Next Generation Force Protection Boats

New wave of patrol and security craft as reported at WorkBoat:

The days of creating patrol boats by outfitting general-use motorboats and fishing trawlers with machine guns and obsolete naval weapons are long gone. That was World War II.

Jump ahead 80 years, and patrol boats have evolved into platforms that have the latest navigation, communications, and propulsion systems while being designed and built with highly efficient hulls that move easily and rapidly through the water and can carry out multiple missions in locations across the globe.

Three cases in point: MetalCraft Marine is building 65 patrol boats that will mostly operate in foreign waters; a high-speed 35-footer from Moose Boats that’s outfitted with fire-fighting systems; and Inventech Marine Solutions’ 40' patrol boat for a sheriff’s department in Florida, which hits 72 mph.

A War with China? Fleet Size and Other Options

Sam Tangredi, writing in USNI Proceedings January 2023 issue sends a warning shot across the bow of some current naval thinking by looking at history Bigger Fleet Win:

Using technological advantage as an indicator of quality, historical research on 28 naval wars (or wars with significant and protracted naval combat) indicates that 25 were won by the side with the larger fleet. When fleet size was roughly equal, superior strategy and substantially better trained and motivated crews carried the day. Only three could be said to have been won by a smaller fleet with superior technology. (footnotes omitted)

As set out at CNN,

Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy at King’s College in London, praised Tangredi’s work.

“His research is a very good way to push back on the silly assumption that mass doesn’t matter in war at sea,” Patalano said.

He stressed two key points.

A larger size means more leaders looking to gain the edge in their commands.

“A larger fleet tend to be more competitive, in training personnel development, and operational capacity,” Patalano said.

And he said a large industrial base is essential, especially in being able to build new units after incurring casualties in battle.

“In naval war, attrition is a real thing, so the ability to replace is vital,” Patalano said.

But wait, there's more - concern over the ability of U.S. Defense industry to gear up to produce the quantity of ships (and weapons) needed:

“Most analysts doubt that the US defense industry — which has consolidated and shrunk since the end of the Cold War — could expand quickly enough to meet wartime demand,” Tangredi wrote.

***

Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of US Fleet Forces Command, last week called on the nation’s defense industries to step up their game, saying “you’re not delivering the ordnance we need.”

“It’s so essential to winning. And I can’t do that without the ordnance,” Caudle said at a symposium in Washington, adding that the US is “going against a competitor here, and a potential adversary, that is like nothing we’ve ever seen.”

In an online forum last week, Caudle’s boss, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday, also noted the numbers problem the US faces in a potential Pacific conflict.

“The United States Navy is not going to be able to match the PLAN missile for missile,” Gilday said.

And if the US Navy can’t match China’s missile for missile, or ship for ship, Tangredi wonders where it can find an edge.

“US leaders must ask themselves to what extent they are willing to bet on technological — without numerical — superiority in that fight,” he wrote.

The CNN reporting, though surprising good, leaves out some key parts of Tangredi's USNI article, referring to Wayne Hughes and Robert P. Girrier:

Inspired by Professor Hughes’ work, my decades of research have brought me to this conclusion: In a naval struggle between near-peers, mass (numbers), and the ability to replace losses bests technological advantage. As the mass of one opponent grows, the chance of its defeat reduces. At a certain point of imbalance in mass, the larger naval force cannot be defeated, even when the opponent attacks effectively first in any one engagement.

***

One might assume that superior ship capabilities rather than mass can provide this effectiveness. But that is not what operations research indicates. As Naval Warfare Publication 3: Fleet Warfare notes: “Hughes’ salvo equations indicate that twice as many shooters beats half as many equivalent shooters firing twice as fast.”

***

If the United States wants to retain global influence, maintain deterrence in multiple regions, and conduct combat operations against a near peer that is expanding its global military footprint, it needs a large number of naval platforms. Today, the peacetime demand of the regional combatant commanders overwhelms the availability of deployable Navy ships.

In addition, a reserve of naval platforms is necessary to replace losses. In World War II, the reserve was the ability to build ships at speed. Today, most analysts doubt that the U.S. defense industry—which has consolidated and shrunk since the end of the Cold War—could expand quickly enough to meet wartime demand. To replace losses in a protracted conflict, the United States would need numbers of ships already in commission.

***

The United States can fund a significant fleet that matches the growth of the PLA Navy—or not. Whether the fleet is 250 or 500 ships is for elected officials and the Navy to decide, but those leaders must identify, acknowledge, and own that risk. There is risk in all choices. But there is particularly higher risk in making choices based on unproven assumptions.

***

A naval war against China in the western Pacific in this decade would pit a smaller U.S. naval force against a larger PLAN, on China’s home turf, within range of the PLA’s air and rocket forces. U.S. leaders must ask themselves to what extent they are willing to bet on technological—without numerical—superiority in that fight.

