UN Security Council adopts a Somalia peacekeeping "in principle" resolution as set out here:The US and AU have been pushing for a UN presence but finding troops to participate has been difficult because of the dangers in Somalia.UN document can be found here.
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Last month UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said few countries were willing to send troops to Somalia, as there was no peace to keep.
Reported as Countries can enter Somali waters to fight piracy: UN:The UN Security Council has passed a resolution permitting member countries to enter the territorial waters of Somalia to fight piracy.Actual Resolution is available here in pdf format:
The US-sponsored resolution, passed unanimously by the Security Council Tuesday, is valid for 12 months. It welcomes the recent initiatives taken by countries like India, Canada, France, Russia, Britain and the US to counter piracy off Somali coast.
The Security Council resolution is expected to come as a big help to countries like India that are fighting Somali pirates. Under international laws, naval ships are free to patrol international waters.
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In its resolution, the Security Council called for "seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment" used or suspected of being used for piracy.
6. Welcomes initiatives by Canada, Denmark, France, India, thePart of the effort is to preserve Somali sovereign rights. Unanswered is the question of what to do with the pirates if captured. Current law applicable to the "high seas" is UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, Part VII, :
Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States
of America, and by regional and international organizations to counter piracy off the
coast of Somalia pursuant to resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008),
the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter piracy off
the Somalia coast, including by escorting vessels of the WFP, and in particular the
decision by the EU on 10 November 2008 to launch, for a period of 12 months from
December 2008, a naval operation to protect WFP maritime convoys bringing
humanitarian assistance to Somalia and other vulnerable ships, and to repress acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia
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9. Calls upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do
so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and relevant
international law, by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, and through
seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in
the commission of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, or for which
there is reasonable ground for suspecting such use;
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10. Decides that for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution
States and regional organizations cooperating with the TFG in the fight against
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance
notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General, may:
(a) Enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action
permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international
law; and
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with
such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant
international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery
at sea;
11. Affirms that the authorizations provided in this resolution apply only with
respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or
obligations under the Convention, with respect to any other situation, and
underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law; and affirms further that such authorizations have been provided only following the receipt of the 20 November letter conveying the consent of the TFG
Article 105. Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraftWhat about pirates taken in Somali waters, which, by definition are waters "in the jurisdiction of a state," failed or not? The UN boots that over to a committee:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
15. Notes that the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; urges States parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under said Convention and cooperate with the Secretary-General and the IMO to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;So the ball now is in the court of the parties to the SUA Convention to figure out the troubling legal framework with which to deal with these pirates. You can read the SUA Convention here. The SUA Convention sprang out of the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro:
According to the provisions of the Convention, any person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and intentionally commits, attempts to commit, threatens to commit, or abets the seizure or exercise of control over a ship by force or threat of force or any form of intimidation; or commits any of the following acts if it endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship: an act of violence against a person on board; destroying a ship or damaging a ship or its cargo; placing or causing to be placed on a ship a device or substance likely to destroy the ship or cause damage to the ship or its cargo; destroying or seriously damaging maritime navigational facilities or seriously interfering with their operation; or communicating information he knows to be false. It is also an offense to injure or kill any person in connection with the commission or attempted commission of any of the previous offenses.Clear?
The Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States. In all other cases, the Convention also applies when the offender or alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party other than the State in whose waters the offence occurred
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Measures to establish jurisdiction over the offenses shall be taken when the offense is committed against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes time the offense is committed; in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; by a national of that State; by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or when a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured, or killed during the commission of the offense.
Compliance and Enforcement: Once jurisdiction has been established, States shall take the offender into custody and immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts. States Parties are required to either extradite the offender in custody or submit the case for prosecution. States Parties are also required to assist each other in connection with criminal pro-ceedings brought under the Convention. States Parties are also to cooperate in the prevention of offenses by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offenses within or outside their territories and by exchanging information in accordance with their national laws.
SUA applies to nearly all of the attacks occurring in the Gulf of Aden, and obliges State Parties to criminalize such acts and establish jurisdiction when the offense is committed against their vessels or nationals. SUA establishes a framework whereby masters of ships may deliver suspected SUA offenders to a coastal State Party and the coastal State Party is obliged to accept custody and extradite or prosecute unless it can articulate why the Convention is not applicable. Leveraging States SUA obligations in conjunction with existing international law against piracy provides an effective legal framework to deliver an "endgame." We have worked for several months now with our partners on the Joint Staff, through the "interagency process", and with our international partners to pursue this outcome.Clearer?
