Revisiting A Less Expensive Path to Growing the Navy: Great Things Come in Small Packages

Orignally posted 17 Dec 2015, but still relevant today as we discuss growing the U. S. Navy:

The U.S. Navy's newly designated "frigate" (nee "Littoral Combat Ship") is not a dead program, but it ain't all that healthy, either, as set out in Pentagon Cuts LCS to 40 Ships. This has set off some "I was right and you were wrong -ism".

Really, the FF/LCS is not the first Navy ship design that proved to be - uh - less than optimal.

It probably won't be the last.

Let's suppose we ask the question that underlies the size of our fleet: What do we plan to do with it?

If the answer is long-range standoff missions, then it would seem aircraft carriers and their assigned air wings are one part of the answer.

If the answer is killing submarines that might threaten our country or those aircraft carriers, it should be clear that ASW attack submarines are a large part of the answer, along with long-range maritime patrol aircraft and real honest to goodness ASW destroyers.

If the answer is support of forces ashore, then perhaps the new Zumwalt-class destroyers are part of the answer.

USS Pegasus (PHM-1)

If the answer is local sea control in contested waters in narrow straits, inshore, then the answer probably is a force deigned to go into harm's way in those waters. As set out in this 2001 Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe describing a 2000 war game:

The U.S. is at war with China, and U.S. Navy commanders are using a new breed of ship called Streetfighter to sail perilously close to the Chinese coast.

There, the small, fast, inexpensive warships -- designed to go into harm's way and, if necessary, be lost -- hunt down Chinese subs and missile launchers hidden among fishing boats and cargo ships. Some Streetfighters are sunk by enemy fire, and casualties are high, but they help the U.S. win earlier than the military pros had projected.
***
The Streetfighters existed only on paper. But their performance in that mock battle was enough to convince the war college's director, Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, that a fleet of Streetfighters could give any foe fits -- provided the Navy is willing to endure casualties.

"Streetfighter is alive, well and an inevitability," he crowed.

Even then, there were "cautious" voices, like a now former CJCS,

Some top Navy commanders have grave doubts. "I look at the Streetfighter concept and worry that we are saying, 'It's OK to lose ships,' " says Vice Adm. Michael Mullen, commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, Va. Others question whether sailors in an all-volunteer force would sign up to serve on the ships, or whether Congress would approve the money to build them.

Yeah, well, the FF/LCS is a lot of things, but it does not appear to be so robust that if confronted by a threat it wouldn't be "expendable." More from Cebrowski:

The 58-year-old admiral immediately homed in on one of the most vexing weaknesses in the current fleet. In the past 10 years, the proliferation of cruise missiles and cheap diesel subs has made it easier for enemies to strike U.S. vessels. A recent General Accounting Office report concluded that the Navy's ability to deal with the threat posed by cruise missiles and diesel subs in coastal regions was "marginal" and that nothing the Navy is currently buying will "provide adequate protection against improved versions of these weapons."

To protect its precious ships and crews, the military leadership is pushing them farther and farther out to sea, where they are safer but not nearly as effective. "We've become risk-averse," Adm. Cebrowski says.

Re-read Adm Mullen's comment again to see what Adm. Cebrowski was speaking about.

The idea of building a new class of small ships had been kicking around at the Naval War College and the Naval Post Graduate School, where retired Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, one of Adm. Cebrowski's former commanding officers, had been playing with some concepts. Adm. Cebrowski had been thinking about the need for a new class of small ship as well. So he and Capt. Hughes put the concept on paper.

Because Streetfighters would be cheap -- one design would cost only about $70 million a ship, compared with as much as $1 billion for a new destroyer -- the Navy would be able to buy hundreds for the price of one 10-ship carrier battle group. The ships would operate along crowded coastal waters, hiding in coves and springing out to destroy enemy subs, hunt down mines and disrupt enemy missiles that could more easily target larger, slower ships.

After a few days or weeks of heavy fighting, the bigger ships would move in and take over the fight. Some Streetfighters would be lost, and some sailors would die. "Streetfighters must be designed to lose," Capt. Hughes wrote at the time. "If the ships become too costly or too heavily manned, commanders will be unwilling to put them at risk."

I am not sure in this age of near real time satellite imaging that "hiding in coves" might still work, but there is that "quantity has a quality all of its own" thing.

The fun one can have imagining a fleet with a combination of large capable ships and small, fast "sea-going fire ants" boiling out of hiddie holes is immense. Capt Wayne Hughes' The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet suggests:

The “New Navy Fighting Machine” promotes a wider mix of ships, in a more numerous fleet, with better-focused capabilities, to meet a range of scenarios in green and blue water environments. The new fighting machine does this within an affordable SCN (Ship Construction Navy) budget ceiling, because the U.S. defense budget already dominates defense spending in the rest of the world.

