Better Late . . .

The Freedom variant littoral combat ship USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) conducted a live-fire missile exercise off the coast of Virginia May 11.

The Milwaukee fired four longbow hellfire missiles that successfully struck fast inshore attack craft targets.

During the evolution, the ship's crew executed a scenario simulating a complex warfighting environment, utilized radar and other systems to track small surface targets, simulated engagements and then fired missiles against the surface targets.

"The crew of the USS Milwaukee executed superbly and the test team ran the event seamlessly, both were critical in making this event successful," said Capt. Ted Zobel, LCS Mission Modules program manager.

This marks the completion of the first phase of the Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM) Developmental Testing (DT) for the LCS Mission Modules (MM) program. This was the first integrated firing of the SSMM from an LCS. Additionally, this was the second at-sea launch of SSMM missiles from an LCS. SSMM leverages the U.S. Army's Longbow Hellfire Missile in a vertical launch capability to counter small boat threats. Initial operational capability (IOC) and fielding of the SSMM is expected in 2019.

U.S. Navy Has a Coastal Mine Detection System

U.S. has a coastal mine detection system reports Megan Eckstine at USNI News

The Navy completed the first phase of its initial operational test and evaluation on the AN/DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) airborne mine detection system and is awaiting Littoral Combat Ship availability to complete the remaining testing.

COBRA is a sensor payload that operates onboard the MQ-8B Fire Scout and can detect beach zone mines in the daytime to help plan amphibious landings. An eventual block upgrade would add nighttime and surf zone detection capabilities.
***
Using air vehicle operators and mission payload operators from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 1, maintainers from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 21 and operators from USS Independence (LCS-2) and the LCS Squadron (LCSRON) 1, the LCS program proved to the Operational Test and Evaluation Force that COBRA can effectively and reliably meet its mission requirements.

“Right now, in order for us to do the kind of reconnaissance you need in advance of an amphibious landing, you’ve got to put sailors and Marines, you’ve got to put somebody in there with eyes on target to see what’s there, see if there’s any obstacles. People are involved in it,” Taylor said.
“With this capability, you’re able to go from the LCS with an unmanned vehicle, you’re able to recon a whole line of beach – not just one or two areas, you can look at the whole beach, you can look at all the lanes that are possible without putting somebody there – which allows you to come back and look at that and choose which lane or lanes are available and which are not.”

COBRA aircraft component (U.S. Navy photo)

More on COBRA here:

The COBRA airborne payload will be carried on the MQ-8 Fire Scout unmanned air system. This allows operators and other personnel to remain at a safe distance from the mine and obstacle belts and enemy direct and indirect fire. COBRA will be embarked in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) as part of the mine countermeasures (MCM) mission package (MP).

Wonder who will protect the LCS at its "safe distance." And what is that distance in today's battlespace?

LCS Fun: "Navy Adjusts LCS Class Crewing, Readiness and Employment"

Navy press release inits entirety, Navy Adjusts LCS Class Crewing, Readiness and Employment:

From Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- The Navy announced Sept. 8 it will implement several key changes to the projected 28-ship littoral combat ship (LCS) Flight 0/0+ class over the next five years that will simplify crewing, stabilize testing and increase overseas deployment presence availability.

The projected 12 Frigates will be the next increment of LCS and will use the same manning, training, maintenance and operating concepts as those that have been approved as part of the LCS review. The decision to make these changes resulted from a comprehensive review of LCS crewing, training, maintenance and operations commissioned in March. While a total of 40 ships have been approved for the program, the Navy Force Structure Assessment still projects the need for 52 small surface combatants that LCS and Frigate address.

Beginning this fall, the Navy will start to phase out the 3:2:1 crewing construct and transition to a Blue/Gold model similar to the one used in crewing Ballistic Missile submarines, patrol craft and minesweepers. The LCS crews will also merge, train and rotate with mission module detachment crews, organizing as four-ship divisions of a single warfare area--either surface warfare (SUW), mine warfare (MCM) or anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Though organized this way, the LCS class will retain the technological benefits of modularity and the ability to swap mission packages quickly if needed. Aviation detachments will also deploy with the same LCS crew, but will remain assigned to their respective squadrons when in home port.

To facilitate these changes across the class, the Navy will eventually homeport Independence-variant ships in San Diego and Freedom-variant ships in Mayport, Florida, 24 of the 28 LCS ships will form into six divisions with three divisions on each coast. Each division will have a single warfare focus and the crews and mission module detachments will be fused. Each division will consist of three Blue/Gold-crewed ships that deploy overseas and one single-crewed training ship. Under this construct, each division's training ship will remain available locally to certify crews preparing to deploy. Few homeport shifts will be needed since only six LCS are currently commissioned while the rest are under contract, in construction or in a pre-commissioned unit status.