The Indian Navy is awaiting the government’s nod to provide escort to ships carrying life-saving assistance to Somalia under the aegis of the United Nations, a senior naval official said.“The navy’s request to protect the UN shipments from pirates is with the government. The Indian Navy is ready and keen to provide its assistance in the UN food programme as it will enhance our credentials as a professional navy in the region,” the senior navy official told IANS Thursday.Good for India, which owns the world's fifth largest navy.
The UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) is responding to urgent humanitarian needs in Somalia. Over 2.4 million Somalis rely on food aid, of which 80 percent arrives by sea.
Food supplies are urgently needed in Somalia but danger posed by pirates has made delivery difficult by land and sea routes. In July the WFP had appealed to naval powers to help protect its ships carrying life-saving assistance from pirate attacks, saying that as many as two million Somalis could go hungry without this essential help.
“We cannot claim to be a power with global impact if we do not take up responsibilities. We are ready to protect the ships passing through the Mozambique Channel (between Madagascar and South east Africa) which is plagued by piracy,” the official added.
27.05.2008: 0748 UTC: 14:04.30N-049:23.72E: Gulf of Aden.Take a look at the two maps in this post (clicking on them should cause them to enlarge). The First shows the Gulf of Aden with 12 mile territorial limits for the countries forming the Gulf (green is Yemen, violet Dijbouti, red Somalia -and the 12 miles is very approximate and except for Yemen, does not really include offshore islands). The ocean area in between the territorial waters is "high seas" and acts of piracy occurring there and pirates captured there are subject international law concerning pirates. Inside the territorial limits, the is no "piracy," but rather "sea robbery" subject to the sovereign law of the state owning the those territorial waters.
A suspicious speedboat, with five persons, was noticed proceeding towards a tanker underway. Master increased speed, took evasive manoeuvres and called the coalition forces. Unable to intercept the vessel, after about forty minutes the boat aborted and moved away. At the same time, another boat was seen crossing the bows at a distance of 3 nm.
28.05.2008: 1200 UTC: 13:43N-048:50E: Gulf of Aden.
Four suspicious high-speed boats, length about 15 meters, wooden/plastic gray hull with four persons in each boat tried to approach a tanker underway. Master took evasive manoeuvres to prevent the speedboats from approaching closer. One speedboat crossed the bow at a distance of 0.5 miles. Later, the boats aborted and moved away in a south-easterly direction.
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28.05.2008: 1040 UTC: 13:09N - 048:58E, Gulf of Aden.
Four heavily armed pirates, in a speedboat, attacked and hijacked a general cargo ship underway. They sailed the vessel into Somali territorial waters. Further details awaited.
1. GULF OF ADEN: Warning from IMB Piracy Reporting Center, 26 May 08. A total ofBusy times.
six attempted attacks and two hijackings have been reported by vessels recently since 19 May 08 at 1720 UTC. The attempted attacks were around 12:49.3Nñ050:36.3E, 13:16.2N-049:08.7E, 13.25.2Nñ047:57.8E, 14:02Nñ050:46E, 13:16.2N-049:08.7E, 12:45.7Nñ046:43.6E, and the two hijackings were located at 13:09N-048:58E (LEHMANN TIMBER) and 13:13N-050:49E
(AMIYA SCAN). Pirates firing at vessels with rocket propelled grenades may attempt to board and possibly hijack. All vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden are advised to take additional precautionary measures and maintain a strict 24 hrs anti piracy visual watch and radar watch. Look out for small suspicious boats converging to own vessel. Report all incidents including suspicious sighting to IMB piracy reporting centre (IMB).
