The Mess in Syria : Now, if Congress would do its job . . . even occasionally

How'd we get involved in Syria, anyway? Something about "humanitarian interventions?" Well, according to Susan Rice, President Obama's National Security Advisor, it was the "least bad option.":

When White House senior advisers gathered that Friday evening in the Oval Office, Obama began with his description of the challenge he aimed to address. We did not have a clearly valid international legal basis for our planned action, he said, but we could argue that the use of banned chemical weapons made our actions legitimate, if not technically legal. Domestically, we could invoke the president’s constitutional authority to use force under Article II, but that would trigger a 60-day clock under the War Powers Act—meaning that if our actions lasted longer than 60 days, he would need to obtain congressional approval to continue military action. Therefore, before we used any significant force in Syria to address its chemical-weapons use, the president thought it best to invest members of Congress in the decision, and through them the American people.

As usual, Obama was thinking several plays down the field—to the potential need for military action against Iran, should diplomacy fail to force that country to give up its still nascent nuclear-weapons program. Once the precedent was established that Congress should act to authorize military action in Syria, we could insist on the same kind of vote should we need to confront Iran—a much higher-risk proposition that he would want Congress to own with us.

I admired the president’s logic, but disagreed with his assumptions. As Obama polled the aides assembled in the Oval, all agreed with him. He called on me last, as he often did in my role as national security adviser.

The lone dissenter, I argued for proceeding with military action, as planned. We had clearly signaled—most recently that morning in a strong speech by Secretary of State John Kerry—that we intended to hold Syria accountable through the use of force. Our military assets were in place. The UN had been warned. Our allies were waiting. As then–Vice President Joe Biden liked to say, “Big countries don’t bluff.” Finally, I invoked the painful history of Rwanda and predicted we could long be blamed for inaction.

Well, eventually off we went to a sort of war. The sort where we lose our troops for "not technically legal" reasons. And the "War Powers Act?" It's a joke:

The 1973 law was meant to prevent presidents from sustaining wars without congressional approval. But no one thinks the lawsuit will succeed. And the War Powers Act has never been successfully employed to end any military mission.

"The War Powers resolution really does not work," says former Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), who co-chaired the Iraq Study Group and the 9/11 Commission.

Instead, the War Powers Act has largely been used as it's being used now — as a political tool that allows Congress to criticize a president about the prosecution of a war.

Excellent piece in Military Times by John Robinson In supporting the Kurds in Syria, US has been playing fast and loose with the law

***
Does it matter that not likely a living soul in the current ISIS planned, authorized, or committed the 9/11 attacks, nor aided or harbored 9/11 perpetrators? Apparently, not a wit. Does it matter that the last administration recognized the 2001 AUMF had outlived its shelf-life and offered a new one, including ISIS language, to Congress? Nope; rejected. Does it matter that a bipartisan group of senators subsequently authored a similar AUMF, to accomplish the same thing? Nope; never left the starting blocks.

We’ve been playing fast and loose with the law ever since 2003, when we connected AQI with the 9/11 perpetrators and now, the chickens have come home to roost and we don’t like it.

We partnered with the enemy-of-my-enemy in Syria to fight the son-of-a-son and we made some friends. We confused that partnership with an alliance and that partnership grew to be as strong as an alliance.

But the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs reminded everyone on Thursday that our actual ally, Turkey, had been a NATO ally for the past 70 years. On Sunday, the new secretary of defense gently corrected his Sunday news show host, when she casually referred to our YPG partners as allies. “The Kurds have been very good partners,” the secretary affirmed. There’s a difference between a 70-year ally and a regional partner, no matter how distasteful you find your ally’s actions to be or how loyal you believe your partner to be.

In 2001, the commander in chief declared, “You are either with us, or with the terrorists.” NATO invoked Article 5, which states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all of its members, for the first time, in response to the 9/11 attacks. NATO allies, including Turkey, aided the coalition effort in Afghanistan.

What if Turkey should invoke Article 5 now, in response to what it sees as a terrorist threat? US forces are withdrawing from areas of combat in northeastern Syria now, but can we see ourselves obligated to a fight on the sides of the allied Turks, against partner Kurds?

Rather than threatening sanctions, Congress should update an AUMF they’ve been dithering on for 16 years. Better still, let Congress declare war on Turkey, on behalf of the Kurds, as Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution authorizes them to do.

Fat chance. Why would they give up the chance to point fingers and assign blame that the current situation gives them?

Laws, apparently, are for little people.

Legal Niceties: "Navy to Commission Middle East-based Expeditionary Sea Base Lewis B. Puller as a Warship "

USNI News reports Navy to Commission Middle East-based Expeditionary Sea Base Lewis B. Puller as a Warship. I've highlighted the key phrase below:

U.S. Navy photo by MC1 David Kolmel

“Converting ESB-3 to a commissioned warship (USS) will allow U.S. Central Command and 5th Fleet the flexibility needed to meet challenges in the region,” Navy spokesman Lt. Seth Clarke told USNI News. “Potential missions, such as mine-countermeasure operations and special operations forces staging, must be conducted by a warship under the law of armed conflict. In order to provide combatant commanders the maximum amount of flexibility, the Navy decided to commission ESB-3 as a U.S. warship once she arrived in [Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command]/U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations.”