The first four LCS ships (LCS 1-4) will become testing ships. Like the training ships, testing ships will be single-crewed and could be deployed as fleet assets if needed on a limited basis; however, their primary purpose will be to satisfy near and long term testing requirements for the entire LCS class without affecting ongoing deployment rotations. This approach accommodates spiral development and rapid deployment of emerging weapons and delivery systems to the fleet without disrupting operational schedules.

Implementing these changes now and as more LCS ships are commissioned over the coming years will ultimately allow the Navy to deploy more ships, increasing overall forward presence. With the Blue/Gold model in place, three out of four ships will be available for deployment compared with one out of two under 3:2:1. The Blue/Gold model will also simplify ownership of maintenance responsibilities and enhance continuity as the same two crews rotate on a single ship. Single-crewed training ships will complement shore-based training facilities and ensure crews have enough time at sea before deployment. The findings and recommendations of the LCS review will allow the LCS program to become more survivable, lethal and adaptable as the LCS become regular workhorses in the fleet.

"As we implement these changes, we will continue to make iterative adjustments and improvements based on evolving fleet requirements and technological developments," said Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, commander, Naval Surface Forces. "Implementing the approved recommendations from this review and continuing to examine other areas for improvement will better position the LCS program for success - both now and in the future."

Well, as "The Big Admiral" says in In Harm's Way:

Well, we all know the Navy's never wrong. But in this case, it was a little weak on bein' right.

So, now, these "frigates" will be one-trick ponies of three stripes. They had better be really, really good in those mission areas, otherwise we could have built more DD's which can do several missions at once.

"Payloads not platforms" - Mine hunting and clearing? More counter mine drones, helos and carriers for them.

Taxpayer money? Along with good intentions, this particular road to hell seems to be lined with it.

The Littoral "Combat" Ship Fantasy Goes On and On and . . .

Our friends at USNI News set out the "basics" of the Littoral Combat Ship and its amazing "mission
modules" in "LCS Mission Packages: The Basics"

The beating heart of both variants of the littoral combat ship (LCS) is the series of three mission packages the Navy is developing to handle some of the service’s most dire needs in the littorals.
***
On paper, the new capabilities and updates of existing functions will greatly increase the Navy’s ability to rapidly undertake some of its most dangerous jobs.

However, the mission packages have experienced delays of up to four years in fielding because of design problems, cost overruns, and manufacturing delays, according to the Government Accountability Office.

USNI News has an interview:

On Aug. 8, USNI News interviewed Capt. John Ailes, program manager for Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare’s (PEO LMW) LCS Mission Modules, for an update on the embattled mission package program.

Ailes acknowledged past failures in the program but painted an optimistic picture of the way forward for the mission packages.

“It’s a wondrous time to be the mission package guy today compared to three years ago because you can point to the successes,” he said.

Right.

No mention of  an "anti-air" mission module.

Oh, wait, that's not an LCS mission set. Of course, since we "own" the sky - only close-in protection might be needed.

The common denominator for all the packages (anti-surface, anti-submarine and mine counter-measures) is the helicopter carried by the ship, along with a variety of drones and yet-to-be found missiles, etc. Looking at the pictures, what's the single thing that would make the LCS useless in its missions?

Why, of course, the loss of its helicopter.

Hmmm.

The most important mission for the LCS is mine hunting and minesweeping.
***
In the 2015 OPEVAL the Navy plans to test the fundamental components of the MCM package: the helicopter-deployed airborne laser mine detection system (ALMDS); the mine-killing airborne mine neutralization system (AMNS); the remote minehunting system (RMS), composed of the remote multi-mission vehicle and the AQS-20A sonar.
***
Problems with the RMMV have delayed the MCM package more than any other component of the mission package. “It’s had a storied past,” Ailes said. “Mostly for reliability.”

The Lockheed Martin system operates just below the surface of the water paired with the AQS-20A sonar. The 14,500-pound, 23-foot long behemoth is deployed from the boat launch of an LCS and is controlled by an operator on board the ship.

Early iterations of the RMMV failed on average every eight hours. The Navy had improved the average to 45 hours before NAVSEA undertook a reliability program to improve the performance.
***
In June, NAVSEA completed its reliability work and now states that reliability numbers for RMMV has grown to more than 200 hours.
***
AQS-20A is the primary sensor of the mine-hunting systems on LCS. The Navy has largely corrected detection problems found in early developmental testing with training and software and hardware upgrades, Ailes said. A plan to field the sonar from the package’s MH-60S was canceled for safety reasons.

