Good News: US shipping terminal reopens after 'dirty bomb' threat

US shipping terminal reopens after 'dirty bomb' threat

A terminal at the Port of Charleston in South Carolina will reopen and the safety zone has

Maersk image of containership

been lifted, the U.S. Coast Guard said on Thursday, after investigating a threat of a "dirty bomb" on a container ship.

It said the "original reporting source of the threat" had been detained for questioning.

Law enforcement agents scanned four containers aboard the Maersk Memphis ship in the Wando Terminal after reports of a "potential threat" on Wednesday, the Coast Guard said.

Maersk Line, the world's biggest container shipping company, said the U.S. Coast Guard had informed it of a threat of a dirty bomb aboard one of its vessels. It said all crew members were safe and ashore.

"Unified Command determines no existing threat to the port. Terminal will reopen and safety zone has been lifted," the U.S. Coast Guard said on Twitter.

Testing response or just a whack job being an idiot?

Port Security: "'Occupy Oakland' Protesters Shut Down Port of Oakland

UPDATE: The Journal of Commerce reports Operations Resume at Oakland as Protest Eases

Original post follows:

Hat tip to Ace

Oakland  Port Area - Main Port at top, by Bay Bridge

'Occupy Oakland' Protesters Clash With Police Following Day Of Protests at Fox News:

Police estimated that a crowd of about 3,000 had gathered at the port at the height of the demonstration around dusk. Some had marched from the city's downtown, while others had been bused to the port.

The demonstrations in Oakland were largely peaceful until the evening skirmish.

The crowd disrupted port operations by overwhelming the area with people and blocking exits with chain-link fencing and illegally parked vehicles. The demonstrators also erected fences to block main streets to the port. No trucks were allowed into or out of the area.

Port spokesman Isaac Kos-Read said evening operations had been "effectively shut down."

And later port officials released a statement saying that maritime activity would be cancelled indefinitely, but they hoped to resume the work day Thursday.

"Our hope is that the work day can resume tomorrow and that Port workers will be allowed to get to their jobs without incident," the statement read. "Continued missed shifts represent economic hardship for maritime workers, truckers, and their families, as well as lost jobs and lost tax revenue for our region."

More from the San Francisco Chronicle here::

As many as 7,000 people, by police estimates, clogged the main port entrance on Middle Harbor Road and seven other gates as the sun went down, chanting slogans and halting all truck traffic going in or out.

"Whose port? Our port!" many yelled, while dozens climbed on top of the idled trucks and waved signs.

The few police officers within sight kept a considerable distance while the waterfront took on the air of a combination protest and street carnival, with everyone from office workers to gutter punks standing alongside each other denouncing inequality.
***
"It's a victory," exulted one protester, 21-year-old Oakland art student Umar Shareef. "To get all these people together as one unit is amazing."

Andrez Quintanilla, a 28-year-old truck driver, was trying to drop off a load at the port, but was forced to cool his engines outside the entrance.

"It's good what they're doing," he said. "They're trying to make sure everyone has their rights, but I wish they would let me go. I need to go home."

Occupy Oakland, the activists who have camped outside City Hall for nearly a month, originally targeted the port to show solidarity with union workers embroiled in a dispute in Longview, Wash. But to most of the thousands of protesters who flowed west from around Occupy Oakland's nerve center in Frank Ogawa Plaza, it was a finale to a long day of outrage at the widening economic divisions in America.

Before the "strike," an open letter from the Port of Oakland to the protest groups:

Better Harbor and Port Security Through Electro Optics

US Sensor Systems reports on a new undersea surveillance system that shows some promise in a press release dated from August 2011:

US Seismic Systems (USSI) . . . announced today it successfully completed a demonstration of its underwater harbor security system this month at a Lake Erie, PA, test site under a contract with Penn State’s Electro Optic Center sponsored by the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Crane, IN. USSI had installed two fiber optic sonar arrays on the lake bottom to detect small craft attempting to enter a protected region of interest (ROI). The USSI system positively detected 100% of the intrusion attempts at ranges up to 4 km. USSI’s equipment was part of a much larger integrated harbor security system called Harbor Sentinel, which included surface search radar, thermal imaging cameras and Automated Identification System (AIS) ship tracking information.
***
The USSI system demonstrated the feasibility of using a very low cost fiber optic underwater sonar array to provide automated tripwire and ROI alarms in a harbor environment without operator intervention. In May, USSI achieved similar results during testing of the system in San Diego’s Mission Bay.
“There are 360 US ports and harbors that conduct trillions of dollars commerce annually. Many of these facilities, which are located in close proximity to large metropolitan centers handle a variety of highly toxic, flammable, and explosive materials,” stated Jeff Grannan of NSWC. “Damage to or destruction of containers storing these substances poses a vulnerability to critical US infrastructure, disruption of commerce, and endangerment to the surrounding population. USSI’s new sensor technology can be an effective force multiplier to assist those agencies tasked with the vital role of keeping America safe.”
“We were gratified to be selected to participate in this very important program, and were very excited that our equipment performed so well under the actual, real-life harbor intrusion scenarios,” stated Jim Andersen, CEO of USSI. “Our fiber optic sensor systems are designed for reliable, trouble-free operation in tough environments, such as in an oil well or at sea, and this highly successful test serves as just one more example of the advantages of our breakthrough technology over traditional, electronic-based sensor systems.”

More from the Penn State Electro-Optics Center here:

Harbor Sentinel utilizes complementary sensor types. Radar and AIS detect surface vessels. Passive fiber optic acoustic arrays detect propelled vehicles without wet side electronics. A 360° panoramic camera with zoom capability identifies surface vessels. High resolution telescopic EO/IR cameras interrogate detected vessels. Data is passed from the sensors via standards based messaging to a single operator station, where it is integrated into a comprehensive display for situational awareness. The operator can cross-cue between sensors to quickly investigate detected targets with other sensors.