The fleet’s new component is a green water force of small vessels to fulfill the three sea service chiefs’ maritime strategy of collaboration and support of theater security operations now manifested in Navy global fleet stations. The green water force also includes coastal combat forces, and additional reconnaissance for the land and sea side of a littoral. These capabilities are achieved with 10% of the SCN budget.

How many "green water ships? Hughes suggests 240 (+400 inshore patrol craft). Hughes rightly compares the need for a new command to drive developing this green water component of naval power to that that developed Naval Aviation in its infancy. Hughes:

We also show, in rough outline, that the new fighting machine is better suited than the present projection-heavy 313-ship1 Navy to support regional conflicts and, if it should become necessary, to constrain Russian ambitions.

Submarines in greater numbers are central to the maritime strategy, but within a constrained budget the larger force cannot be exclusively nuclear powered. We find that diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion not only allow twice as many submarines, but they also nicely complement the SSNs in the critical scenario.

Because the United States has not conducted an opposed amphibious landing in nearly 60 years, the new fighting machine emphasizes amphibious lift rather than amphibious assault. We stress the unparalleled success of national sealift in timely delivery of ground forces where needed, when needed, and for as long as needed. It is a national treasure that has received too little attention. We assiduously maintain this strong sealift component in the new fighting machine.

The study does not eliminate high-end warships, the individual capabilities of which are unmatched by any other nation in the world. To do so would end America’s maritime superiority. On the other hand, a Navy of only large, multibillion dollar warships will result in a smaller and smaller force that cannot fulfill its roles around the world. Some of those roles, maritime interdiction operations and coastal patrol for example, can be handled by smaller ships in greater numbers.

That 313 number above has now shrunk to 272.

Some are going to debate the building of new frigates or corvettes to boost ship numbers. I suggest instead building the "green water" force using technology that already exists. Further, I suggest building up a corps young officers to drive these new toys hard with some LCDR and CDR supervision.

If you don't think there are some young people who like this idea, see this from 2012 New Navy Fighting Machine in the South China Sea by a couple of then Lieutenants, Dylan Ross and Jimmy Harmon:

This thesis advocates fleet growth as articulated in Hughes' New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) study. Comparisons of the NNFM, the U.S. fleet, and the PRC fleet demonstrate both the disparity facing the American surface forces, and the near parity obtained in the NNFM. CT through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and naval obscurants provide American surface forces increased staying power and tactical advantage. Scouting and communications networking through a theater wide constellation of airships provide the American fleet with persistentsituationalawareness of the battle space, tactical communications with subsurface forces, and improved emissions control (EMCON) measures for surface forces. The distributive properties of the NNFM, combined with this study's CT [counter-targeting] and scouting findings, offer American surface combatants success over the PRC Navy in the SCS scenario.

And who wouldn't like to drive one of these:


or be the a squadron CO of 8 or 10 of these:


We could do worse than building a few of these.

In fact, we have done worse. Too bad the PHMs like Pegasus were killed. We could have had 38 years of experience with small fast, heavily armed war ships by now. "Coulda, shoulda."

Fleet Size Matters - A Blast From the Past : "A Repeated Note on a Call for Small, Numerous Ships"

What follows is From December 2013 and going back even further.

Bottom line - the U.S. Navy needs to think small(er) in terms of warship sizes and think bigger in terms of numbers of ships.

As has been repeatedly said by others, while a single large ship may be more capable in some ways, the loss of that single large ship in a fleet composed of fewer all large ships may be ruinous to sea control (something we see when we lose a couple of DDGs due to accidents). The loss of one of many smaller ships in a larger fleet may not hurt so much.

The old post begins under the red asterisks:


****

Way back in 2008 we were discussing the shaping of the U.S. Navy fleet at The Time is Right for Revolution and the links therein. Part of that discussion follows:

CDR Salamander's Maritime Strategy Monday: the Revolt of the Commanders ought to stir up discussion - though I am not sure how many "flag bound" O-6s are reading blogs critical of the group think that has put us where we are. I do know that when on exercises it was common to acknowledge that some issues were "too hard" or "too time consuming" to let them dominate the exercise, though in real life one will not be able to "assume away" such problems.

In my view, during my last days being involved with such matters, we were not training senior officers in how to fight and how hard that fighting is against a determined enemy who has had time to build forces designed to exploit your well-known weaknesses.

So when CDR S calls for a "commander's revolt" I understand his frustration. And note that John Boyd paid for his revolution heavily while lesser men gained from his insight. The would-be revolutionaries need to understand the risks.

