Thoughts on the U.S. Navy of the Future: Capt. Wayne Hughes "Single-Purpose Warships for the Littorals"

VT Halter Marine photo Patrol Missile Craft

In a age of generalization and massive high dollar "do-it-all" warships, Captain Wayne Hughes offers up an alternative point of view in the pages of the June 2014 Naval Institute Proceedings with his thoughts set out in 'Single-Purpose Warships for the Littorals':

Foreign littoral waters have become an unsafe place to operate on the sea surface. Although the bulk of U.S. naval action has been in coastal waters since 1950, their significance has increased with the rise of China, the continuing threat from Iran, and the recent ventures of other countries, such as Russia. In these narrow seas, early warning and constant alertness are harder to achieve. Depth of fire is lost for lack of sea room. The clutter of inlets, differing coastlines and islands, coastal shipping, fishing boats, and oil rigs are all factors that complicate both offensive and defensive tactics.

For many reasons, a single-purpose ship is far preferable to an open-ocean multipurpose ship in situations that require a vessel to sail in these dangerous areas. The advantage of the single-purpose ship can be clearly illustrated by using lost combat capabilities as the basis of comparison. Assume a notional multipurpose ship has four. These might be surface-missile warfare, antisubmarine warfare, mine clearance, and the employment of helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles. Since there is a high probability that one modern antiship cruise missile will put either ship out of action, the advantage in missile combat is 4:1 in favor of the single-purpose ship; when the multipurpose ship is put out of action in a missile battle, the Fleet also loses all its other capabilities. This is a tactical measure of combat advantage. (footnotes omitted)

Read the whole thing.

We had Captain Hughes on Midrats for an interesting discussion about a year and half ago, Episode 150: Policy, Fleet Size, and the Navy Next.

"How to Make the Navy Bigger, Sooner, Cheaper" -A Revisit to 2008

Recently I was asked to provide some thoughts for "Corvette Week" over at

Coastal Command Patrol Boat  (U.S. Navy photo by MC2 Joshua Scott)

 CIMSEC NextWar and came up with Cheaper Corvettes: COOP and STUFT like that, in which I suggested that if "payloads" are the key to the future then the "platform" end of some naval force could allow for a different approach to getting drones of various types out to sea and, even more importantly, out to where the action might be. There is a nice follow on Non-Traditional Drone Motherships by NavalDrones.


As some long-time reader may know, that CIMSEC post was not my first foray into trying to figure out a way to pay less to get more to meet a problem identified by former Navy Secretary Winter back in 2008. One of my efforts was to suggest an anti-piracy force on the cheap, How to Make the Navy Bigger, Sooner, Cheaper

Too much ocean, too many shorelines, too many needs, too few ships. What's a navy to do?

The high-speed experimental boat Stiletto

Secretary Winter wants analysis of the right ships to build and a more efficient process to build them. All of which is fine, but - there is a faster, cheaper path to get bigger, sooner at lower cost - putting hulls in the water while awaiting that analysis.

Here's my modest proposal:

1. Take $250 million dollars and put it aside;
2. Of that $250 million, use $100 million to buy or lease 50 to 100 offshore crew boats as currently used in the offshore oil industry (many of them are reaching the end of their expected useful life in the industry - you might be able to pick up some bargains).
3. Invest $50 million in refurbishing the boats and in getting weapons for their decks. Turn them into "navalized" vessels. Make 22 knots the minimum acceptable speed.
4. Do not try to make these low cost littoral combat ships into battleships for all conditions. Talk to the LCDRs who will be squadron commanders and the LTs who will be the commanding officers about what they would need to provide a presence, fight in a low threat environment against modestly armed pirates and the like, support occasional missions ashore and interdict drug smuggler semi-submersibles. Give them what they need in terms of state of the art comms using COTS (heck, load put a communication van on board if so that no time is wasted trying to rewire the little ships more than needed). Put in some comfortable berthing suited for the sea states in which these things (I call them Special Purpose Vessels or SPVs) will operate.
5. Under no cirmcumstance should the total U.S. Navy investment in any single SPV exceed $2 million, excluding the cost of adding weapons systems (adding a M-1 Abrams, for example) and the personnel costs.
6. Make the project a 12 month "emergency" - and kill the bureaucracy that would ordinarily take on this job - find a hard charging Captain, make him or her report directly to SecNav and tell them what the mission and the budget will be. Then get out of the way except for monthly status reports.