In the old days of Inshore Undersea Warfare, this sort of thing was a pipe dream.

I do note, however, that some of that stuff in the second picture looks like it came from a MIUW Unit.

Hat tip: Ocean News & Technology magazine

Ports and Armed Guard Guidelines

Another nice article from Tanker Operator: "Ports should issue armed guard guidelines":

The IMO recently set out guidelines for shipowners and operators to deal with the use of armed guards, but no reference, or guidance was given to the provision of armed guards while in waters under port state control, or while ‘landed’.

Mee told the conference: “The recent hijacking in port waters in Oman and other similar attacks serves to remind us of the increasing threat posed to shipowners and operators when they are effectively under the jurisdiction of port state control. If clear guidelines for ports aren’t established either by the ports themselves, or the IMO, then the most vulnerable ports may see port calls fall.

“This threat highlights the need for greater involvement of the ports in developing clear guidelines on how security can be provided and provisioned when a vessel is in port waters,” he said.
***
“Ports, ideally under the auspices of the IMO, should move swiftly to issue guidelines illustrating how they handle armed security when they are entering or disembarking ports, as well as guidance for the storage of weaponry,” he warned.

Armed guards are not permitted to operate in territorial waters and it is down to the sovereign state to provide security while vessels wait in the anchorage area.

Nice to see people worrying about some of the stumbling blocks to providing ships with security while in port or operating in the territorial waters of sovereign states that cannot or will not provide secure anchorages or transit routes.

Better Shipping Cargo Container Screening for Improved Port Security?

Photo credit: Port of Houston

Duke University, among other schools, is working on a new approach to checking out shipping cargo containers for worrisome contents, as set out in Duke Today's "Physics for Safer Ports":

Two teams of North Carolina physicists are mapping the intricacies of the atomic nucleus, which could provide better security at the ports. The scientists have identified new "fingerprints" of nuclear materials, such as uranium and plutonium. The fingerprints would be used in new cargo scanners to accurately and efficiently identify suspicious materials. The physics might also be used to improve analysis of spent nuclear fuel rods, which are a potential source of bomb-making materials.

The problem starts at ports, where terrorists may try to smuggle an entire dirty bomb or even smaller amounts of plutonium or uranium by hiding it within the mountains of cargo that pass into the country each day. Cargo scanners using the new nuclear fingerprints would be sensitive enough to spot an entire bomb or the smaller parts to build one, according to Mohammad Ahmed, a nuclear physicist at Duke University.

Photo credit: Port of Houston

Ahmed and his colleagues are developing the fingerprints for the next-generation detectors with HIGS, the High Intensity Gamma-Ray Source. It is the world's most intense and tunable source of polarized gamma rays and is located on Duke's campus as part of the Triangle Universities Nuclear Laboratory. HIGS produces gamma rays that are guided to collide with target materials, causing a variety of nuclear reactions.

Anything that makes scanning the containers faster and more thoroughly is good.

Maritime Security: Shipping Container Bomb Threat

Journal of Commerce reports "Terror Suspect Sought Container Bomb Attack":

An al Qaeda operative and one-time New York City travel agent sought to use his expertise in shipping to smuggle biological and nuclear weapons into the United States in ocean containers, according to leaked documents disclosed by Wikileaks.

The documents identify the suspect as Saifullah Paracha, a 63-year-old Pakistani businessman who worked in New York and is now held at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay.

The file on Paracha, whose son is serving a 30-year prison term in the U.S. on terrorism-related charges, identifies him as a member of a small group that supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the planner behind the September 11 terror attacks. Paracha was part of an al Qaeda terror network that sought to launch new attacks in the United States after September 11, according to reports on the Wikileaks documents by The New York Times.

Shipping and Port Security: Drugs and Radioactive Material

Port of Genoa

Interesting book review from the Wall Street Journal on drug smuggling Book Review: I Am the Market. The bottom line appears to be that familiar theme: "If it is financially lucrative enough, drug smugglers will find a way."

This book highlights some of the ways.

Which ought to be a warning about smuggling other stuff.

Recently a reader (thanks, Russ!) sent along an article about a shipping container full of radioactive stuff sitting on a pier in Genoa, Italy. See Italy Seeks Way to Dispose of Radioactive Container:

Italian authorities are looking for a way of disposing of a container containing radioactive material that has been sitting on the dock at the port of Genoa for more than six months.

Coffee bags in container -what else could be in there?

According to news reports, the container arrived from Saudi Arabia on July 20, 2010, but later yard workers discovered it was radioactive. One report said the container held radioactive cobalt.

Italian security officials have approached the problem warily because it is unknown whether or not the container is a terrorist weapon. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., security officials have warned about a “nuke in the box,” a nuclear or radiological weapon delivered through the supply chain.

This is not a new problem - back in 2005, a shipment was returned from Italy to Morocco because it tripped radiation dectectors.

Genoa

The key question, however, is that implied in a report found at Seaport Security News:

Last year, a shipping container made its way from Saudi Arabia to a dock in Genoa, Italy where it sat idle for several days until dock workers discovered by accident during a “technical review” of the terminal that the container was radioactive. It has been six months since the radioactive container was discovered and it still has not been deactivated. They are currently exploring different methods to deactivate the container, including a robot due to the unknown threat of the materials. They are estimating that the cost of remedying this situation will be €800K, perhaps €1M.

How did this stuff ever make in onto a ship in Saudi Arabia?

Suppose the worst fears of the Italian authorities were realized - that this container contains some sort of "dirty bomb" - and that the trigger was not set for Italy, but for some vital marine chokepoint or other area where it could inflict mass casualties and enduring radiation.