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7. INDIAN OCEAN: New south Asian regional port security organization has been formed to combat a wide range of threats, from illegal fishing and human and drug-smuggling to terrorism and piracy, 20 May 08. The South Asia Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO) consists of nine nations sharing the waters of the Indian Ocean: Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The initiative was inaugurated in the Maldives on 19 May 08 at a four-day conference called 'Partnering for a Safer Sea', hosted by the Maldives Ministry of Transport and Communication. The US is not a member but is supporting the initiative through its Coast Guard Activities Far East. US Coast Guard chief Rear Admiral Craig E Bone was quoted as saying in a keynote speech that it was important for the region to work together on port and maritime security to save
lives and prevent economic damage by thwarting criminal and terrorist acts before they occur. Any disruption of the maritime flow of oil supplies in the Indian Ocean region would have disastrous economic consequences, he said. The formation of SARPSCO ìsends a clear message and a warning to terrorists and criminals in the South Asia and Indian Ocean region that they will be detected, they will be interdicted and their activities will not be toleratedî (LM: Daily News).
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H. INDIAN OCEAN-EAST AFRICA:
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1. GULF OF ADEN: Cargo ship (LEHMANN TIMBER) hijacked 28 May 08 at 1040 UTC while underway in position 13:09N-048:58E, 56NM south of the Yemen coast. The vessel was attacked by four heavily armed pirates. Lehmann GmbH shipping company said in a statement that the owners continue to maintain regular contact with the vessel and all 15 members of the crew are well in view of the circumstances (Operator, UKMTO, AP, LM: International Hearld Tribune, Xinhua).
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2. GULF OF ADEN: Cargo ship (AMIYA SCAN) hijacked 25 May 08 at 2235 local time while underway in position 13:13N-050:49E, 117NM south of Qishn, Yemen, 80NM off the Somali coast. An unknown number of pirates hijacked the vessel and took a total of nine Russian and Filipino crewmembers hostage. The vessel was sailing to Costanza Port, Romania from Mombasa, Kenya carrying a decommissioned oil platform when it was seized. Reider Shipping BV, the vesselís owners, said it was in contact with the pirates but declined to comment on the captors' demands out of concern for the crew's safety (IMB, Operator, UKMTO, LL, CNN).
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3. GULF OF ADEN: Bulk carrier reported suspicious approach 25 May 08 at 0610 local time/0310 UTC while underway in position 13:25.2Nñ047:57.8E, 32NM off the Yemen coast. Three grey boats closed in on the vessel. There were four persons in each boat armed with machine guns. The boats followed the vessel at a distance of one cable and the armed men were shouting in a foreign language. The master raised the alarm, all crew mustered and anti piracy measures were enforced. After following the vessel for 25 minutes, the boats moved away at 0650 local time (IMB, Operator).
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4. GULF OF ADEN: Tanker fired upon 24 May 08 at 1420 local time/1100 UTC while
underway in position 13:58N-050:42E, 103NM south of Qishn, Yemen. Two boats with four persons each closed in on the vessel. The pirates opened fire with automatic guns and a rocket propelled grenade. One RPG round hit and damaged the port bridge wing. Evasive maneuvers prevented the pirates from boarding. No injuries to crew and no pollution. After breaking off the two boats were reported to be drifting in the same vicinity (IMB, Operator, UKTMO).
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5. GULF OF ADEN: Bulk carrier fired upon 23 May 08 at 0830 local time/0430 UTC while underway in position 13:16.2Nñ049:08.7E, 75NM south of Al Mukalla, Yemen and 118NM north of Bossaso, Somalia. One fiberglass skiff with a single outboard motor and four gunmen onboard approached the vessel from the port quarter. The gunmen opened fire on the bridge and accommodations with one rocket propelled grenade and five bursts of automatic gunfire. Vessel took evasive maneuvers and escaped with minimal damage. No injuries to crew reported. The master observed one white hulled fishing dhow approximately 6NM away that he thought could
be acting as a mother ship. The master warned all nearby ships via Ch 16. The vessel resumed voyage. ONI COMMENT: Photo of attacking skiff shows pirates carried a hook ladder of approximately six meters in length. Investments in anti-piracy measures are always encouraged for all vessels operating anywhere near Somalia. Vessels with gunwales within reach of six meter hook ladders are at a higher risk of being successfully boarded and should take extra precautions (IMB, Operator, UKTMO, ONI).
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6. GULF OF ADEN: Yacht reported suspicious approach 22 May 08 at 1430 UTC, while underway in position 13:21.29N-048:25.96E, 38NM off the coast of Yemen. A speedboat crossed the bow of the vessel while two other speedboats approached from the stern. The skipper increased its speed and enforced anti piracy measures to prevent possible boarding. After a while, the speedboats moved away. The suspicious boats seemed to have been launched from a dhow, which was in the position 13:20.9N-049:37.32E. The dhow is described as 20m in length, a red hull and a white superstructure (IMB, UKTMO).
