"Penalties for NGO operations to rescue irregular immigrants at sea" An Answer from the EU Parliment and Why Some NGOs May Be a Problem

During last Sunday's Midrats Episode 397: Migrants, NGOs & the Mediterranean with Claude Berube, Chris Rawley, one topic of discussion was what law governs non-governmental organizations (NGOs) out there in the Mediterranean who are either "rescuing" various forms of migrants and delivering to an EU country or "seeking to prevent" said migrants from reaching EU shores.

As suggested during the discussion, the answer appears to lie with the country whose flag the "rescuer" or "preventer" ship is sailing under. It seems this question was raised in some form to an EU Parliment Commission, which rendered this advice in March 2017. Here's the question from January 2017:

Between January and December 2016, a total of 173 000 irregular immigrants reached Italy by sea, more than in the whole of 2015. The EU sea rescue operation, Triton, is considered to be acting as a powerful magnet for those attempting to migrate illegally from Libya to Italy. Irregular immigrants who have come by the central Mediterranean route are for the most part economic migrants, who are not entitled to international protection. This latter category of migrants includes Nigerians, Ivorians, Senegalese, Malians, Guineans, and Gambians.

In October last year 40% of all operations in the central Mediterranean to rescue irregular immigrants at sea were carried out by NGOs. Frontex experts say that NGO sea rescue operations take place quite close to the Libyan coast, thus tempting immigrants to set out on the perilous crossing. NGO personnel have also guided immigrants’ boats by means of light signals. Frontex has, in addition, put forward serious accusations to the effect that NGO personnel make it impossible to gather evidence about people smugglers and that they encourage immigrants to refuse to cooperate with Italian and EU authorities. In one case irregular immigrants were even brought directly from North Africa to Italy by a vessel owned by an NGO.

According to a recent report by the Austrian military intelligence service, the EU will face a wave of 15 million economic migrants from Africa within the next few years if irregular immigration to Europe is not brought under control. In order to stop irregular immigration, sea rescue operations by NGOs, given that they are fuelling migration, should be made punishable by law. Denying licences to NGOs which take part in operations to rescue irregular migrants at sea might be one way to penalise such organisations.

Will the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, take steps to ensure that penalties are imposed for NGO sea rescue operations to pick up irregular immigrants?

And here's the answer:

The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its reply to the major interpellation on the cooperation between human traffickers and NGOs engaged in search and rescue in the Mediterranean that was debated during the plenary session on 16 March 2017.

The duty to render assistance to persons or vessels in distress at sea is an obligation under international law(1). International law is binding on States, who are obliged to subject shipmasters of private, commercial or military vessels to the corresponding duty to render assistance. The shipmasters of vessels of non-governmental organisations (NGO) are therefore bound to respect the same obligations of international law as shipmasters of State vessels.

European Border and Coast Guard's Risk Analysis 2017 does not constitute evidence of NGOs having cooperated or colluded with criminal smuggling networks to intentionally facilitate unauthorised entry to the EU. This shall however be seen as a reminder that close coordination between all participants in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean is key to the effective implementation of the existing rules and to ensure the safety of all concerned, migrants and crews alike.

The Commission has not received any official information from the competent national authorities about investigations or prosecution of NGOs involved in search and rescue activities for having cooperated with criminal smuggling networks. It is for the national authorities to assess whether the conduct of any NGO or other legal or natural person that rescue people in a concrete case can be sanctioned under EU or national law as a criminal activity.


(1) This principle is enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) (Art. 98) as well as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). In addition, the applicable legal framework includes additional treaties related to maritime traffic, salvage and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) resolutions.

As set out here, the European Commission "is the executive of the European Union and promotes its general interest."

The European Border and Coast Guard's Risk Analysis 2017 can be found here:

A staggering 96% of newly-arrived migrants interviewed in the Central Mediterranean region stated that they had used the services of smuggling networks to illegally enter the EU. This suggests that irregular migration via Libya is entirely dependent on the services of the smuggling networks. Therefore, any activity that would disrupt or deter these groups could significantly curb the flow of irregular
migrants into the EU.
***
In 2016, the Central Mediterranean saw the highest number of migrant arrivals ever recorded from sub-Sahara, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (181 459 migrants, increase of 18% compared with 2015). This trend, which is consistent with previous year-on-year increases, shows that the Central Mediterranean has become the main route for African migrants to the EU and it is very likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.Specifically, 89% of migrants arrived from Libya, making Italy the main entrypoint to the EU. As a result, most of the EU, civilian and NGO vessels in the region focused their Search and Rescue(SAR) activities on migrant boats departing from Libya.