These commanders need some political help from someone who understands that we shouldn't have billion dollar ships doing missions poorly that could be done better by having many more mission-designed ships. To use a famous Navy phrase, "any ship can be a mine sweeper once." Real minesweepers can be reused after they have swept a channel- multibillion dollar "capital ships" cannot.

Given the promise of "network centric warfare," merely connecting a few huge platforms under-utilizes the potential for linking many small ships for greater tactical flexibility. Or, as Captain Wayne Hughes writes in Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (p.286):

We have seen that the number of ships is the most valuable attribute that a fleet can have. We also saw that many small ships offer more tactical flexibility... The U.S. Navy is composed of large, highly capable ships, many of which have area defense capability. It was for defense more than for offense that the American navy sacrificed numbers for quality.*

The asterisk is to his footnote:

Another reason is because of the economies of scale. A large ship with three times the displacement of a small one will have three or more times the payload and probably only cost twice as much. Sometimes the ship must be big to carry and operate its payload, modern carrier aircraft illustrate. A large ship is also more comfortable for long cruises in many kinds of weather.

Hughes needs to be listened to. Sometimes the economies of scale and crew comfort need to be weighed against other factors, like winning wars and not being afraid to send your expensive ships into harm's way.

Where are we five years on? We are still having the same discussion - albeit the number of Littoral Combat Ships (more properly, "Littoral Drone Carriers" or LDCs) is growing. Exactly where the vast drone force is right now is unclear, though drones ought to be cheaper and easier to build in most ways - just turn the job over to robots as GM has done to most of its automobile manufacturing.

Smaller, faster, cheaper and dispersed in the theater where that matters (Southeast Asia) ought to be the U.S. Navy mantra for the next few months and years.

Not to the exclusion of the big gray hulls - as an adjunct force, not a replacement.

Small Ships for Littoral and Archipelago Operations: Turkish Kılıç Class

As we ponder the future of U.S. operations, it is a good idea to look to what other countries are doing.

For example, Turkey has the Kılıç (Sword) Class "corvettes" ("Assault Boats" seems to be the Turkish designation) which, ton for ton, are pretty well-armed, as set out here:

General
Type: FPB 57-052B
First of Class: Kilic
First Commissioning: 1998
Dimensions & Crew
Displacement: 554 t
Length: 62 m
Beam: 8.6 m
Draught: 2.6 m
Crew: 44 (+2 embarked)

Sensors

Lürssen Defence photo

Thales Command and Control System
1 x MW08
1x STING EO
Nav Radar
EO/IR
IFF
ESM
Link

Miscellaneous
1 RIB

Capabilities
ASuW
EW
Maritime Patrol and Surveillance Operations
Confined and Shallow Water Operations


Propulsion
4 Diesel
Total Power: 16,184 kW
Propellers: 4 x FPP
Speed: 40 kts

Weapons
1 x 76/62 Compact
1 x 40 mm double barrel
8 x RGM 84
SRBOC

These are a 20-year old design, but armed with uo to eight Harpoon missiles and operated as a squadron, can present a serious threat to other surface ships.

Designed by Lürssen which considers them "fast patrol boats."

For those obsessed with speed, 40 knots in a pinch, 3300 mile range at cruising speed of 16 knots, 1000 miles at 30 knots.

Nice post on this class at Naval Analyses:

A Book Review Worth Reading: A Forgotten Part of Fleets

B.J. Armstrong, PhD, reviews A Hard Fought Ship: The Story of HMS Venomous in War on the Rocks' A Forgotten Part of Fleets and makes the point oft taken up here for the small ship navy:

There are also, of course, questions that must be asked about the limits of the value of ships like the Venomous. Today small combatants are seen as being too limited in the combat capabilities they can bring to modern conflicts. There are also valid questions to be asked about survivability in the modern battle. And we must also recognize that because they do not fulfill the Navy’s self-image as a large ship, battlefleet force, some officers may not see their value.

Still, the low cost of small combatants relative to other warships and their ubiquitous use in the fleets of prior global naval powers remind us of their enduring value. It may be worth considering that for the price of one of today’s multi-mission destroyers (a destroyer in name but a modern capital ship in design, size, and cost), a flotilla of smaller ships could be built. And while only a very small number of shipyards build the ships of today’s U.S. Navy, a much wider number in the United States can, and do, build small combatants including the Coast Guard’s new patrol cutters and missile boats for foreign markets. The vast majority of the missions that are cited as the baseline for a 355-ship fleet, from freedom of navigation operations and naval diplomacy to littoral combat and broader patrols, are missions that small combatants have excelled at in the past.

Yes!

