the entire event, later described the next few minutes as what hell would look if it ever broke loose. Just after he saw the torpedo hit the water on its way to the IOWA, where some of the most prominent figures in the world history stood, he innocently asked the captain, "Did you give permission to fire a torpedo?"
***
The next five minutes aboard the Willie Dee were pandemonium. Everyone raced around shouting conflicting instructions and attempting to warn the IOWA of imminent danger. First, a flashing light attempted a warning about the torpedo but indicated the wrong direction. Next, the W.D porter signaled that she was going in reverse at full speed.

Despite the strictly enforced radio silence, it was finally decided to notify the IOWA. The radio operator on the destroyer yelled, "Lion (Code word for the IOWA), Lion to come right!" The IOWA operator, more concerned about improper radio procedure, requested that the offending station identify itself first. Finally, the message was received and the IOWA began turning to avoid the speeding torpedo.

Meantime, on the IOWA's bridge, word of the torpedo firing reached President Roosevelt. he only wanted to see the torpedo and asked that his wheelchair be moved to the railing. His loyal Secret Service bodyguard immediately drew his pistol as if to shoot the torpedo!

The IOWA began evasive maneuvers, yet trained all guns on the William D. Porter. There was now some thought that the W.D. Porter was part of an assassination plot. Within moments of the warning, a thunderous explosion occurred behind the IOWA. The torpedo had been detonated by the wash kicked up by the battleship's increased speed. The crisis was over, and so were some careers. Captain Walter's final utterance to the IOWA was in response to a question about the origin of the torpedo. His answer was a weak, "We did it."
From that time forward, the Porter was often greeted with a signal, "Don't shoot! We're Republicans!"

Not surprisingly, the Porter had been banished from the Iowa convoy and sent to Bermuda, where an investigation revealed the torpedo shot was a human error and not an intentional attempt to assassinate President Roosevelt. The ship was sent off the Aleutians where she performed adequately except for an incident during which an allegedly drunken sailor managed to shoot a 5" round at the base commander's quarters (no one was injured except, I suppose, the sailor who did the shooting).

Porter left the Aleutians and participated in a number of battles and escort duties, doing her job well and finally becoming part of the anti-kamikaze screen off Okinawa (see here). It was her luck, bad or otherwise, finally ran out.

Willie D shot down a kamikaze but the aircraft landed close enough to the ship that the suicide plane's bomb, exploding near the destroyer's hull, ultimately sank the Porter despite efforts by various LCSs to assist her (see here). In a rare moment of good luck, the entire Porter crew was saved. As the caption of the nearby photo says:
Sinking after she was near-missed by a "Kamikaze" suicide aircraft off Okinawa, 10 June 1945. USS LCS-86 and another LCS are alongside, taking off her crew.
Though not actually hit by the enemy plane, William D. Porter received fatal underwater damage from the near-by explosion.
Though she will always be remembered as the ship that almost sank the president, her crew also should be remembered as men to went into harm's way and, except for a few bumps along the way, defended their country. It's time to give them some credit and a salute.

Saturday, December 20, 2008

Somali Pirates: Somehow the U.S.'s fault according to the AP

Opinion piece from an AP "reporter" Analysis: Pirates, poverty mark US Somalia failure:
The Bush administration inherited a mess in strategic Somalia and may be leaving President-elect Barack Obama with a worse one.

The explosion of piracy off Somalia's coast is an attention-grabbing product of internal chaos in the Horn of Africa country, and a problem that will outlast the administration's success this past week in winning U.N. backing for possible pirate-hunting raids on Somali territory.
Whatever, it's my opinion that the reporter has no clue about what the U.S. strategic interests are in Somalia - which would be virtually none - and just wants to poke another stick into the departing Bush administration.

The issue, as always, comes down to "nation-building" and any U.S. involvement in that pretty much ended when the Clinton administration withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia after suffering some military losses. One can argue that the losses were exacerbated by the lack of sufficient armored U.S. forces to support the operations of U.S. special forces - a sign of a lack of commitment in the first place.

That the Somalis have been unable or unwilling to break through their clan system to find their own path to internal peace even with extensive UN food and other aid, much of which flows from the U.S., is not really a U.S. problem. That some factions in Somalia are friendly to known anti-U.S. terror groups does not win over American hearts and minds. As the opinion piece notes:
To address Somalia's underlying problems, the U.S. and the rest of the world would have to spend money building or rebuilding basic services and structures and encourage charities, development organizations and the Somalis themselves to do the same.

The Obama team should also ditch the myopic view of Somalia as little more than a hatchery for Islamic terrorism, said J. Anthony Holmes, head of the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and a former top Africa official at the State Department. He was working there when terrorists trained in what had become a terrorist haven in Afghanistan struck the U.S. on Sept. 11 2001.

