Off the Deck

Off the Deck
Showing posts with label Rules of Engagement Against Pirates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rules of Engagement Against Pirates. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

"Expanding Private Sector Partnerships Against Piracy"


From the U.S. Department of State: "Expanding Private Sector Partnerships Against Piracy":
Yet we must also recognize that best management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. Pirates operate in too large of an area for naval forces to respond quickly. The reality is that international naval forces simply might not be there to respond. The problem of piracy is one that can’t simply be solved by national governments. Therefore, we have also supported industry’s use of additional measures to ensure their security – such as the employment of armed security teams. To date, not a single ship with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated. Not a single one.

These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to counter-piracy. This is because – and as anyone in the Navy or Marines can tell you – one of the most difficult combat maneuvers to undertake is to board a ship when coming under fire. While many expected these teams to be made up of undisciplined “cowboys” that would increase the violence at sea, from what we have gathered and observed the opposite has happened. We have not seen cases of pitched battles at sea between armed security teams and pirates attempting to board under fire. In fact, in most engagements between armed security teams and pirates, the situation ends as soon as pirates are aware these teams are on board. We have found these teams to be highly professional. In most cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security teams will use flares or loudspeakers to warn the pirates. If the pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots. That is usually when the interaction ends. Pirates break off the attack and turn their skiffs around and wait for another less protected target.

At the State Department, we have encouraged countries to permit commercial vessels to carry armed teams. However, we do note that this is a new area, in which some practices, procedures, and regulations are still being developed. We are working through the Contact Group and the International Maritime Organization or IMO on these issues. For instance, we have advised that armed security teams be placed under the full command of the captain of the ship. The captain then is in control of the situation and is the one to authorize the use of any force. Last September, we were encouraged to see language adopted by the IMO that revised the guidance to both flag States and ship operators and owners to establish the ship’s master as being in command of these teams.

There have been some logistical and technical issues that have arisen with armed security teams – particularly relating to weapons licensing and the transit of these teams through third countries. The United States regularly works with other governments to help resolve questions on weapons licensing to facilitate compliance with the laws of individual port States as related to firearms transfer. We engage through the Contact Group and the IMO to encourage all port and coastal States to adopt legislation that is conducive to smooth, facilitated movements of security team firearms and equipment. Currently, some States present challenges in this regard by requiring transfer to a third party while a vessel is moored in a port. Others impose fee schedules that directly charge against the presence of these weapons. In response, we have demarched port and coastal States and let them know that U.S. vessels may have firearms onboard and we request that these teams and their firearms be facilitated under applicable laws. We have also worked with the Coast Guard and Department of Transportation at the IMO and through the Contact Group to further encourage port and coastal States to develop regulations that facilitate the use of these teams aboard commercial vessels. We are working hand in glove with industry in all these endeavors to ensure these teams are both properly regulated and properly equipped.

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Somali Pirates: Brits Take Down "Mother Ship", Rescue Hostages

HMS Cornwall in background as her boarding team investigates
From the Royal Navy's web site:
A request for assistance from a South Korean Merchant Vessel in the Indian Ocean on 10th February led to Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) warship HMS Cornwall securing the release of Yemeni crew of a pirated dhow from their 17 Somali captors and returning the fishing vessel to its rightful owners. Items found with the dhow confirmed that it was acting as a ‘mother ship’ for Somali pirates who had captured it on 11th November 2010.

HMS Cornwall is currently the Command Platform for Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, the counter-piracy mission of CMF. On 10th February Cornwall’s Officer of the Watch observed a dhow acting suspiciously and received a distress call from the South Korean Merchant Vessel Yong Jin reporting a potential pirate threat.

HMS Cornwall’s arrival on scene disrupted the attack, and the warship’s boarding teams, supported overhead by her Lynx helicopter, searched and secured the Yemeni-flagged dhow. An initial search found 22 people on board, three skiffs, powerful outboard motors and various items of equipment associated with pirates boarding merchant vessels, such as ladders, enabling the dhow to act as ‘mother ship’ for a group of pirates operating in the area.

Five of the people on the dhow were the original Yemeni crew who had been held hostage for 92 days.