Over the horizon radar system

7. Find a group of O-3s who are ready for command and who can think for themselves and train the heck out of them by letting them go to sea in the type of ships that you are acquiring, let them learn from the masters of current offshore supply and crew vessels. Find some O-4s who can take hold of the idea of being a squadron commander of a 5 ship squadron and train them in mission like that being conducted by the Africa station.
8. Borrow some Army Rangers or fleet Marines and train them in the ship boardings, small boat ops, shipboard firefighting and ship defense. Treat them like the Marines of old. Stress people skills appropriate for counter-terrorism work.
9. Lease some ships to be used as "tenders" for the SPVs - small container ships on which the containers can be shops, supply warehouses, refrigerator units, etc. Bladders for fuel. Use the Arapaho concept to set up a flight deck for helo ops.
10. Be generous with UAV assets - use the small "net recoverable" types.
11. Don't limit the small boat assets to RHIBs. Experiment with M-ships, small go-fasts captured from drug dealers, whatever. The idea is to have boats that can operate in one sea state worse than the pirates, drug smugglers, etc.



Falklands war - container ship landing deck

12. Use the MIUW van concept for adding some sonar capability. TIS/VIS is a necessity.

Start with a couple of squadrons, tell your O-6 that you want them ready in 6 months for operational testing. Unleash the budget dollars. For op testing, send one squadron off to the coast of Somalia for anti-pirate work. Send the other off Iraq. Put those expensive great big cruisers and destroyers currently in the area to work doing blue water stuff.

Paint Coast Guard like stripe on the hull of the SPVs - but make it Navy blue. If the Coasties want to join in, give them a boat and paint the stripe orange. Make the SPVs highly visible. Nothing deters crime like a visible cop on the beat.

I have made some spelling corrections and other modifications from my original post - and would probably add "offshore Gulf of Guinea" as a training zone for the force.

Further, the rapid development of drones of various types opens up lots of new possibilities for using this on-the-cheap "influence squadrons" (with apologies to CAPT Hendrix) to try out new approaches to littoral operations or inshore work. As Admiral Harvey pointed out during his recent appearance on Midrats (starting about24:20), the littorals are a complex world and even non-state actors are in possession of weapons capable of striking out at ships off shore. If you read CDR Salamander's post on a training accident in which a target drone managed to smack into a cruiser The CHANCELLORSVILLE Shrug it is worth reading the comments of Steeljaw Scribe concerning the potential issues facing ships operating close to shore facing a high speed missile threat:

What the BQM did isn't trivial by a long stretch...but consider this - take a 6,000lb+ telephone pole that has been burning liquid fuel to push it to between Mach 2.5 - 3.0; even if the large HE/SAP warhead doesn't fuse and detonate imagine the damage it would cause if C-ville had been hit in the same spot. As for the "shootshootshootshoot" the reality is if you are relying on ownship sensors and kinetic kill, you won't get past the "Oh Shit.." preamble (do the math -- 60-70 nm @ Mach 2.5 - 3.0 and 100 ft or below. And let's just say there are multiple missiles inbound because only Hollywood TTP shoots missiles in a stream raid of 1. We are fast moving beyond the capabilities of chemical-based weaponry to address an extant near-hypersonic threat in the terminal kinetic realm. We absolutely must be there to address the hypersonic threat that will begin to manifest itself before the end of this decade. Fortunately we have folks working on a number of solutions -- but I fear for I also hear a lot of whistling past the graveyard, especially at certain pay grades/GS/SES levels. w/r, SJS

CDR S and I have discussed before the realities of the short reaction window available to ship drivers who operate in restricted waters. One possibility is to come up with technical fixes that allow you to move your force sufficiently offshore to create some breathing space and allow counter-battery fire to be employed. However, if you look at the realities of the world we live on, the areas we most need to operate in are not all in deep blue water with infinite sea room to operate in. Instead, they are mostly narrow seas in which stand-off capability may, in fact, take you out of the fight and moving into the restricted area exposes large ships to numerous threats.