"There was a very serious concern that Somalia could be the next Afghanistan, and we've been reacting to that possibility ever since, but only in the most short-term respect," Holmes said. "We've been trying to kill terrorists rather than to facilitate the rebuilding of a state that would be inhospitable to terrorists."
While I agree that the Somalis need to create a nation out of chaos, they have been given plenty opportunity and a bunch of UN/U.S. aid. The Somali clans have corrupted the process of aid delivery - hijacking overland food caravans, kidnapping and killing aid workers, hijacking aid ships. That there are millions of displaced Somalis and thousands of starving children is as true today as it was when UN forces entered Somalia in the 1990s to "restore hope":
The civil war disrupted agriculture and food distribution in southern Somalia. The basis of most of the conflicts was clan allegiances and competition for resources between the warring clans. James Bishop, the United States last ambassador to Somalia, explained that there is "competition for water, pasturage, and... cattle. It is a competition that used to be fought out with arrows and sabers... Now it is fought out with AK-47s." The resulting famine caused the United Nations Security Council in 1992 to authorize the limited peacekeeping operation United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM's use of force was limited to self-defence and it was soon disregarded by the warring factions. In reaction to the continued violence and the humanitarian disaster, the United States organised a military coalition with the purpose of creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for the conduct of humanitarian operations. This coalition, (Unified Task Force or UNITAF) entered Somalia in December 1992 on Operation Restore Hope and was successful in restoring order and alleviating the famine. In May 1993, most of the United States troops withdrew and UNITAF was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

However, Aidid saw UNOSOM II as a threat to his power and in June 1993 his militia attacked Pakistan Army troops, attached to UNOSOM II, (see Somalia (March 1992 to February 1996)) in Mogadishu inflicting over 80 casualties. Fighting escalated until 18 American troops and more than 1,000 Somalis were killed in a raid in Mogadishu during October 1993. The UN withdrew Operation United Shield in 3 March 1995, having suffered significant casualties, and with the rule of government still not restored.
I am unclear on how Mr. J. Anthony Holmes, "head of the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations" proposes that order be restored without a putting troops on the ground and essentially disarming and entire population while providing alternative and legitimate income sources for clans that are profiting quite nicely from the chaos they help perpetuate. In addition spending billions on Somalia is unlikely in a time when the U.S. is trying to spend its way out of a recession. Somalis and the CFR better start thinking of low cost alternatives to dumping more money into the Somali money pit.

As most Americans have noted, the U.S. military is otherwise occupied right now. As Gahlran at Information Dissemination has noted, the countries most affected by the Somali pirates are beginning to get the idea that the U.S. is not going to "ride to the rescue" in Somali anti-piracy operations and are sending their own, quite capable naval forces to provide anti-piracy patrols and enforcement.

I believe the most rational policy toward Somali pirates is containment, which seems to be the focus of the current effort being used to reduce piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Containment involves keeping ships well off the coast of Somalia, providing escorts for UN WFP ships, providing convoy services for merchants in designated sea lanes, patrolling the sea lanes and responding vigorously to attacks. The cost of such efforts is substantially below the cost of invading and building a real nation out of Somalia.

And I doubt very seriously that it matters who the president was or will be when the subject of Somalia pops up. It is not really a U.S. problem today - any more than it was in 1992.

UPDATE: Mark Bowden author of Blackhawk Down writes of Somalia at the WaPo:
Ould-Abdallah was still hopeful when we spoke that some sort of meaningful power-sharing arrangement will be worked out among the warlords and moderate Islamists before the Ethiopians leave. He said that he had been heartened by the participation in ongoing talks of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former commander of the Islamist courts, though the sheikh's willingness to talk has been denounced by many who once followed his lead. Ould-Abdullah said that although the compromise he is trying to reach will probably bear the label "Islamist," it doesn't necessarily mean the imposition of radical fundamentalism.
***
There is hope in the fact that whatever sort of central authority emerges, whether it is strictly Islamist or some U.N.-brokered coalition, will need substantial international help. The problems of food, shelter and basic health care are so pressing that without enormous humanitarian investment, Somalia will slip further into crisis.
***
One of the most surprising things about Somalia is that despite its broken-down state, some things do seem to work. Most people are not starving. Markets thrive. Ould-Abdallah told me he's always surprised that his cellphone works better there than in some far more stable and prosperous neighboring countries.
I would guess most people are not starving because of the food aid provided by the World Food Program. I guess one could ask whether the continued delivery aid into a corrupt system is somewhat akin to those who facilitate an alcoholic - does it allow the Somalis to avoid confronting their reality?

Mr. Bowden sees the need for engagement with Somalia to prevent further deterioration citing at the end of his piece a sort of "broken windows" theory. While I have used that anaolgy with respect to the Somali pirates, it seems to me that the internal functioning of Somalia must be left to the Somalis - as hard as that is to watch from afar. If they can make their cell phone system work, they can find a government that will work for them. When they do - aid should follow immediately.

UPDATE: Probably a good idea to review a little of what happened during the last "humanitarian intervention" in Somalia as set out in a William Finnegan piece from the New Yorker in 1995:

The alliance that overthrew Siad Barre had no dominant figure who survived, and the outside world, perhaps distracted by the Gulf War, did not try to broker a settlement. Indeed, the United Nations retained no presence whatever in Somalia for nearly a year after Siad Barre fell. And the United States had previously renounced its geostrategic stake in the region. After a few months, still heavily armed, the strongest clan militias began to fight.

