Maritime Security: Coalition Warfare in the 5th Fleet AOR

Interview with VADM Cosgriff, Commander, U.S. 5th Fleet, reported here:

Question: How critical is the policing of the maritime lanes around the volatile areas of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean?

Answer: Well, I usually don't use the term "policing," but seeking to create a maritime order in that part of the world I think is very important. Security in that region writ large, but especially maritime security, is the foundation for regional stability, regional prosperity, and arguably a larger global economic stability, if you think in terms of just safeguarding the free flow of oil and other energy.

But within the region, there are other concerns, such as fishing, poaching or violation of fishing rules. There's piracy, there's human smuggling, drug smuggling. These are things the regional countries care deeply about. ... And again, all of that is the backdrop against violent extremism, which does have a maritime connection.

Q: You also head a naval coalition of 20 nations, contributing to the collective effort in a strategic region that is also a critical choke point for global trade. What would be the risks to global commerce of an incident in that region, and how well prepared are the forces to flush it out?

A: Big question. At least one-third of the containerized cargo moves in the Indian Ocean, probably close to 40 percent of the world's oil, and a large percentage of natural gas comes out of the Gulf proper. The coalition typically is focused on safeguarding the use of the [waters] by fishermen and by shipping companies. It is a non-country-specific [operation], in the sense ... it's a coalition force for maritime security not against a country, or countries.

Q: There have been quite a number of piracy incidents and alerts of piracy off the coast of Yemen and Somalia, and merchant vessels are asked to stay at least 50 miles off the coast. Are the resources to combat this sufficient, or would you welcome more nations to participate in this collective action?

A: There's 2.5 million square miles under our command. It's a huge area, and the Somali basin is a very large area. The coast of Somalia itself is 1,500 miles long from Kenya to Djibouti. Because of the combination of the size of the operation, and the size of the forces we have assigned to us routinely, it is a challenge to get the right forces of sufficient numbers and capacity in the right area for a long enough period of time to actually have an impact.

We know that we can disrupt piracy, [but] so far we've been unable to completely deter it. And we are pursuing other countries who want to join with us, to help us. [It is not confined to operations at sea]. There's a range of activities to help to curtail that sort of behavior. Not the least of which is to help the transnational government of Somalia develop, and get control ashore so the people there engaged in piracy can find more useful and lawful pursuits.

He also addresses naval working relations with the Iranian Navy and more - worth the short time it takes to read it all.

Quick look at cargo container security issues

Found as 100% Screening and Other Cargo Insecurities:

Those who operate ships recognize the dangers of shipping un-inspected cargo, though not as intensely as some prefer. The growing concern over the likelihood of a catastrophic act of maritime and other transport-system terrorism has led to measures for increasing physical security.

Among such measures, one could cite the strict enforcement of the International Code for Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (ISPS) Code, which was adopted in December 2002 and went into effect globally in July 2004. The code, which was introduced by the International Maritime Organization in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, attempts toward a similar strict enforcement of the Container Security Initiative.

Beyond ships and ports, the danger of importing nuclear bombs and other weapons (not to mention terrorists, themselves) in containers may have increased with the U.S. government having opened the borders and highways to Mexican truckers working for 100 companies, according to a 20-plus-year truck driver at FamilySecurityMatters.com.

Which points back to the need for "tamper proof" containers discussed in an earlier post here.

Attention Environmentalists: Al Qaeda Pollutes

Al Qaeda attacks an oil pipeliine, apparently headless of its environmental impact, as set out here.:

An oil leak occurred at a valve on a pipeline near the Tigris River after it was attacked by insurgents near Bayji Sept. 18.

"This act demonstrates once again that al-Qaeda does not care about the Iraqi people or the environment. This is an environmentally dangerous situation and one that hurts the people, rather than helping them," said Lt. Col. Michael O. Donnelly, spokesman for Multinational Division-North.

The Northern Oil Company, or NOC, has immediately begun excavation and repairs to the line in order to prevent any further harm to the Tigris River and surrounding areas.
The NOC has stopped the flow of oil to the leaking valve and set the oil on fire purposely to mitigate water contamination.

This leaked oil could potentially affect river integrity, agricultural crops and live stock using water from the river and other uses of daily life in northern Iraq.

"Despite this latest act of terrorism by these insurgents, the Iraqi responders reacted quickly and their resolve remains strong.

I expect a strong attack on al Qaeda by Algore and his minions.

But I'm not holding my breath.

SecDef Robert Gates- an interesting look

Well worth reading: The Education of Robert Gates by David Brooks:

Gates was decisive during the Walter Reed hospital fiasco. He is honest and trustworthy on Iraq. And on Monday, at the World Forum on the Future of Democracy at the College of William and Mary here, Gates delivered a speech that could define the center ground of American foreign policy.

He ran through the history of the never-ending debate between realists and idealists. He noted that this debate began just after the founding of the Republic. Thomas Jefferson saw the French Revolution as a triumph for liberty. John Adams saw it as reckless radicalism. (Note by E1: Sounds like somebody has been reading Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation which makes that exact point as a reason for a disagreement between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson)

Throughout the messy years that followed, Gates explained, we have made deals with tyrants to defeat other tyrants. We’ve championed human rights while doing business with some of the worst violators of human rights.

“It is neither hypocrisy nor cynicism to believe fervently in freedom while adopting different approaches to advancing freedom at different times along the way,” Gates said.

Two themes ran through his speech. First, the tragic ironies of history — the need to compromise with evil in order to do good. And second, patience — the need to wait as democratic reforms slowly develop.

Latest ICC CCS Weekly Piracy Report (to 17 Sept 07)

ICC Commercial Crime Services Piracy Report to 17 Sept 07 here:

3.09.2007: 0550 UTC: Posn: 18:33.9N - 072:23.0W: Port au Prince, Haiti.
Robbers, armed with knives, boarded an anchored general cargo ship unnoticed. Ship's general alarm sounded and crew mustered. Robbers jumped overboard and escaped with ship's stores. Attempt to contact local authorities were futile.