Important changes were observed on this migratory route in 2016. During 2015, and the first months of 2016, smuggling groups instructed migrants to make satellite phone calls to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Rome to initiate targeted rescues on the high seas. SAR operations were mainly undertaken by Italian law-enforcement, EUNAVFOR Med or Frontex vessels with NGO vessels involved in less than 5% of the incidents. As shown in Figure 5, more than half of all rescue operations were initiated in this manner. From June until October 2016, however, the pattern was reversed. Satellite phone calls to MRCC Rome decreased sharply to 10% and NGO rescue operations rose significantly to more than 40% of all incidents.

Since June 2016, a significant number of boats were intercepted or rescued by NGO vessels without any prior distress call and without official information as to the rescue location. NGO presence and activities close to, and occasionally within, the 12-mile Libyan territorial waters nearly doubled compared with the previous year, totalling 15 NGO assets (14 maritime and 1 aerial). In parallel, the overall number of incidents increased dramatically.

The statistical data show that the criminal networks behind illegal bordercrossings along the Central Mediterranean route continued to exploit criminal business opportunities by handling a great demand for smuggling services and thus posed formidable challenges for EU border control. Libyan-based smugglers,in particular, heavily relied on the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and associated SAR as well as humanitarian assistance efforts, turning it into a distinct tactical advantage. This is not a new strategy, but the scope of the problem is alarming.

In this context, it transpired that both border surveillance and SAR missions close to, or within, the 12-mile territorial waters of Libya have unintended consequences. Namely, they influence smugglers’ planning and act as a pull factor that compounds the difficulties inherent in border control and saving lives at sea. Dangerous crossings on unseaworthy and overloaded vessels were
organised with the main purpose of being detected by EUNAVFOR Med/Frontex and NGO vessels.

Apparently, all parties involved in SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives at minimum cost, strengthen their business model by increasing the chances of success. Migrants and refugees – encouraged by the stories of those who had successfully made it in the past – attempt the dangerous crossing since they are aware of and rely on humanitarian assistance to reach the EU.

So it may not be a matter of "collusion" but it sure seems like the "do-gooders" may be a bigger part of the problem than you might have thought. And, given that perhaps only a few of the "flag states" of their ships are being impacted by the wave of migrants, it seems "State control" might be a little weak. A list of these NGO ships and their flags was in the Berube and Rawly CIMSEC post THE MED MIGRANT CRISIS AND DEFEND EUROPE.

UPDATE: The EU debates of 16 March 2017 can be found here:

David Coburn, author. – Mr President, I think this is a good innovation – more like Prime Minister’s Question Time in the House of Commons, the Mother of Parliaments, so perhaps the centre of the European democracy is following the Mother of Parliaments.

Cooperation between human traffickers and NGOs engaged in search and rescue in the Mediterranean.

On 15 December 2016, the Financial Times, which I am sure you all know, published several excerpts from leaked Frontex reports that suggest a high level of cooperation between smugglers and NGOs:

- ‘…criminal networks were smuggling migrants directly on an NGO vessel’;

- ‘…clear indications before departure on the precise direction to be followed in order to reach the NGO boats’

- ‘…people rescued by NGO vessels were often “not willing to cooperate with debriefing experts at all, with some claiming that they were warned not to cooperate with Italian law enforcement or Frontex”.’

This period has also witnessed a surge in NGO activity in the region and a sharp drop in rescues in response to distress signals. Frontex suggested the latter is due to ‘NGOs cooperating closer to Libyan territorial waters’ or even the lights used by rescue boats, which the agency said acted ‘as a beam for the migrants’.

Does the Commission believe that such actions constitute cooperation with the smugglers, and if not, could it define what would?

Does it believe that such actions constitute collusion, and if not would it define what would?

Does the EU provide any financial assistance to NGOs engaged in search and rescue in the Mediterranean?

Is Frontex hiding anything we should all know about, since we are paying them? I think this place should know more.



Julian King, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, I would like to thank you for the opportunity afforded by those questions to clarify one or two issues.