Though I believe that any war with China will be very much one that is won or lost on the sea, it seems that there is at least some analysis of the effect of shore-based anti-ship missiles controlled by the U.S and its allies that needs to be added into the equation - for as Wayne Hughes and Robert P. Girrier suggest in Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations(3rd ed), battles in the open ocean are rare, but battles inshore are not, and with the current state of land based anti-ship missiles, naval forces do not just have to contend with opposing fleets but with "forts"

Today a "fort" can be an airfield or the launch site for a a missile battery. Either of these can be repaired or rebuilt quickly, but a warship cannot.(p26)

China has the potential home field advantage in that respect, but the U.S. can place more "shooters" ashore and create their own "forts" that create a threat to the PLAN - which is exactly what the U.S. Marine Corps is proposing to do with its Force Design 2030:

NMESIS

 

We will equip our Marines with mobile, low-signature sensors and weapons that can provide a landward complement to Navy capabilities for surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air and missile defense, and airborne early warning. And in partnership with the Navy, our unit will possess littoral maneuver capabilities to include high-speed, long-range, low-signature craft capable of maneuvering Marines for a variety of missions.

The key to this is "Stand-in Forces."

Stand-in Forces Defined

SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary. Depending on the situation, stand-in forces are composed of elements from the Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, special operations forces, interagency, and allies and partners.

Theory of Success

In day-to-day activity, SIF deter potential adversaries by establishing the forward edge of a partnered maritime defense-in-depth that denies the adversary freedom of action.12 The impact of working with allies and partners cannot be overstated; it is key to undermining the adversary’s plans and is a primary reason stand-in forces’ presence must be persistent. SIF also deter by integrating activities with the other elements of national power (particularly diplomatic and informational) to impose costs on rivals who want to use ways and means below the violence threshold to achieve their goals.

Stand-in forces’ enduring function is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition continuum. Stand-in forces do this by gaining and maintaining contact (establishing target custody and identifying the potential adversary’s sensors) below the threshold of violence. This allows SIF to assist in identifying and countering malign behavior, and if armed conflict does erupt, the joint force can attack effectively first and prevent the enemy from doing so.

When directed, SIF conduct sea denial operations in support of fleet operations, especially near maritime chokepoints. SIF can perform sea denial through the use of organic sensors and weapon systems to complete kill webs, but also by integrating organic capabilities with naval and joint all-domain capabilities. SIF also possess sufficient organic maneuver and offensive capability to gain a position of advantage by securing, seizing, and controlling contested key maritime terrain in support of sea denial operations.

By doing the above, SIF become an operational problem an enemy must address to achieve its goals. SIF impose costs on the enemy by presenting operationally relevant capabilities that cannot be ignored, even as their low signature, high mobility, dispersion, and use of deception make them difficult for an enemy to find and target. Their small footprint and focus on partnership make SIF less burdensome on the host nation than larger U.S. formations.

I fully support the Marines in this concept. We could quibble some aspects, but the main thing is get them what they need - now - to make it a reality because it has the potential to change the equations of "fleet size." Add in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Coast Guard and there may be way out of China's spider web. Heck, I can see the Army setting up "forts" too. The more the merrier.

U.S. Navy Ship Damage Control - Lessons from the Pre-WWII German Navy

Interesting read from a 2014 thesis written by LCDR Jeremy Schaub for his Masters in Military Arts and Science at the Army Command and General Staff School U.S. Navy Shipboard Damage Control: Innovation and Implementation During the Interwar Period

The United States Navy adopted the fundamentals of modern shipboard damage control from the Germans at the end of World War I. The tremendous survivability of German warships as seen at Dogger Bank and Jutland led the U.S. Navy to study the German model of damage control and ultimately implement changes in ship design, crew training, and shipboard organization to closely mimic the German model. These changes remain largely intact today.

With so much of the Navy’s heritage rooted in British tradition and influence, it is remarkable that such an effective force multiplier for survival at sea was learned from the German Navy. This was a time in U.S. military history in which emulation of a former enemy could lead to such widespread and enduring results. The most recent shipboard disasters, those of USS George Washington, USS Cole, USS Samuel B. Roberts and USS Stark were all met with herculean efforts of men and women organized, trained, and equipped based on a system of damage control copied from the enemy and implemented nearly a century ago.

U.S. Navy Shipboard Damage ... by lawofsea

Battle of Midway Begins - 80 Years Ago - One of the Greatest Sea Battles

Yes, the sound quality is a little rough, but the images in this version are the clearest I have seen.

Update - less clear, but smoother:

The U.S. African Slave Trade Patrol 1820 -1861 and the Royal Navy West Africa Squadron Anti-Slavery Patrols

Anti-slavery Operations of the US Navy

Long illegal, the infamous slave trade was declared by Congress in 1819 to be piracy, and as such, punishable by death. The Navy's African Slave Trade Patrol was established to search for and bring to justice the dealers in human misery. Never exceeding a few ships in number, the Patrol, which from time to time included USS Constitution, USS Constellation, USS Saratoga and USS Yorktown, relentlessly plied the waters off West Africa, South America, and the Cuban coast, a principle area for slave disembarkation. By the start of the Civil War more than 100 suspected slavers had been captured.