12.09.2007: 0350 LT: Bonny River anchorage, Nigeria.
Five robbers, in two motor boats, armed with guns and knives boarded an anchored chemical tanker from the bow using ropes and hooks. Duty crew spotted the robbers and raised the alarm. The robbers broke the padlock on the forward store and stole ship's stores and escaped. Bonny signal station was called many times but did not respond. Master requested for additional guards from agents.

12.09.2007: 0850 UTC: Posn: 01:36.0N - 050:12.5E, Somalia.
A container ship underway, sighted a suspicious craft at distance of 7.5nm with a speed of 12 knots. Ship took evasive manoeuvres to avoid craft but craft altered course and tried to approach the ship. The ship increased speed, altered course and alerted the crew. Due to ship's higher speed the distance between the craft and ship increased.
Description of craft: Hull - dark blue, superstructure - white, length - 50 meters, type - big fishing vessel, a small speedboat - colour orange hanging outboard.

Coastal Warfare becomes "Maritime Expeditionary Security Group"

Noted here:

Capt. Dave McDuffie is commodore of Naval Coastal Warfare Group 2, which, under an Oct. 1 realignment, will become Maritime Expeditionary Security Group 2. He said the training has involved about 1,000 sailors — with surges of reservists bumping the numbers higher — at Cheatham Annex, Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek and Fort Pickett, all in Virginia.

A major element has been establishing command and control of the disparate units and testing new unmanned aerial vehicles such as the hand-held, 10-ounce Wasp, which is launched with a slingshot.

Under the realignment to an expeditionary security group, McDuffie said, the coastal warfare squadrons will be merged with maritime security squadrons, which means decommissioning two Reserve boat squadrons.

“We had to reorganize the billets, and some people had to move,” he said.

Another potential change in the works could mean an assignment to these expeditionary combat units will become a “closed loop,” where sailors stay rather than go back to the fleet after a tour.

Canadian Navy: Prepare to fight pirates and terrorists

A Canadian view of things to come here:

The Canadian navy needs to learn how to fight terrorists and pirates, says the top commander.

As the army has been forced to fight a brutal counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan, Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson says the navy must prepare itself for conflicts where "threats are whatever your imagination can conceive."

In an interview with The Canadian Press, Robertson said an attack on an Israeli warship last year was the wake-up call.

Most of the 80 crew members of the Israeli corvette Ahi-Hanit were having dinner below deck on a sweltering, sleepy Friday evening 14 months ago when - seemingly out of nowhere - a Chinese-designed sea-hugging missile slammed into the warship's helicopter deck.

The explosion and fire killed four sailors, but the shock waves of the surprise attack by Hezbollah could be felt well beyond the waters of Lebanon.

It was the nightmare scenario that had kept commanders in established navies all over the world awake at nights.

"Here we have a group that's not a nation, armed with mach-(speed), sea-skimming missiles," said Robertson.

"A year ago, no one had foreseen the idea that weapons of that kind could have proliferated to a non-state actor."
Sophisticated armaments in the hands of violent militias and even terrorist organizations represent the biggest emerging threat not only to 21st century navies, but to merchant shipping as well, say experts in maritime warfare.

Hezbollah fired three radar-guided shore-to-sea C-802 missiles that day. One exploded just after takeoff, the second struck the Ahi-Hanit and the third exploded and sank a Cambodian-flagged cargo ship. The high-tech weapons, with a range of 120 kilometres, were apparently supplied by Iran.

In case anyone believed the July 14, 2006, missile strike was a fluke, or even a lucky shot in the dark, U.S. intelligence agencies recently reported that the Shiite militia in Lebanon was boasting openly that it had tripled its store of Iranian-built C-802 missiles.
***
Rob Huebert, a defence analyst, says Hezbollah's landmark attack heralded a new and more dangerous age of maritime warfare.

"Most of the anti-missile capability our frigates and destroyers have is predicated on shots being taken at them by enemies who are over the horizon. But what happens when you get small vessels within sight - or even disguised?" he said.

"I'm thinking of a scenario where you've got all of these little Iranian speedboats and all of a sudden everyone on cue stands up and lets loose with small, cheap missiles. Can you overwhelm the system with numbers?"

Huebert said defence planners will have to pay more attention to so-called close-in weapons systems.

UPDATE: CDR Salamander and I are fishing in the same waters, judging by this, but he has a great quote from the Canadian Admiral, which I missed, but with which I am in total agreement:

A series of well-timed precise attacks on container ships in crowded shipping lanes could lead to economic chaos in countries, such as Canada, that depend on maritime trade.

Other voices on the U.S. and Iran

From the "For what it's worth" department - an opinion piece from Asia Times Online: Growing need for US-Iran confidence steps:

But not everyone in Washington is sold on the idea of upping the ante against Iran. The New York Times has reported of a growing rift between the hawks, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, and the doves, led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, over Iran policy. This has been reflected in the US media, with hawks such as Max Boot defending the Cheney line by anticipating a "catastrophic" victory for Iran and al-Qaeda if the US withdraws from Iraq, and more moderate voices such as the Washington Post's David Ignatius, calling for "cooling" US-Iran tensions, eg by endorsing a growing call by various US military leaders for an "incident at sea agreement" with Iran.

The idea of such an agreement, like ones the US previously signed with the Soviet Union and with China, is timely and worth pursuing in light of the potential collision of the US and Iranian navies in the Persian Gulf. Already the two navies are in almost daily contact, alerting each other to their approaching ships and boats, but that is not enough and to avoid accidental warfare - both sides need to deepen their military-to-military communication.

The aim of this, which could be formalized through a working committee that is an offshoot of the working committees set up as a result of the US-Iran dialogue in Baghdad, would be to adopt concrete measures or steps to avoid unwanted maritime collisions or conflicts in the Persian Gulf and vicinity waters

Showing the flag

Reported as Navy destroyer makes historic African visits:

A U.S. Navy ship pulled into Tanzania this month for the first time in 40 years as the 6th Fleet continues its push for maritime security in and around African nations.