First, as has been reiterated in the EU action plan against migrant smuggling, the duty to render assistance to persons or vessels in distress at sea is an obligation under international law. This is a binding obligation on states, who are obliged to ask ship masters of private, commercial or military vessels to render assistance. The ship masters vessels of nongovernmental organisations are bound by the same duties as ship masters of state vessels.

Second, it does not help to make, if I may say so, general assumptions on the role of all civil society organisations. These organisations are mostly active in support of governments and international organisations. At the same time, rules must be respected, and close coordination between all involved in search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean is obviously key to ensuring the safety of all concerned, migrants and crews alike.

Coordination of the rescue efforts is ensured primarily by the state responsible for the region where an incident is taking place. Any assisting vessel, be it private owned or state controlled, must therefore follow the instructions of the responsible Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre. So to take this example, in the case of search and rescue in the central Mediterranean region, coordination must take place with the Italian authorities.

Third, when it comes to criminalisation of migrant smuggling, we need to be clear about the existing legal framework. According to existing EU legislation, facilitation of unauthorised entry is the act of intentionally assisting a person who is not a national of a Member State to enter or transit across the territory of a Member State in breach of that Member State’s immigration laws. National authorities are the competent body to judge this. They are also competent to assess whether the conduct of any NGO, or indeed other legal or natural person, rescuing people in a specific case could amount to a form of collusion or cooperation with migrant smuggling networks.

So far the Commission has not received any official information from any Member States about investigations or prosecutions of NGOs involved in search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean for having participated in migrant smuggling.

Finally I would like to emphasise that the Commission does not provide any financial assistance to NGOs engaged in search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean. EU funding through the International Security Fund can support search and rescue operations at sea which arise during maritime border surveillance operations. These are the exclusive responsibility of public authorities, hence search and rescue operations carried out by third parties, such as NGOs, are not eligible under the Internal Security Fund for EU funding.

Interesting Series at the NY Times Reporting on the Unregulated (Often Deadly) Aspects of Part of Life at Sea

The first two articles by Ian Urbina covering some of the less pleasant aspects of life at sea are up at the NYTimes as a series on "The Outlaw Sea."
1.  Stowaways and Crimes Aboard a Scofflaw Ship

Few places on Earth are as free from legal oversight as the high seas. One ship has been among the most persistent offenders.

and 2. Murder at Sea: Captured on Video, but Killers Go Free:

A video shows at least four unarmed men being gunned down in the water. Despite dozens of witnesses, the killings went unreported and remain a mystery

Ships belong to and are legally controlled by their flag states. This may mean there is no control at all as a practical matter.  Often, in the absence of a civilizing force,  Hobbes was right with this:

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
(Hobbes, LEVIATHAN, Chap 13)

I guess in theory there could be some sort of policing done at sea, but like many theoretical things, the realities are that people are being killed, enslaved and otherwise maltreated at sea and the sovereign rights of nations rule.

If there is good news, the numbers of bad actors is really pretty small in the great scheme of things. The bad news is that by recruiting crews from dirt poor areas of the world that many of the crewmen so recruited are cowed into submission in order to keep what little money they earn.

I look forward to the next installments.

Gulf of Guinea Pirates: Flag State Liberia says ‘Kerala’ hijacked

For a couple of weeks, the saga of the gas oil tanker Kerala has been drifting along. From the early reports hijacking, there have been allegations by the Angolan Navy that the hijacking was faked by the crew.
of a

Now, Tanker Operator has a follow-on report, "Tanker Operator Liberia says ‘Kerala’ hijacked":

Liberia has entered into the controversy surrounding the alleged hijacking of Dynacom’s LR1 ‘Kerala’ off Angola on 18th January, 2014.

The flag state said that although the investigation is still ongoing, the evidence gathered thus far by an INTERPOL-led incident response team has allowed the Liberian Registry to conclude that the vessel was hijacked by pirates.
***
During the incident, the registry said that the pirates disabled the vessel’s AIS and other communication equipment so that the vessel could not be tracked from shore or satellite. The pirates also painted over the identifying features of the vessel, including funnel, name and IMO number and undertook three separate ship-to-ship transfers unloading about 12,271.5 tonnes of oil in total.
***
On arrival at Tema, all crew members received immediate medical treatment. During the hijacking, one crew member was stabbed by the pirates and others were beaten.