Meanwhile, Siad Barre's forces, having regrouped along the border with Kenya, were attempting a comeback, and at one point battled their way to within twenty miles of Mogadishu. The famine of 1992 was the direct result of this fighting in the south. Unlike the rest of the country, southern Somalia is well watered, and for that reason it is inhabited predominantly by farmers, not nomads. The agriculturalist clans are no match militarily for their nomadic countrymen, who have always formed the bulk of the armies fighting the civil war and, hungry themselves, have systematically robbed the farming clans and driven them off their lands. Poor rainfall exacerbated the plight of the farmers: they began to starve en masse. Relief efforts were hampered by the fighting, and by increasingly brazen looting and blackmail by the armed parties, with General Aidid's forces controlling much of the famine zone. International press coverage of this impasse, and particularly the harrowing images of starving children, finally provoked, in December, 1992, the great multinational intervention, led by the United States, to open relief-supply routes. In truth, the famine was already receding by then -- death rates had been dropping for months -- but the intervention did hasten the region's recovery, saving, at least by the reckoning of its proponents, more than a hundred thousand lives.

The intervention also stopped the banditry in much of southern Somalia. To read reports from the early days of the intervention is horribly sad now, for they are full of the euphoria of war-weary Somalis at the return of a semblance of peace. The power of the warlords had been broken, many said. Plans to disarm the warring factions were initiated. They were never carried through, however, and most of the American soldiers, who constituted the backbone of the intervention -- twenty-five thousand troops in an international force of about thirty thousand -- left Somalia in April, 1993. Victor Gbeho, the last of several United Nations "special representatives" to Somalia, told me recently, "We should have had the courage to do the disarmament. The Somalis expected it, and it would have been possible." But Gbeho's own spokesman, George Bennett, disagrees. There were just too many weapons around, he says, and the warlords could always have bought new ones.

In any event, soon after the United Nations took command of the operation, in May, 1993, it began to go sour. General Aidid's forces attacked Pakistani troops in Mogadishu in June, and Admiral Jonathan Howe, then the U.N. envoy, ordered Aidid's arrest, putting a price of twenty-five thousand dollars on his head. Aidid defied the U.N., gaining public support by aligning himself with a history of Somalian resistance to Italian, British, and Ethiopian colonizers. The remaining American airborne units led the increasingly violent search for Aidid, bombing and strafing suspected hideouts, and killing more than a thousand civilians. One disastrous raid in October left eighteen U.S. Army Rangers dead and seventy-five wounded, and after that the Americans effectively withdrew from the fray. Aidid was never captured, and the United Nations military profile was steadily lowered.

On the political side, the United Nations tried to help rebuild government at the grass roots through district councils composed of local "leaders," but in most places it found itself lost among the endless subclans and eddies of local power. The United Nations' efforts to broker a peace agreement between the major clans were, of course, also unavailing. It seemed that neither Aidid nor Ali Mahdi would accept anything less than the Presidency. Having built up Aidid politically through its pursuit of him, the United Nations built him up further, after taking the price off his head, by dealing with him as though he controlled areas of the country which he did not in fact control. The U.N., which had earlier preferred Ali Mahdi, seemed to be hoping to create a strongman to hand Somalia over to. And yet the buildup of Aidid was not enough to shift the balance of power decisively in his favor, and by the end of its Somalia mission the United Nations was openly preferring Ali Mahdi again.

Where the U.N. continued to function, it tended to spawn large colonies of clients. Thus, by 1994 there were estimated to be in Mogadishu alone more than a thousand "local N.G.O.s" -- non-governmental organizations, set up by Somalis to channel foreign funds into worthy projects like orphanages and literacy training. What fraction of these projects might be legitimate was impossible to determine, but it was widely thought to be small. The direct U.N. payroll, meanwhile, was immense. By the end of its mission, the U.N. was easily the biggest employer in Somalia. Counting dependents, it was supporting, according to some estimates, a hundred thousand people in Mogadishu. And rumor had it that a significant tax was being collected from those wages by the warlords, who were grimly rearming.

Even the U.N.'s ostensible main purpose in Somalia -- to help the country form a government -- seemed at times quite out of synch with the facts on the ground. Many of the nicer houses still standing in south Mogadishu, for instance, are being inhabited by people who do not legally own them -- mooryaan from the countryside, mostly, enjoying their first sojourn in the city. What interest do these young fighters have in peace and reconciliation? A government might permit homeowners to return and evict them. A government might restore law and order, reducing the demand for their services as gunmen. They might even be forced to go back to the countryside, back to their camels and sheep. Then, there are all the businessmen who are doing very nicely in the current, low-tax climate. Some of them are indistinguishable from the warlords (whom they must accommodate, in any event). The U.N., sponsoring its endless, expensive peace conferences in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, often seemed entirely unaware of this kind of structural resistance to the solving of the Somalian conundrum.

Somalia turned into one of the biggest, most expensive projects in U.N. history. The final bill came to more than two billion dollars. The mission could have lasted longer than it did, but once it became clear that "institution building" was going nowhere and that democratic elections would never be held, Security Council support evaporated. The mission's failure was not only political and military but administrative: the Somalia operation became notoriously corrupt (U.N. contracts and equipment, including vehicles, were simply for sale, particularly after the Americans left, in early 1994) and astoundingly wasteful (the U.N. compound in Mogadishu was rebuilt at a cost of more than fifty million dollars and then, in early February, was abandoned to looters). The subsequent reluctance of U.N. members to contribute to new peacekeeping missions, such as the desperately undersubscribed project in Rwanda, can be substantially attributed to the Somalia fiasco. More broadly, the type of aggressive international intervention to stop civilian suffering and establish civil authority -- overriding traditional concerns about national sovereignty -- which was pioneered by the Somalia mission and was regularly touted by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has been badly discredited. The United States, for its part, felt far less enthusiasm for working with the United Nations -- and for international rescue missions in general -- by the time it left Somalia than it had felt when the troops arrived, in the heady days of 1992.