Port of Genoa

Take a look at the original Italian article on this container (Google translation):

A container of radioactive 100 meters distance deliver values five times higher than the "natural background" (those that normally are found). E 'detention in port of Voltri since July, when the alarm went off during a technical review of the Terminal: The Indicators of instruments dedicated to the research of radioactive material went wild, the place was called the fire department and the experts of the Company Regional. The container was isolated, away from the heart of port activities and placed on a pier of the "Sixth Form", pending remedial measures - was guaranteed - would have been very rapid. After six months of strikes and disputes, and city workers are still waiting.

The Technical Unit Complex Regional dell'Arpal has always ensured that the radioactive emissions are not high, but has suggested "appropriate care". It was the Special Unit of Bacteria-Chemical-Radioactive firefighters to identify the nature of the material: cobalt-60, coming from a "source" used by health care facilities to cobalt, or from industries that perform nondestructive testing on metals, ie radiographs. The container had arrived by ship to Genoa from Jeddah - Saudi Arabia - with a stopover in the port of Gioia Tauro. C Official Content ferrous materials, and was landed at the Vte July 14.

Cobalt 60 has a 5 year half life (see Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President, Federation of American Scientists before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2002), and may be a lesser concern than some other radioactive materials, but it is still a concern.

Cobalt 60 Cancer Treatment Device

Cobalt 60 is used in machines designed to kill cancer by focusing the radiation. When these machines are old, they are sometimes scraped without removing the Colbalt 60. See here.

So the real question is - why did it take so long to detect the radiation? What does this say about port security in Saudi Arabia? Were the shipping documents falsified? Was anyone paid off to allow this shipment? What other shipments of hazardous materials would a small bit of Bakeesh allow to go unchecked?

Once again, drug smugglers may help us get a handle on what doors need to be closed to prevent the shipping of potentially terrorist materials.

Port Security: LA Floats Boat to "Screen" Incoming Vessels

Reported here:

The $3 million ship is manned by explosives experts and outfitted with WMD detection equipment. Vessels would have their cargo checked prior to coming into the United States’ most trafficked port complex, the Associated Press reported. Vessels undergo additional screening once they arrive at the port.

The Sheriff’s Department also has a helicopter that searches for radioactive material (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Feb. 10).

“The port complex is one of the most critical infrastructures in the United States,” said Jack Ewell, who oversees the project for the Sheriff’s Department, CBS News reported.

More here:

The new measures include a specially outfitted ship to screen cargo vessels, a radiation detecting helicopter and a dog that can sniff chemical and biological weapons.

The $3-million screening ship is the first of its kind in the world. It can scan the contents of a ship through its hull as it is being escorted into port. The security ship can transmit the data to shore based authorities. It also has a submersible rover that can search hulls for explosives in zero visibility conditions.

Thwarted Attack on U.S. Forces in Bahrain?

Gulf Daily News (Bahrain) reports here:

***
Two Bahrainis, accused of smuggling weapons into the country, planned to attack US ships and personnel at Mina Salman, say prosecutors.
They, aged 22 and 21, were arrested on April 26 - the day of the Gulf Air Bahrain Grand Prix - when police allegedly seized machine guns, weapons, computer discs and other evidence from their homes in East Riffa.
***
Police believe the pair had met members of a terrorist cell (Al Qaeda) abroad.

Their arrest came after National Security Agency received information that the 22-year-old unemployed man, of Jordanian origin, had intensified contacts with the cell in Iran.
***
He then led police to the other - a 21-year-old junior customs officer - who possessed the smuggled weapons.

Police raided his house and found two machine guns, a pistol, bullets, knives and swords, the court heard.

They also seized several books on building missiles, rockets, weapons and explosives, and pictures of the American Base and Navy ships along with research and videos on jehad, alleged prosecutors.

During questioning, the younger defendant confessed to planning an attack on US forces at Mina Salman, said court documents.

That's effective questioning.

Port Security: Navy maps harbor, channel

Shades of COOP Units: Navy maps harbor, channel :

Underwater vehicles floated Wednesday along the Corpus Christi Ship Channel and Inner Harbor just below the water’s surface, mapping the floor.

The three-dimensional images captured will serve several purposes, including port protection.

The exercise was conducted by the Navy in collaboration with the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security and Port of Corpus Christi. The channel and harbor are importing shipping gateways for commercial and military cargo.

The topography collected during this week’s exercise will help Homeland Security in the event of a terrorist attack on the channel. The images would help pinpoint where mines might be.

COOP Units? A Cold War concept that seems to be coming back -at least in its goals, if not as units:

Dr. Truver does mention in passing in a couple of his articles that the Navy Reserve used to have units - Craft of Opportunity (COOP) units- that were once engaged in bottom mapping operations in several ports. However, he also notes that the COOP units are now no more. As Dr. Truver puts it:

It has been years since the Navy, as part of its Cold-War port-breakout concepts, conducted routine bottom surveys and mapping of “Q-Routes” to assure safe egress of warships and auxiliary vessels in support of national strategies and war plans.

The Royal Navy has already embarked on such an effort in several U.K. ports. Some experts have proposed resurrecting the ill-fated mid-1990s’ COOP — Craft of Opportunity — program and have Navy Reserve units conduct periodic surveys and sonar mapping of bottoms.

Sir Lanka: Tamil Tiger Underwater Gear Found

The government of Sri Lanka has been engaged in a major push against the Tamil Tiger rebels. As part of that offensive, government forces have located some Tiger underwater gear, as reported here:

Troops have recovered LTTE marine equipment including 20 diving kits and 3 underwater scooters. They were found by the 58th division commanded by brigadier Shavendra Silva in the area of Ampalavan and Pokkanai to the north of Puthukudiyiruppu. This is the first recovery made by the soldiers of LTTE marine equipment. Security forces believe that these equipment were to be used either for LTTE leaders to escape or for the use of suicide attacks.