U.S. Navy and Marines: It's Payloads, Not Platforms (Again)

A flat spot on a deck and an ampphibious ship becomes a missile platform capable of supporting operations ashore, as set in this PACOM and Expiditionary Group 3 press release

Anchorage Conducts High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Shoot during DB17 by PO3 Abigail Rader:

U.S. Navy Photo by PO2 Matthew Dickinson

The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was fired from the flight deck of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23) during Dawn Blitz 2017, Oct. 22.

The HIMARS is a weapons system made up of the M142, five-ton chassis vehicle and can carry either a launcher pod of six rockets or one MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

It enables Marines to engage targets within minutes after firing and features an advanced targeting system that strikes with an extremely high accuracy rate. The system also features a greater range than traditional artillery, allowing smaller units to cover a larger area.

The demonstration on Anchorage consisted of HIMARS engaging a land-based target with a Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary (GMLRS-U).

“We had two training objectives for today’s shoot,” said Army Maj. Adam Ropelewski, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), lead planner for sea-based expeditionary fires. "The first training objective was demonstrating this capability, and second, we wanted to have good effects on the target. We achieved both objectives. We destroyed the target at 70 kilometers while at sea."

Developing sea-based fires alternatives such as the HIMARS afloat and proving them to be effective provides an opportunity for our Navy and Marine Corps team to evaluate, refine, and improve processes to be ready for the future fight.

“In an environment where we are operating in contested waters, we are finding a way to be able to support the land force with deeper strike capabilities,” said Capt. AJ Kowaleuski, an artillery officer with I MEF.

This ability provides flexibility while the Navy and Marine Corps are supporting each other in combined operations.

This portion of Dawn Blitz validated the commander’s ability to integrate HIMARS with ships to conduct a sea-based strike.

“What we demonstrated not only was its capability, but we further demonstrated capabilities from the blue-green team and Amphibious Force Three,” said Ropelewski. “They performed very well, and were able to come together and work hard to make the mission successful.”
***

While offered up in a slightly different context, this post from 9 years ago is relevant about getting creative in doing what our Navy is supposed to do or so it seems to me. I've edited it slightly:

Ain't no need for a Navy if it can't do the job.

If you don't have the resources, send a couple of fleet lieutenants and some crusty old

The "Whatever It Takes" Fleet

chiefs on a mission to "kludge" the pirates. (insert "build a strong enough presence force")

Don't send a "clean hands" Lieutenant - send that guy who hates the bureaucracy and his buddy.

The kind of LT who uses cans of coffee to smooth shipyard wheels- if you get my drift. (Here's another hint - if he offers to do a Power Point presentation- he's the wrong guy...)

Send a supply guy along with a check book and a willingness to stretch a few rules. Don't ask too many questions, just tell them to "stop the d*mn pirates!" (insert "payloads, not plaforms")

They''ll find a way.

If they ask, tell the Washington crowd that operational conditions mandate "thinking outside the box." Or, perhaps, tell them you are :

Leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model.

To steal a phrase.

Deterring lightly armed pirates in small boat (insert "bullies") is not that tough. But you have to quit thinking like a cruiser skipper and start thinking like a pirate. If I were a pirate (insert "bully") I would hate to see lots of armed fast support vessels escorting ships (insert "hanging around/training local forces").

Of course, I reckon duty on "pirate patrol" in the escort  (insert "the micro") fleet I envision probably won't punch the important SWO tickets. It would just get the job done, unlike tying up a half dozen expensive gray hulls watching a captured ship from a safe distance.

And it would help the Navy do its mission of keeping those sea lanes open. You know that mission from the new Maritime Strategy that Charlie Dragonette quoted:

"The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy."

See also Department of Crazy Ideas: How about a cheap inshore fleet?, Psst.Psst. Wanna Distribute Your Lethality on the Cheap?, A Blast from the Past - Department of The Expendable Ship Division : "How to Make the Navy Bigger, Sooner, Cheaper" Revisited, CHEAPER CORVETTES: COOP AND STUFT LIKE THAT, Micro Force: Small Combatants for the Littorals

Micro Force: Small Combatants for the Littorals

We need a bigger U.S. Navy - but the fleet can be grown in many different ways. One way is to develop a "micro Navy" (as opposed to "Big Navy" gray hulls) buidling on the lessons learned and discarded from U.S. and allied patrol torpedo boat operations in WWII.









Update these boats with anti-ship missiles, mines, and unmanned drone vessels to be deployed from the boats - you've created a potentially deadly small combatant force for use in the littoral for a faction of the cost of larger ships.

More on this later.

