Protecting Sealift Ships in Transit

Back in 2018, there appeared this article in Defense News: ‘You’re on your own’: US sealift can’t count on Navy escorts in the next big war

In the event of a major war with China or Russia, the U.S. Navy, almost half the size it was during the height of the Cold War, is going to be busy with combat operations. It may be too busy, in fact, to always escort the massive sealift effort it would take to transport what the Navy estimates will be roughly 90 percent of the Marine Corps and Army gear the force would need to sustain a major conflict.

That’s the message Mark Buzby, the retired rear admiral who now leads the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, has gotten from the Navy, and it’s one that has instilled a sense of urgency around a major cultural shift inside the force of civilian mariners that would be needed to support a large war effort.

“The Navy has been candid enough with Military Sealift Command and me that they will probably not have enough ships to escort us. It’s: ‘You’re on your own; go fast, stay quiet,’” Buzby told Defense News in an interview earlier this year.

A great deal of gnashing of teeth and wailing followed this report.

Stinger missile launch

More recently, there has been a proposal of how to provide some sort of escort for such ships, Stinger Missile-Toting Drone Boats Could Protect Navy Logistics Ships:

The U.S. Navy wants to explore the idea of using small uncrewed surface vessels, or USVs, armed with Stinger missiles as a relatively low-cost additional layer of defense against various threats in the air and on the surface of the water. The service says it is particularly interested in the possibility of using the drone boats to help protect critical, but ever-more-vulnerable logistics vessels, as well as Marine contingents during future expeditionary and distributed operations.

This latter article goes on to note that the budget item is for experimenting with this concept, which is fine, as a "walk before run" development is a good idea. It also notes that the Stinger missile is an anti-air weapon and might require some modification before taking on the role of anti-surface weapon (although it appears the French already have dual-use weapon, the Mistral, which makes one wonder why we have to re-invent the wheel if we could just acquire an existing system).

All of which is fine and dandy, depending on what the potential threats are and where they might appear.

Most this begs the question of why we aren't simply arming the sealift ships with proven weapon systems that are already in our inventory. Weapons like Phalanx CIWS, SeaRAM, and armed helicopters exist. They can be installed on ships with a minimum of work and a small military detachment can maintain and operate them as required. The Military Sealfit replenishment ships (T-AOs, T-AKEs, T-AOEs) either have hanger or flight decks - the latter two classes usually carry a helicopter detachment already. The MH-60R/S helicopters are exceptionally versatile and can carry out protection against both surface and subsurface threats (MH-60R only) and perform vertical replenishment.

Further, updating the old ARAPAHO Sustainment Maintenance Facility concept would allow for spread helo assets to other types of sustainment shipping:

In the Arapaho program, the Naval Air Systems Command developed a portable, modularized aviation facility intended for installation aboard container ships. It can be installed in less than twenty-four hours and included all components necessary for V/STOL aircraft operations: flight deck, hangar, fuel, and crew accommodations. It was estimated to cost less than $20 million per set.

***

To provide nondivisional Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) and limited depot support in an operational area, the Army established its Pre-positioned Sustainment Maintenance Facility (ARAPAHO) program. Operating as either a sea-based or land-based facility, ARAPAHO consisted of a designated nondivisional AVIM unit's personnel with equipment installed in shelters. Logisticians designed the unit for loading on board a C-5 Seawitch class or larger container ship within twenty-four to thirty-six hours of receiving movement orders, and they envisioned deployment at sea within six days. The unit can use on-board Operational Ready Float (ORF) and Forward Repair Activities (FRA) and will use extended prescribed load list/authorized stockage list (PLL/ASL). ARAPAHO's ability to deploy rapidly would hopefully save forces from waiting sixty days for a ground-based AVIM unit. As a self-transportable unit, ARAPAHO can also quickly redeploy after completing its initial mission.

Pictured nearby is HMS Reliant which tested the Arapaho concept for the UK after the Falklands War, though "The project was not found to be a particular success." However, my feeling is that it remains a good idea with the proper execution.

In addition to placing assets on the sealift ships, there is nothing barring the use of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) to cover long transits across the Pacific or Atlantic as air escorts for them. Unlike in WWII, today's MPA have the ability to range ahead of the transit lanes and detect threats. In addition, long endurance maritime drones should also be used.

As set out above, these assets already exist, they just need a doctrine to be applied effectively in the face of any known threat.

