Reading Eisenhower

Reading Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe, which is a pretty amazing book.

These days it's hard to believe how poor (in nearly every sense except leadership) our military was in the late 1930's and how rapidly it grew. The planning and logistics - an incredible effort. This is a great book for those people who know virtually nothing about what it takes to put major forces, fully equipped and trained, into the field.

General Eisenhower was a straight shooter who greatly admired General George Marshall and his leadership - this excerpt is from when the future President was chief of OPD on Marshall's staff:

Recommended reading.

Somewhere Deming is Nodding - Maybe: "Navy Looking to Add Rigor to SWO Candidate Training Ahead of Assignment to Ship Crew"

Back in the day (1984 or so), the U. S. Navy decided to bring Dr. Deming to the fight.

For those of you unfamiliar with Deming's work, you can read about his work in Total Quality Management here (the Navy called it "Total Quality Leadership') and many other places. However, as with many such initiatives, a new leadership team or two caused the Navy to adandon Deming.

I'll look at Deming's theory in depth later, but one pertinent point is that every business is a customer to some other business and the customer has to seek to improve the quality of the material it receives from its suppliers so that it will spend less time and effort trying to fix or return defective material it receives as it uses those materials to make it own products.

Here's video in which Deming discusses a couple of his 14 Points - starting about 1:38, Deming notes that "finding what's wrong is not improvement of the process ... that managing defects, not looking at the system that produces the defects . . ."



With that as a lead-in, here's what the Navy has set out as a plan:

1.   After finding a defect (junior officers who are "defective" in their watchstanding and professional skills);
2.   actually took a look at the system that sends these officers to enter the fleet;
3.   developed a plan to correct or eliminate those defects before they get to the customer - the customer being the fleet, the supplier being the Navy's personnel and training command.

So, is it a systemic fix or  a plan for a fix? Or putting out fires?

Navy Looking to Add Rigor to SWO Candidate Training Ahead of Assignment to Ship Crew

Adm. Phil Davidson said that, after leading a 60-day effort to compile the Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Forces Incidents after several surface ship collisions last year, he is dedicated to adding more rigor to individual and unit-level assessments – with a particular eye on the seamanship and navigation training and assessments for SWO candidates.

“If you don’t have the underpinning foundation across the board – SWO candidates, your qualified SWOs on the ship, department head, [executive officer], [commanding officer] – then you’re short of an element of the team,” Davidson told reporters after giving a keynote speech at the annual Surface Navy Association symposium.
“My assessment of the team assessment, and SWO candidate training especially, it’s not sufficient enough when it comes to seamanship and navigation. You end up with conning officers and JOODs (junior officers of the deck) who [don’t] have sufficient depth to be part of the team from the outset, and that’s what we want to get to. JOOD is a role, conning officer is a role. They have to be competent in those roles when they step aboard a ship, and to have them be students aboard those ships is too much of a burden.”

This need for young officers to be proficient from their first day on an operational ship’s crew was highlighted by the fatal collision between destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and a merchant ship last summer. At the time of the collision, Davidson said during his speech, “there were only two ranks on watch: the CO, and ensigns.”

As a result, Davidson said SWO candidate training would be lengthened and would include more rigorous training and assessment on seamanship and navigation, damage control, risk assessment and other fundamentals.

Okay, so far as it goes.

Deming has 14 points, as you've seen, they are all inter-related. Will the Navy be bold enough to adopt all 14? Or is this just an effort to fix one piece of a larger problem withour addressing the other parts of the "system" that are in need of continuous improvement?

Here's an interesting piece from when it became apparent that the Navy was giving up on Deming, Imminent Demise of Deming in the Navy:

How do we make Quality/Deming theory relevant to warfighting ON THE BATTLEFIELD? To address this, we need to demonstrate links between Quality/Deming theory and military theory. We need to be able to use military history to empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of Quality/Deming theory in enhancing COMBAT-EFFECTIVENESS (we are addressing a group of (understandably) empirical people). Nothing else can impress our target audience. We are presently unequal to this task because it requires knowledge of military theory and history that is almost universally lacking among us, even those of us who are in the military. We can not hope to win unless we adopt this approach. In its absence, the military is right to reject Quality, Deming, and theory as irrelevant.