The guided missile destroyer USS Forrest Sherman called on Dar es Salaam on Sept. 5 before sailing south to make another notable port visit to Moroni, Comoros, a week later, according to recent Navy press releases.

“Peaceful, secure and prosperous seas are in everyone’s best interest,” said Capt. Nicholas Holman, addressing a group of diplomats and Tanzanian government and military officials, a release stated. “We look forward to building a strong partnership with Tanzania and working together to achieve this very important goal.”

A few years ago, Naval Forces Europe/6th Fleet began a maritime security push to enhance a naval presence in African waters to the south of Europe and the Black and Caspian seas to the east.

The aim is that those nations’ militaries establish stability on their own for their respective nations, which in turn would breed stability throughout the world. If vulnerable nations can protect themselves, Navy leaders have said, the United States won’t have to.

The visit to Comoros, a nation of three islands in the Mozambique Channel between Madagascar and the east coast of Africa, marked the first time a U.S. Navy ship visited in more than 30 years.

“We look forward to partnering with Comoros and other countries in Southeast Africa to combat maritime security threats like piracy, unlawful fishing and smuggling,” Holman said in a release.

UPDATE: And more on a ship visit to the Philippines here:

While the United States continued to support the Philippines in its anti-terrorism efforts, a US Navy official denied on Sunday that the presence of a US Navy spy ship in Cebu had something to do with the conflict in the southern Philippines.


Captain Steven Lott, commanding officer of the USS Chosin, a guided missile cruiser said their presence in Cebu was for a "social visit" before leaving on Monday for their homeport in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Lott said the visit was part of the continued cooperation between the US and Philippine governments, especially to foster good relations with their local counterparts.

He said two other US navy ships have been anchored in Manila but USS Chosin, a 9,600-ton ship, chose to come to Cebu after visiting Hong Kong to meet with their counterparts in the Naval Forces Central (Navforcen), the Philippine Navy command that covered Visayas.
***
"Our visit here is purely a social visit. Our government is extending assistance to the Philippines especially in the war in Mindanao but our presence here has nothing to do with what's happening in Mindanao right now," he said.

Spy ship? Hardly.

But maybe this quote suggested that idea:

"What we are mostly doing is to conduct anti-terrorism activities. We do surveys on the area, tracking down other ships, submarines and see what's down there. So far in the Philippines, it has nothing to worry (about terrorist attacks)," he said.

Pol-Mil: Thoughts on the "Quad Four" and the SCO

Thoughts on the recent joint war games with India, the U.S., Australia and Japan and those of Russia, China and their Shanghai Cooperation Organization at Strategic Chess:

Big-power military blocs appear to be back on the table in Asia. In a vast geographical exercise held with surprisingly little publicity earlier this month, the navies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India took to the Bay of Bengal for war games stretching from Andhra Pradesh to the Andaman Islands. The first security exercise by the “Quadrilateral initiative,” as the group is known, it also included a small contingent from Singapore. It involved two US carriers, the Kitty Hawk and the Nimitz, plus 25 other surface ships and submarines.

This display of floating iron, one of the biggest exercises of its kind ever, is notable because it came just after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), comprised of China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries, held its group summit and military exercises. It remains to be seen if the SCO will become more than a symbolic talking shop, but it seems to have energized India into becoming involved in a way the previous Congress governments would have abhorred. In the past, they saw the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, particularly nuclear neutrality. Today, ships like the Nimitz, which are assumed to carry nuclear weapons as a matter of routine, are allowed to berth in Indian ports.

And, whatever the claims to the contrary, it is clear that the Quad initiative, as it has come to be called, was formed with the express aim of countering the Shanghai bloc, and in particular containing China. Defense papers published independently by all four countries have recently listed China as a potential “military threat.”

An explanation of the map here. Sea lines of communication...

Port Security: Texas Coast

Preparing for the worst on the Texas coast:

Port security is a growing concern, and since 9/11, Southeast Texas has been labeled as a high risk target area for terrorist attacks.

On Tuesday, the Port of Beaumont hosted terrorist training for swat teams and the Beaumont Police Department.
***
One retired Houston SWAT leader and terrorist training expert has come to lead the program.
***
The Port of Beaumont has been flagged as a target area for terrorist activity, and local law enforcement wants to be prepared.
***
Specialists say it would take something drastic like another nine eleven to get some people to take our nation's security threats seriously.

Wall said, “The coast guard, national, state and local law enforcement is scrambling to get back where we should've been a long time ago because now the threat is clear. The threat is present. If we aren't ready for it we're going to become victims."

Somalia: Yemenis fishing in trouble waters

The law of the lawless sea portrayed in an article about Yemeni fishermen fishing off Somalia here:

Yemeni fishermen and their Somali counterparts from Puntland have reached a kind of unofficial agreement: The Yemenis send their vessels to Somalia and then either get the Somalis to fish for them and buy the catch off them, or are allowed to fish for themselves on payment of a hefty fee. In the latter case the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries licenses the Yemeni fishermen to fish, and provides an armed man to go on board.

To get permission to fish, Yemeni boat-owners pay US$1,000 upfront to Puntland officials through an agent in Mukalla, southern Yemen. The Somali leaders' green light enables Yemeni fishermen to fish freely in Puntland territorial waters. The Somali agent pays US$300 for the hired guard.

If the Yemeni fishermen choose to buy a Somali catch - caught using the Yemeni boats - they have to pay $1,200 ($1,000 for the license, and $200 in tax). The catch for each vessel can usually be sold in Yemen for up to $10,000.