Somali Pirates: Hijacking and "Thwarting"

From the Tribune of India: India, China warships thwart pirate attack off Aden coast

The Indian Navy and China’s People’s Liberation Army (Navy) jointly

OS-35

saved a bulk carrier named OS-35 which came under attack by pirates. The 178-metre ship was attacked by pirates on Saturday night in the Arabian Sea. The INS Mumbai provided air cover to the distressed merchant vessel, while the PLA Navy ship Yulin sent in a team of 18 to sanitise the merchant ship.

Previous reports were that OS-35 had been hijacked see Reuters: Somali Pirates "Suspected" in Bulker Hijack

Somali pirates are suspected of hijacking a bulk carrier ship, the head of

INS Mumbai

a maritime security company said on Saturday, in the latest in a string of attacks after years of calm.

A security source working at the Puntland Marine Police Force said the vessel was Tuvalu-flagged and is known as OS35.

Info on OS-35 here

PLAN frigate of type involved

Copyrighted photo of OS-35 by Julian De Lucas from Vesselfinder.com.

History of Convoy and Routing [1945]

Early in WWII, Hitler's plan was to cut off supplies to the British Isles and starve the Brits into submission. Using his submarine force the effort was to stop the flow of oil, war material and food from Canada, the U.S and the western hemisphere.

As set out here, the losses to merchant shipping were terrific:

The fight against the U-boats was the "Battle of the Atlantic":

Winston Churchill once wrote that, '... the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril'. In saying this, he correctly identified the importance of the threat posed during World War Two by German submarines (the 'Unterseeboot') to the Atlantic lifeline. This lifeline was Britain's 'centre of gravity' - the loss of which would probably have led to wholesale defeat in the war.

One of the tools that turned the tide against the U-boats was the use of convoys and routing ships

around known danger areas.

Not that convoys were a new technique - instead their use in WWII was a modern adoption of a practice used almost since the dawn of shipping - placing armed escorts with merchant ships to prevent the cargo vessels from being taken by pirates and other bad actors.

It is useful to take a look at the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command's republication of History of Convoy and Routing [1945] (also available here):

D. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. SHIPPING CONTROL PRIOR TO OUR ENTRY IN THE WAR

1. Since the beginning of their war in 1939 the British Admiralty, through their Naval Control Service Officers (N.C.S.O.) in the principal ports of the world, have maintained a routing, diverting and reporting service, covering all areas except those under control of the Axis. The details of instruction for N.C.S.O.'s are laid down in "Naval Control Service Instructions". The reporting system so established was called "VESCA" system, and that portion of it devoted to U.S. merchantmen was known as the "CHATFOLD" system, centered in Ottawa. Individual routes for all independently sailed ships under British and Allied registry were furnished from main ports under such standard routing orders as those contained in "Mercantile Atlantic Routing Instructions" (short title MARI)54 64 (see Chapter V).

2. Article 714 of Navy Regulations specifies that in time of war "the Commander in Chief shall afford protection and convoy, so far as it is within his power, to merchant vessels of the United States and to those of Allies." As the Axis threat developed it gradually became apparent to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington that the U. S. Navy would require an organization similar to the Admiralty's particularly in the event of the war being forced on us. A Ship Movements Division (Op-38) had been set up during World War I, and had continued in existence. Furthermore, in June 1939 a new Naval Transportation Service, War Plan Orange (WPNTS-1) had been issued, based on the tasks assigned by the Basic War Plan, as a consequence of which the Port Directors (San Francisco and New York particularly) had built up their organization. The Joint Merchant Vessel Board, also organized in World War I, but virtually inactive since, was revitalized bytransfer to Op-30-M in September 1939. On 13 November 1939 the C.N.O. (Op-30M-BD, Serial 7904) sent a letter to Commandants of all Naval Districts, less 9th and 16th, concerning duties of Port Directors in war; "Port Director - Guide for Peace Time Preparation for War". About August 1940 the first compilation was made of merchant vessels and small craft suitable for Navy use. Shortly thereafter, on 14 November, Op-30-M was transferred to Op-38 and set up as Op-38-S, Ship Movements Division31.
3. Material progress appeared in the "Report of the Combined British-United States Staff Conversations" (short title ABC-1)dated 27 March 1941. By Annex V of this report the world was divided into two spheres of merchant ship control in place of the previous world-wide British system. U. S. control was to extend over the western half of the Atlantic from about 26° W and the whole Pacific to 100° E. The British service was to continue to function in the U. S. area until such time as we were ready to assume full responsibility. The Sea Frontier had not yet been established and the idea of a fleet control zone outside the limits of the coastal zones was still a basic feature50.