“We took the Q20 and flew it from a 60S for a long time but the problem was, if an engine failed you could lose the aircraft,” Ailes said. “It hardly ever happens but once you lose an engine it would be catastrophic.”
***
The fourth capability for the first part of the MCM package is the airborne mine neutralization system (AMNS).

AMNS is lowered by a helicopter in the water after the crew has detected mines and is guided by an operator on board the helicopter to neutralize the mine. The system struggled with breaks in the fiber-optic cord that tied it to the sled; operators also had difficulty engaging the mines.

Ailes said that improvements to the arrangement of the neutralizers and skilled operators have blunted some of the impact of earlier problems with the system.
***
The surface warfare (SuW) package for littoral combat ship (LCS) is the simplest and most-tested mission package the Navy plans to field.
***
In addition to the 57mm main deck gun, the SuW package includes twin 30mm Bushmaster cannons, a planned surface-to-surface missile, and an MH-60R helicopter.
***
The Navy canceled a version of the ASW package that would have used the RMMV to patrol for submarines in favor of a so-called “in stride” capability that would allow the ship to move at speed to detect submarine threats.
***
The offensive component of the ASW package is on the MH-60S helicopter, which fields Mk-54 airdropped lightweight torpedoes. The GAO was the least critical of the ASW package in its July report.

So, see, it's all on track.

By the way did you catch the concept that you need two variations of the MH-60 helicopter as part of the "mission modules?" A MH-60R for surface warfare and a MH-60S for ASW and MCM? Just out of idle curiosity - has anyone checked on the qualifications the crews of these birds are going to need to fulfill these mission sets?

Just asking.

By the way, no criticism of Capt Ailes is intended. He's playing the hand he got dealt.

The Littoral Combat Space Holder - I Mean "Combat Ship" Goes to War . . . for continued funding

CDR Salamander does the Full Monty of exposing the "The LCS Full Court Press".

Think continued funding and all will be as clear as The Emperor's New Clothes.

Well, as for me, I enjoy a fast ship as much as the next old SWO, but I think we ought to have some truth in advertising.

The single most valuable and powerful weapon system currently available to the LCS is . . . the MH-60 helicopter.

It seems to me then, the most powerful LCS is not the high speed little launch platform in the foreground of the picture below, but that big, slow thing next to it, which could hold a whole lot more MH-60's (with different mission packages) and other things like Marine Sea Cobras (which reminds me - why doesn't the Navy have it own Sea Cobras?).

I mean, if you want high speed and the ability to operate in the shallow waters of the world, those helicopter things work pretty well. And they don't cost $300 million each.

And if you want to go fast and look scary in shallow water, there is a school of thought that says you ought to explore this old technology:

Criticism of the Littoral Combat Ship: "Oh, you mean that 'old' negative report? That is so a year ago."

From Military.com, Navy Defends LCS from Damaging Internal Report:

U.S. Navy leaders have taken to Capitol Hill to defend the Littoral Combat Ship after an internal service report described the next-generation surface ship as “ill-suited to execute regional commander’s warfighting needs.”
****
However, Navy leaders have said it’s unfair to judge the program on a report that is a year old.

Wow.

What a powerful defense.

Probably should update that report to reflect the raft of new problems. Such as LCS Crew Discovers Seawater in Freedom’s Lube-Oil. A problem which, by the way, the Navy described by stating it is not as bad as it could been:

Navy officials say this kind of malfunction has, on occasion, happened on other ships as well but stressed that no crew members were ever in harm’s way.

“Although the failures are infrequent, it’s not unusual that these pumps would fail from time to time. This was not an incident where there was flooding on the ship or the ship was taking on water. The crew was never in danger,” said Falvo.

I feel so much better for knowing that.

About that "internal report" - see here:

“This review highlights the gap between ship capabilities and the missions the Navy will need LCS to execute,” said the report prepared last year for the Navy by Rear Admiral Samuel Perez. “Failure to adequately address LCS requirements and capabilities will result in a large number of ships that are ill-suited to execute” regional commanders’ warfighting needs.
***
The Perez report also highlights the vessel’s limited combat capability. The Navy has acknowledged that the vessels are being built to the service’s lowest level of survivability, a Pentagon-approved decision that sought to balance cost and performance.