Britain attempted to stop slavery by legislation in 1807, and enacted stronger measures in 1827, declaring that participation in the slave trade was piracy and punishable by death; slavery was made illegal in the British Empire in 1833.

Interesting note on where slaves were landed from historian Henry Lois Gates, Jr.:

In the 360 years between 1500 and the end of the slave trade in the 1860s, at least 12 million Africans were forcibly taken to the Americas - then known as the "New World" to European settlers. This largest forced migration in human history relocated some 50 ethnic and linguistic groups.

Only a small portion of the enslaved - less than half a million - were sent to North America. The majority went to South America and the Caribbean. In the mid-1600s, Africans outnumbered Europeans in nascent cities such as Mexico City, Havana and Lima.

The Foote booklet referenced in the second video (at 1:06:18) can be found at African Squadron: Ashburton Treaty: Consular Letters

The American Flag has become deeply involved in the slave traffic. Of this as you are aware, from the reports of our officers on the African and Brazil stations and from our diplomatic agents in Rio de Janeiro, there is abundant evidence in the Navy and State Departments. To correct this abuse, and with the design more effectually to suppress the slave trade, Senator Clayton, at the last session, introduced a bill denying consular sea-letters to American Vessels when sold abroad, provided such vessels were bound to the coast of Africa. This wise and beneficent measure was adopted, the bill passing the Senate unanimously. It is greatly to be deplored that the same bill was not immediately taken up and passed by the House of Representatives.

It may be well here to remark in reference to sea-letters, that on the sale of an American vessel in a foreign port to an American citizen, the register of the vessel, which is her proof of nationality, cannot be transferred with the vessel itself; but a sea-letter, which is merely a transcript of the register and bill of sale with the consular seal appended, is given by the Consul as a substitute for said register for the purpose of nationalizing the vessel.

The greatest abuse of our flag has arisen from the facility with which these consular sea-letters have been obtained. More than two-thirds of the slavers on the African coast claiming American nationality, as may be found in documentary evidence, have been provided with this sea-letter. Or in other words, American vessels when sold abroad, have had their nationality perpetuated by this consular sea-letter for the express purpose of being employed in the African slave trade. And surely, when the evil arising from the issuing of this document becomes as well understood in the House, as it has been in the Senate, it may be supposed, that the bill, denying said sea-letters to African bound vessels, will also be passed unanimously by that body.

Love it or hate it, preserving the INSURV process is important

USNI News reportsHouse Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Save Navy’s INSURV Reports

House Armed Services readiness subcommittee chairman Rep. John Garamendi (D-Calif.) and Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.) – the vice ranking member of HASC and the ranking member of the HASC seapower and projection forces subcommittee – have written the Naval Readiness Act to continue the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) reports.

If passed, the bill would “make permanent” the INSURV report, according to the text, and mandate both a classified report for lawmakers and an unclassified report for the public. The legislation would also require the Navy to brief lawmakers on the report’s findings.

***

“INSURV gives us a snapshot of the material condition of our fleet, and a thorough one at that. It’s not the most popular program on the deck-plate; from the most junior enlisted to the most senior officer, it is a dreaded inspection, but a necessary one. It ensures that every submarine that submerges, surfaces; every warship that deploys, returns home,” Wittman said in a news release.

***

While the reports have long caused headaches for the Navy, as inspections leading to sub-par results have reflected poorly on the service and its ships, HASC lawmakers have told USNI News the assessments are essential for understanding the state of the service’s ships.

“I think that the transparency is really important, and I also think that the report should not be classified,” Rep. Elaine Luria (D-Va.), a former Navy nuclear-qualified surface warfare officer who is now the vice chair of HASC, told USNI News last month. “I think that the taxpayers need to understand how the Navy’s being maintained, how their tax dollars are being used and what the readiness of our Navy is for our national defense.”

Photo from the INSURV website:

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Greg Fenske and a member of the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) team inspect parts from an ordnance jettison locker aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). The ship is undergoing INSURV in preparation for an upcoming deployment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Colby S. Comery/Released)

CNO NAVPLAN 2021:

This Navigation Plan nests under the recently-released Tri-Service Maritime Strategy and outlines how the U.S. Navy will grow its naval power to control the seas and project power across all domains, both now and in the future.

U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Op... by lawofsea

You can find the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy here

U.S. Navy Arctic Blueprint

From the forward:

"This forward looking regional blueprint describes how the Department will apply naval power as we continue to prepare for a more navigable Arctic Region over the next two decades."