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7. GULF OF ADEN: Container ship reported attempted boarding 19 May 08 at 1500 local time while underway in position 12:49.3N-050:36.3E, approximately 145NM northwest of Bossaso, Somalia. Two small speedboats approached the vessel from the bow. One of the speedboats had four pirates armed with automatic weapons and rocket launcher. The pirates aimed the rocket launcher towards the bridge and reportedly attempted to board the vessel. †The master raised the alarm, took evasive maneuvers and the crew mustered. After 10 minutes, the suspected pirates aborted and moved away. The boats were seen approaching two other ships about five miles off (IMB).
8. GULF OF ADEN: General cargo ship (VICTORIA) hijacked 17 May 08 at 0905 local time while underway in position 02:13.19N-046:49.38E, 40NM off Mogadishu, Somalia. The Jordanian-flagged vessel, owned by Marwan Shipping Company, with a crew of 21, was transporting 4,200 tons of bagged sugar from Mumbai, India to Mogadishu when it was hijacked by unknown gunmen. The BBC World Service reported pirates tried to dock the vessel off Hobyo but the local residents resented their presence. Shariff Ali Guure, a member of the Hobyo Traders, told reporters that the pirates should leave the area or face confrontation. According to local media reporting, the vessel owners and Somali officials are conducting negotiations.
Marwan Shipping reported that the hijackers are demanding a ransom, but the sum was not revealed. All crewmembers are reportedly safe. As of 23 May 08, the vessel was reportedly released (IMB, AFP, AP, BBC, LM: Shipping Times UK, The Times of India, Indo-Asian News Service, Hindustan Times, nationmedia.com).
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9. GULF OF ADEN: Container ship reported suspicious approach 15 May 08 at 0900 UTC while underway in position 13:02.6N-045:42.6E, 32NM northeast of Port Aden. Four suspicious speedboats reportedly chased the vessel. Each vessel had four people onboard. The vessels speed was about 18knts but they did not close in. Two boats sped up to 22knts and closed in. The vessel increased speed and took evasive maneuvers. Thirty minutes later, the speedboats moved away (IMB, UKTMO, Operator).
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10. GULF OF ADEN: Tanker reported suspicious approach 15 May 08 while underway in position 15:40.8N-052:41E, approximately 59NM northeast of Qishn, Yemen. The vessel observed a high speed boat doing 24knts approaching the vessel from the port quarter. The crew on the poop deck monitored the boat which came within 1.4NM and then altered course away from the vessel. The boat was steering 315T and approached from southeast. The boat was dark blue with four persons onboard (Operator, UKMTO, IMB).
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11. GULF OF ADEN: Tanker reported suspicious approach 13 May 08 while underway in position 12:43.1N-045:42.6E, 31NM east southeast of Port Aden, Yemen. Four speedboats were in close proximity of the vessel. Two of the speedboats were detected on the port side and two speedboats on the starboard side. The master sounded the general alarm and briefed the crew on anti-piracy precautions. Each speedboat was manned by two persons. No weapons were
observed. However, the master noticed concealed items within the boat. At 0615 UTC, the master altered its course to the starboard side. The master observed the speedboats achieve a speed of over 20kts, but were having difficulty in the wind conditions. At 0620 UTC, the two speedboats on the starboard side crossed the shipís bow and attempted to approach the vessel's port side. The master altered its course to the starboard side in order to make the port side under swell direction. The master alerted the Company Security Officer in Dubai, UAE, and announced the speedboats position via VHF ch. 16. At 0635 UTC, the vessel started to gain
distance from the four speedboats. At 0635 UTC, Marshall Islands Duty Officer was advised about the situation via telephone by the Ship Manager in Dubai. At 0640 UTC, the four speed boats altered its course to the port side, shore direction.† Master reported again the position of the speed boats via VHF Ch.16. Fortunately, the master was able to maneuver the vessel to take evasive action, thereby successfully mitigating the threat from the four speed boats, which headed back towards the general vicinity of the Yemen coast. UKMTO NOTE - This incident was investigated by UKMTO and assessed as fishing activity. The vesselís position was close to
land and in a known area of high fishing activity. On speaking to the master he told UKMTO that the two boats forward kept on the port side and seemed to force the vessel to starboard side. No shots were fired and in each of the four boats only 2 people per boat were seen (Operators, UKMTO, IMB).