As I note in the CIMSEC post, one benefit of the use of smaller, cheaper ships with lots of drones is the increase it causes in targeting to your opponent. Given that no one in the fight has an infinite number of bullets, forcing your opponent to have to make hard choices on what to shoot at can only be good thing.

Influence squadrons, indeed! More platforms, more payloads, less money. Win,win, win.

War at Sea: Missile or Torpedo Firing Unmanned Surface Vessels

USV's that fire missiles must be part of the littoral or near coastal sea battle force . . . from about a year ago, US Navy tests first 11-meter missile-firing sea drone (video):

Now, a little bigger, please. Gimme a quad set of such armed USVs operating from a mother ship and I could make life miserable for someone. here. Here's part of the section on weapons for the USV: Oh, yes, the U.S. Navy has a USV "Master Plan"

• Torpedoes - Under consideration within the analysis were: CVLWT, Mk 54 and Mk 48 (ADCAP) Results: Torpedoes provide dual-use capability (ASW, SUW). Torpedoes could also conceivably have a “dial-a-blast” effect (detonate short of target to vary “shock” factor), but this option is not under development and is not strictly required for this mission to be effective.

• Missiles – Under consideration within the analysis were: Hellfire, NLOS-LS (NetFires), and Brimstone. Missile system capabilities that would be desired include: inertial navigation system, fixed box launcher (reconfigurable/modular), sealed units (fire-through end cap), network-able, discrimination achieved via multiple sensor sources, maritime environment operations capable ("marinized"). Results: Small low-cost missiles would be effective, but not at much greater range than larger torpedoes. Though more capable missile systems (e. g., longer standoff ranges, bigger warheads), they are more appropriately installed on and launched from the host ship. For the sizes of missiles reasonable for USV applications, there is little advantage to USV launch. In summary, the weapons of choice in this scenario appear to be torpedoes, since in the sizes capable of being carried on USVs, they alone have the range to engage the enemy outside the threat's counter-boat weapon range. There is also a much greater chance of the target being unalerted by a torpedo attack than a gun or missile attack.

NLOS-LS is toast, so that leaves smaller systems or making the USVs big enough to handle something larger than Hellfire or Brimstone. UPDATE: A very recent Rand report on U.S. Navy Employment Options for UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES (USVs) (PDF). Hat tip: Naval Drones, who notes:

The study analyzed the suitability of USVs for 62 different naval missions (yes, there are that many). USVs were compared to other platforms, including manned, and unmanned (UUVs and UAVs). According to the report, USVs are more suitable than other platforms in missions requiring longer endurance, higher power availability for payloads, and the ability to interface “cross domain” sensors and with other platforms above, on, and below the water.

Old news - Navy to add more "Coastal Patrol" ships to Arabian Gulf - Where are those Littoral Combat Ships? The World Wonders

Some older (May 10, 2013) news from the U.S. Navy:

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) will forward deploy five

USS Tempest - U.S. Navy photo by PH2 Danny Ewing Jr.

patrol coastal (PC) ships to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), Manama, Bahrain, May 14.

USS Tempest (PC 2), USS Squall (PC 7) and USS Thunderbolt (PC 12) are scheduled to arrive this summer. Two additional ships are expected to transfer next year. Commander, Patrol Coastal Squadron ONE (PCRON 1) along with a PC maintenance support team will also permanently move.

Five PCs have provided dedicated coastal patrol capability to the Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet (C5F) area of operation (AOR) since 2006. The PCs currently stationed in Bahrain are manned with unaccompanied, rotational crews. The forward deployment resulted in the decision to shift from 6-month rotational crews to permanent crews stationed in Bahrain allowing families to accompany their Sailors to Bahrain. The shift alleviates the significant strain placed on the crews and their families while ensuring capacity and capability.

A total of ten PCs will be permanently stationed in Bahrain by the spring of 2014. Three PCs will remain stationed in the continental U.S.