Some would look to the Boyd OODA loop as being akin to Deming's "Plan, Do, Check, Act" (PDCA) but others note differences:

The P-D-C-A cycle or loop is primarily an analytical approach that can be used with great success in a completely internal manner. One does not need to consult the external environment or adjust to unfolding circumstances to make the P-D-C-A loop work. P-D-C-A can be used with great success on the shop floor with the data that is available. Analysis which involves the use of a more or less complete data set to reach a conclusion. We use the data to make a decision about how to proceed, we than check and act to confirm or reject the hypothesis that our analysis has led us to.

O-O-D-A is more concerned with synthesizing an action out of an incomplete data set. Since we can never recognize all of the variables that we are forced to deal with in any environment, we must be able to make a decision that we believe will give us the highest probability for success. The synthesis of an action from the observation and orientation of a complex and mysterious environment, subject to frequent and unpredictable change, is the essence of the O-O-D-A loop.

Hmm.  I agree that PDCA can be internal - but the process also calls for going "outside" to partner with "suppliers:"

Even today many organizations treat suppliers as adversaries to beat at the negotiating table. Dr. Deming explained that the organization was a system that included the suppliers and customers. You need to manage and continually improve that entire system.

And to do so most effectively you need to partner with your suppliers over the long term. You need to treat them as partners. Saying they are partners is nearly worthless. What matters is how you operate. . .

If your "supplier" is providing personnel - isn't it vital that the supplier knows what traits you need in your workers, or in the case of the Surface Navy, what the traits are that make a good "surface warfare officer?" Can these traits be tested for? Can the desired traits be taught?

Movies to Help Train Naval Officers

Recently I was reminded that in those olden times when I was a young Lieutenant, we used to teach leadership in a course called, I think, "Leadership Management Effectiveness Training (LMET)" - in any event, one of the training aids - used to demonstrate the leadership syles of Douglas McGregor's "THeory X and Theory Y" was the Air Force classic "12 O'Clock High". It appears that "12 O'Clock High" is perhaps still being used for this purpose.

I don't think, however, that particular movie is the end all of good movies for learning about leadership, accountability, and management.

A few years ago I put up a list of 5 movies that are Navy themed that had merit in "Sunday" Ship History: Best Navy Movies

...So, here's my list, in no particular order:

1) In Harm's Way. Except for the subplot involving Kirk Douglas's rape of a young nurse, an excellent movie. Patrick Oneal should not be missed as the smarmy PR hack/spy for the admiral ... RADM Torrey has been ordered in to work around. Later when Torrey saves that admiral some "face" it's a great moment in staff political warfare, which, in case you don't know is a big part of real warfare. Burgess Meredith is excellent as a reserve intel officer.

2) The Caine Mutiny. Remarkable movie, Fred McMurray really could act despite the roles he got later in life. Bogart is great as a mentally worn-out skipper whose wardroom fails him on many levels while also being a sort of crazed screamer that some of us have served with. Have some frozen strawberries while you watch it.

3) Destination Tokyo. Almost enough to make you want to join the submarine force. Undersea heroics based on true events. Who wouldn't want to serve with the crew of Cary Grant's boat?


4) Operation Petticoat. The other Cary Grant submarine movie - this time a comedy - and a pretty good one. Tony Curtis is great as the officer assigned to get spare parts "no questions asked" which was, back in the day (and perhaps today), a valuable skill set. Was there really a pink submarine in the Navy? Well, according to this site . . .


5) Mr. Roberts. On a ship traveling between "from Tedium to Apathy and back again, with an occasional side trip to Monotony." Once again the personality of the skipper, well played by James Cagney, comes to the fore (just as it does in real life). A reminder that not everyone who serves is at the tip of the spear, but it doesn't make them any less the sailors . . .

At the time (2009) I posted that list, it was not about leadership.

However, all 5 of those films should be in a "leadership film" collection for all hands.

In these modern times, the sub-plot of In Harm's Way about the rape of a young nurse officer is not at all out of place, but a reminder that human beings are - human- and humans do stupid, selfish and cruel things to each other. The deft handling of a problem admiral by Admiral Halsey and the politics behind it all, including the staff "spy" - well, there are many lessons there.

