Counterstrike: U.S. Navy Strikes Radar Sites in Yemen Involved in Recent Missile Launches

Freedom of the seas means not letting bad guys take potshots at ships at sea. Nothing like a little firework to celebrate your 241st birthday, U.S. Navy!

Official Navy headline reads U.S. Military Strikes Radar Sites in Yemen Involved in Recent Missile Launches Threatening USS Mason, but

The following is a statement released today by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on U.S. military strikes against radar sites in Yemen:

"Early this morning local time, the U.S. military struck three radar sites in Houthi-controlled territory on Yemen's Red Sea coast. Initial assessments show the sites were destroyed. The strikes -- authorized by President Obama at the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford -- targeted radar sites involved in the recent missile launches threatening USS Mason and other vessels operating in

The guided missile destroyer USS Nitze (DDG 94) launches a strike against three coastal radar sites in Houthi-controlled territory on Yemen's Red Sea coast.

international waters in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb. These limited self-defense strikes were conducted to protect our personnel, our ships, and our freedom of navigation in this important maritime passageway. The United States will respond to any further threat to our ships and commercial traffic, as appropriate, and will continue to maintain our freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb, and elsewhere around the world."

As a side note, Iran is sending a frigate and a replenishment ship to the Gulf of Aden in what looks to me like one of their routine counter-piracy patrols, as set out here:

Iran’s 44th fleet, comprised of Alvand destroyer and Bushehr logistic warship, has been dispatched to the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to protect the country’s trade vessels against piracy in the unsafe zone.

The Iranian fleet will head for the waters near Somalia and Tanzania afterwards through the Indian Ocean.

After making a port call in Tanzania, the 44th fleet will sail along the eastern coasts of Africa if the weather holds out, and is scheduled to sail even for the western coasts of South Africa, in the South Atlantic Ocean.

The presence of the Iranian fleet in the Gulf of Aden coincides with the US decision to directly get involved in a Saudi-led war against Yemen.

As do a billion other things.

Freedom to Navigate - "Freedom of Navigation Operations" as challenges to "excessive claims to water and airspace"

Interesting read at Foreign Affairs "All in Good FON: Why Freedom of Navigation Is Business as Usual in the South China Sea" by Mira Rapp-Hooper (a reprint of an Oct 2105 article):

Rumors first emerged in May 2015 that the Pentagon was contemplating military operations around China’s new artificial islands among the Spratly Islands. Through such exercises, the United States would aim to demonstrate that it does not recognize spurious Chinese claims to water and airspace around the islands.
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As the history of the Freedom of Navigation Program and its relationship to international law make clear, however, such operations would complement U.S. diplomacy and, although they would contest China’s claims to water and airspace under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they would not contest its claims to territory.
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In a recent Senate hearing, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) argued that Washington’s failure to transit within 12 nautical miles of China’s claims “grants de facto recognition” of them. A report soon followed with the headline “McCain: U.S. Should Ignore China’s Claims in South China Sea.” This was likely not the message the Senator intended to convey, but reporting has consistently suggested that FONOPS would be used to push back against China’s claims to territory. The United States, however, has a long-standing policy that it does not take a position on other countries’ sovereignty disputes. FONOPS are meant to challenge excessive claims to water and airspace; they do not challenge territorial claims.

In other words, the FONOPS reality is both considerably more nuanced and far less escalatory than the popular narrative suggests. (emphasis added)

Yes, very nuanced. But:

. . . [P]recisely because the South China Sea territories are disputed, and because Washington does not take a position on such sovereignty disputes, it need not recognize territorial seas or airspace around any of China’s artificial features—or those of any other countries. In short, territorial seas are a function of recognized state sovereignty, and where that sovereignty is disputed, vessels and aircraft may pass freely.

... even if China’s Spratly holdings were uncontested, the fact remains that Beijing’s seven island features are artificial. Under UNCLOS, man-made islands do not confer territorial seas or airspace. Rather, they are granted only a 500-meter safety zone. In China’s case, before its building spree, at least three of its seven artificial islands were low-tide elevations or reefs, rather than rocks or islands. Under international law, these features are not even subject to sovereignty claims—by China, or by anyone else. By this logic, even without persistent sovereignty disputes, Mischief Reef, Gaven Reef, and Subi Reef would not be entitled to water or airspace of their own, and therefore may be especially appropriate features around which to transit.