U.S. Navy Arctic Blueprint ... by lawofsea

"Advantage at Sea" - U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard New Maritime Strategy

Tri Service Strategy by lawofsea on Scribd

Not Too Surprised - "Navy will scrap fire-ravaged Bonhomme Richard"

Navy Times report by Geoff Ziezulewicz here:

The U.S. Navy will not repair the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard, which burned for more than four days this summer in San Diego.

In the end, resurrecting the devastated large-deck amphib would have been too costly, Rear Adm. Eric Ver Hage, commander of the Navy Regional Maintenance Center, told reporters Monday.

Use the money that repairs would have cost to build more frigates.

U.S.Navy photo by MC2 Austin Haist

Navy Ship Manning: "{M}an the fleet to the requirements or reduce the requirements"

Excellent discussion of the U.S. Navy's shipboard manning issues by a former Fleet Master Chief of Fleet Forces Command at the USNI Blog Manning Still Matters: A Fleet Perspective:

To those leaders making these decisions, or who are unaware of them but could influence them, I would ask, “Would you feel safe boarding a civilian airline whose maintenance department was routinely and chronically undermanned this way?” and “Would you feel comfortable letting your family?” Even though leaders and budgeters save costs in the MPN account, there are personal costs that result from reductions in their sailor’s sleep, fitness, personal time, or cognitive performance. Manning shortfalls contribute to crew fatigue and reduced crew endurance, increasing the chance of mistakes and increasing their risk tolerance to a point of ethical dilemma and decisions to cut corners with maintenance and other administrative requirements to self-manage the workload.

This is a "read the whole thing piece." Master Chief Kingsbury points out the issues caused by the efforts to save personnel dollars -

• Overwork on some ratings at sea
• Impact on morale and retention
• Impact of fatigue 
• Poor effects of "fill vice fit" manning - i.e. there's a reason the manning document calls for a certain number of quartermasters, for example. 
• Stress Dangers of cross decking as short term fills for shortages in certain rates

Giving the fleet billets is one thing, but in a highly technical environment requiring specialized people, giving them the right billets with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet the job requirement is another. And, the sailor working 80 hours suffers the same effects regardless of where their unit is in the OFRP. Once any ship falls to a certain level of fit, they could be displayed as yellow or red to more accurately reflect the level of risk, so force manning managers could decide where to accept risk. To this end, leverage the new type commander human factors engineers, fleet safety officers, and naval safety center to analyze and articulate the risk to mission and force. Then, communicate to OPNAV N1 in terms of operational risk and challenge them to take actions to mitigate it, such as increasing recruiting goals, retention incentives, or adjusting distribution policies.

From the Navy's Core Values Charter

“COMMITMENT” The day-to-day duty of every man and woman in the Department of the Navy is to join together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people and ourselves. I will:

• Foster respect up and down the chain of command. 
• Care for the personal and spiritual well-being of my people. 
• Show respect toward all people without regard to race, religion or gender. 
• Always strive for positive change and personal improvement. 
• Exhibit the highest degree of moral character, professional excellence, quality, and competence in all that I do. (emphasis added)

The "well-being" of our people ought to be the driving factor in ship manning. This has to include that the right people are put in the right positions with the right training and tools to do their jobs so that any ship - all ships- go to sea with the confidence that the men and women who serve therein are ready to take on the heavy burdens going to sea and, potentially, into harm's way involve.

Admiral Nimitz said, "Leadership consists of picking good men and helping them do their best." When we put our men and women into a fleet where they are hamstrung by manning shortfalls, we are not exercising good leadership.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Sarah Mead

Carrier-Based Navy F-18s May Get Hypersonic Cruise Missiles

DoD Kicks Off New Hypersonic Program; F-18 To Get Hypersonic Cruise Missile Breaking Defense reports:

USAF photo

One hypersonic program that Bussey revealed is already in the works would eventually put a hypersonic cruise missile on a carrier-based F-18.

She said the effort, which is being run by the Air Force Research Lab and has been contracted to Boeing, is developing a dual mode scramjet design. “We’re doing this so that we can have an option for the Navy that is compatible with F-18 based on carriers. We hope to have that testing wrapped up in time to support any decisions that either the Air Force or the Navy will end up making in terms of future hypersonic cruise missile activities.”

Earlier in the piece is this-

Universities in the US, Australia, the UK and Canada are eligible to work on the DoD program, said Gillian Bussey, head of the Joint Hypersonic Transition Office. But Bussey added Texas A&M has strict counterintelligence protocols in place, and the Pentagon will have strict rules for who can participate in the often classified work. The team in particular wants to ensure “we’re not training Chinese scientists that are going to go help their programs for example.”

Way cool!

On this day in U.S. Navy history

U.S. Navy Counting Ships and a Brief Discussion of Ship Types

When discussing how large the U.S. Navy should be, the place to start is how big the fleet is now and, importantly, what that ships make up that fleet. It would be easy to assume that a fleet of 250 ships consisted entirely of those classes of ships capable of offensive and defensive combat operations. A quick glance at the numbers and classes below ought to dispel that idea.