Tamil Tiger suicide attack have been a model for other radical groups, including their use of suicide bomb belts. The "Sea Tiger" maritime portion of the group has engaged the Sri Lankan Navy in pitched sea battles and bombed ships in harbors. The equipment captured would support covert insertion of underwater attack units.

More here from the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense:

Infantrymen of 58 Division further advanced into LTTE hiding area entering Ampalavanpokkanai town perimeter have found underwater scooter, diving kits, oxygen cylinders and many other diving equipments from west of Puthukudiyirippu area yesterday, 19 February.


Nearly 5 hours long fighting between troops of 6 Gemunu Watch (6GW) and terrorists ensued in the area before troops captured these items, defence sources in battlefront said.

Two underwater scooters, Oxygen cylinders in various capacities, modern diving kits, sniper weapon and many other diving equipments were among the items uncovered.

Pictures are from that site and appear to me to show rebreathing diving gear and one man sea scooters. Not fancy, but capable.

Port Security: Indian Navy Head Worries About Containers

Reported here:

Indian Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta Wednesday said terrorists may use shipping containers for the movement of nuclear weapons and called for augmented safety measures at ports.

"Container is the most likely means for the terrorist organisations for illegal transporting of nuclear weapons. Hence, the serious concerns about container security," Mehta told reporters at a seminar on "Port Sector - Developments and Security".

He said the country from where a container leaves should issue safety certificates.

"Countries should certify that whichever container leaves the port is safe," Mehta added.

The fear that terrorists would use the sea route to strike became fact on Nov 26 when 10 armed terrorists slunk into Mumbai on boats to begin three days of mayhem that killed some 170 people.

UPDATE: A connected article: India's largest port improving security:

We are working on an integrated security mechanism. As a part of this approach, we plan to install one scanner for cargo-scanning as well as having our own bomb detection and disposal unit here," said Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) chairman SS Hussain.

Port Security: Port of Long Beach's new security center

Reported as Port of Long Beach Fusion Center Opens:

The center, which sits on a narrow strip of land within the harbor, controls an assortment of cameras, motion sensors, and security teams that monitor the port's 3,200 sq. ft. and acts as a fusion center for hundreds of local, state, and federal agents that provide security for America's second biggest port, according to the Press-Telegram (of Long Beach).

Inside the center, highly trained security officers from Long Beach mix with port police, divers, Coast Guard officers, federal agents and Navy personnel in a maze of offices and meeting rooms.

Some of the port's 115 cameras are so powerful, operators can read the badge number of someone standing two miles away, said Cosmo Perrone, the port's director of security. Other cameras are armed with facial recognition technology, reports the BBC. The most technologically advanced cameras cost $80,000, paid for by federal funds.

But the most astounding feat may be the port's access to private surveillance networks from other organizations and businesses.

Harbor officials have also linked into hundreds more private security cameras deployed at truck sites, warehouses and rail corridors, a move Perrone championed in recent years as port authorities established unprecedented levels of cooperation between the public and private sectors.

A video about the center is available here.

Watching over U.S. Ports

Nice report from the Charleston Post & Courier -Covering the Waterfront:

There's one question SeaHawk officials can answer quickly and directly, because it comes up often: Of all the nation's ports, why Charleston?

Residents know Charleston boasts an active commercial waterfront. It ranks sixth in the nation by container volume, handling the equivalent of 1.8 million 20-foot-long steel boxes a year.

But what most locals might not know is that 40 percent of ammunition and vehicles bound for the Middle East pass through here, Gutierrez said. And nearly all the mine-resistant, armored-protected trucks — also known as MRAPs — roll through Charleston.

Port Security: Sea mines, UWIEDs and other threats

The 2004 terrorist attack on the Philippine Superferry 14 resulted in the deaths of 116 people and the loss of the ship. In that case, the damage was wrought by a bomb planted inside the ferry. Increased security for ships and ferries may cause terrorists to look to other ways to cause such damage to ships and to vital shipping lanes, including those in ports or inshore areas.

As noted in a recent post, the Department of Homeland Security recently unveiled a "Small Vessel Security Strategy" (SVSS) warning of the threat potential of small vessels:

Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Small vessels have also been successfully employed overseas by terrorists to deliver Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs).

The SVSP points out the critical nature of U.S. ports, through which flows 20% of "annual world ocean-borne overseas trade." This trade, so vital to our economy is moved through 8 high volume ports, 352 lesser ports, along 95,000 miles of coastline and about 10,000 miles of rivers, canals and other internal waterways. In addition, territorial and economic zone waters are vital to the American economy:

In 2005, offshore activities contributed over $120 billion and two million jobs to American economic prosperity. Approximately 30% of U.S. oil supplies and 25% of its natural gas supplies are produced in offshore areas. Nearly 700 ships arrive in U.S. ports daily, and 8,000 foreign-flag ships, manned by 200,000 foreign mariners, enter U.S. ports every year. Annually, the nation’s ports handle more than $700 billion in merchandise, while the cruise industry and its passengers account for $35.7 billion in direct and indirect economic output. All told, the U.S. MTS (Maritime Transportation System) supports a global chain of economic activity that contributes more than $700 billion to America’s economy each year. In addition to the global maritime trade contributions, the economic role of ocean industries provides tremendous value to the domestic economy. The MTS supports the commercial fishing industry and its 110,000 fishing vessels. In 2006, it contributed approximately $35.1 billion to the U.S. economy, while the recreational saltwater fishing industry was valued at $30.5 billion. (footnoted omitted)

Ports and water transportation are big, important businesses.

