Friday Film: "Fog" (1943)

Typhoon Cobra: The Third Fleet in Bad Weather

Typhoon Cobra

As a hurricane/tropical storm runs through Florida and heads for the Carolinas through Georgia, it might be a good time to consider the things that can happen when a fleet wanders into the path of a big storm. In the instant case, it was the U.S. Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey in December 1944 which ran into "Typhoon Cobra." Or perhaps it was the typhoon that ran over the Third Fleet. In any event, after the storm passed, it wreaked havoc:

. . . three destroyers capsized and sank, and 790 lives were lost. Nine other warships were damaged, and over 100 aircraft were wrecked or washed overboard; the aircraft carrier Monterey was forced to battle a serious fire that was caused by a plane hitting a bulkhead.

Or. as Admiral Nimitz noted in Extracts Relating to the Typhoon from Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Report,

Admirals Nimitz and Halsey

On 18 December 1944, vessels of the Pacific Fleet, operating in support of the invasion of the Philippines in an area about 300 miles east of Luzon, were caught near the center of a typhoon of extreme violence. Three destroyers, the HULL, MONAGHAN, and SPENCE, capsized and went down with practically all hands; serious damage was sustained by the CL MIAMI, the CVLs MONTEREY, COWPENS, and SAN JACINTO, the CVEs CAPE ESPERANCE and ALTAMAHA, and the DDs AYLWIN, DEWEY, and HICKOX. Lesser damage was sustained by at least 19 other vessels, from CAs down to DEs. Fires occurred on three carriers when planes were smashed in their hangars; and some 146 planes on various ships were lost or damaged beyond economical repair by the fires, by being smashed up, or by being swept overboard. About 790 officers and men were lost or killed, and 80 were injured. Several surviving destroyers reported rolling 70 or more; and we can only surmise how close this was to capsizing completely for some of them. It was the greatest loss that we have taken in the Pacific without compensatory return since the First Battle of Savo.

Of the ships lost, Nimitz notes that they were

Maneuvering up to the time of sinking, in the attempt to maintain station, by all ships that

USS Monterey in which Gerald Ford, future president, served during Typhoon Cobra

were lost. DEWEY, saved by apparently a narrow margin, had given up the attempt.

Of all Nimitz's words, the most frightening are these where he describes the futility of belated action resulting in

The storm "taking charge" and making impossible various evasive and security measures which might have been effective at an earlier stage.

Light Cruiser Sante Fe takes a heavy roll

Admiral Nimitz declined the opportunity to do much second guessing but he did unload some wisdom:

11. The most difficult part of the whole heavy-weather problem is of course the conflict between the military necessity for carrying out an operation as scheduled, and the possibility of damage or loss to our ships in doing so. For this no possible rule can be laid down. The decision must be a matter of "calculated risk" either way. It should be kept in mind, however, that a ship which founders or is badly damaged is a dead loss not only to the current operation but to future ones, that the weather which hinders us may be hindering the enemy equally, and that ships which, to prevent probable damage and possible loss, are allowed to drop behind, or to maneuver independently, may by that very measure be able to rejoin later and be of use in the operation.

12. The safety of a ship against perils from storm, as well as from those of navigation and maneuvering, is always the primary responsibility of her commanding officer; but this responsibility is also shared by his immediate superiors in operational command since by the very fact of such command the individual commanding officer is not free to do at any time what his own judgment might indicate. Obviously no rational captain will permit his ship to be lost fruitlessly through blind obedience to plan or order, since by no chance could that be the intention of his superior. But the degree of a ship's danger is progressive and at the same time indefinite. It is one thing for a commanding officer, acting independently in time of peace, to pick a course and speed which may save him a beating from the weather, and quite another for him, in time of war, to disregard his mission and his orders and leave his station and duty.

13. It is here that the responsibility rests on unit, group, and force commanders, and that their judgment and authority must be exercised. They are of course the ones best qualified to weigh the situation and the relative urgency of safety measures versus carrying on with the job in hand. They frequently guard circuits and possess weather codes not available to all ships; and it goes without saying that any storm warnings or important weather information which they are not sure everybody ha received should be re-transmitted as far as practicable. More than this, they must be conscious of the relative inexperience in seamanship, and particularly hurricane seamanship, of many of their commanding officers, despite their superb fighting qualities. One division commander reports that his captains averaged eight years or less out of the Naval Academy, and this is probably typical.

14. It is most definitely part of the senior officer's responsibility to think in terms of the smallest ship and most inexperienced commanding officer under him. He cannot take them for granted, give them tasks and stations, and assume either that they will be able to keep up and come through any weather that his own big ship can; or that they will be wise enough to gauge the exact moment when their tasks must be abandoned in order for them to keep afloat. The order for ships to be handled and navigated wholly for their own preservation should be originated early enough by the seniors, and not be necessarily withheld until the juniors request it. The very gallantry and determination of our young commanding officers need to be taken into account here as a danger factor, since their urge to keep on, to keep up, to keep station, and to carry out their mission in the face of any difficulty, may deter them from doing what is actually wisest and most profitable in the long run.