The ship “is not expected to be survivable in that it is not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment,” Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester, said in a January report.

Even in its surface warfare role, when all armaments are working as intended, the vessel “is only capable of neutralizing” small, fast-attack boats and it “remains vulnerable to ships” with anti-ship cruise missiles that can travel more than five miles (8 kilometers), according to the Perez report. Iran has 67 such vessels, according to a chart in the report.

The Littoral Combat Ship is “ill-suited for combat operations against anything but” small, fast boats not armed with anti-ship missiles, the Perez report found.

Of course, our shipmate CDR Salamander is all over this.

The Perez report is not the first "negative vibe" re the LCS. A good piece (which may be behind the USNI Proceeding "member's only" wall is "Birth of the Littoral Combat Ship" by Capt. Robert Carney Powers, USN (Retired) :

It has taken 17-plus years since the LCS concept was born to come up with a flawed ship. What must go to accommodate the systems needed to make it relevant to its tasks? The LCS is, after all, a 3,000-ton ship (much larger than a World War II destroyer escort, and three-fourths the size of a Perry - or Knox -class frigate). The space for needed capability can be found.

As currently configured (weapons, manning, concept), is the LCS up to the tasks it could soon face (in the Strait of Hormuz and elsewhere)? The answer is regretfully “no.”

Is the LCS fit to be “the most numerous ship in the U.S. Navy?” Same answer.

Ah, yes, we are going to put sailors into ships that can't do the job, you know, unless we were suddenly attacked by war canoes.

Perhaps if we paint scary shark's teeth on the bows of these ships we strike fear in the hearts of our prospective enemies.

Ooooh, look - scary!

Time to rethink our fleet needs and the needs of those we send to sea to defend this country.

Navy Playing with the Stiletto

U. S. Navy photo

Well, there is this image from here of the M Ship Company's Stiletto "boat" doing stuff with the Navy.

You might remember Stiletto from an earlier post of mine A real littoral combat ship goes to sea with an Army crew or perhaps the discussion of the hull form from Sunday Ship History: Hickman's Sea Sleds .

Be that as it may, the U.S. Navy is playing with Stiletto as set out here and here:

The Stiletto Maritime Demonstration Program kicked off its first Capability Demonstration with the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) off the Virginia coast near Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va.

The demonstration provided NECC Sailors — and 15 industry partners — an opportunity to evaluate products in a realistic maritime environment.

Simulated small boat threats pass by the high-speed experimental boat Stiletto so Sailors assigned to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) can observe new technologies in a relevant maritime environment. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

The Stiletto Maritime Demonstration Program team launches and 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat from the high-speed experimental boat Stiletto. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

So, what's it doing? Testing concepts spelled out by NAVSEA here:

Rapidly transition advanced technologies to higher Technology Readiness Levels through flexible installation and demonstration in maritime operational environments

Transition ship, air & land-based C4I capabilities to small craft to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness
Sensors
Data links to offboard sea, air, and land assets
Leverage existing Stiletto sensor, computer, and network
infrastructure
Unmanned / Autonomous asset launch and recovery
Reduce crew injury and fatigue
Small boat launch and recovery operations

That "unmanned/autonomous" stuff? From the right hand side of the page, "Launch and Retrieve 11m RHIB, UUVs, UAVs." Which explains the photo below, showing a UAV launch/retrieval system mounted on the stern:

Probably won't get a photo of the UUV thing.

More from the RFI for this "capability demonstration":

Stiletto, a maritime demonstration platform, serves as a technology demonstration tool for industry, Government, and academic organizations. It provides an opportunity to learn and to improve systems as they function in an at-sea environment and raise a system’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The Stiletto program’s physical infrastructure consists of the high speed Stiletto craft with a Command Information Center (CIC), Launch and Recovery (L&R) for an 11M Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB), arch space for sensor installation, flight deck for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) L&R, and electronic network infrastructure with wide band satellite communications (SATCOM), along with an 11M NSW RIB with unmanned capability. Both the craft and its systems were designed to be flexible, modular, and re-configurable to enable near “plug-and-play” installation. The Stiletto crew includes engineers and technicians with expertise in multiple maritime technology areas. The crew can provide engineering assistance to integrate systems aboard the craft and to help develop demonstration plans to achieve technical goals.

Electronics Technician 2nd Class Jason Rhodes, assigned to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, gets familiar with technology controls and interfaces of the high-speed experimental boat Stiletto. (U.S. Navy photo)

Interesting.