Let's dissect the list. At the bottom of the list are USS Constitution and AGER2. AGER2 is the USS Pueblo, which, while commissioned, is held by the North Koreans, as it has been since it was seized by them in 1968. Constitution is the oldest commissioned ship, one of the great three masted frigates, first commissioned in 1797. As the charts indicate, she in the only active frigate currently in the Navy inventory.

There are 11 MCM (Mine Countermeasure ships) and 32 amphibious ships on the list, 5 "Fleet Support" ships (2 submarine tenders, 2 Command ships and one ESB (Expeditionary Sea Base). All valuable ships but all are not capable of going unescorted into areas of threats. The Navy would like to rid itself of the MCMs.

In addition, there are currently 19 LCS class ships. 4 of these, having proved - um- useful as technology test beds, are soon to be decommissioned. More are being built, which will eventually push their number to 30. However, these ships have minimal manning and are awaiting the final versions of the various modules which were supposed to make them capable of filling several mission areas, mine hunting, inshore ASW, and countering fast moving small craft. They are not designed to go toe-to-toe with destroyers and cruisers, nor do they have the anti-air warfare systems possessed by other combatants, though improvements have been made, including the addition of the 100 mile ranged Naval Strike Missile. Though equipped with weapons, in reality, their main weapon system is their aircraft, H-60 helicopters or Fire Scout drones. Up-armed LCSs may prove useful in some missions.


Fleet ballistic missile submarines (14) and Patrol Craft (13) have special roles. The SSBNs are strategic assets which play a role in nuclear deterrence. The PCs are valuable littoral assets, suitable for operations in the near shore areas a - surprise - patrol ships. The DDG-1000 series is another set of tech experiments, which have created ships looking for a mission.

The real meat of the combat power of the Navy, however, lies in the aircraft aboard its carriers (to include Marine F-35s embarked on certain amphibs - though they are mostly for close air support of landing forces, they can perform some combat air patrol missions), and in its cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines.

Of these forces, the Navy has 22 cruisers and 67 destroyers. More destroyers are being built, but the cruiser force is aging with the newest one commissioned in 1994 - 26 years ago. Ship lives can be extended, but ... the Navy keeps trying to decommission some of them, as set out in this 2019 piece, here:

The U.S. Navy is considering canceling six planned service-life extensions on its oldest cruisers, meaning the service will be short six of its current 22 largest surface combatants by 2022, according to defense officials who spoke to Defense News on background.

The plan, as it will be proposed to Congress, is to decommission the cruisers Bunker Hill, Mobile Bay, Antietam, Leyte Gulf, San Jacinto and Lake Champlain in 2021 and 2022, foregoing plans for service-life extensions that have previously seen support in Congress.

All the ships will be at or near the end of their 35-year service lives when they are decommissioned, but the Navy has yet to decide on a replacement for the cruisers, which are the largest combatants in the fleet with 122 vertical launch systems cells. This comes at a time when the Navy needs as many missiles downrange as it can field as it squares off with the threat of Chinese and Russian anti-ship missiles.

Cruisers have 26 more vertical launch system, or VLS, cells per hull than their Arleigh Burke Flight IIA destroyer counterparts, and 32 more than the Flight I Burkes.

But the cruisers, which act as the lead air defense ship in a carrier strike group, have been notoriously difficult to maintain. The fleet has managed everything from cracking hulls to aging pipes and mechanical systems. The ships’ SPY-1 radars have also been difficult to maintain, as components age and need constant attention from technicians.

According to the Navy's 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan, the cruisers will not be replaced with new cruisers (except as "large surface combatants"), right now meaning more Burke class destroyers (Flight III) (which might be cruisers in all but name) and a new class of frigates (FFX). The goal is 104 +/- "major surface combatants and 50 some odd "minor surface combatants" (which includes frigates) It also includes 50 +/- attack submarines, and and a force of "cruise missile submarines" or "SSGN/Large Payload" submarines.  There also remain the likelihood that the future force will include numbers of unmanned vessels of various types. These ships are cheaper to build and operate since they don't need crew spaces or food storage spaces and crews cost a great deal of money.
Here's the March 2019 plan:

U.S. NavyReport to Congress... by lawofsea on Scribd

All of which assumes that the Navy gets the funding for a 355- ship force as mandated by law.

Okay, that's the background from which informed conversations about the needs and size of the Navy can be had. Many of us assert that 355 still is too small and that more surface combatants are needed to fulfill some of the missions that the Navy is tasked with, such as ocean escort duties in the face of a submarines threat to sea lines of communication to protect sustainment and follow-on forces. While some of those duties may be taken up by allied naval forces, with the major exceptions of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, many allies have not grown their naval forces since they decided to cash in on the "peace dividend" that followed the end of the Cold War. More on that topic in another post.