Yemeni fishermen say they face many hazards when on trips to Somalia. “When Somali pirates see our boats, they block our way and demand that we hand over diesel, petrol and food. They are hungry people. Sometimes they kidnap us and demand $20,000 to release us. We are helpless. We don't give them any money, because we don't take any with us. We contact the agent via radio and complain to him about his countrymen. The agent negotiates with them and later they free us - but usually after taking our possessions and insulting as well as intimidating us," said al-Nawbi. One of his friends was recently shot dead while being chased by Somali pirates.

It's here: Talk Like a Pirate Day

Ahoy! Time for all lubbers of the pirates of the old school to celebrate - it's Talk Like A Pirate Day!

Carry on smartly now!










I remember my first exposure pirates---what a great bedtime tale when read by my father... I can hear it now-

Fifteen men on the dead man's chest
Yo-ho-ho, and a bottle of rum!
Drink and the devil had done for the rest
Yo-ho-ho, and a bottle of rum!'

Some pirated film clips here.

Sharpsburg/Antietam at Kingdom of Chaos

Nicely done post at Kingdom of Chaos: Sharpsburg/Antietam. Sometimes the effects of the "bloodiest day of battle on the North American continent" are forgotten, though they were far-reaching.

A good reminder from El Jefe Maximo.

Barnett on Ulrich's "Sea Traffic Control"

Thomas P.M. Barnett has short piece on Adm. Ulrich's idea of "Sea-Traffic Control"

Worldwide, aircraft are transparent, because they're all required to carry an "identification friend or foe" beacon that allows them to be tracked leaving and entering airports by aircraft-traffic-control systems and monitored between airports by sensors distributed across a global network. Trip the wire that defines "suspicious activity" and somebody's fighter aircraft will soon be on your tail. NATO alone routinely launches two or three fighters a week to identify unknown aircraft.

No such pervasive system currently exists globally for maritime traffic. If a ship any bigger than a small freighter is flagged by a nation belonging to the International Maritime Organization, it carries an ID beacon similar to aircraft. But without a shared monitoring network, that's like tracking only selected commercial jets part of the time and giving everyone else a pass.

So Admiral Ulrich, upon taking command in Naples, Italy, three years ago, asked a simple question: "If we can do that in the air, why can't we do it on the sea?"

He made a point of pioneering his sea-traffic-control effort first inside the Mediterranean, where NATO's southern naval forces have been historically concentrated, but his real target was Africa.

Africa's littoral waters are the most ungovernable maritime space in the world. Smuggling, drug running, human trafficking, illegal immigration, illegal fishing, environmental degradation, oil theft, and piracy -- you name it, it's all there in abundance.

***
Instead of hundreds of millions, Ulrich's network cost $150,000. The shore-based receivers are small, roughly the size of a radar dish you might find on a pleasure craft. Most can be attached to tall buildings or existing cell towers along the coast.
***
So far, Ulrich has enlisted all the countries of the Persian Gulf, and he's moving down the west coast of Africa. He's got Belgium, Poland, Slovenia, Morocco. The Black Sea, Tunisia, and Algeria are next. By late summer, twenty-seven countries and counting. Now he's pitching Russia.

With Ulrich's system in place, local police, coast guards, and border patrols catch all his bad guys for him, saving an American military response. "I don't do defense; I do security," he says. "When you talk defense, you talk containment and mutually assured destruction. When you talk security, you talk collaboration and networking. This is the future. This is the thousand-ship navy, except there are no ships."

Port Security: Underwater Surveillance and Protection

Marine Link reports on a new system in Norway at Underwater Surveillance and Protection

Updater on the "Goose Creek Two"

Visit Curt at Flopping Aces here and here for updates in the Goose Creek, South Carolina "students" with explosives case as law enforcement and the courts meet some of the challenges posed by this matter and the rule of law in dealing with potential terrorists.

Prior posts on these alleged "homemade fireworks" wannabes here and links therein.

Lawfare, anyone?

For the convenience of the court, I have added pictures of a common firework and a pipe bomb. Can you tell which is which?

Monday Reading

With a substantial roundup of matters maritime, it's Fred Fry International: Maritime Monday 76 - with some interesting photos of collapsed shipping containers (shippers might want to check their insurance) which may be related to rapid loading.

We can call it "RLS" for "Rapid Loading Syndrome" and start collecting money on TV telethons..."Do you suffer from RLS? You might not even know it....Give generously..."

For his lucky 13th edition of Monday Maritime Matters, Xformed covers the namesake and the ships of the U.S. Navy with the name Conyngham.

And over at Brickmuppet, the Coastie does a tour of the last pre-dreadnought battleship -- the Japanese battlewagon Mikasa with many photos, including a gun mount in what appears to be a wardroom, sort of shades of the days of sail.

UPDATE: Latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 12 Sep 07) posted here. Highlights:

2. SOMALIA: Cargo Vessel reported suspicious approach 09 Sept 07, at 0850 UTC in
position 01:30.N-050:12.5E. The suspicious vessel was at a distance of 7.5NM, bearing 335
degrees, with a speed of about 12kts and a course of 170 degrees. Closest Point of Approach
(CPA) was 2.3NM. To increase CPA we altered course 40 degrees to starboard and maintained
075 degrees. Suddenly the suspicious craft altered its course to port side and tried to approach
closer. The crew was immediately alerted, speed increased and the course was adjusted to keep
the suspicious vessel at stern. After about one hour, the distance between the two vessels
increased to 7NM, and vessel resumed its voyage to destination. The suspicious craft was
descried as having a dark blue hull, white superstructure, about 50 meters in length, and the
shape and equipment as a big fishing vessel. On the starboard side, there was a small boat of
orange color, hanging outboard. ONI Comment: This observed behavior is also consistent with a
pelagic purse seine fishing vessel searching for a school of tuna (ONI, Operator).
***
5. SRI LANKA: Navy destroys three LTTE vessels in sea battle 10 Sept 07 beginning in the
morning through 11 Sept 07, 600NM northeast of Dondra Head. According to the Sri Lankan
Navy, they claim to have destroyed much of the LTTE’s arms smuggling network after sinking
three large ships. The vessels have been sunk in three different encounters since the initial battle
on Monday morning. The ships were said to have been transporting weapons to the LTTE
terrorists in the South East of Dondra Head Sea. According to the available information the
three ships were carrying heavy mortar guns, multi barrel rocket launchers, aircraft spare parts,
large stocks of ammunition, fuel etc. Each vessel that was sunk was said to have been carrying
12-15 LTTE cadres each (LM).
***
6. SRI LANKA: Yacht (FLYING GERMANIA II) reportedly attacked 18 Aug 07, at 0750
local time while underway in position 05:22.58N-78:9.75E, 78 miles southwest of the coast as of
12 Sept 07 reporting. The vessel reported being chased and attacked by a number of fishing
vessels while traveling from Maldives to Malaysia. The vessel managed to fend off the attackers
(www.bluewater.de).
***
1. INDONESIA: Tanker boarded, robber apprehended 09 Sept 07, at 0030 local time in
position 06:15.43S - 108:27.23E, Balongan anchorage. Two robbers boarded the vessel broke
into the store locker and stole ship’s property. They tried to lower the stolen items into a waiting
boat but could not do so as the boat had drifted away due to engine failure and the current. The
alert crew raised the alarm and two crewmembers confronted the robbers who jumped overboard.
However, they could not board their boat which was adrift. One robber hung to the ballast
overboard discharge on the starboard side and the other robber had drifted away due to current
and swell. All crew gathered on deck and rescued the other robber. The Indonesian Navy and
police were informed and were told about the adrift boat and the missing robber. The authorities
managed to tow the boat but could not find the missing robber. The authorities boarded the ship
for investigation and the master handed over the robber. There were no injuries to crew and
nothing was stolen (IMB).
***
10. SINGAPORE: Yacht (DILAN) reported suspicious approach 09 Sept 07, at 1145 local
time in position 01:54.1N-106:31.49E, 48NM southeast of Pulau Repong. The vessel reported
two speedboats carrying an unknown number of men onboard and that were believed to be
armed, were trailing the vessel at close proximity. Suspicious of their intention, the yacht
broadcasted the incident via their VHF radio. The master of a container ship, the (HUB
TRADER) received the report on his VHF radio and relayed the incident to the Singapore Port
Operations Control Centre (POCC). The POCC, upon receipt of the relay, informed the
Maritime Rescue and Coordination (MRCC) Jakarta about the incident and made navigational
broadcast of the incident on the NAVTEX and SAFETYNET system (ReCAAP ISC).
***
1....PAPUA NEW GUINEA: Vessel (NOSY) boarded, robbed, skipper missing per
reporting 11 Sept 07, in the evening, near Fergusson Island in Milne Bay Province. The captain
of the vessel is believed to have jumped overboard while the crew was hospitalized after pirates
boarded their boat and robbed. A Milne Bay provincial disaster officer said the crew sustained
injuries from sharp objects and were receiving medical treatment at the Alotau hospital. The
captain jumped overboard near Valeta point around 2300 local time and a search party was sent
out but have yet to locate him. The 28feet workboat, transporting passengers and cargo was
headed for Alotau after leaving Mabawoia station in the Esa’ala district. The boat was then
interecepted by pirates who were using a speedboat. The crew was able to bring the boat back to
Mabawaoia station after the confrontation and met with merchant vessel (POMIO QUEEN) that
took them to Alotau. An officer stated that piracy was a problem in Milne Bay waters but police
do not have the resources and funds to combat it. The officer also stated that this was the third
piracy incident this year (LM).
***

1. HAWAII SUPERFERRY PROTESTORS: Hawaii Superferry indefinitely canceled
future trips due to protests 10 Sept 07, Nawiliwili Harbor. The decision to cancel all future trips
to Kaua’i was made after Coast Guard officials informed the company that they could not
guarantee the Alakai’s safe passage into Nawililwilil Harbor. Hundreds of protestors kept the
350-foot catamaran out of the harbor for three hours, and it turned around and headed back to
Honolulu. The action came ahead of a crucial hearing before a Maui judge who will consider
what could be a suspension of the company’s Maui service until the state completes an
environmental assessment (LM).
.
2. GREENPEACE: Greenpeace has set up a blockade 14 Sept 07, Saguenay River, north of
Quebec City, Canada. A Greenpeace spokesman stated that SFK Pulp was targeted because it is
one of several companies linked to destruction of the boreal forest. According to the Greenpeace
spokesman, the pulp is destined for Europe to be turned into magazine paper sold to most
magazine publishing houses in Europe. The Greenpeace ship, the 50-metra (ARCTIC
SUNRISE) in on site, along with four Greenpeace Zodiacs. Two activists are in the water in life-
rafts sitting in front of the freighter (JAEGER ARROW) while other activists are attempting to
lock down the vessels mooring lines. Greenpeace claims the action will continue until SFK Pulp
makes an effort to change its practices. Saguenay police are on the scene but have not made any
arrests (REUTERS).

Sunday Ship History: The Inchon Invasion, September 1950

Before World War II, Japan essentially owned the Korean peninsula, officially annexing Korea under a disputed treaty. As the war ended, the Korea became divided, as set out here:

The Soviet Union occupied the northern half of Korea after World War II ended in 1945.

Southern Korea was controlled by the United States.

The peninsula was formally split in two on 9 September 1948.

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army attempted to end that split by invading across the 38th parallel dividing line between North and South:

At approximately 4 a.m. (Korean Standard Time) on a rainy Sunday morning Democratic People's Republic of Korea Army (DPRK - North Korea) artillery and mortars open fire on Republic of Korea (ROK - South Korea) Army positions south of the 38th Parallel, the line then serving as the border between the two countries. The opening barrage is followed shortly by tank/infantry attacks at all points along the Parallel. At 11 a.m. North Korea announced a formal declaration of war and what is now known as "The Korean War" officially began.

On June 27, the UN acted:

During the late evening, the U.N. Security council passes a resolution calling for member nations to give military aid to South Korea.