One more hit for the Littoral Combat Ship - Assigned helicopters can't tow the minesweeping gear for LCS MIW ops

Mine sweeping helicopters used by the U.S. Navy have been big honking MH-53E's with three engines and huge rotors.

                               An MH-53E Sea Dragon conducts a mine sweeping exercise.                                                                      U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Martens

The plan was to replace them with a "kit" for the small MH-60S birds, which could then be flown off the Littoral Combat Ships as part of the "mine warfare package."

Well, it won't be happening.

As reported by Janes at MH-60S underpowered for MCM towing operations, report finds:

MH-60S AMCM version (Sikorsky photo)

The US Navy's (USN's) future airborne mine countermeasure (AMCM) MH-60S helicopter is unable to tow the minehunting sonar or minesweeping system forming part of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) mine countermeasures module (MCM) mission module, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT and E) revealed in his annual report, released 15 January.

"The navy determined the MH-60S helicopter cannot safely tow the AN/AQS-20A Sonar Mine Detecting Set (AQS-20A) or the Organic Airborne Sweep and Influence System (OASIS) because the helicopter is underpowered for these operations," read the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Fiscal Year 2012 report from DOT and E, Dr J Michael Gilmore.

"The MH-60S helicopter will no longer be assigned these missions operating from any ship, including LCS," it added.

One form of LCS

Among other things, there are many MH-60 pilots breathing a sign of relief that this mission may pass them by.

The actual money quote from the 2012 DOT and E report (pdf, numbered page 177):

The MH-60S helicopter and AQS-20A sonar are not operationally effective or suitable because the helicopter is underpowered and cannot safely tow the sonar under the variety of conditions necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations recently concluded that the MH-60S helicopter is significantly underpowered for the safe performance of the AMCM tow mission and provides limited tactical utility relative to the risk to aircrew, and cancelled that MH-60S mission. The decision to cancel the AMCM tow mission affects employment of both the AQS-20A sonar and Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep.
• As observed during the OA and developmental testing, the AQS-20A does not meet all Navy requirements in all operating modes. Contact depth (vertical localization) errors exceeded Navy limits in all AQS-20A operating modes. FCD also exceeded Navy limits in two of three search modes.
• The analysis of test data collected during Phase A of the OA of the MH-60S and ALMDS is still in progress. Preliminary evaluation of data collected during the OA suggests that the ALMDS does not meet Navy requirements for FCD or reliability. DOT and E expects to issue a formal test report in 2QFY13. Phase B testing was originally intended to provide early operational testing insight into the operational effectiveness and suitability of AMCM systems when operating from an LCS, and to identify risk to the successful completion of IOT and E. However, the Navy’s cancellation of Phase B testing will eliminate these intended benefits.

Plan B seems to involve surface robots.

Wow.

If you are going to run robots around, here's a lower cost alternative to the LCS for MIW ops:

Long linger time with nice deck chairs.

Just saying.

Fun with the Littoral Combat Ship: New Council to Watch Over the "Testing and Introduction"

Nothing says "winning program" like the need to establish a high-powered committee to take charge, which is what the Chief of Naval Operations has done, as set out in "CNO Establishes LCS Council":

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established a board known as the LCS Council Aug. 22 made up of four Navy vice admirals to oversee continued fleet testing and introduction of littoral combat ship (LCS) sea frames, mission modules, and mission packages.

Adm. Jonathan Greenert designated Vice Adm. Rick Hunt, director of the Navy Staff, as the council's chairman. Other officers on the council include Vice Adm. Mark Skinner, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander, Naval Surface Forces; and Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.

The focus of the LCS Council will first be to develop a class-wide plan of action to address the areas identified as needing improvement in recent assessments and reviews. The plan is expected to be implemented by Jan. 31, 2013.

"Addressing challenges identified by these studies, on the timeline we require, necessitates the establishment of an empowered council to drive action across acquisition, requirements and fleet enterprises of the Navy," said Greenert.

It is expected that issues will arise in any first-of-class shipbuilding program. Navy ships are designed with test and trial periods to ensure everything is working correctly, and repairs can be made, if required. That approach also allows for the incorporation of lessons learned into the follow-on ships before they're delivered.

I can tell already that this is just going to be swell.

Four Vice Admirals. Great googly moogly!

On the LCS: Learning Curve Completion Too Costly

LCS versions

First, read "LCS: Quick Swap Concept Dead" from Defense News, then read CDR Salamander's "Another LCS Shoe Drops", then Galrahn's "The End of the Beginning for LCS".