Surface Warfare: "Command" Opportunity for U.S. Navy Lieutenants and Lieutenant Commanders

Per-41 is looking for a few good LTs and LCDRs as set out in their newsletter here

U.S. Navy by MC2 Joshua Scott

NEW EARLY COMMAND OPPORTUNITIES!!
Early Command is an experience that is highly valued by both the Surface Warfare community and those who serve as Commanding Officers in Mine Countermeasures (MCM) or Patrol Coastal (PC) ships. Because Early Command provides some of our finest Surface Warfare Officers with an invaluable experience leading sailors in crucial missions across the world, we’ve teamed up with Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to create more opportunities for top performing Junior Officers to serve as Afloat Commanding Officers.

Beginning in November 2017, officers will have an opportunity to screen for O3 / O4 Command Afloat positions in MKVI Patrol Boats. Lieutenants who have completed their 2nd Division Officer tour will be eligible to command a MKVI Patrol Boat. Post-Department Head Lieutenants and Lieutenant Commanders will be eligible to serve as Company Commander for a Company of three MKVI Patrol Boats.

MKVI Patrol Boats are the newest platform in the NECC inventory and are based out of Little Creek, VA, and San Diego, CA, and deployed to Bahrain and Guam. Over 84 feet in length, the MKVI is a highly capable platform whose primary mission is to provide capability to persistently patrol littoral areas beyond sheltered harbors and bays for the purpose of force protection of friendly and coalition forces and critical infrastructure. These missions include: security force assistance (SFA); high value unit (HVU) shipping escort; visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations; and theater security cooperation (TSC). The Mark VI program of record is for a total of 12 boats -- six boats have been delivered to the fleet and six more are to be delivered by the end of the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2018.

Screening for these new opportunities will be conducted at the November 2017 Early Command Board. Previous Early Command opportunities in MCM and PC ships are still available. These more traditional opportunities for Command Afloat provide significant leadership and operational experience while carrying out missions in C4F, C5F, and C7F. While maintaining readiness for a full spectrum of capabilities, MCMs and PCs execute TSC, HVU escort, and Counter Illicit Trafficking (CIT) operations.
***

Info on how to apply is in the newsletter.

Basic info on the Mark VI boats is available here:

Navy Photo by MCCS Joe Kane

General Characteristics, MK VI Patrol Boat
Propulsion: Installed Power: 5,200 HP - 2 x MTU 16V2000 M94 and 2 x Hamilton HM651 Water Jets
Length: LOA: 84.8'
Beam: 20.5'
Displacement: 170,000 lbs (full load displacement)
Draft: less than 5 ft
Speed: Cruise: 25+ Knots; Sprint: 35+ Knots
Range: 600+ Nautical Miles
Crew: 2 Crews, 5 Personnel each, plus 8 Person Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) Team (18 Total)
Armament: MK 50 (.50 cal) Gun Weapon System (Qty 4); MK 38 Mod 2 (25 mm) Gun Weapon System (Qty 2); MK 44 Machine Gun System; Multiple Crew Served Weapon & Long Range Acoustic Hailing Device (Qty 6)

I don't know, but if I were a young JO looking for something other than a staff weenie billet for a shore tour, I'd be looking at this - never met a small boy skipper who didn't enjoy the heck out of his tour.

What we need is more boats and more opportunities for young officers to get their experience underway and in charge.

UPDATE: CIMSEC had a nice 2016 article on these boats MK VI: THE NEXT GENERATION OF INTERDICTION

Dear Big Navy: Take a Hint from the Air Force

Yes, it might have had a little prompting from Senator McCain, but someone at the Air Force seems to have seen the light - not every job requires the most expensive weapon in the tool box or, as Aviation Week puts it, U.S. Air Force Chief Backs Idea Of Low-Cost Fighter Fleet

The U.S. Air Force chief of staff endorses the idea of buying 300 low-cost, light-attack fighters for counterterrorism missions as a “great idea.”
***
In a white paper out this week, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested that in addition to using the A-10 for close air support, the Air Force should buy 300 light-attack fighters. They could help perform close air support and other missions where air defenses are not a problem and help bring pilots up to speed. “The Air Force could procure the first 200 of these aircraft by fiscal year 2022,” the paper says.

I would suggest moving faster.

Payloads and flexibility.

Now, Navy how about Trump's Gunboats?:

Instead of continuing to use the wrong tool for the job, it is logical to

develop a diverse force of smaller naval ships to handle numerous, smaller missions, leaving the blue water navy to pursue the larger, vital warfighting role that it was designed to do. Smaller navy vessels working in squadrons may be more cost-effective in responding to global maritime incidents, patrolling coasts, and deterring similar forces. While the threat of Somali piracy has diminished the destabilization of other economies and nations could cause new threats to shipping to emerge as off Venezuela. Larger threats continue to loom as small Iranian boats swarm U.S. Navy ships in the Strait of Hormuz and China’s maritime militia in the South China Sea have harassed ships in the past. Rather than offering larger, single targets of opportunity, dispersed squadrons of smaller vessels provide greater opportunities to counter asymmetric operations.