PCs provide the U.S. Navy with a fast, reliable platform that can respond to emergent requirements in a shallow water environment. The primary mission of these ships is coastal patrol and interdiction surveillance, an important aspect of littoral operations outlined in the Navy's maritime strategy.

These small ships are about 20 years old and have never been favorites of the "Big Navy" which even foisted some of them off on the Coasties until their worth seemed to gain some appreciation.

Brought back from the brink of retirement, Danger Room notes that these little ships get a "fix up" for deployment:

Under a crash program valued at $4 million, the Cyclones — five of which are permanently stationed in Bahrain — are getting a new laser targeting system for their twin 25-millimeter cannons. The Mk-38 laser kit gives the “high-precision accuracy against surface and air targets such as small boats and unmanned aerial system,” according to contractor BAE Systems.

Well, why belatedly note this move? It struck me as a nice counter-piece to this bit of fluff about one of the expensive "Littoral Combat Ships" out gathering experience in Southeast Asia USS Freedom Brings Littoral Combat Ship Capabilities To CARAT Malaysia :

The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) accomplished several firsts

USS Freedom - U.S. Navy photo by MC1 Jay C. Pugh

to participate in exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) with the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), June 15.

Freedom was the first U.S. Navy ship assigned to Commander Task Group (CTG) 73.1 to pull straight into Kuantan's shallow pier.

"Being pierside at Kuantan Naval Base gave us the chance to make an instant impression, and show regional navies what this ship can do and how we can contribute to mutual interests at sea," said Cmdr. Timothy Wilke, commanding officer.
***
Fast, agile and mission-focused, LCS platforms are designed to operate in near-shore environments and employ modular mission packages that can be configured for three separate purposes: surfaces warfare, mine countermeasures or anti-submarine warfare. Freedom deployed to Southeast Asia with the surface warfare mission package.

During the at sea phase, additional events that will highlight Freedom's capabilities include an inbound fast attack craft drill; a search and rescue exercise with Freedom's MH-60R helicopter; and a visit, board, search and seizure drill with Freedom's embarked surface warfare mission package boarding team.

You might note that the LCS can land helicopters whereas the Cyclone-class PCs cannot. One would think that might be nice-to-have feature out there in the Arabian Gulf - but perhaps it is felt that there is enough air support in the vicinity that the PCs don't need to bring their own.

While I am aware that the LCS mission is part of a learning curve, it seems to me that if the Navy wants to practice the LCS's intended missions, playing with the small boys in a more realistic environment ought to send an LCS to share the fun in the Arabian Gulf - perhaps simply providing helicopters coverage for the PC crowd if nothing else. Then the CO of the LCS will have a chance to make a "instant impression" in some way other than mooring to a pier.

The Littoral Combat Space Holder - I Mean "Combat Ship" Goes to War . . . for continued funding

CDR Salamander does the Full Monty of exposing the "The LCS Full Court Press".

Think continued funding and all will be as clear as The Emperor's New Clothes.

Well, as for me, I enjoy a fast ship as much as the next old SWO, but I think we ought to have some truth in advertising.

The single most valuable and powerful weapon system currently available to the LCS is . . . the MH-60 helicopter.

It seems to me then, the most powerful LCS is not the high speed little launch platform in the foreground of the picture below, but that big, slow thing next to it, which could hold a whole lot more MH-60's (with different mission packages) and other things like Marine Sea Cobras (which reminds me - why doesn't the Navy have it own Sea Cobras?).

I mean, if you want high speed and the ability to operate in the shallow waters of the world, those helicopter things work pretty well. And they don't cost $300 million each.

And if you want to go fast and look scary in shallow water, there is a school of thought that says you ought to explore this old technology:

Syria to Get Advanced Anti-Ship Missiles from Russia

Not good news Syria to Get Advanced Anti-Ship Missiles from Russia:

Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has announced that his country will sell advanced anti-ship cruise missiles to Syria, as agreed in a 2007 contract. Israel has expressed concern that the deal will endanger Israeli ships in the Mediterranean. The United States had also objected to the deal.
***
The missiles that will be sold to Damascus are P-800 Yakhont supersonic cruise missiles. They can carry a warhead weighing up to 200 kilograms, have a range of 300 kilometers, and are difficult to detect due to their ability to cruise near the water's surface.