The Small Vessel Security Strategy does a good job of identifying historic threats posed by small vessels:

The four scenarios of gravest concern in using small vessels in terrorist-related attacks have been identified as: a. Domestic Use of Waterborne Improvised Explosive Devices (WBIEDs); b. Conveyance for smuggling weapons (including WMDs) into the United States; c. Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into the United States; and d. Waterborne platform for conducting a stand-off attack (e.g. Man-Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS) attacks).

See pages 11 through 14 of the SVSS (available for download here) for descriptions of how these scenarios have or could be played out. Of the four, terrorists around the world have already engaged in all of them except, to my knowledge, transport of a WMD.

Absent from the SVSS discussion is another potential threat to our maritime security - the potential use by terrorists or others of sea mines or underwater improvised explosive devices (UWIEDs) (hereafter such objects will be referred to as "mines") in our vital internal waterways. That small vessels have the potential to deliver mines or mine-like objects is a topic that deserves mention among the other things that government agencies, small vessel owners and operators, whether business or recreational, ought to keep in mind while they are keeping an eye out for suspicious activity along the waterways.

While this potential mine problem was not mentioned in the SVSS, it has been receiving attention - at least in some circles. Dr. Scott Truver, co-author of book Weapons that Wait (Gregory K. Hartmann, Scott C. Truver, Weapons that Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy, USNI Press, Annapolis, 1979), has been actively writing and speaking about his concern that this threat not be forgotten. Dr. Truver's articles have appeared in National Defense Magazine as far back as April 2007 in a piece titled (incorrectly, I believe) "Mines, improvided explosives: a threat to global commerce?" (should read "improvised", I think). He points out a problem - the chain of command is not clear in dealing with mine threats:

In U.S. coastal waters, the responsibility for security falls to the Coast Guard. The Justice Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also figures prominently in investigations involving explosives. The Navy is the lead agency for mine countermeasures expertise and operations.

The lines of responsibility in an actual attack, however, are murky.

The federal government has a lead role under the national response plan. But regional, state, local, and commercial partners must also be closely integrated and informed. Indeed, a multi-agency team is needed for each U.S. port — or at least the 17 “tier-one” facilities having significant military or economic importance.

The Coast Guard’s “captains of the port” play a crucial role as local federal maritime security coordinators.

But the Coast Guard has no capabilities — and perhaps even no desire — to conduct countermine operations. Retired Coast Guard Vice Adm. James D. Hull, who served as Atlantic area commander, said that countermine is “primarily the Navy’s responsibility … The Navy has the expertise and equipment to do the job. The real question is whether the Navy’s forces can respond in the appropriate time to neutralize a threat.”
***
“I’m not sure we’ve done all our homework concerning who could or should hunt for real weapons,” said retired Navy Capt. Thomas B. Davilli, a former commander of countermine forces. “One thing I do know, [the Navy’s] assets are designed to operate safely in the presence of the threat. Whether others will have the capability is doubtful.”

Participants in a recent war game, he said, “pointed to a local law-enforcement organization that has an EOD-like response dive team.” But the presence of an anti-tamper countermeasures device on the mine or underwater explosive device certainly complicates matters, he added. “Others have suggested hunting for actual mines from small craft towing commercial side-scan sonars. … The thought of sending crewed assets into a mined threat area without signature silencing or some sort of ‘safe track’ procedures is foolish.”


Exacerbating the challenge for federal, state, and local actors is the fact that no two ports are alike. Each differs in geography, channels, bathymetry, winds, tides, currents, bottom sediments, turbidity, climate, and critical infrastructure — piers and wharves, moorings, navigation markers, cables and pipelines.

The best strategy is to interdict the minelayers before the mines can be put in the water. If that fails, the Coast Guard, Navy, FBI, ATF, and other federal- and non-federal first responders will need to understand what is known as the “intelligence preparation of the environment.”

Agencies must be aware of potential mining areas, at least for each of the 17 “tier-one” ports.

There also is "Mines and Underwater IEDs in U.S. Ports and Waterways: Context, Threats, Challenges and Solutions" by Dr. Truver in the Naval War College Review, Winter 2008, Vol.61, No.1, pp.106-127 (the entire Winter 2008 issue can be downloaded in pdf format here - just select the issue). This article is worth reading for many reasons, but some of it contains information that will be eye-opening to many Americans who are unfamiliar with the mine threat - including reports of domestic mine terrorist acts that have already happened in this country. One such incident involved the "patriotic SCUBA diver:"

The “patriotic scuba diver” mine crisis of January 1980 showed that a terrorist threat of mines—in this case “mining” the Sacramento River during the Soviet grain embargo announced by President Jimmy Carter—could have dramatic effects on maritime trade. An unknown person identifying himself as the “patriotic scuba diver” claimed by telephone to have placed a mine in the waterway; all shipping movement ceased almost immediately. Once on scene, the Navy minesweeper USS Gallant required four days of intensive minehunting to
determine the channel was safe. No mines were discovered, but the cost in merchant
vessel lay days caused by the hoax was estimated in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars.

Another incident occurred during the last presidential election:

...on 21 April 2004 a tugboat operator on Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, spotted a suspicious floating bag and called the Coast Guard.18 The Coast Guard contacted the Jefferson Parish bomb squad, which fished the bag out of the water. It proved to be a UWIED, a couple of pounds of explosive in plastic pipes with a timer, wrapped in trash bags to keep it afloat. One possible target was Senator John Kerry, a presidential hopeful who had been scheduled for a campaign trip on the lake. The bomb squad used a water cannon to neutralize the device.