The Gunboat Navy

Getting the U.S. Navy numbers up faster, sooner while waiting for the longer lead-time construction discussed by Claude Berube and me over at The National Interest in Trump's Gunboats

Instead of continuing to use the wrong tool for the job, it is logical to develop a diverse force of smaller naval ships to handle numerous, smaller missions, leaving the blue water navy to pursue the larger, vital warfighting role that it was designed to do. Smaller navy vessels working in squadrons may be more cost-effective in responding to global maritime incidents, patrolling coasts, and deterring similar forces.

Go take a look.

Update: But wait, there's more - U.S. Navy "Swarm Boats":

The U.S. Navy is getting ready to "swarm" its adversaries.

The Office of Naval Research over the weekend released video of tests conducted in August that showed five "drone" boats swarming a vessel that posed a threat to a Navy ship.
"The U.S. Navy is unleashing a new era in advanced ship protection," the service says in the video.

Can you say, "Force multiplier?"

Building a Temporary Larger Fleet While Waiting for New Construction Ships (A Reanimation of an Old Post)

There is a great deal of brilliant discussion of how to build the 350 ship Navy called for by President-elect Trump see Jerry Hendrix's 12 Carriers and 350 Ships: A Strategic Path Forward from President Elect Donald Trump and Bryan McGrath's Quick Hit: Small Surface Combatants and the 350-Ship Navy for what the smart kids in the room are saying.

And, if you need to ask why we need a Navy - well, I respectfully suggest you listen to the Midrats show with Bryan McGrath:


On the other hand, there is that part of me that keeps reverting to being smart in how we spend our money and still increase our striking power while waiting for a host of new construction ships to join the fleet.

Some of this lies in the world of "distributed lethality" in which we spread advanced weapons to platforms that have, historically, been under-armed for a world in which combat may come sooner and in places where it might be less expected. While "DL" is a good idea, it does not increase the number of ships in our fleets. As I have often said in these posts, even the most capable ship can only cover so much ocean.

Numbers matter.

So does assigning the right ship to the right mission - should a multi-billion dollar cruiser/destroyer be assigned to chase pirates in speed boats? Or to show the flag off some limited threat shore?

I have said "No" in the past - see Department of Cheaper Pirate Fighting and the links therein for earlier thoughts.

In keeping with this theme, I offer up a post from 2008, which, if not as smart as those of Hendrix and McGrath, may prompt some cost-effective short-term Navy expansion:

In the September 2008 issue of the United States Naval Institute's magazine Proceedings, the Secretary of the Navy looked at the issue of "An Affordable Naval Presence." It has a sub-head of "We need a more cost-effective Fleet."

The piece lays out the requirements imposed by our maritime nature:

Our nation's maritime strategy reaffirms the use of sea power to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore, including the need for our naval forces to support humanitarian operations, counter piracy, and assist in capacity building and training of partner nations. The requirement to support these missions moves us to adopt persistent global presence as a key tenet of our strategy. The increasing desire for U.S. Navy presence is one of the driving factors behind our decisions on Fleet size and composition.

The value of presence is under-appreciated by many, for they fail to recognize the role of maritime security in support of the world economy to protect it against the vulnerabilities that terrorism and rogue nations pose. Clearly, most would agree that the world is far more connected and interdependent than in years past. Nations have moved away from the idea that they must possess economic self-sufficiency and have largely recognized the value of trade and specialization.

***

The more dispersed nature of today's world trade patterns has major implications for our view of maritime security . . .

Ah, there's the rub. Too much ocean, too many shorelines, too many needs, too few ships. What's a navy to do?

Secretary Winter wants analysis of the right ships to build and a more efficient process to build them. All of which is fine, but - there is a faster, cheaper path to get bigger, sooner at lower cost - putting hulls in the water while awaiting that analysis.