Current listing U.S. Navy ships-
Source - NavSea Naval Vessel Registry

Not So Subtle -- "Let's Send a Message in the Strait of Hormuz"

Prepared to counter potential small boat swarms when transiting near a minor annoyance:

STRAIT OF HORMUZ (Aug. 12, 2019) An AH-1Z Viper helicopter attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 163 (Reinforced), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) takes off during a strait transit aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4). The Boxer Amphibious Ready Group and the 11th MEU are deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dalton S. Swanbeck/Released)STRAIT OF HORMUZ (Aug. 12, 2019) 

You might note that "manned mobile gun platform" on the elevator behind the helicopters.

Hurry Up! "Navy Laser, Railgun and Gun-Launched Guided Projectiles"

From USNI News: Report on Navy Laser, Railgun and Gun-Launched Guided Projectiles

The Navy is developing three new ship-based weapons that could improve the ability of Navy surface ships to defend themselves against missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and surface craft: the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), previously known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP).

The Navy refers to the initial (i.e., Increment 1) version of SNLWS as HELIOS, an acronym meaning high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance. EMRG could additionally provide the Navy with a new naval surface fire support (NSFS) weapon for attacking land targets in support of Marines or other friendly ground forces ashore. The Department of Defense is exploring the potential for using GLGP across multiple U.S. military services.

Any one of these three new weapons, if successfully developed and deployed, might be regarded as a “game changer” for defending Navy surface ships against enemy missiles and UAVs. If two or three of them are successfully developed and deployed, the result might be considered not just a game changer, but a revolution. Rarely has the Navy had so many potential new types of surface-ship air-defense weapons simultaneously available for development and potential deployment.

You can read the "Oct. 23, 2018 Congressional Research Service report, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress" at the USNI News link.

While you are there, you might make a contribution to keep USNI News alive.

Surface Warfare Training - Congressional Improvement Plan

From JOHN S. McCAIN NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONFERENCE REPORT

5 SEC. 334. SURFACE WARFARE TRAINING IMPROVEMENT.
6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:
8 (1) In 2017, there were three collisions and one
9 grounding involving United States Navy ships in the
10 Western Pacific. The two most recent mishaps in-
11 volved separate incidents of a Japan-based United
12 States Navy destroyer colliding with a commercial
13 merchant vessel, resulting in the combined loss of 17
14 sailors.
15 (2) The causal factors in these four mishaps
16 are linked directly to a failure to take sufficient ac-
17 tion in accordance with the rules of good seaman-
18 ship.
19 (3) Because risks are high in the maritime envi-
20 ronment, there are widely accepted standards for
21 safe seamanship and navigation. In the United
22 States, the International Convention on Standards
23 of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (herein-
24 after in this section referred to as the ‘‘STCW’’) for
25 Seafarers, standardizes the skills and foundational knowledge a maritime professional must have in sea-
26 manship and navigation.
3 (4) Section 568 of the National Defense Au4
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
5 114–328; 130 Stat. 2139) endorsed the STCW proc-
6 ess and required the Secretary of Defense to maxi-
7 mize the extent to which Armed Forces service,
8 training, and qualifications are creditable toward
9 meeting merchant mariner licenses and certifications.
11 (5) The Surface Warfare Officer Course Curriculum is being modified to include ten individual
13 Go/No Go Mariner Assessments/Competency Check
14 Milestones to ensure standardization and quality of
15 the surface warfare community.
16 (6) The Military-to-Mariner Transition report
17 of September 2017 notes the Army maintains an ex-
18 tensive STCW qualifications program and that a
19 similar Navy program does not exist.
20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that—
22 (1) the Secretary of the Navy should establish
23 a comprehensive individual proficiency assessment
24 process and include such an assessment prior to all
1 operational surface warfare officer tour assignments;
2 and
3 (2) the Secretary of the Navy should signifi-
4 cantly expand the STCW qualifications process to
5 improve seamanship and navigation individual skills
6 training for surface warfare candidates, surface war-
7 fare officers, quartermasters and operations special-
8 ists to include an increased set of courses that di-
9 rectly correspond to STCW standards.
10 (c) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2019, the
11 Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional
12 defense committees a report that includes each of the fol-
13 lowing:
14 (1) A detailed description of the surface war-
15 fare officer assessments process.
16 (2) A list of programs that have been approved
17 for credit toward merchant mariner credentials.
18 (3) A complete gap analysis of the existing sur
19 face warfare training curriculum and STCW.
20 (4) A complete gap analysis of the existing sur-
21 face warfare training curriculum and the 3rd mate
22 unlimited licensing requirement.
23 (5) An assessment of surface warfare options to
24 complete the 3rd mate unlimited license and the
25 STCW qualification.