Article 105. Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraftUPDATE2: The International Maritime Organization is happy, too. I guess a couple of years of effort may be "high speed" in UN terms. UPDATE3: The UN relief agencies, who have been trying to keep Somalis alive but who have been troubled by pirates and land sharks, are also happy.
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
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Article 111. Right of hot pursuit
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued ouside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established.
2. The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones.
3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State.
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To all my college friends who loved Cuba then, for its Castros and Che, a sharp does of reality from President Bush (h/t Jay Nordlinger at NRO) here:One of the great success stories of the past century is the advance of economic and political freedom across Latin America. In this room are officials representing nations that are embracing the blessings of democratic government and free enterprise. And the United States is proud and active to work with you in your transformations.Forty-five years ago the world was at the brink of nuclear war when Cuba allowed/invited the Soviet Union to place atomic weapons on Cuban soil. The Navy was called on to quarantine Cuba and interdict any shipping that might be carrying missiles or warheads for Cuba, as set out here:
One country in our region still isolates its people from the hope that freedom brings, and traps them in a system that has failed them. Forty-eight years ago, in the early moments of Cuba's revolution, its leaders offered a prediction. He said -- and I quote -- "The worst enemies which the Cuban revolution can face are the revolutionaries themselves." One of history's great tragedies is that he made that dark prophecy come true.
Cuba's rulers promised individual liberty. Instead they denied their citizens basic rights that the free world takes for granted. In Cuba it is illegal to change jobs, to change houses, to travel abroad, and to read books or magazines without the express approval of the state. It is against the law for more than three Cubans to meet without permission. Neighborhood Watch programs do not look out for criminals. Instead, they monitor their fellow citizens -- keeping track of neighbors' comings and goings, who visits them, and what radio stations they listen to. The sense of community and the simple trust between human beings is gone.
Cuba's rulers promised an era of economic advancement. Instead they brought generations of economic misery. Many of the cars on the street pre-date the revolution -- and some Cubans rely on horse carts for transportation. Housing for many ordinary Cubans is in very poor condition, while the ruling class lives in mansions. Clinics for ordinary Cubans suffer from chronic shortages in medicine and equipment. Many Cubans are forced to turn to the black market to feed their families. There are long lines for basic necessities -- reminiscent of the Soviet bread lines of the last century. Meanwhile, the regime offers fully stocked food stores to foreign tourists, diplomats and businessmen in communism's version of apartheid.
Cuba's rulers promised freedom of the press. Instead they closed down private newspapers and radio and television stations. They've jailed and beaten journalists, raided their homes, and seized their paper, ink and fax machines. One Cuban journalist asked foreigners who visited him for one thing: a pen. Another uses shoe polish as ink as a typewriter ribbon.
Cuba's rulers promised, "absolute respect for human rights." Instead they offered Cubans rat-infested prisons and a police state. Hundreds are serving long prison sentences for political offenses such as the crime of "dangerousness" -- as defined by the regime. Others have been jailed for the crime of "peaceful sedition" -- which means whatever Cuban authorities decide it means.
Reports of the arrival of large numbers of Soviet technicians and military personnel, the construction of larger launch complexes, and the extension of airstrips to accommodate high-performance aircraft pointed unmistakably to the rapid development of Cuba into a Soviet base for offensive action against the United States. Descriptions of suspicious cargoes aboard Cuba-bound ships, obtained from sources at ports of loading and unloading and from aerial photographs taken by Navy reconnaissance aircraft, together with information on vehicle and rail convoys gathered from Cuban informants, strongly indicated the preparation of missile sites of other than the surface-to-air variety Which had been under surveillance for some time.
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Although military contingency considerations toward Cuba had their genesis long before, on October 1 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to discuss the circumstances under which military action against Cuba might be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented. The following day, the Secretary sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggesting six contingencies; among them were (a) evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of Bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors and (b) a decision by the President that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing national security."