HMS Cornwall’s commanding officer, Commander David Wilkinson, said:

“Our presence in the area has had a hugely significant effect on the lives of five Yemeni fishermen, who have been freed from over three months of pirate captivity and can now return to their families.

In addition we have restored a merchant vessel to legitimate use on the high seas and my highly trained team have conducted a very slick boarding operation which has ensured that this pirate vessel is no longer able to operate.

This demonstrates the reassurance and security offered by the presence in these waters of HMS Cornwall and other warships from Combined Maritime Forces“
 BZ Cornwall!

All photos from the Royal Navy.

Tuesday, February 01, 2011

Somali Pirates: Resistance Can Be Deadly

"BBC News" reports Sailor dies in clash with pirates north of Seychelles, referring to the attempt by a Seychelles patrol vessel to halt the attack. During the exchange of fire, some crewmen escaped and other tried to retake their ship. This proved deadly to one crewman:
A Seychelles patrol boat appears to have reached the hijacked vessel first, with a Danish warship from Nato's counter-piracy force only arriving after the fatal clash.

When the Seychelles boat opened fire the pirates "evidently lost control", Mr Stolberg told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper.

In the ensuing confusion, reports suggest the crew tried to overwhelm their captors, and two crew members managed to escape.

"The pirates shot dead one of our men, probably in a fit of anger," Mr Stolberg said.

Nato spokeswoman Lt Cdr Jacqui Sherriff told the BBC News website that when the Danish ship, the Esbern Snare, reached the scene, the master of the Beluga Nomination urged it to keep its distance because of the earlier clash.
Now there are number of voices being raised about whether the use of force will escalate the level of violence in what has been a relatively "safe" form of hijacking, crew kidnapping and hostage taking. See here, for example:
Despite acclaim for the Korean action, it could have undesirable consequences. It opens up questions whether violent assaults should be made on hijacked ships in circumstances when there are high risks of loss of life to the assaulting forces, the ship’s crew and the pirates themselves. Such actions could lead to an escalation of violence off Somalia. Already there are reports of the Somali pirates threatening revenge against South Korean ships and crews.

The international shipping community remains generally opposed to employing armed security guards onboard vessels passing through high risk piracy areas. Reasons for this include fears about the risks of escalating violence and of injury to the crew and damage to the ship, as well as the uncertain legal implications. Similar considerations apply to military assaults on the pirates holding hijacked ships. Following the Samho Jewelry incident, the European Union Naval Force operating off Somalia said it would not follow suit in storming ships to secure their release for fear of endangering hostages.
And, as seen here, the pirates have threatened that future captives of force-using countries (in this case, Korea) will be executed in a form of "revenge killing" and deterrent against future rescue efforts.

Most rescue efforts have been undertaken when the ship's crew was known to be in a "citadel," essentially a "safe room" on a ship. NATO has provided guidance regarding the use of citadels on ships (from here):
  • The use of a CITADEL DOES NOT guarantee a military response. Before owners, operators and masters commit to a policy that recommends the use of a citadel, it is important to understand the criteria that military forces will apply before a boarding to free the ship can be considered:
  • 100% of the crew must be secured in the CITADEL.
  • The Crew of the ship must have self-contained, independent, 2-way external communications. Sole reliance on VHF communications is insufficient.
  • The pirates must be denied access to propulsion.
The following points should also be taken into consideration when preparing CITADELS:
  • All emergency equipment in the CITADEL should be fully and regularly tested for functionality.  The communications system should have a power supply for a minimum of 3 days, based on a continuous open line1
  • A full list of emergency contact numbers including UKMTO should be held inside the CITADEL.
  • At least 3 days of food and water provisions for all the crew should be available in the CITADEL.
  • Medical supplies, including medication for the treatment of physical trauma, and sanitation should be made available.
The cautionary point made above the the use of a citadel does not guarantee that there will be a military response is important. The area covered by the Somali pirates is vast, the number of warships relatively small given that expanse and the number of trained teams able to insert themselves onto a merchant is also a small number.

This was discussed on our internet radio show, Midrats last Sunday when we interviewed Capt. Alex Martin, the leader of the U.S. Marine team that successfully retook the merchant ship Magellan Star (about 29:55 on).




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