Silliest quote:

Serdyukov said Russia sees “no cause for the concern” expressed by the U.S. and Israel. Russia does not believe that the weapons will make it into terrorist hands, he said.

Right.

About the P-800 here.

Multi-Purpose Offshore Patrol Vessels

I think in keeping with my call for using something other than billion dollar Aegis cruisers and destroyers for patrolling against pirates who use $400 boats, AK-47s and RPGs - see Department of Cheaper Pirate Fighting and links therein, blogger Brickmuppet sends along a link to a company developing a multi-purpose Offshore Patrol Vessels.

It might be a little more sophisticated than my original anti-pirate vessel, pictured nearby with the tank on it. Though the thoughts are the same.

According to "V.Navy" the French built vessels can be used for several things:

V.Navy aims to design multi purposes vessels able to fight against piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing (coast guard vessels), but also able to be used as Fast Supply Intervention Vessel.
***
These kinds of patrol vessels are completely suitable and legitimate to monitor dangerous areas like Gulfs of Guinea or Aden.

And V. Navy's brochure:

Offshore Patrol Vessels V.Navy has been specially design to fulfill specific missions to fight against piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing (coast guard vessels), but also able to be used as Fast Supply Intervention Vessel.

Able to accommodate 28 persons dedicated to the mission, it can as well transport 24 passengers.

Control station situated at bridge level is composed of two control stations, forward and aft, a debriefing room is also incorporated in the design.

Its great autonomy of 10 days is provided through its large fuel and fresh water tanks.
***
Main dimensions are:
Length between perpendicular : 46m
Length overall : 48.5m
Beam max : 9.5m
Summer Draft : 1.8m
***
WaterJets with Quadruple marine diesel main propulsion engines will be utilised for the propulsion system to reach a maximum speed of 28.5 knots
***
A. DECK EQUIPMENT
1. Typical equipment
OPV has typical deck equipment for FSIV operation:
- crane
- anchor winches
- timber covered deck
- 4 x International reefer connections (415V AC/50Hz) (E1 says: Plug in comm van! It's modular!)
2. Specific equipment
One launching ramp is constructed integral to the vessels transom to cater for RIB deployment. There is an extended hinged launch gate at the bottom of the ramp that will be deployed with manual hand winch. A single fixed electric capstan winch is installed on the side bulwark area adjacent to the RIB's. Removable pulley stations will be placed at the top of the launch ramp and in front of the second RIB
cradle for retrieval purpose.

A heavy duty portable platform is constructed to fit into the launch ramp for crew boat operations. The insert provide flush deck and transom for normal crew boat operation and lock in place by simple and robust pin type system for easy removal.

B. BALLISTIC
1. Protection
Ballistic protection is achieved by Dyneema and is included to the bulkhead of accommodation and fuel tank areas.
2. Weapons stations
The vessel structure is suitably strengthened to support the weapon and its stresses and a heavy insert plate is fitted to the deck. pedestals or mounts are client supply included.
Arms store is provided on main deck

It looks to me like there's room for one boat to have the aerostat for long range radar detection, too (see here and CDR Salamander here.) And I'm sure the V boats could handle UAVs. USVs and all the other alphabet soup of unmanned ship extenders just fine.

Add to the squadron a helicopter capable ship and you are off to the littorals. Even the "idiots-go-to-sea crew" on Whale Wars can operate a helo, after all.

Are these boats or the ones I've suggested to be cobbled from offshore oil supply vessels meant to take on mines, submarines, aircraft or fleets of warships? Well, no, they are not. But for fighting pirates and terrorists in littoral waters, they may be just the thing.

Somali Pirates: Somalia Convoy Corridor?

Well, here's a proposed solution to inshore Somali piracy as reported here:

Somalia's new unity government will solve the problem of piracy by creating a maritime corridor through the country's territorial waters, the Somali ambassador to Russia said on Thursday.