Here's my modest proposal:

1. Take $250 million dollars and put it aside;
2. Of that $250 million, use $100 million to buy or lease 50 to 100 offshore crew boats as currently used in the offshore oil industry (many of them are reaching the end of their expected useful life in the industry - you might be able to pick up some bargains).
3. Invest $50 million in refurbishing the boats and in getting weapons for their decks. Turn them into "navalized" vessels. Make 22 knots the minimum acceptable speed.
4. Do not try to make these low cost littoral combat ships into battleships for all conditions. Talk to the LCDRs who will be squadron commanders and the LTs who will be the commanding officers about what they would need to provide a presence, fight in a low threat environment against modestly armed pirates and the like, support occasional missions ashore and interdict drug smuggler semi-submersibles. Give them what they need in terms of state of the art comms using COTS (heck, load put a communication van on board if so that no time is wasted trying to rewire the little ships more than needed). Put in some comfortable berthing suited for the sea states in which these things (I call them Special Purpose Vessels or SPVs) will operate.
5. Under no cirmcumstance should the total U.S. Navy investment in any single SPV exceed $2 million, excluding the cost of adding weapons systems (adding a M-1 Abrams, for example) and the personnel costs.
6. Make the project a 12 month "emergency" - and kill the bureacracy that would ordinarily take on this job - find a hard charging Captain, make him or her report directly to SecNav and tell them what the mission and the budget will be. Then get out of the way except for monthly status reports.
7. Find a group of O-3s who are ready for command and who can think for themselves and train the heck out of them by letting them go to sea in the type of ships that you are acquiring, let them learn from the masters of current offshore supply and crew vessels. Find some O-4s who can take hold of the idea of being a squadron commander of a 5 ship squardron and train them in mission like that being conducted by the Africa station.
8. Borrow some Army Rangers or fleet Marines and train them in the ship boardings, small boat ops, shipboard firefighting and ship defense. Treat them like the Marines of old. Stress people skills appropriate for counterterrorism work.
9. Lease some ships to be used as "tenders" for the SPVs - small container ships on which the containers can be shops, supply warehouses, refrigerator units, etc. Bladders for fuel. Use the Arapaho concept to set up a flight deck for helo ops.
10. Be generous with UAV assets - use the small "net recoverable" types.
11. Don't limit the small boat assets to RHIBs. Experiment with M-ships, small go-fasts captured from drug dealers, whatever. The idea is to have boats that can operate in one sea state worse than the pirates, drug smugglers, etc.
12. Use the MIUW van concept for adding some sonar capability. TIS/VIS is a necessity.

Start with a couple of squadrons, tell your O-6 that you want them ready in 6 months for operational testing. Unleash the budget dollars. For op testing, send one squadron off to the coast of Somalia for anti-pirate work. Send the other off Iraq. Put those expensive great big cruisers and destroyers currently in the area to work doing blue water stuff.

Paint Coast Guard like stripe on the hull of the SPVs - but make it Navy blue. If the Coasties want to join in, give them a boat and paint the stripe orange. Make the SPVs highly visible. Nothing deters crime like a visible cop on the beat.

Show the flag.

But wait, there's more! For only "shipping and handling" you can call these cheap ships "corvettes" and go really additive - as I set out in Cheaper Corvettes: COOP and STUFT Like That:

Looks like sea-going trucks to me

If the answer to the Navy’s future is robotics, then Admiral Greenert’s July 2012 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings piece, “Payloads Over Platforms, Charting a New Course” opens up a whole new world of possibilities for using existing small ship platforms as “trucks” to deliver large numbers of modern weapons platforms to areas of interest.

As former Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Work emphasized during his recent appearance on MIDRATS, the Littoral Combat Ship is such a truck–a vehicle for delivering unmanned weapons system.

This post is meant to take that concept and cheapen it.

Now, I know that "Big Navy" like large platforms, but I assert that large platforms are mostly big targets.

Conversely, a fleet of small, well-armed. fast, expendable - and cheap - "platforms" is a smart, asymmetric response to the threats that exist now.

After all, one of our jobs is to make a potential enemy's task harder - and more fighting hulls in the water sooner works to that end.

See also The Small Ship Navy: Numerous and Expendable? Why not?

Sunday Ship History: Small Ship Firepower

A weapon system of rockets for inshore support - lots of firepower in inexpensive platforms:

Much more on the LCI variations Sunday Ship History: The Original LCSs A larger version of these "rocket ships" shown here:

FIREPOWER OFF VIETNAM aka AMERICAN ROCKET SHIPS BOMBARD VIETNAM

British Pathe (click on image to go to video) That's USS Carronade (IFS-1) shown in the latter video. More about her here:

USS Carronade (IFS-1/LFR-1) was a ship of the United States Navy first commissioned in 1955. She is named after the carronade, a type of short barrelled cannon. As an Inshore Fire Support Ship (IFS), part of the so-called "brown-water navy", Carronade was built to provide direct naval gunfire support to amphibious landings or operations close to shore. Carronade was armed with two twin 40mm anti-aircraft mounts (mounted fore and aft of the superstructure), one dual-purpose 5" .38caliber naval cannon, and eight mk.105 twin automatic rocket launchers. Each launcher was capable of firing thirty spin-stabilized rockets per minute. *** During the Vietnam War, Carronade served as the Flagship of Inshore Fire Support Division 93 (IFSDIV93), working alongside the USS Clarion River (LSM(R)-409), USS St. Francis River (LSMR-525) and USS White River (LSMR-536). Shortly before decommissioning, all ships in IFSDIV93 were re-designated as LFR.