Clarke said the ship’s capabilities development document back in 2012 noted that the ship could temporarily commission as a warship if needed for emergent operational requirements. But, he added, “instead of being a temporary change, USNS Lewis B. Puller will be commissioned permanently as a listed warship (USS). Because of the nature of the evolving threats in the region, permanent conversion to USS reduces any ambiguity of ESB-3’s status and eliminates the administrative distraction that a temporary conversion creates while streamlining the command and control process. In 2016, the Navy began the necessary steps to commission the ship as a warship. All echelons, including the Fleet, [Military Sealift Command], the Type Commander, the Combatant Commander, and [chief of naval operations], agreed that permanently commissioning ESB as a warship was the best way forward.”

Degrees of Seriousness

ABC News coverage of shoot down of Syrian fighter/bomber by U.S. Navy F-18:


ABC Breaking News

Good analysis about potential messages and effects begins about 1:24. Did the U.S. draw that "red line" about what behavior it will tolerate? How will Russian leadership (read "Putin") respond? Will this lead to a "tit for tat" response attempt by Syrians (w Russian backing) or will the Russians respond directly?

"Self-defense" of coalition partners would seem to be a pretty reasonable rationale for the action the U.S. took.

But really, this is one of those middle of the meter reading on the "Degrees of Seriousness" meter.

South China Sea Bully: China's "People's War at Sea"

Armed Chinese "fishermen" attack Vietnamese fishing boats as reported by Tuoi Tre News here:

A Vietnamese fishing boat from the central province of Quang Ngai was operating in the Vietnamese waters in the East Vietnam Sea on Friday when it was reportedly attacked by three Chinese ships, local authorities said.

These Chinese ships got close to the QNg 96507 TS, with 16 fishermen on board, when it was fishing off Vietnam’s Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, the authorities of the province’s Ly Son District said on Saturday, citing a report from the attacked boat’s captain, Nguoi Lao Dong (Laborer) newspaper reported.

Crew members of the foreign ships, which were in white and coded with 46102, 45101 and 37102, got on board the local boat, with AK assault rifles and electric batons in their hands, said captain Nguyen Loi.

These Chinese then beat a number of the fishermen with their weapons, causing injuries to them, Loi said.

The foreigners also smashed navigation equipment and fishing tools on the local ship, and took away all the aquatic products from it.

This report is covered by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in its Worldwide Threats to Shipping report of 6 August 2015 (pdf).

In most of the world, fishermen do occasionally spar over fishing areas, but this reported incident has some interesting characteristics. First, the Chinese fishermen had weapons - "AK assault rifles and electric batons" - and this, with the Chinese, heavily implies some sort of official sanction in having fishing boats so equipped - though many near coastal fishing boats do carry some sort of weaponry to fend off sea robbers, this has the feel of something more.

In addition, as well set out by James Kraska in his Diplomat article, "China’s Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare: The use of fishing vessels as a maritime militia has profound legal implications":

With 200,000 vessels, China operates the largest fishing fleet in the world, and its commercial industry employs 14 million people – 25 percent of the world’s total. This massive enterprise operates in conjunction with the armed forces to promote Beijing’s strategic objectives in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The militia, for example, were involved in the 1974 invasion of the Paracel Islands, as well as impeding freedom of navigation of U.S. military survey ships. The maritime militia also provides logistics support to Chinese warships. In May 2008, for example, militia fishing craft transferred ammunition and fuel to two warships near Zhejiang Province.

Fishermen are assigned to collectives or attached to civilian companies and receive military training and political education in order to mobilize and promote China’s interests in the oceans. The fishing vessels of the militia are equipped with advanced electronics, including communications systems and radar that supplement the PLAN force structure and enhance interoperability with other agencies, such as the China Coast Guard. Many boats are equipped with satellite navigation and can track and relay vessel positions, and gather and report maritime intelligence.