Now, for some fun quotes from the Defense News piece:

The LCS, according to the assessments, is not able to fulfill most of the fleet missions required by the Navy’s primary strategy document . . .

Equipped with a surface warfare or maritime security mission package, the ships were judged capable of carrying out theater security cooperation and deterrence missions, and maritime security operations, such as anti-piracy.

LCS killer?

But the LCS vessels cannot successfully perform three other core missions envisioned for them — forward presence, sea control or power projection missions — and they can provide only limited humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations, sources said.

A key LCS failure identified by the OPNAV report, sources said, is its inability to effectively defend against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a weapon carried by hundreds of small, fast-attack craft operated by virtually all potentially hostile navies. These weapons include C-801 and C-802 Chinese missiles, Russian SS-N-2 Styx missiles, European weapons such as the Otomat and Exocet, and U.S.-made Harpoon missiles.

C-802 ASCM boxes on Pakistani warship

Navies that can launch ASCMs include those of China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. The weapons have taken on an added dimension since 2006, when the Israeli corvette Hanit was hit by a C-802 launched by a Hezbollah shore battery in Lebanon. humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations, sources said.
***
Rowden also has asked the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to study replacing the 57mm gun on both LCS designs with a 76mm weapon, similar to the weapon on today’s frigates.
***
The trouble with that weapon is that it can fit on Freedom LCS 1-class ships, but not on the narrow bow of the trimaran Independence LCS 2-class. “I don’t know if we can get it on both hulls,” Rowden acknowledged.

Warships

Now, let me pose a question to you. Suppose you had a choice of going to sea in a ship capable of "carrying out theater security cooperation and deterrence missions" (it can float!) and "maritime security operations, such as anti-piracy" (it can carry a RHIB, s security team and some machine guns and take on guys bobbing about in open boats carrying Ak-47's) or a cruiser or destroyer or even an amphibious ship capable of carrying lots of helicopters and Marines -- which vessel would you pick to go into harm's way and further the national security interests of the U.S.?

A more cost effective pirate fighter?

Which vessel - a job, I have previously suggested could also be done by converted offshore oil service boats at much less cost).

Do we really need to spend $300 million plus for a ship to fight pirates in open boats?

In fact, I doubt if the converted offshore boats could survive an ASCM attack either, but at least they don't cost $400,000,000 each.

Now, let me address a point my friend Galrahn makes in his post:

24 Littoral Combat Ships has always been a reasonable number for moving the most important concepts of the LCS down the road - like learning lessons about smaller crews, developing interchangeable (modular) payload system interfaces, understanding operational and deployment capacities with smaller ships with small crews, getting the training right for ships with rotational crews, and getting a solid understanding of what the operational challenges are when fielding distributed unmanned systems networks at sea.

I disagree with the need to spend additional tax payer money on these LCS ships to "move concepts" or gain the understandings he describes. The U.S. Navy has operated smaller ships with small crews for a couple of hundred years. The entire minesweeper fleet consisted of small, minimally manned crews and, in recent years, there have been "rotational" crewing of such ships. Where the hell are the "lessons learned" from those operations? Why do we need to spend 24 x $300,000,000 to scratch that itch again? I will bet that any former 'sweep CO will be full of useful suggestions on those concepts.

24 LCS hulls is going to be nearly 10% of the fleet of the future. Would you like to send your sons or daughters to sea in a "combatant" that is under-gunned, can't defend itself against known threats and may be carrying the wrong "module" at the wrong time? If so, just have them get the tattoo of a target on their foreheads. It will save time.

Further, if you want to demonstrate and play with "distributed unmanned systems networks at sea" - why not rent a fleet of those offshore oil service boats and go out and play all you want for a fraction of the cost of a single LCS?

No, there may be a perfect job for a vessel like the LCS, but building a couple of dozen is not the way to look for it. Warship capability ought to be driven by strategy, and strategy should not be driven by vessel limitations.

John Patch has some ideas for moving forward.

Navy Establishes Program Executive Office for Littoral Combat Ships

A complete and unedited press release titled, Navy Establishes Program Executive Office for Littoral Combat Ships:

From Naval Sea Systems Command Office of Corporate Communications

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- The Navy established the Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ships (PEO LCS), during a ceremony at Washington Navy Yard, July 11.

"The littoral combat ship is a critical shipbuilding program and demands the very best skill and effort from government and industry teams," said Asst. Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) Sean J. Stackley in a memo establishing the new PEO. "To ensure that we deliver this program to the fleet successfully, I am establishing a new Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ships that will align several program offices into one consolidated PEO, focused entirely on achieving that result. This action takes efforts that are currently managed across multiple organizations, and integrates design and development and tests, trials and evaluations under one roof. PEO LCS will have authority across all aspects of the program."