Liberia, of course, is not the "operator" of the vessel but rather the nation which provides the flag of convenience for ships. The operator of the vessel is Dynacom, which asserts it was a hijacking all along. Angola might just have an interest in claiming that its waters are safe which might have clouded their initial reaction.

A noted in prior post, this will be an interesting legal mess to sort out. There are lots of players:

Liberia will continue working with the authorities in Ghana, Nigeria and Angola and elsewhere in the region in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of this crime, the registry stressed.

Good luck with that.

You might note that shutting off the AIS and the painting indicates a modicum of sophistication in the purported hijackers. Three offloads? Wow.

"Interim" Guidance for private maritime security companies agreed by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee

Reported by the IMO as "Guidance for private maritime security companies agreed by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee":

Following further debate during a working group, the MSC agreed Interim Guidance to private maritime security companies (PMSC) providing contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the High Risk Area.

The guidance covers:

• PMSC Professional Certification, including the recommendation that PMSC should seek certification with relevant national and international private maritime security service standards when these are established;

• PMSC Company requirements, including the recommendation that PMSC should establish procedures to provide maritime security services to ship owners and ship operators and comply with all relevant legal requirements;

• Management, including recommendations on selection, vetting and training of personnel for a PCASP team;

• Deployment considerations, addressing the specific aspects of PCASP deployment and the role of the PMSC in ensuring efficient and successful deployments, including communications with the ship owner or operator, and including recommendations relating to management of firearms and ammunition from embarkation to disembarkation and use of force. (The PMSC should recognize that laws governing the use of force may differ over time and according to location. The applicable national law, including any criminal laws, for an incident on a ship from which PCASP will be operating will be principally that of the flag State. It may also include the laws and regulations of coastal, port and other States.)

IMO | Maritime Safety Committee re "Arms Aboard Ships"

IMO | Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 90th session, 16 to 25 May 2012 (High-level segment on arms on board):

Opening address by IMO Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu
May 16, 2012
MSC 90
Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu's opening address to the High-level segment on arms on board
16 May 2012

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

As I mentioned in my opening remarks to the meeting, this is the first ever high-level segment of the Committee and its importance is underscored by the presence here today of the President of the Assembly and the Council Chairman. I am particularly pleased to welcome and receive the support of the host Government through the participation of the Secretary of State for Transport – the Right Honourable Justine Greening MP – and of many Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Vice Minsters and others who have indicated their wish to participate in this very important debate – I wish to express my sincere appreciation to you all.

Reports received by the Organization indicate that, although the number of attacks by pirates continues to increase, the proportion of attacks that are successful has decreased. This may be due to a number of factors, including naval protection and better implementation of IMO guidance and Best Management Practices, including the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP). There is anecdotal evidence that the number of ships carrying firearms has increased. On the basis of declarations of weapons carried and on their observations, naval forces estimate that around 25% of ships in the High Risk Area are carrying firearms, however it is also believed that a number of ships are not declaring the presence of private armed security for various reasons, including the lack of flag State approval.

The carriage of firearms on board merchant ships is a complex legal issue with Member States taking diverse positions. The Committee has determined that the carriage of armed personnel is a matter for flag States to authorize, however it has also accepted that their carriage has legal implications for coastal and port States, particularly with respect to the carriage, embarkation and disembarkation of firearms and security equipment in areas under the jurisdiction of such port or coastal States.

Resolution A.1044(27) on piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia endorses the position of this Committee that seafarers should not carry firearms and that the carriage of armed personnel on board ships for enhancing their protection should be left to flag States to decide, once a thorough risk assessment exercise has been carried out and following consultations with the shipowners concerned.

Amongst other things, the resolution strongly urges Governments which have not already done so:

.1 to decide as a matter of national policy, whether ships entitled to fly their flag should be authorized to carry privately contracted armed security personnel and, if so, under what conditions; and

.2 in their capacity as port or coastal States, to decide on their policy on the embarkation, disembarkation and carriage of privately contracted armed security personnel and of the firearms, ammunition and security-related equipment, and to promulgate it widely to other Member Governments, to industry, and to the Organization.

As a truly global industry with many stakeholders, shipping benefits from harmonization of procedures, adoption of common minimum standards and clarity with respect to national legal regimes. However, while progress has been made on developing general guidance, policy on the use of Private Security Guards is not common among Member Governments and, across the shipping industry. There are no agreed minimum performance standards for Private Security Guards and ships using them are subject to many, diverse legal regimes at present.