USCG checklist on obtaining 3rd Mates License:

USCG NATIONAL 3rd MATE OF SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS OF UNLIMITED TONNAGE UPON OCEANS OR NEAR COASTAL WATERS §... by lawofsea on Scribd

You might note that Navy ROTC grads who do not attend one of the maritime academies may have require some additional time to meet the "Sea Service" requirement.

Friday Film: "Seapower in the Pacific" (1946)

This Rand report from 2013 may be of interest:

Protecting the Military Sea Logistics Stream

In an important but largely overlooked speech back in November 2017, the head of  U. S. Transportation Command discussed some of the real problems facing USTRANSCOM in its sealift role, as reported in SEAPOWER Magazine Online:

Military Sealift Command (MSC) is sailing in “contested waters” today and the military needs to consider changing the way it operates, such as relearning how to conduct armed escort missions as it did in World War II, the commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TransCom) said Nov. 15.

TransCom also is in discussions with the Navy on how it could replace the badly aged ships in the sealift and prepositioning fleets, possibly by buying low-cost used merchant ships, Air Force Gen. Darren McDew said.

Damage to UAE operated vessel Swift after missile attack off Yemen

Speaking at an Air Force Association breakfast at the Capitol Hill Club, McDew was asked about the concerns of Vice Adm. Dee Mewbourne, commander of MSC — which is part of TransCom — that the growing threats from potential adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, means that his ships will be sailing into “contested waters.”

“They doing that now,” McDew said, possibly referring to the missile attacks against two MSC ships operating off of Yemen earlier this year.

And the contested environment “doesn’t start when they get under way. It starts before they leave port,” he added, repeating his earlier warnings about the threat all of his command faces from cyber attacks and disruption of the space-based navigation systems.
***
McDew compared the potential threat to the MSC vessels to the horrific losses inflicted

"Armed Escort" FFGs in 1982

by German submarines on the Merchant Mariners crossing the Atlantic in World War II. Those civilian seaman “died at the highest rate of any U.S. force” in the war he said.

To help counter that threat, “in World War II, we had armed convoys,” he noted. “We haven’t had to worry about that since then. Maybe we have to look at what armed escort looks like.”

The general suggested that today’s cyber threats could equal the danger from World War II submarines.

The military will have to think differently because “those lines of communications will be contested.”
***
Asked about Mewbourne’s concerns about the advanced age of his sealift and prepositioning ships, McDew said he was in discussions with the Navy on how to modernize the sealift fleets.

He said the National Defense Authorization Act, which may be approved by Congress by the end of the month, has language that “would allow us to buy used vessels. There are ships on the market now that would cost one-half or one-third as much as new ships, and are available for pennies on the dollar.”

Those ships could be modernized and modified in U.S. shipyards, so “everyone wins,” he said.
McDew noted that he is “the largest owner of steam ships in the world,” but does not want that distinction, adding that virtually all the world’s commercial vessels have diesel engines, which are cheaper and require fewer Sailors.

Okay, let's look at the issues:

1.  The threat environment has changed so that, at the very least, near shore sealift shipping is threatened by both state and non-state actors. This is true because of the proliferation of anti-shipping cruise missiles that can be transported by truck and operated with ease (see War Is Boring To Threaten Ships, the Houthis Improvised a Missile Strike Force ). While the most recent example is that of the cited missile attacks off Yemen, the issue has been very ripe since 2006 when Hezbollah, apparently aided by Iran, fired a C-802 missile at an Israeli warship. The threat of such missile attacks by state actors has, of course, been around much longer  (also Iran: Silkworm on the Hormuz).
2.  The "sealift fleet" is old and too small. See Not Sexy But Important: "IG launches review of Military Sealift Command readiness problems".While it may be possible to modernize the sealift fleet by buying more modern used ships and refurbishing them for military use, there are issues in protecting those newer (and the current) ships both from cyber and sea-going threats. General McDew notes the need for "armed escorts." The U. S. Navy retired its last "designed to convoy" escort Perry-class FFG-7 frigates without replacements in 2015. Now the Navy is looking for a new FFX to fill the gap - and in seeming recognition that the Littoral Combat Ship is not a suitable vessel for the task - which it was never intended to perform.
3. Underlying all of the above is the sound recognition that "sea control" in today's world is far more complex than it was in the time of a couple of near peer navies. With the land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, the safe haven of being "offshore" has moved much further from land than it used to be. Using a putative fisherman having a hand-held GPS and a radio, or using small drones flown from the beach, the targeting of shipping offshore does not really require expensive shore based or aerial targeting radars to launch missiles with their own target seeking capabilities.
4. As a result, all those "chokepoints" so vital to sea lines of communication are threatened as never before. While the U. S. has long relied on "out-teching" adversaries, the speed with which technology changes to counter such tech is worrisome and requires both more hardware both of a counter-battery nature and defense to be spread to more vessels, including to those combat logistics force ships now operated by MSC as unarmed, mostly civilian manned units. It may be time, under the rules that govern arming such ships to return to the day when mnay such ships were manned by Navy officers and sailors, or at least to return to the days of "Navy Armed Guards" but with very modern weaponry to counter these threats. 