The Caine Mutiny? Leadership, as so emphatically pointed out at the end of the film, involves accepting responsibilty to help a struggling commander in the form of "loyalty up" - though undoubtly there is some point at which action must be taken. The question of exactly where that point is and how it should be taken could be the meat of a great class discussion. Mr. Roberts has some of the same issues - with the addition of a martinet of a skipper out for himself at the expense of his crew tossed in. To this mix I would a non-Navy film - Fort Apache described:

The rigid and arrogant Col. Owen Thursday, the new commander of Fort Apache, ignores the advice of Capt. York, his seasoned second in command, and ends up alienating his troops with his harsh treatment. Thursday is determined to boost his military honor and reputation by engaging and defeating the Apache warrior Cochise. ... Refusing to accept criticism or acknowledge any mistakes in his command, Thursday eventually puts his regiment in great danger culminating in a near-disaster for the troops.

Learning to listen to (and respect) your sub-ordinates ought to be part of every sailor's skill set, and this John Wayne/Henry Fonda/John Ford gem helps reinforce that point.

Along with Fort Apache one of the other John Ford "cavalry" movies that has leadership lessons is "She Wore a Yellow Ribbon". Among the lessons to be garnered from the film is the need to let junior officers gain experience both by observation and by taking the risks necessary for them to grow. There is also a sub-theme of the permanence of certain things -

Top Sergeant Quincannon: [on their upcoming retirement] The army will never be the same when we retire, sir.
Captain Nathan Brittles: The army is always the same. The sun and the moon change, but the army knows no seasons.

Substitute "Navy" in place of "Army" and it's still right. The underlying point, though, is that a key job of all military leader is to train our juniors so they will carry on the job. Training, even in combat, is our key mission.

By the way, you can download "She Wore a Yellow Ribbon" for free here.

Another old movie that has leadership lessons is The Cruel Sea, described as

The film portrays the conditions in which the Battle of the Atlantic was fought between the Royal Navy and Germany's U-boats. It is seen from the viewpoint of the British naval officers and seamen who served in convoy escorts. The film begins with a voice-over by Ericson (Jack Hawkins);
This is a story of the Battle of the Atlantic, the story of an ocean, two ships, and a handful of men. The men are the heroes; the heroines are the ships. The only villain is the sea, the cruel sea, that man has made more cruel...

Working an inexperienced crew into a team and struggling with inadequate resources while trying to keep sea lines of communication open . . . It's a Navy movie, here featuring the Royal Navy in a vital role, one that we neglect today at our peril. More than that, the decisions that weigh on a commanding officer are well-represented . . .

While there are probably many other movies that could mentioned (The Enemy Below, Das Boot, Patton), these old movies have many moments that teach us about ourselves and about leading others.

Toxic Leaders: Interesting Thoughts from a Book Written in 1836

From Mr. Midshipman Easy

The greatest error now in our service, is the disregard shown to the feelings of the junior

Frederick Marryat

officers in the language of their superiors: that an improvement has taken place I grant, but that it still exists, to a degree injurious to the service, I know too well. The articles of war, as our hero was informed by his captain, were equally binding on officers and crew; but what a dead letter do they become if officers are permitted to break them with impunity! The captain of a ship will turn the hands up to punishment, read the article of war for the transgressing of which the punishment is inflicted, and to show at that time their high respect for the articles of war, the captain and every officer take off their hats. The moment the hands are piped down, the second article of war, which forbids all swearing, etcetera, in derogation of God's honour, is immediately disregarded. We are not strait-laced,--we care little about an oath as a mere _expletive_; we refer now to swearing at _others_, to insulting their feelings grossly by coarse and intemperate language. We would never interfere with a man for damning his own eyes, but we deny the right of his damning those of another.
***

But it remembered that these are not the observations of a junior officer smarting under insult--they are the result of deep and calm reflection. We have arrived to that grade, that, although we have the power to inflict, we are too high to receive insult, but we have not forgotten how our young blood has boiled when wanton, reckless, and cruel torture has been heaped upon our feelings, merely because, as a junior officer, we were not in a position to retaliate, or even to reply. And another evil is, that this great error is disseminated. In observing on it, in one of our works, called Peter Simple, we have put the following true observation in the mouth of O'Brien. Peter observes, in his simple, right-minded way:

"I should think, O'Brien, that the very circumstance of having had your feelings so often wounded by such language when you were a junior officer would make you doubly careful not to use it towards others, when you had advanced in the service?"