To a certain extent, Carronade and her companions were meant to satisfy US Marine Corps needs for amphibious gunfire support.


Updated to fix spelling.

Navy Playing with the Stiletto

U. S. Navy photo

Well, there is this image from here of the M Ship Company's Stiletto "boat" doing stuff with the Navy.

You might remember Stiletto from an earlier post of mine A real littoral combat ship goes to sea with an Army crew or perhaps the discussion of the hull form from Sunday Ship History: Hickman's Sea Sleds .

Be that as it may, the U.S. Navy is playing with Stiletto as set out here and here:

The Stiletto Maritime Demonstration Program kicked off its first Capability Demonstration with the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) off the Virginia coast near Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va.

The demonstration provided NECC Sailors — and 15 industry partners — an opportunity to evaluate products in a realistic maritime environment.

Simulated small boat threats pass by the high-speed experimental boat Stiletto so Sailors assigned to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) can observe new technologies in a relevant maritime environment. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

The Stiletto Maritime Demonstration Program team launches and 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat from the high-speed experimental boat Stiletto. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

So, what's it doing? Testing concepts spelled out by NAVSEA here:

Rapidly transition advanced technologies to higher Technology Readiness Levels through flexible installation and demonstration in maritime operational environments

Transition ship, air & land-based C4I capabilities to small craft to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness
Sensors
Data links to offboard sea, air, and land assets
Leverage existing Stiletto sensor, computer, and network
infrastructure
Unmanned / Autonomous asset launch and recovery
Reduce crew injury and fatigue
Small boat launch and recovery operations

That "unmanned/autonomous" stuff? From the right hand side of the page, "Launch and Retrieve 11m RHIB, UUVs, UAVs." Which explains the photo below, showing a UAV launch/retrieval system mounted on the stern:

Probably won't get a photo of the UUV thing.

More from the RFI for this "capability demonstration":

Stiletto, a maritime demonstration platform, serves as a technology demonstration tool for industry, Government, and academic organizations. It provides an opportunity to learn and to improve systems as they function in an at-sea environment and raise a system’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The Stiletto program’s physical infrastructure consists of the high speed Stiletto craft with a Command Information Center (CIC), Launch and Recovery (L&R) for an 11M Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB), arch space for sensor installation, flight deck for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) L&R, and electronic network infrastructure with wide band satellite communications (SATCOM), along with an 11M NSW RIB with unmanned capability. Both the craft and its systems were designed to be flexible, modular, and re-configurable to enable near “plug-and-play” installation. The Stiletto crew includes engineers and technicians with expertise in multiple maritime technology areas. The crew can provide engineering assistance to integrate systems aboard the craft and to help develop demonstration plans to achieve technical goals.

Electronics Technician 2nd Class Jason Rhodes, assigned to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, gets familiar with technology controls and interfaces of the high-speed experimental boat Stiletto. (U.S. Navy photo)

Interesting.

Exporting Good Ideas: The RiverHawk Multimission Platform Launched

MSS Image

For Lebanon, as reported by MarineLink, RiverHawk's Multimission Platform Launched

RiverHawk Fast Sea Frames (RHFSF) has launched its signature Advanced Multimission Platform (AMP) at its shipyard in Tampa, Florida. Fully designed and built in the United States, the 145-foot coastal security craft was contracted 12 months ago by the U S Department of the Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to Maritime Security Strategies (MSS) of Tampa, Florida. RiverHawk designed, produced and is outfitting the ship, scheduled for final delivery to NAVSEA in May. Subsequent transfer is expected this summer to the Lebanese Armed Forces under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The launching ceremony was attended by NAVSEA program officials, representatives from the U S Central Command (USCENTCOM) and a delegation from Lebanon led by the Chief of the Lebanese Navy, Rear Admiral Nazih Baroudi.

The AMP 145 is a design contracted for by Maritime Security Strategies of Tampa, which describes the design as follows:

Each Advanced Multimission Platform begins with our basic design, the AMP-145.
The platforms are built performance tough, using state of the art fabrication processes, materials, and technologies.
12 month delivery.
Composite hull with Aluminum deck and superstructure for speeds of 30+ knots.
Twin Hamilton Waterjets/MTU diesel plants.