As mobilization of forces begins, limited American and UN forces are deployed into South Korea. The North Korean army continues its advance, pushing the UN forces into a relatively small area on the southeast coast around the port of Pusan. This area becomes known as the "Pusan Perimeter":

On August 1 the Eighth Army issued an operational directive to all UN ground forces in Korea for their planned withdrawal east of the Naktong River. UN units would then establish main defensive positions behind what was to be called the Pusan Perimeter. The intent was to draw the line on retreating and hold off the Korean People's Army while the U.S. Army could build up its forces and wage a counteroffensive.
The Pusan Perimeter assumed by U.S. and ROK forces on August 4 involved a rectangular area about 100 miles (160 km) from north to south and 50 miles (80 km) from east to west. The Naktong River formed the western boundary except for the southernmost 15 miles (24 km) where the Naktong turned eastward after its confluence with the Nam River. The ocean formed the eastern and southern boundaries, while the northern boundary was an irregular line that ran through the mountains from above Waegwan to Yongdok.

General MacArthur was in command of the UN forces in Korea, and was looking for a way to relieve the pressure on the defenders of the Pusan Perimeter and to go on the offensive. He came up with a stunning plan - an amphibious invasion that would serve to cut the North Korean army supply lines and open up a new front in the war. Even more stunning was his choice for the location of the invasion- the port of Inchon, up near the South Korean capital of Seoul. Inchon is port noted for its extreme tidal ranges and its difficult approach channels. It should be noted that General MacArthur's mind turned to an amphibious operation quite early in the war- according to this, within days of the North Korean invasion:

During the first week of July, with the Korean War little more than a week old, General MacArthur told his chief of staff, General Almond, to begin considering plans for an amphibious operation designed to strike the enemy center of communications at Seoul, and to study the location for a landing to accomplish this. At a Far East Command headquarters meeting on 4 July, attended by Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives, Generals MacArthur and Almond discussed the idea of an amphibious landing in the enemy's rear and proposed that the 1st Cavalry Division be used for that purpose. Col. Edward H. Forney of the Marine Corps, an expert on amphibious operations, was selected to work with the 1st Cavalry Division on plans for the operation. [1]

The early plan for the amphibious operation received the code name BLUEHEARTS and called for driving the North Koreans back across the 38th Parallel. The approximate date proposed for it was 22 July, but the operation was abandoned by 10 July because of the inability of the U.S. and ROK forces in Korea to halt the southward drive of the enemy. [2]

Meanwhile the planning for an amphibious operation went ahead in the Far East Command despite the cancellation of BLUEHEARTS. These plans were undertaken by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), Far East Command, which General Wright headed in addition to his duties as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. One of Wright's deputies, Col. Donald H. Galloway, was directly in charge of JSPOG. This unusually able group of planners developed various plans in considerable detail for amphibious operations in Korea.

On 23 July, General Wright upon MacArthur's instructions circulated to the GHQ staff sections the outline of Operation CHROMITE. CHROMITE called for an amphibious operation in September and postulated three plans: (1) Plan 100-B, landing at Inch'on on the west coast; (2) Plan 100-C, landing at Kunsan on the west coast; (3) Plan 100-D, landing near Chumunjin-up on the east coast. Plan 100-B, calling for a landing at Inch'on with a simultaneous attack by Eighth Army, was favored. [3]

This same day, 23 July, General MacArthur informed the Department of the Army that he had scheduled for mid-September an amphibious landing of the 5th Marines and the 2d Infantry Division behind the enemy's lines in co-ordination with an attack by Eighth Army.
***
On 12 August, MacArthur issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B and specifically named the Inch'on-Seoul area as the target that a special invasion force would seize by amphibious assault. (citations omitted)

Assembling a landing force was a challenge as was getting the Joint Chief on board with the idea of Inchon as the target:

All through July and August 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave implied or expressed approval of MacArthur's proposal for an amphibious landing behind the enemy's battle lines. But while it was known that MacArthur favored Inch'on as the landing site, the Joint Chiefs had never committed themselves to it. From the beginning, there had been some opposition to and many reservations about the Inch'on proposal on the part of General Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff; the Navy; and the Marine Corps. The FEC senior planning and staff officers-such as Generals Almond and Hickey, Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff; General Wright, the G-3 and head of JSPOG; and Brig. Gen. George L. Eberle, the G-4-supported the plan. [15]

The Navy's opposition to the Inch'on site centered largely on the difficult tidal onditions there, and since this opposition continued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send two of its members to Tokyo to discuss the matter with MacArthur and his staff. A decision had to be reached. On 20 July General Collins and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, left Washington for their conference with MacArthur. Upon arrival in Japan, Collins and Sherman engaged in private conversations with MacArthur and key members of his staff, including senior naval officers in the Far East. Then, on the afternoon of 23 July, a full briefing on the subject was scheduled in General MacArthur's conference room in the Dai Ichi Building.
***
After a short introduction by General MacArthur, General Wright briefed the group on the basic plan. Admiral Doyle then presented the naval considerations. His general tone was pessimistic, and he concluded with the remark, "The operation is not impossible, but I do not recommend it." The naval part of the briefings lasted more than an hour.

During the naval presentation MacArthur, who had heard the main arguments many times before, sat quietly smoking his pipe, asking only an occasional question. When the presentation ended, MacArthur began to speak. He talked as though delivering a soliloquy for forty-five minutes, dwelling in a conversational tone on the reasons why the landing should be made at Inch'on. He said that the enemy had neglected his rear and was dangling on a thin logistical rope that could be quickly cut in the Seoul area, that the enemy had committed practically all his forces against Eighth Army in the south and had no trained reserves and little power of recuperation. MacArthur stressed the strategical, political, and psychological reasons for the landing at Inch'on and the quick capture of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. He said it would hold the imagination of Asia and win support for the United Nations. Inch'on, he said, pointing to the big map behind him, would be the anvil on which the hammer of Walker's Eighth Army from the south would crush the North Koreans.