Mohammed Mahmud Handule said at a RIA Novosti news conference that the Somali government had already worked out the legal and technical issues involved in opening the corridor.

"The new [Somali] government will rigorously work on this [problem of piracy]," he said. "We want to create a corridor where from Point A all ships will be put in groups of 5-7, and then our friends, including Russia, will escort them to Point B. Vessels not travelling through that corridor will be considered pirates or poachers."

And we all know what to do with pirates and poachers . . .

Wait, who said "You are either with us or against us?"

Navy to Roll Out New Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package

This might be interesting Navy to Roll Out New Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package:

"The delivery of the anti-submarine warfare mission package will provide the Navy with a persistent large area detection capability, through our advanced unmanned vehicles and bi-static ASW systems," said Sandel. "Tomorrow we will take a critical step forward in support of assured access in the littorals for U.S. Joint Forces."

LCS can be configured to deploy with any one of three interchangeable mission modules: the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) module; mine countermeasures (MCM) module and surface warfare (SUW) module also know as mission packages. The first ASW mission package (MP) will use several different vehicles -- MH-60R, unmanned air vehicle, unmanned surface vehicle -- and associated sensors -- towed array sonar, remote towed active source, USV dipping sonar, multi-static off-board source -- to detect, classify, localize, track and engage submarines in the littoral environment.

More here:

The aircraft and water vessels will tow acoustic sensors capable of discerning quiet diesel-electric submarines in the cluttered underwater environment, says Capt. Michael Good, program manager of the LCS mission modules.

The unmanned systems will allow the Navy to hunt those submarines without putting ships in range of torpedoes.
“We don’t want to be in a knife fight in a phone booth,” says Good.

The remote multi-mission vehicle will chug through the water like a snorkeling submarine. It will release one of two medium-frequency sonar arrays that will emit an acoustic signal or listen for returns as they are towed along.

The plan is for the two RMMVs to work in concert as a bi-static acoustic detection system. The first vehicle will deploy an active sonar array and the second will tow a hydrophone array.

Likewise, the unmanned surface vehicles will carry one of two payloads, an active low-frequency sonar, called the multi-static off-board source, or a hydrophone towed array. The USV also can deploy a modified dipping sonar typically operated from helicopters. The Navy is looking at several variants, including Raytheon’s AN/AQS-22 airborne low-frequency sonar and the HELRAS DS-100 made by L3 Communications.

“We’re looking at both possibilities down the road,” says Good.

Armed with the MK-54 torpedo, the manned Sikorsky MH-60R helicopter will act as a “pouncer” to attack the threat submarine after detections are made by the sensor payloads on the unmanned vehicles, he says.

Outfitted with an electro-optical infrared sensor, Northrop Grumman’s Fire Scout rotorcraft will perform as a communications relay platform to extend the distance that the unmanned vehicles can operate away from the LCS. In the future, it could be equipped with other anti-submarine warfare sensors, says Good.
***
The first ASW mission package, set for delivery in September, will not have the RMMV and its two towed systems. The second package, whose delivery date has not yet been determined, will include the underwater vehicle and the towed systems.
“We’re very eager to get the integration work done on the unmanned surface vehicles and get them to sea,” says Good. Testing will be completed this spring.

This fall, Good plans to evaluate the full mission package at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center, an instrumented range in the Bahamas. Because the range isn’t large enough or deep enough to fully test the systems at the lower frequencies, he is also working on locations at sea where the use of active sonar will be permitted.

The requirement for the LCS anti-submarine warfare package was to be able to hunt quiet diesel submarines in the littorals. But some of these systems, particularly those employing lower frequencies, will work in deep water, says Good. His intention is to operate as many of the systems in deeper ocean to evaluate potential applications for anti-submarine warfare.

But first he has to find a way to set sail with the technologies. With LCS delayed and facing an uncertain future, he is working to identify a substitute vessel that could take the mission package to sea for testing.

“I just have to be a little more creative in how I get to sea,” says Good, who is contemplating options including barges.

Navy Not Going to Do Littorals? Or Just Waiting for Right Ship?