Somali Pirates: Iran joins pirate fight

Reported as Iran sends warship to fight Somali pirates:
An Iranian warship has entered the Gulf of Aden to protect Iranian vessels against pirates off the coast of Somalia, state radio said on Saturday.

"After travelling more than 4,000 maritime miles ... an Iranian warship entered the Gulf of Aden to protect Iranian ships against pirates," the radio said, without further details.

Iran said last month it was negotiating with pirates who seized a ship it had chartered but that it was ready to use force to free the vessel.

Friday, December 19, 2008

Somali Pirates: Malaysian Navy helps Chinese crew under attack

International Maritime Bureau relates how the Malaysian Navy came to the aid of the Chinese cargo ship in Royal Malaysian Navy thwarts pirate attack:
The ICC International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) received the distress call from the Chinese heavy lift vessel, Zhen Hua 4, which was broadcast immediately to all the naval commands in the area. The Zhen Hua 4 had been boarded by pirates who had not been able to enter the accommodation block. The crew of the vessel had locked themselves in having attempted to thwart the boarders through evasive manouvres and the use of water cannons.

The Combined Task Force requested a Malaysian Naval vessel, which was closest to the distress position to respond. The Malaysian warship scrambled a helicopter to the scene of the attack closely followed by the warship. When the Malaysian helicopter arrived there were six pirates on board the hijacked vessel and three on board a nearby skiff. Warning shots were fired at the skiff causing the pirates to panic and capsizing the skiff as a result . The attackers withdrew and fled on board another skiff that was alongside the Zhen Hua 4. The Malaysian Navy reported seeing a suspected pirate ‘mother ship’ near the vessel. Another Combined Task Force vessel supported the actions taken by the Malaysian Naval vessel.
Photo shows pirate boat alongside Chinese ship (arrow added). More photos here.

UPDATE: More infor here along with photo.

Friday Reading

Daniel Sekulich at Modern Day Pirate Tales offers up Pirates and peacekeepers with photos of the crew of a Chinese vessel under attack by pirates as they prepare Molotov cocktails to fight the pirates and one looking at the business end of two RPGs in the hands of pirates. Daniel also notes an ironic twist in the position of the US and the UN in dealing with Somalia. Many more photos here.

CDR Salamander does Fullbore Friday with a look at the CA-31.

John does a little OPSEC lesson teaching.

Spook86 on a rail line threat that probably falls under Coast Guard jurisdiction at least on the waterside. I know they cover the topic in America's Waterway Watch. For a small service, they have a heck of lot on their plate. A couple of years ago the Weekly World News reported on a different way to protect bridges from whence comes the photo. UPDATE: The surviving WWW website has an update. Maybe not work safe.

A different sort of amusement here, where professional mariners take on the ship of fools run by the self-reported pirates from Save the Whales.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

Port of L.A. Cargo Slump

Reported as "Los Angeles terminal operators 'in trouble':
Port of Los Angeles executive director Dr Geraldine Knatz has told the Los Angeles Harbor Commission that the port’s terminal operators are now facing a 20-30% drop in volume in the first quarter of 2009 and some terminals may have trouble meeting their minimum rent obligations Some operators have told Dr Knatz that volumes had “cratered” with one terminal down 50% on last year. LA’s biggest customer is Maersk and it has recently moved to pulls ships off the transpacific trade and consolidate some volume in Seattle at LA’s and Tacoma’s expense. Dr Knatz has written to port staff advising them of the need to understand that customers are in “survival mode.” To play its part the port is recommending that the Commission shelve the per TEU infrastructure fee slated to be levied from next January and “modify the clean truck program to lessen the [financial] impact.” Dr Knatz added that this is not the time to borrow for capital investment and projects that generate revenue for tenants must now have top priority. She has issued a hiring and overtime freeze and the port’s audit committee has made an additional US$20M in budget cuts (9% of expenditure) on top of cuts previously made. Some projects under the ports clean air action plan are certain to be delayed or cancelled. Dr Knatz warned: “Times have changed. We embarked on the clean air action plan when times were good and now we are trying to implement it when times are bad.”

Somali Pirates: Shipping container surcharge caused by pirate risk


A French container carrier is imposing a "surcharge" on containers being carried through the piracy risk areas of the Gulf of Aden, as reported here:
FRENCH container carrier CMA CGM is to impose a $23 per teu* surcharge on all containers it transports through the pirate-frequented Gulf of Aden from January 1.

The company’s announcement comes days after it accepted a demand from crews for double pay for the time of transit through the zone designated as being under threat of pirate attack.
***
It justified the measure by “increased insurance premium and other costs caused by the prevailing risks of piracy in the area”.
Crew rate increases, insurance rate increases,ship diversions and passenger ship fly arounds can now all be laid at the feet of the pirates plying their trade in the Gulf of Aden.

*A "TEU" is a term referring to a container size and stands for a "twenty-foot equivalent unit" measuring 20 × 8.0 × 8.5 feet (6.1 × 2.4 × 2.6 metres). A container ship's capacity may be measured in "TEUs." A little history of shipping containers here.

Website for CMA-CGM.
Some container ships may have 10,000 or more TEU capacity.