RADM Murdoch

Led by Rear Adm. James Murdoch, the new PEO provides a single program executive responsible for acquiring and maintaining the littoral mission capabilities of the LCS class from start to finish, beginning with procurement, and ending with fleet employment and sustainment.

"I am excited by the challenge of leading this historic effort to provide the Navy with new and highly capable warships equipped with extraordinary aviation features, large payload capacities and flexible environments for future missions - all contained within a fast, stable and efficient seaframe to support the Navy's needs today and tomorrow," said Murdoch.

E. Anne Sandel has been named as the executive director.

Acquisition and maintenance of the sea-frame and mission modules were previously overseen by two different PEOs - PEO Ships and PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), respectively. With the creation of PEO LCS, PEO LMW has been disestablished and resident LCS program functions have been transitioned to the new PEO. Non-LCS program functions from PEO LMW have been realigned within Naval Sea Systems Command and existing PEOs.

LCS and its mission modules have been developed under a different strategy for shipbuilding using modular capability, minimal manning and new sustainment concepts. That strategy and the unique aspects of LCS lend themselves to a PEO structure that takes into account the complexity of a system-of-systems approach. Realignment to co-locate the shipbuilding and mission modules programs, together with fleet introduction, is designed to optimize program communication and increased programmatic synergy.

The new PEO LCS will include the following Program Offices: LCS (PMS 501), Remote Minehunting System (PMS 403), Unmanned Maritime Systems (PMS 406), LCS Mission Modules (PMS 420), Mine Warfare (PMS 495), and essential fleet introduction program and functional offices, such as test and evaluation and aviation integration.

The LCS is an entirely new breed of U.S. Navy warship. A fast, agile, and networked surface combatant, LCS's modular, focused-mission design will provide combatant commanders the required warfighting capabilities and operational flexibility to ensure maritime dominance and access for the joint force. LCS will operate with focused-mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute missions as assigned by combatant commanders.

LCS will also perform special operations forces support, high-speed transit, maritime interdiction operations, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and anti-terrorism/force protection. While complementing capabilities of the Navy's larger multi-mission surface combatants, LCS will also be networked to share tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units.

Now, you are all experienced with large bureaucracies . . . whatever could such a move mean? Heh. At least it's some action apparently designed to get this thing under control.

Good luck, RADM Murdoch. Herding cats is just so much fun.

What was it Mark Twain wrote about the man said as he was being tarred and feathered and ridden out of town on a rail? Something like, "if it weren't for the honor and glory of the thing, I'd just as soon walk."

On the other hand, it may be worth noting that the tag assigned to the admiral's photo on his official Navy page is "thumb_mad%20dog.jpg" . . .

Littoral Combat Ship: Minimal Manning Factors

Duty Aboard the Littoral Combat Ship: ‘Grueling but Manageable’:

Designed to sail in close-to-shore waters, the 3,000-ton LCS is technologically unlike anything sailors have experienced before. But it remains to be seen whether advanced technology can make up for actual hands on deck.

“When we started this, we knew we had to learn more than one job. We knew we would have to be multi-talented. But I don’t think any of us had any idea how much we were going to have to know and learn and stretch ourselves to be able to get this ship to operate,” says Doyle, who has been with the LCS program since 2005. She served as the crew’s executive officer through Freedom’s build and commissioning process and became commanding officer in March 2009.
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The crew works in three six-hour shifts. Sailors stand watch at their assigned stations for six hours and then have the next 12 hours off. But the caveat is that the ship conducts many missions that require more sailors than just one shift’s worth of watch standers, Doyle says.
***
Sailors only end up with about six hours of rest a day. “We try not to impinge upon those six hours. But sometimes we have to,” Doyle says. Emergencies, such as fire or flooding, require all hands on deck. Pulling in and out of port also involves the entire crew.

Timmons says he only has four to six hours of sleep every 24 to 48 hours. The work cycle on board is grueling but manageable, he says. He believes that LCS is the future of the Navy.

Most Navy veterans with ship service have done their share of long hours and long days with minimal rest. These were, for the most part, exceptions - not a design plan.

Merchant ships can get away with minimal manning because they don't have all those things to do that distinguish warships from them - like manning a combat info center, operating helicopters and the like.

Now, if you need more people to operate safely, where will you put them?