4. After the conclusion of this ABC-1 agreement there was prepared in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Division of Ship Movements, Captain Charles S. Alden, U.S.N.) the "Principal Navy Shipping Control Plan, Rainbow No. 5" (short title WPSC-46). This basic plan - which superseded pamphlet "Navy Shipping Control-General Instructions", prepared by Op-38-S on June 19 1941 - outlined the tasks of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commanders in Chief and what were then known as Coastal Frontier Commanders in connection with the control of merchant shipping; agreements with great Britain, New Zealand and Australia; and general instructions for the operation of the Merchant Ship Control Service. (Note: This plan, which is based upon Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No.5, was actually promulgated 15 December 1941 by C.N.O. letter, Op-38-S-P, serial 064038. It was to remain the basic ship control directive until superseded 28 February 1944 by MER-1, issued with Cominch serial 00678, mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this history)5 31 59.

5. On 17 October 1941 the first actual routing directive for merchantmen of American Flag was issued by Op-38-S-A, under the subject of "Routing of American Flag Merchant Shipping", and addressed to Commanders, Coastal Frontiers and Naval Districts and Commanders in Chief, Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets. Although the routing of merchant ships continued to be of the utmost importance, considerable opposition was experienced from merchant ship operators, Maritime Commission, etc., and long conferences wasted valuable time4 31.

6. Finally, on 18 November 1941, to administer the directives of WPSC-46, a "Convoy and Routing Section" (Op-38-O) under the Ship Movements Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, (then Admiral H. R. Stark) was organized and placed in effect with the immediate objective of assuming responsibility in the Western Atlantic area west of the dividing line of responsibility. Thus it can be said that "Convoy and Routing", gradually developed as "Ship Movements Division" since the summer of 1940, was finally brought into operation only 19 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor59.

Yes, it's not the most exciting reading, but, as you read the source material, think about the consequences to the war effort had there not been such an organization put into place . . .

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 25 October - 23 November 2016 and NATO Ending Indian Ocean Counter-Piracy Operations

In addition to the information in the following ONI report, it is of interest that Voice of America reports NATO has announced that it is ending its counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean:

NATO has ended Operation Ocean Shield after a sharp drop-off in attacks by Somali pirates.

The Royal Danish Air Force carried out the last Indian Ocean surveillance missions for NATO.

The NATO operation had been one part of a highly successful coordinated international response to the threat of piracy that also included the European Union, the United States and other independent nations.

During its peak, piracy off the Horn of Africa had an economic impact of $7 billion, with more than 1,000 hostages taken. There hasn’t been a successful piracy attack since 2012, down from more than 30 ships at the peak in 2010-11. The NATO planes flew from the Seychelles.
***
NATO is now shifting resources to deterring Russia in the Black Sea and people smugglers in the Mediterranean.

NATO's spokesman Dylan White said in a statement that the global security environment had changed dramatically in the last few years and that NATO navies had adapted with it.

After more than a decade of NATO-led operations far beyond its borders, the military alliance is shifting its focus to deter Russia in the east, following Moscow's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula.

According to NATO, operations will cease on 15 December 2016.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 25 October - 23 November 2... by lawofsea on Scribd

Time to Re-Read "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower"

Let's start off 2016 with a brief visit to the basics, as in recalling the March 2015 revision to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, introduced as follows (excuse the caps, they are from the Navy-provided transcript):

MARITIME LEADERS FROM THE U.S. NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND COAST GUARD UNVEILED AN UPDATE TO THE COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEA POWER MARCH 13TH. THIS STRATEGY UPDATE IS DESIGNED TO HELP U.S. FORCES ADAPT TO CURRENT WORLD AND TECHNOLOGICAL SITUATIONS.

"THAT IT REALLY DEFINES WHAT YOU'RE DOING TODAY, WHAT THE PEOPLE THAT I HIGHLY ADMIRE AND RESPECT ARE DOING OUT AND AROUND THE WORLD BEING WHERE IT MATTERS, WHEN IT MATTERS.THIS CODIFIES THE EFFORTS OF OUR SAILORS OUT AND AROUND TODAY."

"THE BIGGEST CHANGE IS THE OTHER DOMAIN IN WHICH WE OPERATE, THAT'S THE CYBER DOMAIN. IT IS EXPLICIT IN EVERY LINE OF OPERATION THAT WE CONDUCT TODAY. ONE FROM A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE CYBER DOMAIN ISN'T COMPROMISED."