David Axe asks whether the Navy Already Shifting Away from Shallow Waters? :

...Bob Work, a naval analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, says the Navy is shifting its focus again, before the inshore fighters have even joined the fleet... The shift helps explain the recent, apparently sudden, decision to axe the costly DDG-1000.
***
LCS is a lot of things -- fast, maneuverable, fairly inexpensive even after big cost overruns -- but it is not heavily armed, heavily armored or built to fight after heavy damage. LCS is meant for the fairly benign shallows, exclusively, and if that's a place that doesn't exist anymore, then LCS is a ship without a home.

Look, I understand the potential threats to the LCS and I question its costs and lack of armament - but there is danger in the littorals that only some sort of surface ship can address. It is my view that not building the LCS or the DDG-1000 could simply be a recognition that, due to the threats noted in the piece referenced in the linked Axe article, there needs to be a serious rethinking of what the U.S. needs for the nasty type of littoral work that billion+ dollar cruisers and destroyers shouldn't be doing while not tying up vast amounts of shipbuilding funds that could be used to maintain the "Blue Water Fleet" while giving the force something to use in the littorals.

It is clear to me that subs can handle a lot of the stuff the "stealth destroyer" appears to have been designed for. See here. Why spend tons of money to reinvent the stealth already provided by our undersea force?

My thinking is that the Navy needs to think about tender-like mother ships and lots of cheaper,smaller, faster, armored and well armed warships for the shallow water work. Use Admiral Cebrowski net working concepts and put some young gun SWOs out there to invent the new tactics for the littorals. Free the cruisers and destroyer to get back to their work.

This force ought to be the pirate fighting/sea lane protecting/offshore oil platform security/drug interdicting/inshore patrol group. Get together with the Coast Guard and really decide on a joint platform with easily swappable components.

Use as much COTs gear as you can.

Plan on on, say, 5 ship squadrons with 20 officers and 30 chiefs and 100 sailors who are not primary maintenance workers but gunners and system operators. Design excellent crew protection - leave habitability issues for the "mother ships." Have a couple of different size mother ships and be flexible depending on the threat level.

Treat these small boys like surface bound fighter aircraft - don't expect them to go off by themselves for 6 months - deploy them like an aircraft carrier and her embarked squadrons.

Co-opt a SH-60S squadron (or a big detachment) and work on inshore hunter-killer concepts and tactics. Hell, see if you can steal an AC-130 gunship (or develop something like it) and work on getting it "mothership" launch and recovery capable.


The goal is to control the sea, not surrendering pieces of it to our enemies because it's "too hard" to do it right.

UPDATE: Support for my thought? From SECNAV:

Building a more cost-effective Fleet through wiser investment will help us with the financial challenges we face, but it is only one part of the equation. The second part is figuring out what we need to buy, how to better choose the types of ships we need, and how many ships of each type we need to build. The key question for strategists and national security scholars to consider is, therefore, the following: How do we optimally match what we buy with the most likely threats we see in the future?

Answering this question requires an assessment of the risks we are likely to face, and an assessment by military and political leadership as to what levels of risk are acceptable. The right portfolio of ships will reflect these assessments. The Navy must constantly calculate and mitigate risk due to competing demands and resource constraints. Many important questions arise from this discussion of risks, to include: Are we prepared for all of the unknowns? Are we well-prepared for potential small-scale engagements that we might face? Is it wise or prudent to adopt a strategy of taking more risk in large conflicts that are of low probability?

UPDATE: The "mothership" (tender) of the PGs from the past in a post at The Bow Ramp. There is little new under the sun...

UPDATE: A little PG history.My understanding is that these were rough riding ships that wore out their crews in heavy weather.

A real littoral combat ship goes to sea with an Army crew

Quietly, after the "as big as a WWII destroyer" LCS gets an operational test, a design far closer to what many of us thought the LCS should be also gets a test, as set out here:

DID has covered the late Vice-Admiral Cebrowski’s legacy at the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation. With the formal roll-out of the 88-foot Stiletto stealth ship and its cutting-edge “M-Hull” wave-damping design, that legacy takes another step forward. The Stiletto is part of Project WolfPac, which aims to test new concepts of shallow-water and riverine warfare organized around swarms of smaller, affordable ships linked by communications.