UN Chief Says Somalia "Not Ready" for UN Peacekeepers

Could this be the least surprising story of the week? - "UN Chief Says Time Not Ripe for Somalia Peacekeeping Operation":
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Wednesday that he disagrees with the United States that it is time to send U.N. peacekeepers to Somalia.

He said he has been trying over the past four months to respond to a Security Council request to establish a multi-national stabilization force for Somalia.

Mr. Ban said he has spoken to 50 countries, but the responses have "either been lukewarm or negative." He said no country has volunteered to lead such a mission and only one or two have expressed a willingness to contribute troops. Among Security Council members, he said just one country has stepped forward to offer funding and equipment - but not peacekeepers.

"Therefore, my efforts to establish international stabilization forces may not be materialized at this time. But I know that there are some member states of the Security Council, including the United States, who favor to establish United Nations peacekeeping operations there," he said. "I believe, and all my senior advisors and staff in DPKO [the Department of Peacekeeping Operations] and concerned departments, their assessment is the situation is not ripe, the conditions are not favorable to consider a U.N. peacekeeping operation."
No one wants to get stuck in Somalia.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Somali Pirates: Pirate Attack Photos

Question the courage of merchant ship crews facing attacks by Somali pirates armed "only" with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades? Go to Fred Fry International: Pirate Attack Photos - M/V KAPITAN MASLOV and see what they are up against on a thin-hulled merchant ship...

Somali Pirates: Chinese crew beat back attack but yacht not so lucky

Reported here:
Chinese sailors backed up by international navies fought off Somali pirates trying to hijack their ship Wednesday, as the UN authorised land operations against the increasingly bold bandits on land.

The dramatic high-seas encounter was among a fresh wave of attacks by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, where three other ships were hijacked on Tuesday, as China considered whether to send warships to the pirate-infested waters.

A band of pirates boarded the Chinese-owned vessel "Zhenhua 4" on Wednesday, but the sailors prevented them from invading their crew accommodation for several hours -- enough time to seek help from the coalition forces.

"I'm actually very surprised that the crew managed to hold back the pirates. I don't know how they did it, but they did it," said Noel Choong, head of the International Maritime Bureau piracy reporting centre in Kuala Lumpur.

"Because of this action, the military helicopters came and they managed to chase the pirates away. The pirates on board eventually left the ship and the master is proceeding on his course," he told AFP.

The rescue of the Chinese crew was the latest successful intervention from the newly created European Union naval task force, which has taken over patrols off the Horn of Africa from NATO.

But Somali pirates managed to capture three other ships in the Gulf of Aden on Tuesday, said Andrew Mwangura of the Kenyan chapter of the East African Seafarers Assistance Programme.

The pirates seized a yacht crewed by just two people and two commercial ships: a cargo vessel, the Bosphorus Progidy; and a tug serving as an oil industry support ship, said Mwangura.

French oil giant Total said the tug, owned by Malaysia's Muhibbah Engineering, had a crew of 11 and had been working for them.
Convoys, convoys, convoys.

The Chinese are mulling over whether to send a couple of ships to join in the anti-pirate force, as reported here:
A military strategist told China Daily that joining other countries to fight Somali pirates would be a "very good opportunity" for the Chinese navy to get into the thick of the action.

"Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese navy," Prof Li Jie, a naval researcher, told China Daily.

China has never dispatched any troops on combat missions overseas. But in 2002, two Chinese vessels - a destroyer and a supplier - spent four months on a global tour, the country's first.

Li also would not confirm the mission but added that "if the navy's special forces join in, that will be in order to counter the pirates' attempt to board other ships".

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

UN okays land and air attacks on Somali

Reported as UN gives OK to land, air attacks on Somali pirates:
On the same day Somali gunmen seized two more ships, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Tuesday to authorize nations to conduct land and air attacks on pirate bases on the coast of the Horn of Africa country.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was on hand to push through the resolution, one of President George W. Bush's last major foreign policy initiatives.

Rice said the resolution will have a significant impact, especially since "pirates are adapting to the naval presence in the Gulf of Aden by traveling further" into sea lanes not guarded by warships sent by the U.S. and other countries.

The council authorized nations to use "all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia" to stop anyone using Somali territory to plan or carry out piracy in the nearby waters traversed each year by thousands of cargo ships sailing between Asia and the Suez Canal.

That includes the use of Somali airspace, even though the U.S. appeased Indonesia, a council member, by removing direct mention of it, U.S. officials said.

Somali Pirates: Two Ships Nabbed off Somalia

Reported here:
A tugboat, most of on aboard are believed to be Indonesians, and a Turkish cargo ship have been hijacked off the coast of the war-wracked Somalia on Tuesday, according to agencies' reports.

The tugboat operated by the French oil giant Total was on its way to Malaysia when it was hijacked, the reports said.

Somali Pirates: Exploiting Cracks in International Relations

Another piece in the NY Times about how the Somali "Pirates Outmaneuver Warships Off Somalia", which is only partially true.

The pirates have an advantage of not revealing themselves until they strike and are able to hide among the normal fishing and other traffic. The few warships assigned to cover a massive amount of ocean are easily spotted by pirates, and, I assume, there movements are reported by spotters to pirates who have radios and GPS systems.