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century

By the way, if you want to read A. T. Mahan's Influence of Seapower of History Upon History (1660-1783), you can find it for free here. I also recommend reading B. J. Armstrong's 21st Century Mahan but unless your library carries it, you might have to pay for it (Kindle version is about $13).

Another free book on Maritime Strategy is Sir Julian Stafford Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

You might have heard mention of these books on our Midrats podcasts, including the latest show Episode 313: Fleet Architecture and Strategic Efficiency with Barney Rubel.

Somewhere along the way you might want to consider, that level of war often called "operational":

The operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations. See also campaign.

Campaign

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space. See also operational level of war.

Have fun.

USNS Yukon,  U.S. Navy photo by Jason D. Landon

Oh, and don't forget - logistics, logistics, logistics. It's not enough to field a force if you can't sustain it and its operations.

A nice look back at WWII sea logistics in Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II in the introduction to which Admiral Spruance wrote:

A sound logistic plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

In a war, one operation normally follows another in a theater and each one is dependent upon what has preceded it and what is anticipated. The logistic planning has to fit into and accompany the operational planning. The two must be closely coordinated, and the planners for each must look as far into the future as they can in order to anticipate and prepare for what lies ahead.

Got all that?

Have fun!

Somali Pirates: Disable pirate "motherships?"

From American Shipper:

With frustration over Somalia piracy increasing, shipping executives are discussing whether naval forces should disable vessels as they are hijacked to prevent them from being used as “mother ships” from which attacks can be launched further offshore.
“One idea is to use floating nets to disable the propeller because that way you can easily recover the vessel as soon as the pirates are off the ship,” said Spyros Polemis, chairman of the International Chamber of Shipping, speaking at Shipping 2011, the annual conference of the Connecticut Maritime Association. “They have other thoughts, but I can not disclose everything.”
But some voices cautioned against the tactic.***

Read the whole thing. One of the major concerns in dealing with the pirates in the past has been not provoking them into doing more harm to the captive crews than they already do.

If they are holding a ship and its crew, disabling the ship may cause the pirates to toss a few bodies over the side of the ship until the ship is freed or their safe passage is guaranteed. From the article:

While there is a risk that pirates may harm crews if ships are disabled, Polemis said it would be “really against their own interest. Because if the warship is nearby, and they can see the warship, and the warship disables the vessel, what is the pirate going to do? If they are going to harm the crew, then the Navy is going to go on board the ship and kill the pirates. They are risking their own lives I think the likelihood is they will go aboard their boats and leave.”

The counter-argument to that is that when harm is done to a crew, there must be a price paid by the pirates or else they have little incentive to be relatively civilized.

One way to disable pirate small boats

Maersk hires war ship to defend ship against Somali pirates

The Copenhagen Post reports that Maersk hires war ship to protect tanker :

Danish shipper A.P. Moller Maersk has hired out soldiers and a warship from Tanzania to protect its fleet in pirate-ridden waters off the coast of Africa, and now other shippers are expected to follow suit.

Maersk hired the warship through former special forces soldiers working for firm Guardian GBS security in December 2008. The ship was charged with protecting the Brigit Maersk tanker from pirates. It is unknown how much the shipping company paid for the service.
‘The waters east of Africa are a grey zone because developing countries don’t have resources to fight pirates. It’s a temporary solution that a shipper has hired a warship from another country, but there’s no alternative,’ said Jan Fritz Hansen, vice-president of the Danish Shipowners’ Association.

Steffen Jacobsen, technical director at Maersk Tankers, said the company checked first to make sure the move was legal.

‘That’s why we chose it as an alternative solution to a very critical situation,’ he said.

Doesn't this make sense for those that can afford it? Should several companies get together and set up private escorted convoys for the Indian Ocean since professional naval forces are already stretched too thin operating off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden?

Multi-Purpose Offshore Patrol Vessels

I think in keeping with my call for using something other than billion dollar Aegis cruisers and destroyers for patrolling against pirates who use $400 boats, AK-47s and RPGs - see Department of Cheaper Pirate Fighting and links therein, blogger Brickmuppet sends along a link to a company developing a multi-purpose Offshore Patrol Vessels.

It might be a little more sophisticated than my original anti-pirate vessel, pictured nearby with the tank on it. Though the thoughts are the same.

According to "V.Navy" the French built vessels can be used for several things:

V.Navy aims to design multi purposes vessels able to fight against piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing (coast guard vessels), but also able to be used as Fast Supply Intervention Vessel.
***
These kinds of patrol vessels are completely suitable and legitimate to monitor dangerous areas like Gulfs of Guinea or Aden.