Give me a couple of "mother ships" for I would take one of these into harm's way...

Mship home page. "WolfPAC" PointPoint presentation can be downloaded from this page.

WolfPAC:

Wolf PAC – Command & Control of Distributed Operations
Technological and operational means to command & control large numbers of networked unmanned systems (>50) geographically dispersed

And it's not a "mother ship", it's an "Operations Support Vessel." See slide 40...

UPDATE: Army crew:

Army Sgt. Ronnie Monroe and Army Pfc. Eric Gilbert perform pre-underway checks on Stiletto while pierside during a refueling stop, June 12, 2008. Stiletto is a one-of-a-kind, experimental vessel designed for high-speed special operative amphibious insertions. Stiletto is operated by Army mariners from the 7th Sustainment Brigade, 10th Mountain Division of Fort Eustis, Va. Joint Task Force Guantanamo conducts safe and humane care and custody of detained enemy combatants. The JTF conducts interrogation operations to collect strategic intelligence in support of the Global War on Terror and supports law enforcement and war crimes investigations. JTF Guantanamo is committed to the safety and security of American service members and civilians working inside its detention facilities. ID: 98604 Date Taken: June 12th, 2008 Location: Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, CU Photographer: Petty Officer 2nd Class Nathaniel MogerView Portfolio
Joint Task Force Guantanamo Public Affairs More Photos from Joint Task Force Guantanamo Public Affairs

UPDATE:

Video from MShipco.com- I hope they don't mind me borrowing it.

Coastal Warfare becomes "Maritime Expeditionary Security Group"

Noted here:

Capt. Dave McDuffie is commodore of Naval Coastal Warfare Group 2, which, under an Oct. 1 realignment, will become Maritime Expeditionary Security Group 2. He said the training has involved about 1,000 sailors — with surges of reservists bumping the numbers higher — at Cheatham Annex, Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek and Fort Pickett, all in Virginia.

A major element has been establishing command and control of the disparate units and testing new unmanned aerial vehicles such as the hand-held, 10-ounce Wasp, which is launched with a slingshot.

Under the realignment to an expeditionary security group, McDuffie said, the coastal warfare squadrons will be merged with maritime security squadrons, which means decommissioning two Reserve boat squadrons.

“We had to reorganize the billets, and some people had to move,” he said.

Another potential change in the works could mean an assignment to these expeditionary combat units will become a “closed loop,” where sailors stay rather than go back to the fleet after a tour.

Inshore Boats Units cover Maritime Security Operations boarding teams

Reported here:

Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron (NCWRON) 5 Oil Platform (OPLAT) Detachment provided security for USS Chinook (PC 9) and USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332) visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) teams while conducting Interaction Patrols (IPATS) Aug. 5 in the north Persian Gulf.

NCWRON 5 OPLAT Det.’s mission is to protect VBSS teams while they are maintaining security in the region’s shallow waters.

“We assist in Maritime Security Operations (MSO), in particular, in the shallow water region of the area,” said Lt. Cmdr. Mike Merrill, Inshore Boat Unit (IBU) 51 officer in charge. “Using our patrol craft, we provide a 360-degree ring of security around boarding teams as they board commercial vessels.”

VBSS and IPATS are elements of MSO that help generate support and awareness amongst commercial vessels sailing in the region of the coalition's efforts to ensure a safe and secure maritime environment. Coalition forces also conduct MSO under international maritime conventions to ensure security and safety in international waters so that commercial shipping and fishing can occur safely in the region.

In addition, the sailors are training Iraqi Marines to take over the job-
Photo caption:

Photo - Gunner's Mate 2nd Class Nickel Samuel assigned to Mobile Security Detachment (MSD) 24 observes Iraqi marines participating in a live-fire exercise. MSD-24 is training Iraqi marines to maintain security in and around the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminals, which provides the Iraqi people the opportunity for self-determination. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Christopher T. Smith.