The fleet support missions being undertaken by China’s maritime militia may make fishing vessels lawful targets during armed conflict, with potentially tragic consequences for legitimate fishermen from China and nearby states. This is an example of China’s “legal warfare,” which is the perversion of legal concepts or processes to counter an opponent. Unlike the Philippines’ arbitration case over China’s dashed line, which is not “legal warfare” because it simply seeks a legal determination based on the rule of law, the maritime militia exploit seams in the law and thereby place at risk the very civilians that the law is made to protect. (emphasis added)

Professor Kraska is also author (with Michael Monti) of a recent U.S. Naval War College (NWC) study The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia (pdf):

China operates a distributed network of fishing vessels that are organized into a maritime militia to support the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The militia is positioned to conduct a “people’s war at sea” in any futureconflict. This strategy exploits a seam in the law of naval warfare, which protects coastal fishing vessels from capture or attack
unless they are integrated into the enemy’s naval force. The maritime militia forms an irregular naval force that provides the PLAN with an inexpensive force multiplier, raising operational, legal and political challenges for any opponent.
***
In a meeting last year, a former admiral of a blue water naval force in Northeast Asia said off the record that Chinese fishing vessels operate with military personnel on board — a point seconded by the retired chief of navy of a Southeast Asian State now at odds with China over maritime claims.
***
China believes that a civilian militia composed of fishing vessels may be a less provocative means of promoting its strategic goal of regional hegemony. During peacetime, this approach is likely correct since fishing vessels are not instruments of war. Opposing States are less inclined to mobilize to resist fishing vessels in the same way they would resist foreign warships. (emphasis added)

Well, that may be true to a point. But it seems to me to be a very short step from identifying the Chinese bullying tactics and the placement by the PLAN of armed troops on fishing boats for those threatened states to respond by placing their own armed military or quasi-military forces onto to their own fishing fleets and thereby potentially escalating matters with some rapidity.

I highly recommend reading the two Kraska pieces in their entirety - these are not dry law review articles concerning the meaning of the placement of an "and" instead of an "or" in some part of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather the analysis of Chinese efforts to push the limits of international law (not that international law seems to restrict great powers all that much, a cynic would say).

The greater point is there is more to worry about than just interference with regional fishing fleets in China's actions.

Confusion to the Foe: U.S. Drone Swarms

From the Office of Naval Research:



ONR News:

Office of Naval Research officials announced recent technology demonstrations of swarming UAVs — part of the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) program ...

LOCUST can launch swarming UAVs to autonomously overwhelm an adversary. The deployment of UAV swarms will provide Sailors and Marines a decisive tactical advantage.

Way cool. Now we need some applied imagination to work on how to best use these things - and not to make it "doctrine" but allow for ad hoc uses based on ground realities.

Another cool reveal at the Sea-Air-Space gathering, MDUSV

MDUSV: ONR’s Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV) program will be to autonomous surface vessels what LDUUV-INP will be to the undersea autonomous realm. The technology will be joined with an emerging new platform called the Antisubmarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV), in partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. This joint, modular platform is designed for multimission capabilities and modular payload options — and will bring new advances in speed, endurance and sea-state capabilities. On display is a model of the future 130-foot long vessel. The project will include the use of ONR-sponsored autonomous technologies similar to those used in autonomous swarmboats.

And then there is the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) INP, described in 2014 by the Director of Disruptive Naval Technologies:

Why LDUUV: Develop fully autonomous long endurance UUVs capable of 60+ days of operation in the littorals, extend and multiply the current Navy platform’s capability.
• Ability to extend the reach of the Navy into the denied areas
• Focus Areas: Endurance, Autonomy, Advanced Energy
• 5x –10x Current UUV Energy Density
• Open Architecture
• Open Ocean/Over the Horizon Operations
Why is LDUUV Hard:
• LDUUV operates in complex ocean environments near harbors, shore, and high surface traffic locations that change significantly over relatively short periods of time.
• Need to dramatically increase power and endurance from current capability.
• Need to mature autonomous systems to compete complex missions and remain navigationally safe without human intervention.
Solution Attributes:
• Development of advanced air independent UUV energy systems to provide months of operations
• Focus on technologies that enable full autonomy in a cluttered maritime environment
• Conduct pier to pier fully autonomous operations to demonstrate increased mission flexibility

Update: LDUUV releases part of a "payload" (USN image)

• Defined interfaces and standards to payload and autonomy capability
development
• Leverage technologies from Navy Enterprises
Approach:
• Two BAAs, one addressing Autonomy and Endurance (individually), the other addressing Advanced Energy
• Potential for synergy with other UUV energy initiatives
• Leverage legacy and developmental autonomy technologies

How's all this unmanned stuff supposed to work? There was vision put out in 2013 by the U.S. Department of Defense "Unmanned Integrated Systems Roadmap with this image:

A very good read at Naval Drones "Robot Ethics and Future War" by CAPT (ret) Wayne P. Hughes, Jr:

*** Lucas described a common concern in ethical debates about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or when armed, UCAVs). He put due stress on the future of autonomous lethal platforms, in other words robots, and on the development of cyber weapons. These and other emerging technologies such as autonomous or unmanned underwater vehicles (AUVs or UUVs) carrying mines or torpedoes might render war itself less destructive and costly, raising concern that it would be easier to rationalize their employment in inter-state conflict. This would lower the threshold for going to war, which then might expand in unanticipated, unintended, and deadly ways.

Read it all.

Hat tip to Naval Drones