General MacArthur then turned to a consideration of a landing at Kunsan, 100 air miles below Inch'on, which General Collins and Admiral Sherman had favored. MacArthur said the idea was good but the location wrong. He did not think a landing there would result in severing the North Korean supply lines and destroying the North Korean Army. He returned to his emphasis on Inch on, saying that the amphibious landing was tactically the most powerful military device available to the United Nations Command and that to employ it properly meant to strike deep and hard into enemy-held territory. He dwelt on the bitter Korean winter campaign that would become necessary if Inch'on was not undertaken. He said the North Koreans considered a landing at Inch'on impossible because of the very great difficulties involved and, because of this, the landing force would achieve surprise. He touched on his operations in the Pacific in World War II and eulogized the Navy for its part in them. He concluded his long talk by declaring unequivocally for Inch'on and saying, "The Navy has never turned me down yet, and I know it will not now."

The Navy almost did, but it seems the net result of Navy concerns was a weasel-worded message to MacArthur which authorized him to hang himself if he so chose, but...

On 28 August the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur which seemingly concurred in the Inch'on plans yet attached conditions. Their message said in part: "We concur in making preparations for and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea, either at Inch'on in the event the enemy defenses in the vicinity of Inch'on prove ineffective, or at a favorable beach south of Inch'on if one can be located. We further concur in preparations, if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We understand that alternative plans are being prepared in order to best exploit the situation as it develops.

Knowing what he wanted, MacArthur ignored the message and continued planning for Inchon. Again the Joint Chiefs urged rethinking and MacArthur replied:

There is no question in my mind as to the feasibility of the operation and I regard its chance of success as excellent. I go further and believe that it represents the only hope of wresting the initiative from the enemy and thereby presenting an opportunity for a decisive blow. To do otherwise is to commit us to a war of indefinite duration, of gradual attrition, and of doubtful results.... There is no slightest possibility . . . of our force being ejected from the Pusan beachhead. The envelopment from the north will instantly relieve the pressure on the south perimeter and, indeed, is the only way that this can be accomplished.... The success of the enveloping movement from the north does not depend upon the rapid juncture of the X Corps and the Eighth Army. The seizure of the heart of the enemy distributing system in the Seoul area will completely dislocate the logistical supply of his forces now operating in South Korea and therefore will ultimately result in their disintegration. This, indeed, is the primary purpose of the movement. Caught between our northern and southern forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy cannot fail to be ultimately shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities.... For the reasons stated, there are no material changes under contemplation in the operation as planned and reported to you. The embarkation of the troops and the preliminary air and naval preparations are proceeding according to schedule.

The next day the Joint Chiefs, referring to this message, replied tersely to MacArthur, "We approve your plan and President has been so informed." [20] It appears that in Secretary of Defense Johnson, MacArthur had in Washington a powerful ally during the Inch'on landing controversy, for Johnson supported the Far East commander. [21] Thus on 8 September Washington time and 9 September Tokyo time the debate on the projected Inch'on landing ended.

On the Navy side, planning went forward:

In making ready its part of the operation, the Commander, NAVFE outlined the tasks the Navy would have to perform. These included the following: maintain a naval blockade of the west coast of Korea south of latitude 39° 35' north; conduct pre-D-day naval operations as the situation might require; on D-day seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead in the Inch'on area; transport, land, and support follow-up and strategic reserve troops, if directed, to the Inch'on area; and provide cover and support as required. Joint Task Force Seven was formed to accomplish these objectives with Admiral Struble, Commander, Seventh Fleet, as the task force commander. On 25 August, Admiral Struble left his flagship, USS Rochester, at Sasebo and proceeded by air to Tokyo to direct final planning. [25]

On 3 September, Admiral Struble issued JTF 7 Operational Plan 9-50. Marine aircraft from two escort carriers, naval aircraft from the U.S. carrier Boxer, and British aircraft from a light British carrier would provide as much support aircraft as could be concentrated in and over the landing area, and would be controlled from the amphibious force flagship (AGC) Mt. McKinley. An arc extending inland thirty miles from the landing site described the task force objective area.
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More than 230 ships were assigned to the operation. Surface vessels of JTF 7 were not to operate within twelve miles of Soviet or Chinese territory nor aircraft within twenty miles of such territory. [27]

MacArthur had selected Inch'on as the landing site for one paramount reason: it was the port for the capital city of Seoul, eighteen miles inland, and was the closest possible landing area to that city and the hub of communications centering there.

Inch'on is situated on the estuary of the Yom-ha River and possesses a protected, ice-free port with a tidal basin. The shore line there is a low-lying, partially submerged coastal plain subject to very high tides. There are no beaches in the landing area-only wide mud flats at low tide and stone walls at high tide. Because of the mud flats, the landing force would have to use the harbor and wharfage facilities in the port area. The main approach by sea is from the south through two channels 50 miles long and only 6 to 10 fathoms deep (36-60 feet). Flying Fish Channel is the channel ordinarily used by large ships. It is narrow and twisting.