In order to stimulate debate on this important subject, we have issued MSC 90/20/5, which describes the current situation and outlines a number of related policy issues requiring further deliberation by this Committee. While recognizing the reality of the situation in which Private Security Guards are employed and the diverse positions of Governments, there is a need to consider how the international community should deal with the issue of Private Security Guards and, in particular, the need to arrive at practical solutions to the issue.

Since the issue of Private Security Guards on board ships is of utmost sensitivity and requires detailed consideration of the policy issues involved, I considered it particularly helpful and appropriate, under this agenda item, for the Committee to engage in a high-level policy debate on this topic.

I invite all Member Governments representing flag, port and coastal States and States of seafarers, and shipowners to share their views on this issue of arms on board which is now critical for the international maritime community.

The outcome of your discussions today will provide the clear policy direction required for subsequent discussions on related, technical documents that the Committee and its Maritime Security and Piracy Working Group will be considering under this agenda item.

***

We have been dealing with piracy problems off the coast of Somalia for 5 years now.

Despite serious efforts by Governments, navies and the industry, the international community has not been able to stop Somali piracy.

We have seen significant developments over the last 4 years:

Somali Pirates: Iranian Vessel Hijacked in Maldivian waters

Eglantine (from here)

Reported as Pirates hijack cargo vessel in Maldivian waters:

A foreign cargo vessel has been hijacked by Somali pirates in Maldivian waters, the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) has confirmed.

The Bolivian-flagged vessel was hijacked about 190 nautical miles northwest of Hoarafushi island in Haa Alif Atoll, said MNDF Spokesperson Major Abdul Raheem.

Maldives circled in red

The MNDF have dispatched defence vessels to the scene of the hijacking. The vessel was identified on Somalia Report as the Iranian-owned MV EGLANTINE, with 23 crew members on board. The vessel, which has previously been named the Bluebell and the Iran Gilan, is owned by Darya Hafiz Shipping.

“Since it is a hijacking it is possible that the pirates will be armed. I cannot give further details on the mission. There are factors to be considered before going to a direct confrontation or rescue,” said Major Raheem. Foreign authorities have been asked for assistance, he confirmed.

Flags of Convenience reports the ship, being Iranian owned is on the U.S. Department of State's Speically Designated Nationals list.

Armed Guards on Merchant Ships: The "Flag-State Endorsement"

Who will be responsible for Barney?

Interesting update to the Italian armed guard mess off India at The Hindu "Business Line" Ships with armed guards: Govt may fix responsibility on flag-state:

India's maritime administration may make ‘flag-state endorsement' mandatory for foreign merchant ships entering Indian waters with armed security guards on board. The idea is to make the Government of the country in which the ship is registered (flag-state) also responsible for any action on the part of the armed guards deployed on the vessel.
***
Currently, flag-states give a general approval for shipping companies to engage private security guards. The contract is between the ship owners and the security agency which provides the armed men. With rising incidents of attacks on cargo ships by Somali pirates, many countries, including India and Italy, have allowed their merchant ships to have armed guards on board. Ships have to follow the policy (on deployment of guards) of the country in which they are registered. The policy is based on the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) guidelines.

Problems can arise when the ship is owned, managed and operated by people of different nationalities. Typically, a ship may be registered in one country and its owner based in another. Further, the private security agency that provides the guards could be operating from a third country. Adding to this, there is every possibility of the security men belonging to different nationalities. Given such complexities, Government officials here said it needs to be made mandatory that flag states should shoulder the responsibility of ensuring that any liability arising out of reckless acts by armed men on board are honoured.

Of course, there are problems with such an "endorsement," too. What if the foreign merchant ship is not in "Indian waters?" In fact, what if the entire act complained of occurs on the "high seas?" How do you hold the government of some "flag of convenience" state like Tuvalu responsible? Somewhere I once dug up the info that about 35% of shipping sails under a "flag of convenience." Is India going to forbid entry to its waters for such ships - not that it may matter all that much because many of those ships can't afford or won't hire armed security guards.
UPDATE 22 Feb 12: "It was an accident, not manslaughter" - an opinion piece.

Somali Pirates: Shipping Company Threatens to Change Flags Unless Allowed to Put "Private Protection" on Ships

Dockwise Heavy Lift Vessel

What do shipping companies do when facing legal restrictions on their ships that don't allow them the freedom to look out after their own interests? Why, they change the flag under which they sail to one with fewer restrictions.