The pirates further have an advantage in that international law no longer allows them, once captured, to be strung up from a yardarm as a lesson to other pirates. Instead, as is the case with the 23 pirates being held on an Indian warship, they are a burden on the warship and its crew as they try to determine what to do with the Somalis. See here:
With no instructions from the Indian government, naval officers on board the ship INS Mysore are confused about what to do with the 23 pirates and their dhow apprehended in the Gulf of Aden while repulsing an attack on an Ethiopian merchant vessel.

"Since Saturday afternoon, the 12 Somali and 11 Yemeni pirates are in custody on board INS Mysore and they are being fed with rations meant for sailors," Navy officials said here on Monday.

"We have not received any instructions yet from the defence ministry or the external affairs ministry on what needs to be done with the pirates," they said

The piquant situation that INS Mysore finds itself in has been compounded as the Rules of Engagement issued to the warship before it set sail to Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy patrol duties is unclear on the course of action if it did seize a pirate vessel and sea brigands, officials said.

However, officials claimed that frantic efforts were in progress in both ministries to get a foreign port to accept the bandits for trial in their courts and were optimistic of finding a solution by Tuesday.

The only other option available to INS Mysore is to abandon its anti-piracy patrols and return to an Indian port to hand over the pirates to local authorities for trying them.
The fact that Somalia has no real government merely adds to the confusion - and frustration.

By the way - surprised to find Yemenis listed among the pirates? Get over it. Piracy is making enough money that it is drawing area thugs like flies drawn to a honey pot.

And don't be shocked that the pirates are adopting new tactics, including swarming attacks by multiple boats, as they figure out how to counter the limited defenses mounted on merchant ships. With a 20 or 30 boat swarm of RPG and automatic weapon laden pirates, an armed security team would have to be pretty large to avoid being overwhelmed. Neither should pirate expansion to areas outside the Gulf of Aden be a surprise. They are inside the NATO/EU OODA loop.

Safety lies in a old fashioned pirate fighting techniques, such as a good escort/accompaniment system.
NATO/EU and French ships (Update: and the Russians) have set up such a plan, but many shipping companies don't want to be delayed waiting for a convoy to form and rely, instead, on the knowledge that the pirates are only grabbing a small percentage of all the ships that flow through the risk areas and further seem to be moving up the shipping scale from the small freighters and fishing boats they used to nab to bigger, more high profile ships like tankers and cruise ships. The pirates, to borrow a phrase attributed to the bank robber Willie Sutton, know "that's where the money is." To some ship owners, the risks are relatively low and they have overhead to meet. You might note that the crews of the captured ships are rarely natives of European countries - the ship owners have gone for low cost labor from the Philippines, India and Pakistan to crew their ships. Their real investment is in the hull and the time value of the use of the ship.

The pirate business model is pretty simple. They maintain a low overhead operation. Weapons and people come cheap in Somalia and Yemen. They use inexpensive fishing boats that blend in with the local fishermen. They reportedly use captured vessels as "mother ships." GPS equipment and some phones, even sat phones are not expensive. If your lose a boatload of pirates, a boat or even a mother ship, everything can cheaply and easily be replaced. Unlike the old time pirates like Blackbeard, the pirate leaders are not out on the small boats risking their lives and investments with the pirate crews. Update: A look at the way they maintain initiative in ransom negotiations here:
"All the initiative has been held by pirates during the negotiations. The pirates have a system for bargaining, and we've been moving accordingly. They released a few ships before Eid al-Adha; however, they later hijacked a few other ships. That's to say, they don't want to empty a pool in which they have around 30 or 40 ships," Marangoz was quoted as saying by Anatolia.

"We know that there were examples in which pirates didn't release the ships after receiving money from companies as advanced payment. That's why we conduct bargaining while taking these possibilities into consideration. Experience also shows that bargaining with pirates takes approximately one-and-a-half or two months. We've been approaching the end of this process. Our sole goal is rescuing our crew safe and sound," Marangoz added.
Operating out of a state with no local law enforcement, and where palms are easily greased if there were, means low risk on the shore side to both the boat crews and their masters, many of whom seem to live outside Somalia anyway. Cash payments of ransom keep the leaders off the international financial radar and reporting system. Somalia's reputation as a hornet's nest is keeping foreign powers offshore and away from the pirates, recent rumblings about seeking authority to go ashore with military force aside.

Is any nation standing up and volunteering to lead the charge? Does any nation, other than the U.S., have the capacity to put a major military force ashore in Somalia and sustain it through a nation building process? Does the U.S. have a vital national interest at stake in Somalia? I have a round of "Nopes" for you. Feel free to disagree.

Now is the time to start thinking about other weak or failing states with sea access where the U.S.'s national interests might be affected. Nigeria, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico come to mind.

What steps should we be taking?

UPDATE: Time magazine suggests fixing Somalia. A "Marshall Plan for Somalia?"

Good luck with that.

Monday, December 15, 2008

Monday Reading

Start off youir maritime week with Maritime Monday 140 wherein Fred Fry captures the sea-doings of the past week and also has pictures of the ships of the Dutch line Flinter.

Somali Pirates: Shore fight needs more intel

Ignore the stupid headline - Gates says U.S. lacks intelligence to fight Somalia pirates - and concentrate on the message:
The United States lacks the intelligence needed to pursue the fight against pirates on Somali soil, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Saturday.

His comments came days after the U.S. delegation at the United Nations circulated a draft resolution that would give countries the right to pursue pirates on land as well as at sea.

Analysts say that pursuing pirates on land is crucial to any military response to attacks that have targeted dozens of ships in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean in recent months.