And V. Navy's brochure:

Offshore Patrol Vessels V.Navy has been specially design to fulfill specific missions to fight against piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing (coast guard vessels), but also able to be used as Fast Supply Intervention Vessel.

Able to accommodate 28 persons dedicated to the mission, it can as well transport 24 passengers.

Control station situated at bridge level is composed of two control stations, forward and aft, a debriefing room is also incorporated in the design.

Its great autonomy of 10 days is provided through its large fuel and fresh water tanks.
***
Main dimensions are:
Length between perpendicular : 46m
Length overall : 48.5m
Beam max : 9.5m
Summer Draft : 1.8m
***
WaterJets with Quadruple marine diesel main propulsion engines will be utilised for the propulsion system to reach a maximum speed of 28.5 knots
***
A. DECK EQUIPMENT
1. Typical equipment
OPV has typical deck equipment for FSIV operation:
- crane
- anchor winches
- timber covered deck
- 4 x International reefer connections (415V AC/50Hz) (E1 says: Plug in comm van! It's modular!)
2. Specific equipment
One launching ramp is constructed integral to the vessels transom to cater for RIB deployment. There is an extended hinged launch gate at the bottom of the ramp that will be deployed with manual hand winch. A single fixed electric capstan winch is installed on the side bulwark area adjacent to the RIB's. Removable pulley stations will be placed at the top of the launch ramp and in front of the second RIB
cradle for retrieval purpose.

A heavy duty portable platform is constructed to fit into the launch ramp for crew boat operations. The insert provide flush deck and transom for normal crew boat operation and lock in place by simple and robust pin type system for easy removal.

B. BALLISTIC
1. Protection
Ballistic protection is achieved by Dyneema and is included to the bulkhead of accommodation and fuel tank areas.
2. Weapons stations
The vessel structure is suitably strengthened to support the weapon and its stresses and a heavy insert plate is fitted to the deck. pedestals or mounts are client supply included.
Arms store is provided on main deck

It looks to me like there's room for one boat to have the aerostat for long range radar detection, too (see here and CDR Salamander here.) And I'm sure the V boats could handle UAVs. USVs and all the other alphabet soup of unmanned ship extenders just fine.

Add to the squadron a helicopter capable ship and you are off to the littorals. Even the "idiots-go-to-sea crew" on Whale Wars can operate a helo, after all.

Are these boats or the ones I've suggested to be cobbled from offshore oil supply vessels meant to take on mines, submarines, aircraft or fleets of warships? Well, no, they are not. But for fighting pirates and terrorists in littoral waters, they may be just the thing.

Somalia: Private pirate fighters? Blackwater says it's ready

Reported as Blackwater offering to protect ships from pirates near Somalia:

"We have the capability to assist" shipping companies, said Bill Mathews, Blackwater executive vice president. He and other company leaders are former Navy SEALs. Ship security "is kind of what we did for a living" before joining Blackwater, he said.

Blackwater is offering the MV MacArthur, a 183-foot vessel with a crew of 14 and a helicopter pad, as an escort for ships through the Gulf of Aden. The helicopters and MacArthur won't be armed, although workers will carry guns, Mathews said.

The company will need a State Department license to sell its services to a foreign government or business, said Anne Tyrrell, a Blackwater spokeswoman.

Blackwater offers up a press release announcement (pdf) here.

Hunting for the "Mother Ships" of Somali pirates

A new campaign - Anti-piracy coalition turns their sights on elusive Somali mother ship:

The U.S.-led coalition working to secure sea lanes beset by pirates believe skiffs like the ones used in the attack on the Japanese ship must have come from elusive "mother ships."

"The small boats which are used for piracy could not travel," from shore as far into the ocean as ships have been attacked, said Commodore Khan Hasham of Pakistan, one of the U.S. allies in the anti-piracy operation. "So they needed a mother ship from which the pirates could launch skiffs."
***
The patrols address a growing problem. The International Maritime Bureau has recorded 31 attacks off Somalia this year but believe many more go unreported. The 31 includes the seizure a month ago of the Japanese tanker carrying as much as 40,000 tons of highly explosive benzene in the Gulf of Aden.

Initially, American intelligence agents worried terrorists from Somalia's Islamic extremist insurgency could be involved, and might try to crash the boat into an offshore oil platform or use it as a gigantic bomb in a Middle Eastern port. When the Japanese vessel was towed back into Somali waters and ransom demanded, the coalition was relieved to realize it was just another pirate attack.

Until you find a "mother ship" the best bet is to set up traffic lanes and offer up escort services in loose convoys.