The memorandum requested contingency preparatory actions and an evaluation of the consequences of such actions. The political objectives of the contingencies were defined as the removal of the threat of Soviet weapon systems and, if necessary, the removal of the Castro regime to assure the permanent dislocation of these weapons.
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Sunday, 14 October
U-2 reconnaissance photographs of Cuba positively identified three medium-range ballistic missile sites at San Cristobal. This was the first photographic intelligence of the area since August 29, at which time there was no evidence of any such development.
Monday, 15 October
More U-2 photographs taken the day before were developed and analyzed. They further confirmed the existence of strategic missiles and sites in Cuba. Two additional U-2 flights made during the day not only reconfirmed the San Cristobal sites, but also showed two intermediate-range ballistic-missile sites under construction at Guanajay, where there had been no deployment activity on August 29.
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Atlantic Fleet forces already were at a high peak of readiness because of a heavy schedule of training operations which were underway.
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The quarantine proclamation had been completed and the OAS and UN resolutions were prepared. Mr. Pierre Salinger (White House), Mr. Robert Manning (State), and Mr. Arthur Sylvester (Defense) met to establish public-affairs coordination.
At 1430Q, the President met with the National Security Council, Mr. Don Wilson (USIA), and Admiral Anderson to discuss the third draft of the Presidential speech and progress reports on preparations. It was positively decided that our first objective would be to block further shipments of offensive military equipment to Cuba and that our aim was also to see that the Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba under UN supervision and inspection.
The philosophy that Cuba should be invaded was not completely rejected. It was placed to the right in the spectrum of action. First would come the limited blockade, then a complete blockade.~ these failed to achieve the removal of the offensive weapons, the next step would be selective air strikes, followed finally by the implementation of one of two invasion plans - 314, where time did not permit peak readiness of the invasion force, or 316, where amphibious and airborne assault could be accomplished from a full readiness posture. The last contingency was general war, which might result from extreme Soviet reaction.
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Monday, 22 October
*** The President had used the term "quarantine" instead of "blockade", because the latter term could have been interpreted as an act of war. The proposed interdiction was aimed solely at offensive weapons and every effort was to be made to not have other nations consider the action as a warlike act.
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Tuesday, 23 October
On the day following the President's announcement, much interest still was shown in international reaction to the proposed U.S. action, not only that of the Soviet Bloc, but the free world as well. Russia canceled all military leaves and stopped discharges, particularly for personnel in rocket, anti-aircraft, and submarine duties. There also were several reports of Soviet long-range submarines along Russian shipping routes. A Japanese press report said that the Director General of Tass, visiting Japan, stated, "If the United States sinks a Soviet ship, there will be total war."
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Wednesday, 31 October
Soviet merchantmen approaching the quarantine zone continued to heave to upon reaching the 500-mile line. By 31 October, Kladna and Karl Marx had joined Belovodsk and Groznyy in lying dead in the water. Other significant developments on this first day of the new phase of operations centered around reappraisal of submarine surveillance successes and committal of Latin American assistance to the U.S. military action. An unprecedented number of eleven submarines had been identified outside of Soviet home waters. At least four Russian "F" class submarines were operating in the area east of the Bahamas. All of these had been sighted on the surface at least once. In one case, one of these remained on the surface for 45 hours, under escort of two U.S. destroyers.The end of the crisis came swiftly:A quarantine was decided on that would interdict any further arms shipments to Cuba. Boardings and inspections of cargos were authorized. It was followed by the positioning of massive numbers of ships, troops and planes along the East Coast in case a direct attack on the missiles sites had to be undertaken to lead to their prompt removal. Additional U–2 flights were authorized (one of which was shot down with the loss of its pilot), confirming and extending the initial findings. Low–level photo reconnaissance flight produced exquisitely detailed information about the state of deployment of the Soviet ballistic missiles.
An intensive diplomatic effort was begun to inform allies and the United Nations about the situation. While the ballistic missile deployment was denied by the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Grominko on his October 18 visit to the White House and by Ambassador Zorin at the United Nations (both unaware of the photographs available to President Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson), the visual evidence presented at a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25 was so overwhelming that it led to speedy approval of the US military policies that had been put in place
In view of the firm, uncompromising actions instituted by the United States, Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev reversed his missile deployment venture in the Western Hemisphere. On October 28 the offensive missiles were returned to the Soviet Union.