"With the level of information we have at the moment, we're not in a position to do that kind of land-based operation," Gates told a regional security conference in Bahrain. "Our first need is intelligence, (to know) who is behind it."

Referring to media reports that "two to three clans or extended families" were behind the pirate attacks on ships off the Somali coast, Gates said: "If we can identify who those clans are then we can operate on land under the auspices of the United Nations and seek out ways to minimize collateral damage."

Somali Pirates: Tough to spot


The captain of a English warship provides a look at the work of pirate hunting here
Speaking from the Kenyan port of Mombassa, Cdr Simpson said: "They are like a needle in a haystack. They don't identify themselves.

"They tend to be in small skiffs with outboard motors on the back and they'll wait for the right sort of ship to go by.

"The weather has been quite windy recently and it has been kicking up white horses on the top of waves, which makes them even more difficult to see.

"Then you have got the entire Yemeni fishing fleet, who also work out of small skiffs. So not only have you got to identify the pirates, you have got to try and sort them out from everything else as well. It is a difficult task.

"It is a big sea and these are small ships, so we have to be in the right place at the right time.

"A bigger force of warships in the area can only be a good thing because it provides the opportunity for warships to be in the right area when an act of piracy takes place. The ideal solution is find them before that happens."
Many people seem to think the pirates are alone on the sea flying the "Jolly Roger" while the commercial ships flow politely in traffic lanes. It's a lot more chaotic than that out there.

UPDATE: Corrected to reflect proper nationality of ship as per comment 2.

Sunday, December 14, 2008

Sunday Ship History: Naval Ammunition Depots

Forty years ago, driving across the relative flat lands in the center of Nebraska, it might have struck some drivers as odd to run across a large Navy facility near Hastings - the Naval

Ammunition Depot (NAD), Hastings. In fact out in the midlands the Navy built its largest ammunition depot, where ammunition for Navy ships was both manufactured and stored while awaiting shipment to either coast.

Before World War II, the U.S. Navy had an uncomplicated ammunition storage system, as set out here:

Under the Navy's peacetime practice, each combat unit of the fleet was provided at the time of its commissioning with enough ammunition to fill its magazines, and,in addition, a reserve supply was stored ashore. Periodically, much of this ammunition had to be overhauled, an operation involving the removal of all explosive material and the refilling with new, and the checking of all mechanical parts. The nature of the overhaul operation was such that it was feasible of accomplishment only at a well-equipped shore station. As safety considerations demanded that a combat ship have its magazines emptied before coming into a navy yard, convenience suggested that the ammunition depots, equipped to store the reserve supply and the magazine ammunition and to conduct the overhaul operations, be located in close proximity to the yards.

On the East Coast, the naval ammunition depot at Hingham, Mass., was only 12 miles away from the Boston Navy Yard, across Boston Harbor. The New York area had two depots, one at Iona Island, N.Y., 45 miles up the Hudson River,devoted primarily to industrial activities, and one at Lake Denmark, N.J., 50 miles northwest of the yard by rail, serving principally as a storage depot. For Philadelphia, there was the Fort Mifflin depot, across the Schuylkill River from the navy Yard The St. Juliens Creek depot, 3 miles up the Elizabeth River from the Norfolk Navy Yard, was part of the important Hampton Roads operating area. In addition,at Yorktown, Va., there was a large mine depot, which will be discussed in this chapter as roughly equivalent to an ammunition depot.

East of the Sierra Nevada, 375 miles by rail from the San Francisco Bay area, was the newest ammunition depot, at Hawthorne, Nev., well located to support the depots at Mare Island and Puget Sound. It was the only depot within the United States that was up to date in design, for its very existence could be attributed to a disastrous explosion at one of the older depots which had brought in its train a revolutionary change in ammunition stowage practices.

That the handling of explosives was dangerous should not be a surprise. The explosion referred to above involved the Lake Denmark site destroyed virtually the entire Naval Depot and also did a great deal of damage to an adjacent Army ammunition facility. A fuller description of incident is set out here. An interesting presentation on current issues resulting from the New Jersey blast can be viewed here.

As noted, the main lesson learned from the event was that ammunition bunkers needed to be spread further apart to avoid the sort of chain reaction that destroyed the New Jersey facility. It also looks like it dawned on the engineering command that it might be a good idea to place future depots in less densely populated than New Jersey or Massachusetts - thus, Nevada and Nebraska were logical choices.

In the days that immediately preceded the U.S. entry int WWII the Navy began to make improvements to its existing facilities and development of additional magazines in Charleston, SC and Puget Sound, Washington. Further, a large facility was established in southwestern Indiana as Crane Naval Ammunition Depot. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, an ammunition shipping facility was authorized for the San Francisco area, in the East Bay (actually Suisun Bay off the Sacramento River at Port Chicago. Some of you will recall the later Port Chicago explosion and mutiny. See also here.

Despite these steps and many others, it became apparent that even more was needed:
Even while the depots at Hawthorne and Crane were being expanded so prodigiously in the early summer of 1942, it became apparent that the need for inland production and storage of naval ammunition would still not be met. Enlargements under way would,when completed, tax the capacities of their rail connections, however, and further expansion, it was decided, would have to take place at new points.Plans were laid, therefore, for the building of two additional inland depots, on transcontinental railroads, and the choice of location fell on Hastings, Nebr., and McAlester, Okla. On the first of July, letters of intent were forwarded to contracting firms authorizing them to begin construction.