Yes, there is a time when a young officer needs to say "No" to those above him or her in the chain of command and do what he believes is right.

That's a very fine line, though.

More on this storm and its consequences at the Naval History and Heritage Command's Typhoons and Hurricanes: Pacific Typhoon, 18 December 1944

Disaster Prep Wednesday: NOAA/NWS Storm Prediction Center

It's summer and a good time to know more about the NOAA/NWS Storm Prediction Center

About the SPC

SPC Mission

The Storm Prediction Center maintains a high-achieving staff using innovative science and technology to deliver timely and accurate watch and forecast products/information dealing with tornadoes, severe thunderstorms, lightning, wildfires, and winter weather for the United States to protect lives and property.

SPC Vision

The trusted source for the prediction of tornadoes and other high-impact hazardous weather.

SPC Unique Value Proposition

SPC national products and services for severe thunderstorms and tornadoes are an essential source of information for the protection of life and property.

Overview

The Storm Prediction Center (SPC) is part of the National Weather Service (NWS) and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP). Our mission is to provide timely and accurate forecasts and watches for severe thunderstorms and tornadoes over the contiguous United States. The SPC also monitors hazardous winter weather and fire weather events across the U.S. and issues specific products for those hazards. We use the most advanced technology and scientific methods available to achieve this goal.***

Really, this is a great site.

The best way to learn what's there is to go play around with it. Click here

Disaster Prep Wednesday: Weather Forecasting is an Art Mixed with Science

Been fun to see the usual griping about "how the weather forecasters blew it" in their predictions of the putative "great blizzard of 2015." Over the years I've had plenty of meeting with professional meteorologists and to a person they take their jobs very seriously. They are wounded by "missing" a forecast. In their defense, there are so many variables in weather that a forecast covering all the possible contingencies is virtually impossible.

What you need to know is that all forecasts are based on probabilities - founded in science but still probabilities. If the one of the inputs changes slightly, a forecast can shift maybe 30 or 40 miles or more.

The mistake the forecasters make is in not revealing the manner in which they have to compare models and how they use the data they have to attempt to refine their predictions.

That's the "art" part.

Its akin to being an experienced sailor who can "feel" a shift in the the wind before it actually happens.

The other mistake is made by the public that fails to grasp that there is a certain probability of error built into a forecast. See here:

What does this "40 percent" mean? ...will it rain 40 percent of of the time? ...will it rain over 40 percent of the area?

The "Probability of Precipitation" (PoP) describes the chance of precipitation occurring at any point you select in the area.

How do forecasters arrive at this value?

Mathematically, PoP is defined as follows:
PoP = C x A where "C" = the confidence that precipitation will occur somewhere in the forecast area, and where "A" = the percent of the area that will receive measureable precipitation, if it occurs at all.

So... in the case of the forecast above, if the forecaster knows precipitation is sure to occur ( confidence is 100% ), he/she is expressing how much of the area will receive measurable rain. ( PoP = "C" x "A" or "1" times ".4" which equals .4 or 40%.)

But, most of the time, the forecaster is expressing a combination of degree of confidence and areal coverage. If the forecaster is only 50% sure that precipitation will occur, and expects that, if it does occur, it will produce measurable rain over about 80 percent of the area, the PoP (chance of rain) is 40%. ( PoP = .5 x .8 which equals .4 or 40%. )

In either event, the correct way to interpret the forecast is: there is a 40 percent chance that rain will occur at any given point in the area.

Get it?

The other thing to be aware of is that TV has spawned a "panic industry" that may misrepresent the probabilities of an event in order to generate rating. See Snow Job: Why the media hyped the big bad blizzard of 2015:

But we all know the drill. Television loves storms! Everyone shifts into team coverage mode. Reporters in parkas stand out in the snow and wind. Anchors stand in front of green-screen maps. It happens every winter, but it’s breaking news. Other news is whited out. “Hardball” turned into “Snowball.”

The real question is whether it's better to spool up in advance of an event with a low probability but a potentially high impact (e.g. 4 feet of snow in NYC) or discount the reaction because of a low probability. As Mr. Kurtz notes in the piece cited above:

I’ll cut the politicians some slack, since overpreparing for an overhyped storm brings a day of criticism, but being unprepared for a killer storm can paralyze a region for 10 days. Botching a snow cleanup has put several mayors’ jobs in jeopardy. “Hindsight is 20/20,” Cuomo said. “You act on the information you have at the time … I’d rather be a little safe than sorry.”

We need to learn that "mostly right" is pretty darn good. The meteorologists I know are working hard to move their percentages of "right" up. 

The media wins either way, you might note.

Disaster Prep Wednesday: Weather School

From the National Weather Service, a chance to learn about weather, for free on the internet at your own pace: JetStream - An Online School for Weather.

Not intended to make you a professional weather guesser, but:

This site is designed to help educators, emergency managers, or anyone interested in learning about weather and weather safety.

Like chicken soup in the treatment of a cold, "it can't hurt."