Another interesting part of this article is this from one of the commanding officers who was interviewed:

“We don’t have big fuel tanks though, so while we’re very efficient, we can’t go far,” says Edwards, who last month took command of Blue Crew and sailed Freedom back to her home port of San Diego.

That's just dandy. Send a squadron of these to sea and you'll need a dedicated logistics train to keep them fueled and fed.
 

Navy to Roll Out New Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package

This might be interesting Navy to Roll Out New Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package:

"The delivery of the anti-submarine warfare mission package will provide the Navy with a persistent large area detection capability, through our advanced unmanned vehicles and bi-static ASW systems," said Sandel. "Tomorrow we will take a critical step forward in support of assured access in the littorals for U.S. Joint Forces."

LCS can be configured to deploy with any one of three interchangeable mission modules: the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) module; mine countermeasures (MCM) module and surface warfare (SUW) module also know as mission packages. The first ASW mission package (MP) will use several different vehicles -- MH-60R, unmanned air vehicle, unmanned surface vehicle -- and associated sensors -- towed array sonar, remote towed active source, USV dipping sonar, multi-static off-board source -- to detect, classify, localize, track and engage submarines in the littoral environment.

More here:

The aircraft and water vessels will tow acoustic sensors capable of discerning quiet diesel-electric submarines in the cluttered underwater environment, says Capt. Michael Good, program manager of the LCS mission modules.

The unmanned systems will allow the Navy to hunt those submarines without putting ships in range of torpedoes.
“We don’t want to be in a knife fight in a phone booth,” says Good.

The remote multi-mission vehicle will chug through the water like a snorkeling submarine. It will release one of two medium-frequency sonar arrays that will emit an acoustic signal or listen for returns as they are towed along.

The plan is for the two RMMVs to work in concert as a bi-static acoustic detection system. The first vehicle will deploy an active sonar array and the second will tow a hydrophone array.

Likewise, the unmanned surface vehicles will carry one of two payloads, an active low-frequency sonar, called the multi-static off-board source, or a hydrophone towed array. The USV also can deploy a modified dipping sonar typically operated from helicopters. The Navy is looking at several variants, including Raytheon’s AN/AQS-22 airborne low-frequency sonar and the HELRAS DS-100 made by L3 Communications.

“We’re looking at both possibilities down the road,” says Good.

Armed with the MK-54 torpedo, the manned Sikorsky MH-60R helicopter will act as a “pouncer” to attack the threat submarine after detections are made by the sensor payloads on the unmanned vehicles, he says.

Outfitted with an electro-optical infrared sensor, Northrop Grumman’s Fire Scout rotorcraft will perform as a communications relay platform to extend the distance that the unmanned vehicles can operate away from the LCS. In the future, it could be equipped with other anti-submarine warfare sensors, says Good.
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The first ASW mission package, set for delivery in September, will not have the RMMV and its two towed systems. The second package, whose delivery date has not yet been determined, will include the underwater vehicle and the towed systems.
“We’re very eager to get the integration work done on the unmanned surface vehicles and get them to sea,” says Good. Testing will be completed this spring.

This fall, Good plans to evaluate the full mission package at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, an instrumented range in the Bahamas. Because the range isn’t large enough or deep enough to fully test the systems at the lower frequencies, he is also working on locations at sea where the use of active sonar will be permitted.

The requirement for the LCS anti-submarine warfare package was to be able to hunt quiet diesel submarines in the littorals. But some of these systems, particularly those employing lower frequencies, will work in deep water, says Good. His intention is to operate as many of the systems in deeper ocean to evaluate potential applications for anti-submarine warfare.

But first he has to find a way to set sail with the technologies. With LCS delayed and facing an uncertain future, he is working to identify a substitute vessel that could take the mission package to sea for testing.

“I just have to be a little more creative in how I get to sea,” says Good, who is contemplating options including barges.

And another one bites the dust: Navy Terminates Fourth Littoral Combat Ship

Navy Terminates Fourth Littoral Combat Ship :

Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead announced Nov. 1 that the Department of the Navy is terminating construction of the fourth littoral combat ship (LCS 4) for convenience under the termination clause of the contract because the Navy and General Dynamics could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract.

The Navy had not yet authorized construction on LCS 4, following a series of cost overruns on LCS 2. The Navy intended to begin construction of LCS 4 if the Navy and General Dynamics could agree on the terms for a fixed-price incentive agreement. The Navy worked closely with General Dynamics to try to restructure the agreement for LCS 4 to more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties.

And in a "Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play" moment, the Navy says:

The Navy remains committed to the LCS program.

Perhaps just not this LCS program...