Since the Chinese aren't being all that subtle - in that they are making very territorial-like claims, nuance may be wasted.

Who is willing to go to war to keep the South China Sea open to free navigation?

Or for that matter, who is willing to fight to close the South China Sea to the free passage of ships under international law?

Naval Power: Freedom of the Seas and the Global Marketplace

Interesting speech on foreign policy given by Senator Marco Rubio at the Brookings Institution with a key section (at about 1:25) highlighted over at the Heritage Foundation: "Rubio Is Right: Naval Power Pivotal to U.S. Foreign Policy". First, a portion of the speech, via a Brookings video: The Heritage Rubio money quote:

Even in our military engagements, the lasting impact of our influence on the world is hard to ignore. Millions of people have emerged from poverty around the world in part because our Navy protects the freedom of the seas, allowing the ever-increasing flow of goods between nations.

And some Heritage analysis:

Alas, however, in recent years, the importance of a navy in U.S. foreign policy has not enjoyed the attention it should. The Obama Administration’s much-announced focus on the Pacific theater and U.S.–Chinese relations is lacking in both conviction and capabilities. The absence of a rhetorically firm, well-coordinated, and multifaceted policy toward China’s deviations from liberal economic practices and abuses of human rights has been noted elsewhere, but of material concern is the inadequate defense structure that is taking shape in the midst of strategic ambiguity and looming, indiscriminate budget cuts.

By contrast, China’s military spending steadily increases. This is particularly concerning when one considers Chinese intimidation in the region. And now, China appears complicit in materially destabilizing the region’s security; evidence points to continued Chinese assistance in North Korea’s efforts to build a successful long-range missile program.

China and the South China Sea: Back to the "Cow's Tongue"

Red dashed line is the "Cow's Tongue"

There are a couple of things floating about the internet involving China and its assertion of claims to a large chunk of the South China Sea - a topic that I remind you has been discussed here and on Midrats on several occasions (see China: "The Cow's Tongue", Midrats (Dr. Michael Auslin in first part of show) and, more recently, A War of Words Over the South China Sea).

Senator James Webb has taken on this South China Sea issue as "America's Munich Moment":

So when the senator opines that the United States is ‘approaching a Munich moment with China’ in the South China Sea, it’s worth taking his words seriously.

He levels an incendiary charge. If this is a Munich moment in the making, who are the protagonists? Webb seemingly casts China in the part of Nazi Germany, an aggressive, acquisitive power bent on increasing its geopolitical sway at small states’ expense. This makes President Hu Jintao the counterpart to German dictator Adolf Hitler. President Barack Obama plays the part of Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister who traded away much of Czechoslovakia in 1938 in the hope of slaking Hitler’s land hunger.
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Americans seldom follow Southeast Asian politics, despite the importance of this maritime crossroads to US and global commerce. Filipino leaders maintain that the 1951 security treaty between Manila and Washington covers maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea. Would Americans fight to defend such claims, or are they, like Czech sovereignty for the Western powers in 1938, a secondary affair?

As noted here. the U.S. Senate has taken a stand on the South China Sea by passing a resolution condemning the use of force in the disputed waters in Southeast Asia. See, from Senator Webb's website, U.S. Senate Unanimously “Deplores” China’s Use of Force in South China Sea:

The text of S.Res.217 is below:

Title: Calling for a peaceful and multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia.