Dr. Truver mentions many more examples of the mining of restricted waters by "merchant" ships of terrorist supporting nations, including the mining of the Suez Canal by Libyans in 1984 (see page 111 of the article). Mines do not require a sophisticated delivery system. Dr. Truver also prepared an interesting presentation to the American Society of Naval Engineers "Naval Mines and Underwater IEDs...The Threat is Real!"which can be seen in pdf format or html. See also National Defense Magazine January 2008 article Improvised Explosive Devices: Could They Threaten U.S. Ports? Not surprisingly, the answer is "yes:"

“Underwater improvised explosive devices are a credible threat,” said Rear Adm. John Christenson, vice commander of the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command.

Another layer of the mine threat pops up in discussing the Armed Forces Journal March 2008 edition, in retired Navy Captain Karl Hasslinger's "Undersea warfare: The hidden threat" in which the author posits an al-Qaeda inshore and offshore threat occurring in the not too distant future (he suggests 2011):

Over the past year, al-Qaida used a combination of merchant ships, commercial submarines and remotely operated vehicles to place explosives in U.S. ports and adjacent to seabed infrastructure, including transoceanic telecommunications cables, and oil and gas pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico.

Simply add recreational boats to his list of threat delivery platforms and he and Dr. Truver are fishing in the same waters.

I do note that "limpet" mines have been used to sink a number of vessels in port,
including vessels belonging to the Greenpeace, though in all fairness, many of these sinkings were the work of governments. Most major ships are now inspected for such mines before they depart for deep water. The mines of concern are not attached to the hulls of ships like limpets, but rather the sort of mines placed on the floor of a ship channel or area of restricted maneuvering.
That the threat has caught the eye of active duty problem managers is evident from this Navy Times comes article:

America’s maritime security forces plan to devote more attention to the threat of terrorist mines in U.S. ports, top Navy and Coast Guard commanders said Wednesday, even as the Navy scales back its mine warfare ships before its new mine countermeasure systems enter the fleet.

Vice Adm. Evan “Marty” Chanik, commander of 2nd Fleet, said this year’s “Frontier Sentinel,” a joint U.S.-and-Canada maritime security exercise scheduled for June, will include a harbor mine scenario, and he cited requests by the Department of Homeland Security for funding to conduct detailed surveys of prominent ports. Commanders hope that having detailed charts of ports would be a good start towards helping with responses if terrorists mined them.

And Coast Guard Vice Adm. D. Brian Peterman, commander of the Coast Guard’s Atlantic Area command, cited the monthly “warfighter talks” that take place between Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead and Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen, at which the harbor mine problem is a frequent topic, Peterman said. The fact that the mine challenge is discussed “at the highest levels” shows that it’s “getting the right attention.”

Well, maybe. I've been in a lot of exercises where the "mine problem" is truly a show-stopper, gets acknowledged as such and then gets "assumed" away.

It was a fairly common part of some of the Naval Control of Shipping exercises (as far back as the early 1980's and presumably before then, too) to start the problem of getting essential shipping from Port A to Port B with reports of someone observing someone rolling a mysterious object off the fantail of some foreign flagged ship (aren't most of them?) into some U.S. restricted waterway.

As any naval officer knows, the answer to the question "How many mines does it take to create a minefield?" is - "None - it just takes the threat of a mine."

The issue then became one of treating said object as a potential mine and beginning the process of working through the "de-mining" process. In case you are wondering, there were variations on this theme, including scuttled ships in narrow shipping channels, explosively dropped bridges, etc, etc.

De-mining, for those of you unfamiliar with the process, can be a painfully slow task indeed.

The exercises were very unrealistic, in that someone always seemed to have been watching the "bad guys" at exactly the right minute, recognized there might be a problem and dialed the right telephone numbers to get the attention of the appropriate authorities before multi-million dollar ships with multi-billion dollar cargo actually started their transit through the now potentially dangerous waters.

Because sinking the ships alongside the pier was not conducive to convoy planning, the Naval Control of Shipping exercises didn't deal with that issue so much.

I suspect in real life that one of those big ships might become the "flaming datum" that demonstrates the existence of a mine problem in the channel.

Real experts in mine warfare know that the thing that takes time is getting to know the underwater terrain. As reported here, vice commander of the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command, Rear Admiral Christenson offers up this:

“If you want to get a port opened quickly, you have to do your homework in advance,” Christenson said. “You have to know what’s on the bottom before you start.”

In that vein, his command is consolidating information on U.S. ports and attempting to survey harbor waters in order to identify objects that already are lying in the bottom of the ocean.

“If we already know where those refrigerators, cars and anchors are in advance, if somebody drops something in, we can do a change detection to see what’s new. But that requires investment and effort in advance,” said Christenson.

Last year, the service conducted an 11-mile channel survey in San Diego. To sort through the 600 mine-like objects detected on the sea floor required 600 man-hours to accomplish the task.

Conducting such port surveys before a catastrophic event occurs could cut the Navy’s response time in half and accelerate the reopening of a port, said Christenson.

“It has all the potential in the world of making the mine countermeasure response to a domestic crisis much more manageable,” said Truver.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration conducts such surveys and it has estimated it will take three years and cost $14 million to map the bottoms of the nation’s busiest 20 ports.

“That’s the insurance policy that you buy so that you don’t have $1.9 billion worth of economic impact alone per day, based on what we experienced in the 2002 West Coast strike,” he said.

Dr. Truver does mention in passing in a couple of his articles that the Navy Reserve used to have units - Craft of Opportunity (COOP) units- that were once engaged in bottom mapping operations in several ports. However, he also notes that the COOP units are now no more. As Dr. Truver puts it:

It has been years since the Navy, as part of its Cold-War port-breakout concepts, conducted routine bottom surveys and mapping of “Q-Routes” to assure safe egress of warships and auxiliary vessels in support of national strategies and war plans.