The Inch'on harbor divides into an outer and an inner one, the latter separated from the former by a long breakwater and the islands of Wolmi and Sowolmi which join by a causeway. The greater part of the inner harbor becomes a mud flat at low tide leaving only a narrow dredged channel of about ~13 feet in depth. The only dock facilities for deep draft vessels were in the tidal basin, which was 1,700 feet long, 750 feet wide, and had an average depth of 40 feet, but at mean low tide held only feet of water. [28]

Inch'on promised to be a unique amphibious operation-certainly one very difficult to conduct because of natural conditions. Tides in the restricted waters of the channel and the harbor have a maximum range of more than 31 feet. A few instances of an extreme 33-foot tide have been reported. Some of the World War II landing craft that were to be used in making the landing required 23 feet of tide to clear the mud flats, and the LST's (Landing Ship, Tank) required 29 feet of tide-a favorable condition that prevailed only once a month over a period of three or four days. The narrow, shallow channel necessitated a daylight approach for the larger ships. Accordingly, it was necessary to schedule the main landings for the late afternoon high tide. A night approach, however, by a battalion-sized attack group was to be made for the purpose of seizing Wolmi-do during the early morning high tide, a necessary preliminary, the planners thought, to the main landing at Inch'on itself. [29](Note by E1: The nearby photo showing a landing craft (medium) perched on a ship wreck in the Inchon area gives an idea of the tidal range and the hazards faced by the landing force)

Low seas at Inch'on are most frequent from May through August, high seas from October through March. Although September is a period of transition, it was considered suitable for landing operations. MacArthur and his planners had selected 15 September for D-day because there would then be a high tide giving maximum water depth over the Inch'on mud flats. Tidal range for 15 September reached 31.2 feet at high and minus .5 feet at low water. Only on this day did the tide reach this extreme range. No other date after this would permit landing until 27 September when a high tide would reach 27 feet. On 11-13 October there would be a tide of 30 feet. Morning high tide on 15 September came at 0659, forty-five minutes after sunrise; evening high tide came at 1919, twenty-seven minutes after sunset. The Navy set 23 feet of tide as the critical point needed for landing craft to clear the mud flat and reach the landing sites. [30]

Another consideration was the sea walls that fronted the Inch'on landing sites. Built to turn back unusually high tides, they were 16 feet in height above the mud flats. They presented a scaling problem except at extreme high tide. Since the landing would be made somewhat short of extreme high tide in order to use the last hour or two of daylight, ladders would be needed. Some aluminum scaling ladders were made in Kobe and there were others of wood. Grappling hooks, lines, and cargo nets were readied for use in holding the boats against the sea wall.
***
At the end of August the ports of Kobe, Sasebo, and Yokohama in Japan and Pusan in Korea had become centers of intense activity as preparations for mounting the invasion force entered the final stage. The 1st Marine Division, less the 5th Marines, was to outload at Kobe, the 5th Marines at Pusan, and the 7th Infantry Division at Yokohama. Most of the escorting vessels, the Gunfire Support Group, and the command ships assembled at Sasebo.

The ships to carry the troops, equipment, and supplies began arriving at the predesignated loading points during the last days of August. In order to reach Inch'on by morning of 15 September, the LST's had to leave Kobe on 1o September and the transports (AP's) and cargo ships (AK's) on 12 September. Only the assault elements were combat-loaded. Japanese crews manned thirty-seven of the forty-seven LST's in the Marine convoy.

Final preparations included some last minute checking on conditions near Inchon:

As a final means of checking on conditions in Inch'on harbor, the Navy on 31 August sent Lt. Eugene F. Clark to Yonghung-do, an island at the mouth of the ship channel ten sea miles from Inch'on. There, Clark used friendly natives to gather the information needed. He sent them on several trips to Inch'on to measure water depths, check on the mud flats, and to observe enemy strength and fortifications. He transmitted their reports by radio to friendly vessels in Korean waters. Clark was still in the outer harbor when the invasion fleet entered it.

The photo shows Lt. (later Commander) Clark and some of his men. Commander Clark's book about his adventures, The Secrets of Inchon, is interesting reading, as is this (pdf).

The invasion began with pre-invasion bombardment:

The Inchon assault formally began with an air and gunfire bombardment of Wolmi-Do island on 13 September 1950. Six U.S. Navy destroyers led off that morning by steaming up the channel on the flooding tide, the better to avoid any waiting mines. Overhead, carrier planes bombed and rocketed Wolmi-Do, whose artillery batteries threatened the planned landing beaches. Further inland, other planes had been working for several days to isolate the Inchon area from enemy reinforcement.

The destroyers anchored off Wolmi-Do shortly after noon and began firing pointblank at targets there and along the Inchon waterfront. Their bombardment continued for about an hour, followed by heavier gunfire from cruisers and more air attacks. North Korean return fire damaged three of the destroyers, killing an officer on USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729). Wolmi-Do and other nearby targets were hit again the following day, with good results, and again just before landings began on the morning of 15 September.

See also here for a destroyer eye view at the
DeHaven Sailors Association website.

The landings went forward and the invasion forces worked their way inland. At the same time, the forces in the Pusan Perimeter began a counterattack, pushing the North Korean army to move north, eventually to be caught between the forces brought in through Inchon and those moving out of Pusan.

While valor was the order of the day, one photograph speaks volumes:



Caption:

First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez, USMC, leads the 3rd Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines over the seawall on the northern side of Red Beach, as the second assault wave lands, 15 September 1950. Wooden scaling ladders are in use to facilitate disembarkation from the LCVP that brought these men to the shore.
Lt. Lopez was killed in action within a few minutes, while assaulting a North Korean bunker.

Lt. Lopez was awarded the Medal of Honor. Today we honor Lt. Lopez's memory with a Military Sealift Command prepositioning ship named, MV 1st Lt. Baldomero Lopez.

A salute to all those brave men of Inchon!

UPDATE: Added map of Pusan Perimeter from here

Great Train Robbery?

Fuel surcharges may have resulted in overcharges of $6.5 billion by U.S. railroads, it syas here:

Five major freight rail companies overcharged customers more than US$6.5 billion under the guise of fuel surcharges, according to a study commissioned by businesses that are accusing US railroads of anti-competitive behaviour.

"This is the greatest train robbery of the 21st century," said Jack Gerard, president and chief executive of the American Chemistry Council, which represents about 90 percent of the nation's chemical makers.

The council commissioned an economic analysis that found the railroads' fuel surcharges were excessive by more than $6.5 billion between 2005 and the first quarter of 2007. The study was based on regulatory filings and other estimates for Union Pacific Corp, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp, Norfolk Southern Corp, Kansas City Southern and CSX Corp.

Allegations in lawsuits should be approached with caution, as they tend to be extreme.