The two new stations were designed as twins, as nearly identical as the sites permitted; the contract for each depot called for the construction of 707b magazines, 70 storage buildings, 2 large-caliber loading plants, 2 medium-caliber loading plants, and a two-line bomb and mine filling plant.

Operation of an ammunition depot requires a large organization. Until the summer of 1942, all depot labor had been civilian,but,under the circumstances that had come about, it became impossible to maintain operations on that basis. The new depots had been deliberately located in thinly populated areas, areas incapable of supplying the wartime labor force for the huge operations necessary. To relive the condition of inadequate forces, civilian housing projects had been developed near several of the depots, but it was finally decided that civilian labor would have to be supplemented by enlisted personnel, a decision resulting in the formation of Ordnance Battalions.

The Nebraska and Oklahoma facilities each were over 70 square miles in size. Storage bunker design was practical:
High explosive magazines for bulk explosives and high-explosive loaded in thin containers, fuses and detonators, were reinforced-concrete earth-covered arch structures, 256 feet wide and 20,50, or 80 feet long. For less hazardous but still highly inflammable materials, like smokeless powder, fixed and semi-fixed ammunition, small arms ammunition and loaded projectiles, magazines were of two general types: above-ground and earth-covered. Magazines of the above-ground type, illustrating earlier practice, were built with masonry walls, either of reinforced concrete or brick, with light steel roof trusses supporting a pitched roof of corrugated cement-asbestos. The light roofs were designed to be blown off in the event of an explosion. The earth-covered magazines were built either as three-span multiple arches or as vertical-walled, flat-roofed, reinforced-concrete structures. A large number of experimental triple-beehive magazines was built at McAlester, but not repeated elsewhere. Irrespective of structural type, these magazines provided about 5,000 square feet of useful storage space.

Storehouses for inert materials and buildings to house industrial operations were of masonry when permanent construction was called for; otherwise, of timber frame and composition-board siding. All building design was dictated by the function to be served.

Based on the disaster at Lake Denmark, great care was taken to provide protection against lightning:
Lighting protection was an important feature of construction at all stations. All metal, including concrete reinforcing, had to be thoroughly grounded in buildings were explosive or inflammable materials were to be stored or handled. Buildings not earth-covered were provided with a primary lightning protection system composed of a number of grounded steel masts interconnected under ground by a heavy wire girdle. The line of masts, typically surrounded the structure to be protected, a few feet outside the building lines, providing an "umbrella of protection."
The effect of the building of a large ammunition depot on the town of Hastings, Nebraska, is well set out here (good short video here):
The construction of a $45 million ammunition depot (the largest in the nation) brought both growth and stress to Hastings Nebraska. The development helped the Hastings community emerge from the Depression, but it also brought a great influx of immigrants and created new social pressures. At its peak, the depot employed approximately 2,000 military personnel and 6,692 civilian production workers. There were also 2,000 civilians still involved in construction of the plant. All together, over 10,000 workers.
In addition to the regular problems of rapid growth, there was a substantial issue with racial prejudice - both during the construction as many construction workers were Native Americans and with about 20% of the plant workers, who were black Americans:
Racial prejudice became even more apparent when the Navy announced that black sailors and civilians would serve at the Hastings ammunition depot. Immediately there was concern among the white residents about where the newcomers would be housed.
***
The federal government also provided housing for black civilian workers in the Spencer Park addition located in southeastern Hastings. When Spencer Park was completed in 1944, black families lived in 260 buildings in the southeastern section farthest away from Hastings. The Hastings community had limited experience with race relations, but it now had segregated housing. Not surprising, the segregated Navy provided segregated on-base housing as well.
***
There was a need for recreation as well as housing, and once again, the solution was a separate facility. There wasn't much for African Americans to do in Hastings when they weren't working. Every Friday afternoon Hastings NAD officials provided "cattle trucks" with benches on the sides, to transport black workers to Omaha where there was a sizable African-American community. In essence, blacks were forced to travel for hours in converted cattle trucks in search of entertainment because the white community of Hastings assumed separate facilities for African-Americans was a necessity.

Eventually, with the aid of a federal grant, Hastings opened a separate USO club for black servicemen at 624 West First Street. Regularly scheduled activities and dances were held.
The work being performed was dangerous:
At least four major explosions occurred, killing 21 people. The first accident left a crater 550 feet long, 220 feet wide, and 50 feet deep. The blast caved in the roof on the Harvard, Nebraska, High School, 15 miles away. The blast was felt as far away as Omaha, almost 150 miles away.
In addition to the black workers and sailors, many of the plant workers were women:
A large percentage of NAD workers were women, partly because of the absence of men and partly because of the economic opportunities this job provided for females.

How much economic opportunity?Almost three times what they could earn in town as clerks:
The pay for civilian workers was 74 cents per hour and the workweek was 60 hours - about $45 per week.
The facility operated 24 hours a day during WWII and operated under reduced staff afterward, with a slight increase during the Korean War. It was closed in 1966 and various acreage has been converted to other uses.

So, if you happen to be driving through Hastings on U.S. Highway 6, off to one side you will see the remnants of the Hastings NAD. Give it a little salute as you drive by, to honor the men and women who served there country and the Navy there during a time of war.



Many of the photographs are from the Adams County, Nebraska Historical Society website.