Whereas, on June 9, 2011, 3 vessels from China, including 1 fishing vessel and 2 maritime security vessels, ran into and disabled the cables of an exploration ship from Vietnam, the VIKING 2;
Whereas that use of force occurred within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam, an area recognized as its Exclusive Economic Zone;
Whereas, on May 26, 2011, a maritime security vessel from China cut the cables of another exploration ship from Vietnam, the BINH MINH, in the South China Sea in waters near Cam Ranh Bay;
Whereas, in March 2011, the Government of the Philippines reported that patrol boats from China attempted to ram 1 of its surveillance ships;
Whereas those incidents occurred within disputed maritime territories of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, composed of 21 islands and atolls, 50 submerged land atolls, and 28 partly submerged reefs over an area of 340,000 square miles, and the Paracel Islands, a smaller group of islands located south of China’s Hainan Island;
Whereas China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei have disputed territorial claims over the Spratly Islands, and China and Vietnam have a disputed claim over the Paracel Islands;
Whereas the Government of China claims most of the 648,000 square miles of the South China Sea, more than any other nation involved in those territorial disputes;
Whereas, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China signed a declaration on the code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea;
Whereas that declaration committed all parties to those territorial disputes to “reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea” and to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force”;
Whereas the South China Sea contains vital commercial shipping lines and points of access between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean;
Whereas, although not a party to these disputes, the United States has a national economic and a security interest in ensuring that no party uses force unilaterally to assert maritime territorial claims in East Asia;
Whereas, in September 2010, the Government of China also deliberately provoked a controversy within the waters of the Senkaku Islands, territory under the legal administration of Japan in the East China Sea;
Whereas the actions of the Government of China in the South China Sea have also affected United States military and maritime vessels transiting through international air space and waters, including the collision of a fighter plane of the Government of China with a United States surveillance plane in 2001, the harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE in March 2009, and the collision of a Chinese submarine with the sonar cable of the USS JOHN MCCAIN in June 2009;
Whereas, like every nation, the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and open access to the maritime commons of Asia;
Whereas the Government of the United States expressed support for the declaration by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in 2002 on the code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, and supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion;
Whereas the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and in unimpeded economic development and commerce;
Whereas, on October 11, 2010, Secretary Gates maintained “The United States has always exercised our rights and supported the rights of others to transit through, and operate in, international waters.”;
Whereas, on June 3, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Gates stated that “[m]aritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity”;
Whereas, on June 4, 2011, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Liang Guanglie, the Defense Minister from China, said, “China is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea.”;
Whereas, on June 11, 2011, the Government of Vietnam held a live-fire military exercise on the uninhabited island of Hon Ong, 25 miles off the coast of Vietnam in the South China Sea; and
Whereas, on June 11, 2011, Hong Lei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman of China, stated, “[China] will not resort to force or the threat of force” to resolve the territorial dispute: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate—
(1) reaffirms the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and pledges continued efforts to facilitate a multilateral, peaceful process to resolve these disputes;
(2) deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea;
(3) calls on all parties to the territorial dispute to refrain from threatening force or using force to assert territorial claims; and
(4) supports the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea.

Now comes Vietnam to assert its complaints against China's encroachment into what it asserts are Vietnamese waters, in The East Sea: Seizing opportunity, getting out of danger:

If we look at the map of the East Sea, the territorial water sovereignty of each country and the international maritime order have been clearly clarified under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS).

China's Nine-Dotted Line Map

But why China dares to put forward the U-shape line to claim up to 80 percent of the East Sea – which could only happen if the wheel of history have reversed to the time before the World War II; when Vietnam, the Philippines and the countries around the East Sea were not recognized as independent nations and when Vietnamese, Filipino and other peoples did not have independence and freedom?
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In that context, China has two options: 1) Cooperating with other super powers in the world, led by the US, to supply goods for maintaining the international order, the stability and prosperity development based on cooperation and global trade; 2) replacing the US and the US’ strategic allies (West Europe and Japan) to set up the new world order and new military alliance headed by the US in order to force others to obey the new order.

In fact, China has chosen the second. This process began by trampling on the UNCLOS in order to turn the East Sea into its pond. It is uneasy for China to realize that ambition because: 1) it abolishes the sovereignty of countries around the East Sea and goes on the contrary with the trend of the time (the campaign to struggle for independence for nations after the fascism was defeated). 2) In the long run, it can make a bad precedent for appropriating the rights of free navigation and maritime safety on international sea routes. Other countries (except for China) will have to pay fees or be fined or banned from using international sea routes or air routes, which are controlled by China.

The key point here is the clear difference between international maritime routes and maritime routes in China’s waters. When politic or interest conflicts occur, China can use its control right to ban related countries from traveling in the East Sea, though in principle, China commits maintaining free navigation. This will not happen if China cannot impose its real control on the waters bordered by the U-shape line.

The sovereignty disputes in the East Sea are not a bilateral matter, but the issue of regional and international security. China understands it very clearly and China understands that the US, Japan, West Europe and other superpowers in the world, like Russia and India also know its plot.

This game shows adventure in the strategy that China is pursuing. Carefully analyzing that game will create international agreement to solve the East Sea disputes, which China makes up into “bilateral conflicts” on the “indisputable sovereignty” in which China is the victim.

Now, with heads turning toward the U.S. to be a presence, ask yourself, "What fleet do we need?"

And, make no mistake, this is all about naval power and power projection.