That's exactly what is going on here with a threat from a Dutch shipping outfit as announced in a press release: Dockwise Requests more Leeway from Netherlands Government to Counteract Pirates:

Dockwise urges the Netherlands government to allow for better protection on its vessels to counteract piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. As the ability of governments to offer military protection is limited, the ability for ship owners to employ additional private protection is of the utmost importance. Despite several appeals, private protection onboard Dutch vessels could meet with legal impediments. Other nations do allow for such added protection measures. Dockwise eventually may be forced to have its vessels sail under a different flag if restrictions are not eased imminently.

On the growing piracy problem André Goedée, Dockwise's CEO, comments: "As an oil and gas service provider, our vessels - which as a consequence of their specific nature have been labeled by experts to be very vulnerable to pirate attacks - have to enter pirate-infested waters most months of the year. At this point we are not allowed to protect our employees adequately against pirates, while other nations do allow for added security measures. Our clients, too, request added security measures for their employees and cargoes on-board. In the interest of our employees and because of the increasing pressure from the industry itself, we may be forced to seek other alternatives - such as bringing the vessels under a different jurisdiction and flag - if regulations are not adapted quickly. We would regret having to take such a decision, but we are left with no choice should the Dutch government remain idle."

Dockwise is most noted for its fleet of "heavy lift" ships used to transport everything from oil rigs to damaged ships.

UPDATE: On a somewhat related note, Maersk Shipping announced last month an increased "risk surcharge" due to Somali pirates:

Reflecting higher costs stemming from a jump in piracy off the Somali coast, A.P. Moller-Maersk AS raised its emergency-risk surcharge. Maersk's container-freight division increased the fee on each 40-foot container shipped through risky waters to $200–$500 from $100–$400, to pass on some of the company's rising costs to customers, said Erik Rabjerg Nielsen, the division's head of daily operations. Customers typically pay about $3,000 total to ship a container from Asia to the U.S. He estimated that Maersk's antipiracy costs will rise to $200 million this year from $100 million last year as ships are forced to sail faster and longer to prevent hijackings and crews receive doubled salaries as compensation for the added work.

Piracy has an effect.

Iranian ships face Europe ports ban

Iran's merchant fleet ("IRISL= Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines) might be in trouble - Lloyd's List reports "IRISL ships face Europe ports ban":

Sanctions already imposed by both the US and the United Nations have specifically been aimed at IRISL, which is accused of facilitating Tehran’s nuclear proliferation plans, despite its repeated denials.

Maltese foreign minister Tonio Borg has told the Times of Malta newspaper that the European Council has instructed foreign ministers to move against transport entities, including IRISL and other shipping outfits.

“Besides transport, a number of economic sectors will be targeted by the EU sanctions, which will also include a ban on investments, technical assistance and technology transfers to Iran’s oil and gas industry,” he said.

Thanks to Fred Fry for sending this on, with a note to the effect that Iran can't continue the shell game of "selling" and "reflagging" described here because "everyone knows who owned them and they really can't disguise that given that any legitimate buyer is almost certainly going to run afoul of the sanctions themselves given that actually buying the ships would involve transferring money."

UPDATE: Fred, by the way, will be a guest on Midrats this Sunday at 5 pm (Eastern).
Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

Iran: Flags of Convenience and Breaking Sanctions

Nice report of how Iran evades sanctions by the NYTimes at Web of Shell Companies Veils Trade by Iran’s Ships:

But an examination shows how Iran has used a succession of stratagems — changing not just ships’ flags and names but their owners, operators and managers, too — to stay one step ahead of its pursuers. This cat-and-mouse game offers a case study in the difficulties of enforcing sanctions.

“We are dealing with people who are as smart as we are, and of course they can read our list,” said Stuart A. Levey, the under secretary of the Treasury who oversees the sanctions effort and the blacklist of Irisl and its fleet.

That blacklist simply hasn’t kept up.

It's always a mistake to underestimate how wily your enemies are.

One of my earlier posts on flags of convenience involving that other "friend of the U.S.," North Korea.

Ship photo of vessel "Amplify" by Daniel Ferro from Shipspotting.com and used in accord with terms found there.

Hat tip to Information Dissemination.

Flag of convenience: Liberia

Nice summary of the Liberia Flag of Convenience issue here.