The Royal Navy has already embarked on such an effort in several U.K. ports. Some experts have proposed resurrecting the ill-fated mid-1990s’ COOP — Craft of Opportunity — program and have Navy Reserve units conduct periodic surveys and sonar mapping of bottoms. Others have recommended that the maritime transportation industry and port authorities take the lead. Another option is to outsource the survey and mapping responsibilities to contractors. In short, there is yet no coherent plan, staffing or program.

At least one contractor is available for such work, Orca Maritime, operated by a couple of retired Navy EOD operators. Orca's "vision" is to

Build the foundation for an effective underwater maritime domain security program, significantly enhancing public safety, economic stability, and environmental protection in our ports.

Orca provides relevant news concerning port security here. Included among these links is one to a recent article featuring a discussion between the Coast Guard Commandant and the Navy CNO in which a discussion of the need to get to know the territory under the waves is laid out:

Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead recently discussed the ability of the U.S. government to conduct surveys of domestic ports to help defend the country against a potential underwater mine or improvised explosive device attack, the top Coast Guard officer told Inside the Navy in a recent interview.

“What we’ve been discussing with NOAA [National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration], the Navyand everybody else is how to come up with a standardized, repeatable process to do port surveys,” Allen said April 9.

“We’re putting together a plan on how to do it, everyone is in agreement we need to do it and we’re going through the first year of [figuring out how to] program that into budgets.”
***
A terrorist mine attack in a domestic port could disrupt the flow of global commerce and have “psychological effects on the general populace,” retired Vice Adm. Conrad Lautenbacher, the director of NOAA and under secretary of commerce for oceans and atmosphere, wrote in a Nov. 29, 2007, letter to Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Patrick Walsh.

The subject of Lautenbacher’s missive was to enlist the help of the Navy to secure funds, which would be provided by the Department of Homeland Security, to survey 50 dual-use U.S. ports over five years at a cost of roughly $38 million.

Additionally, the NOAA director wants $2 million to survey two East Coast ports this fiscal year, the letter states.
***
Outstanding issues remain before funding can be secured for the surveying effort, Allen said last week. One of these issues is “agreeing [that] not every port is important,” he noted.

“You have to decide which ports you’re going to do, in what sequence, and how much it’s going to cost to do them,” Allen said. It remains unclear whether NOAA, Navy oceanographers or contractors -- or a combination of all three -- would conduct the surveys.

I admire Admiral Lautenbacher for his aggressive pursuit of the issue and Admirals Allen and Roughhead for getting started on talking about assigning the problem to "solvers."

However, I am concerned that this very important part of port protection will go the way of so much of mine warfare- ignored until it's really needed.

Some seem to believe that mines are a threat that is "overblown" compared to other threats (like LNG tankers being turned into "fireballs"), although I am unimpressed with the analysis in that it overstates the difficulty of planting mines and underestimates the ease with which such mines can be acquired or manufactured. But then again, I have seen the damage done to a billion dollar ship by a $1000 mine.

Being prepared is the better alternative.

(NB E1: I want to make sure that it understood that in this piece, I am not referring to big old World War I style contact sea mines, such as the one in the top most photo, but rather to modern mines such as those in the lower mine photos (top to bottom): Manta -shallow water mine; Murena- "multi influence sea mine; open view of a Maindeka limpet mine, and to home made mines that could be in almost any form - ranging from an small ice cooler to an oil drum. Weapons that can be handled by one or two people.)

DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy

DHS: Fact Sheet: DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy:

As the U.S.S. Cole attack vividly demonstrated, there is a clear need to close security gaps and enhance the small vessel security environment. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) addresses these concerns, providing a coherent framework to improve maritime security and safety.

The complete stratgy, in pdf format, can be viewed here.
From the Foreward:

Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between the vast number of legitimate vessel operators and the relatively few individuals engaged in illicit activities. The challenge is immense, as it involves nearly 13 million registered U.S. recreational vessels,2 82,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial small vessels. On any given day, a considerable number of these boats share waterways with commercial and military traffic, operating at hundreds of U.S. ports and in the immediate vicinity of critical maritime infrastructure, including bridges and waterfront facilities such as petrochemical plants. More information concerning small vessels is needed to improve the proper assessment of the risk posed by these vessels. The challenge is to balance the collection of requisite information necessary for proper assessment of risk posed by these vessels, with the freedom of the seas expected by the small boating community.

Small vessels?

Small vessels are characterized for the purposes of this strategy as any watercraft—regardless of method of propulsion—less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. Small vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, and any other personal or commercial vessels involved in U.S. or foreign voyages.

Some analysis of the stratgy here:

As boating season approaches, the Bush administration wants to enlist the country's 80 million recreational boaters to help reduce the chances a small boat could deliver a nuclear or radiological bomb along the country's 95,000 miles of coastline and inland waterways.

According to a Wednesday intelligence assessment obtained by the Associated Press: "The use of a small boat as a weapon is likely to remain al-Qaeda's weapon of choice in the maritime environment, given its ease in arming and deploying, low cost, and record of success."

While the United States has so far been spared this type of strike in its own waters, terrorists have used small boats to attack in other countries.

The millions of humble dinghies, fishing boats, and smaller cargo ships that ply America's waterways are not nationally regulated as they buzz around ports, oil tankers, power plants, and other potential terrorist targets.
***
The United States has spent billions of dollars constructing elaborate defenses against the giant cargo ships that could be used by terrorists, including strict regulations for containers and shipping.

"When that oil tanker is coming from the Middle East, we know everything about it before it gets here," said John Fetterman, deputy chief of Maine's marine patrol. But when it comes to small boats, he said, "nobody knows a lot about them."

The only way to police the waterfront, said maritime security expert Stephen Flynn, "is to get as many of the participants who are part of that community to be essentially on your side." Flynn, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, said treating boaters as allies instead of a threat would go a long way.
***
Allen says the boater who is on the water every weekend knows where people fish and when a boat near a piece of critical infrastructure looks out of place.