"Peter, that's just the first feeling, which wears away after a time, till at last, your own sense of indignation becomes blunted, and becomes indifferent to it; you forget, also, that you wound the feelings of others, and carry the habit with, you, to the great injury and disgrace of the service."

Let it not be supposed that in making these remarks we want to cause litigation, or insubordination. On the contrary, we assert that this error is the cause, and eventually will be much more the cause, of insubordination; for as the junior officers who enter the service are improved, so will they resist it. The complaint here is more against the officers, than the captains, whose power has been perhaps already too much curtailed by late regulations: that power must remain, for although there may be some few who are so perverted as to make those whom they command uncomfortable, in justice to the service we are proud to assert that the majority acknowledge, by their conduct, that the greatest charm attached to power is to be able to make so many people happy.

About Captain Frederick Marryat, While he was an early 19th Century man in many regards and attitudes, he certainly got the above correct. References to the "article of war" are to the Royal Navy's articles of the day.

Nothing sticks in your memory like a "screamer" whether in the service or in a civilian job, especially that part about "we were not is position to retaliate, or even to reply."

On Midrats Sunday 17 Nov 13, 5PM: Episode 202, "Lessons from the Hanoi Hilton"

Please join us on 17 Nov 13 at 5pm (1700) Eastern U.S. for our Episode 202: "Lessons from the Hanoi Hilton":

Are there lessons one can learn from the most exceptional edges of the military experience that can be useful to the civilian world?

Was there something from the experience of American prisoners of war imprisoned at the "Hanoi Hilton" during the Vietnam War that had to do with their success in their subsequent careers?

Our guests to discuss for the full hour will be Peter Fretwell and Taylor Baldwin Kiland, authors of Lessons from the Hanoi Hilton: Six Characteristics of High-Performance Teams.

You might find the review of their book by one of the former POWs, CAPT Dick Stratton, relevant:

It is almost as if the authors were there beside Jim Stockdale while he was in the Maison Centrale (Hanoi Hilton).

Join us live or pick the show up later by clicking here.

Midrats 10 June 12 :Episode 127: "Disruption, Disfunction and Leadership" on Blog Talk Radio

Join us Sunday, 10 June, at 5pm (Eastern U.S.) for Midrats 10 June 12 :Episode 127: "Disruption, Disfunction and Leadership" on Blog Talk Radio, a show that poses some interesting questions:

What is a "crisis in leadership?

In an organization that prizes the Type-A personality that takes risk combined with a strong intellect - yet at the same times asks from it silence and order - what happens when each end loses faith and trust in the other?

Our guest for the full hour will be Peter Munson, Marine officer, KC-130 aircraft commander, Middle East specialist, author, and editor of Small Wars Journal.

As a starting point, we will use his article in SWJ, Disruptive Thinkers: Defining the Problem:

"Today’s military is facing a significant crisis. ... The rank and file of the military who have made or witnessed the massive efforts and sacrifices of the past decade, and who have seen so very little in the way of satisfying results in return, ... They are disappointed by the failures of leadership and imagination that have yielded toxic commands, a rash of firings in some services, and a breach of trust with our most vulnerable service members. They wonder about the future of the weapons systems that support and defend them as they read tales of acquisition woe. They question the growing focus on bureaucratic minutiae. They question how they can be trusted so completely in a combat environment, but are treated as children in garrison. They wonder how a military system that prides itself on justice will reward the generals that have presided over failure, ... while at the same time eroding the autonomy and discretion of junior commanders with a creeping campaign of bureaucratic centralization.

These are symptoms of a malaise facing the military, of an ossified and decadent institutional culture and a bloated bureaucracy that has grown a profusion of power centers that jealously guard their territory and their budget."

A crisis or a return to the old "garrison mentality" that follows all wars? A return to a system that punishes warriors and rewards "toadies" who are all "book?"

Seen the movie, "Heartbreak Ridge?" - remember the major out to get Gunny Highway? He's one of "role models" we'll be talking about.

I suspect that John Boyd's name will come up.



Can't make the show? Pick it up later at Midrats on Blog Talk Radio or from Midrats on iTunes