The most important point is to start now to address these issues. It is apparent that General McDew "gets it" - and the the Navy is moving to act - but Congress needs to understand th problems and find funding for the needed fixes now, before it's too late. 

Military Lessons to Be (Re-) Learned from the Astros World Series Win

Let's begin with the Astros plan - About That Prediction ... How the Astros Went From Baseball's Cellar to the 2017 World Series

“When you’re in 2017, you don’t really care that much about whether you lost 98 or 107 in 2012,” Luhnow said back then. “You care about how close we are to winning a championship in 2017.” In other words, they were entirely focused on several years down the line, which meant shedding every one of their expensive assets and starting from scratch. People hated it.
***
The most remarkable thing of all about the Astros is this: they told everyone exactly what they were going to do—and then they did it.

So, as the old diving saying goes, "Plan your dive, dive your plan" - making a plan forces you to think of the long view, while giving you the flexibility to assess short term issues that may arise while the plan is being played out. As President Eisenhower once quoted,

I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of "emergency" is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.

So, the first thing you do is to take all the plans off the top shelf and throw them out the window and start once more. But if you haven't been planning you can't start to work, intelligently at least.

That is the reason it is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve--or to help to solve.

War in the Pacific beginning in 1941? War Plan Orange:

[RADM] Rodgers' concept was little different from the one ultimately used in the Pacific War: a "leapfrog" campaign to conquer the Marshalls and Carolines (held by Japan before the war); liberation of the Philippines; and blockade.[3] Absent was the "decisive battle" of Mahan, and of Japanese planning.

American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in submarines and naval aviation had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete. In particular, they did not understand that aircraft could effectively sink battleships, nor that Japan might put the U.S. battleship force (the Battle Line) out of action at a stroke—as in fact happened during Pearl Harbor.

American plans changed after this attack. Even after major Japanese defeats like Midway, the U.S. favored a methodical "island-hopping" advance, never going far beyond land-based air cover.[7] Meanwhile, blockade was imposed from the very beginning of the war, with the first American submarine, USS Gudgeon, arriving off Japan on about 31 December 1941.[8]

A number of requirements grew out of Orange, including the specification for a fleet submarine with high speed, long range, and heavy torpedo armament.[9] These coalesced in the submarine Dolphin[10] in 1932 (only to be rejected and returned to with the Gato class in around August 1941).[11] The demand for submarines of this size also drove the development of the notorious Mark XIV torpedo (and its equally notorious Mark VI exploder), under the guidance of Commander[12] Ralph W. Christie.[13] The Navy also spent "several hundred thousand dollars" to develop powerful, compact diesel engines, among them the troublesome Hooven-Owens-Rentschler (HOR), which proved useful for railroads.

The plan is dead? Long live the plan!

Today the U.S. Navy is short of ships, the smaller fleet we have to meet too many commitments seems to have been "ridden hard and put away wet", in the classic meaning of that phrase. For the surface Navy, maintenance has suffered and it's blindingly obvious that training has suffered.

With regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty.

I'm sure that firing people and many a "long green table" will be joining those already in progress.

However, what is really needed is a plan - a long-term plan to re-invigorate the Surface Warfare Community - which includes both more ships that can fight and more quality in the training of those who will fight them.

What should come first? I say more ships - and in a hurry - so that maintenance schedules for existing ships can be established while commitments can still be met.

Secondly, and the Navy is beginning to address this, better training for the surface warfare community. I assert that all non-warfare training be conducted before any sailor or officer hits the fleet. All the time wasted on non-warfare concerns eats into the time to be spent on basic shiphandling, emergency procedures and (although the crews in recent incidents have performed well in this area) damage control. If after all the "social" training has been entered into a sailor's record there is a violation of those rules, then punishment should be both swift and severe enough to warn all the others. Is being an alert watchstander so complicated that only geniuses can perform the task? Not in my experience. What is needed is the understanding that the watch team - consisting of the bridge team (OOD, JOOD, lookouts, Quartermasters, helm and after steering), the engineering watch, and those watch standers in CIC needs to know it job completely and to also needs to know when to call for help.

The Navy can rightly point to Congressional budget games for some of the issues it faces. On the other hand, it can also point to its own willingness to report "Can Do" when it should have been screaming "Can't Do" as factors in the need  to develop a new plan that matches the reality of the current fleet.

And the need to develop a long-term plan to restore the Navy to its preeminate position in the world.

An "Astros" plan.

(update - edited next to last paragraph for clarity.) (update 2 - edited again for clarity and to add that part about the watch team that I accidently left out in the original.)