Port of Los Angeles gets anti-boat barrier

The Port of Los Angeles has a new anti-intrusion barrier paid for with Dept of Homeland Security funds, a reported here

While the foam and steel-cable barrier might not look like much, port authorities say they hope it will serve as a deterrent to small boats that could pose a threat to cruise ships and cargo vessels passing through the port.

"The barrier stops the vessel, then forces it to bounce back," said George Cummings, director of homeland security for the Port of Los Angeles.

"It's not intended to do damage to a boat," he said. "We just want to stop it and keep it from going where we don't want it to go."

Port officials purchased 5,000 feet worth of the barrier with funds from a federal Department of Homeland Security grant, according to port spokesman Gordon Smith.

Port officials said they hope the new security barrier will prevent a terrorist attack like the one in Yemen that killed 17 American sailors and wounded 39 others when a small boat laden with explosives blew a large hole in the USS Cole on Oct. 12, 2000.

"There isn't an imminent threat here, but the cruise terminal could be targeted for an attack, so it makes sense to test out the barrier here," Smith said. "It's also a good place to test the equipment without disrupting terminal operations at the rest of the port."

Port website here. The system is manufactured by WhisprWave, which has the following video on their website:

UPDATE: Fixed gremlin induced typo in title.

Port Security: Smart Sensors on the Job

How do you see in the dark or see what can't be seen? Some tools identified here:

The mission of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. military is, in part, to ensure the protection, safety, and security of the nation and its citizens. Science and technology are playing an ever increasing role in this mission. In fact, the Directorate for Science and Technology, the primary research-and-development arm of DHS, is working in partnership with private businesses, national laboratories, universities, domestic and foreign government agencies, and the military to drive the development and use of high-tech solutions in support of securing the nation. Together, the homeland security and military communities are making significant strides in technology, particularly in the vital areas of intelligence and surveillance.

One example here.

UPDATE: On the other hand, these tools have to be part of a larger effort, not the sole line of defense.

Shipping Container Security: Resistance Movement

The politics of container security reported here:

Atlanta-based Home Depot and fellow "big box" chain stores have targeted donations to key lawmakers and stepped up lobbying efforts amid industry resistance to a law mandating 100 percent security scanning for imported cargo.

The new measure - recommended by the commission that examined the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks - requires that every cargo container be scanned for radiation or nuclear hazards before being shipped to the United States.

Business groups, who argue that importers are doing enough to improve cargo security already, are seeking to delay its implementation, which is slated for July of 2012.

"It is not a smart way to conduct cargo security" by checking every container, said Jason Conley, homeland security policy chief for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Foreign seaports would have to buy costly scanning equipment and America's trading partners could retaliate against U.S. exports, he said.

At the retail giants, including Wal-Mart, Target, Home Depot, Best Buy and Circuit City, corporate political action committees have focused campaign dollars on Republican members of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, a study of campaign filings by Congressional Quarterly found.

Of the top five Senate recipients of these funds, Sens. Susan Collins of Maine, Norm Coleman of Minnesota, and John Sununu of New Hampshire are all GOP members of the homeland security panel, which could play a crucial role as retailers seek a potential two-year extension of the cargo-scanning deadline.

Maritime security authority Stephen Flynn said he has watched the "energetic" delay tactics with concern.

"The status quo is not sustainable," Flynn said of the current system, under which only a tiny percentage of cargo-that which has been identified as high risk-is scanned for hazards.

No system is fail-safe, said Flynn, a former Coast Guard officer and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. But he warned that an explosion of a single radiation device in a cargo container would freeze trade worldwide indefinitely unless shippers had a 100 percent scanning system to restore public confidence.

Although industry critics point out that scanning technology is imperfect and prone to false alarms, Flynn said that sending cargo boxes through a portal that combined both radiation detection and image scanning would give inspectors instant and reliable information about suspicious materials. He said the cost would be about $20 per container, which he called reasonable since a typical Wal-Mart container has about $60,000 in merchandise.

The Retail Industry Leaders Association, the trade group for the "big-box" chains, attempted to defeat the 100 percent scanning proposal last year. Spokesman Brian Dodge said that was only one of many issues-including product safety, crime, and tax issues-that have prompted his group to grow and have an expanded presence on Capitol Hill.

Shipping company concerns discussed here. Need for "tamper-proof" containers here, which references a threat scenario:

In a recent piece in Seapower magazine by David W. Munns here. Mr. Munns posits a scenario in which containers passing through Pakistan have had their contents stolen by thieves who un-weld the seams of the metal containers, take the products from inside the container and then re-weld the seams, apparently without breaking the seals on the boxes.

The cost savings of cargo theft reduction ought to help some shippers feel better about an improved container...though it seems to me that a combination of more secure containers, other forms of electronic security and a good random container container checking policy would serve as well as 100% scanning.

Port Security: Undersea Tech

As reported here

A surveillance system will be installed in the Piscataqua River this summer to protect the Port of New Hampshire from terrorist attacks.
more stories like this

The system will include sonar equipment and a remotely operated underwater robotic camera called the Sea Otter that will allow authorities to check potential threats to the bridges that connect New Hampshire and Maine.

The camera will also let authorities check the hulls of incoming ships.

The system was developed by Sonatech Corp. of Bedford and has been tested at several other ports.
***
Though some critics have questioned the need for such technology, Woodsum said terrorists are close to having the ability to use divers to attach bombs to ship hulls and bridges.

"We have bridges that can be attacked and sunk [in] the harbor, which would basically stop all traffic," between New Hampshire and Maine, he said.

Nicholls agreed.

"I think it pays to be prepared, whether we're operating in the Port of Portsmouth or the Port of Los Angeles," he said.

Yes, it does.

Sonatech home.