China's Naval Militia

Very interesting read from Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy for the U.S. Naval War College's Chinese Maritime Studies Institute on China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA (pdf):

Photo source: Tankler News

Amid growing awareness that China’s Maritime Militia acts as a Third Sea Force which has been involved in international sea incidents, it is necessary for decision-makers who may face such contingencies to understand the Maritime Militia’s role in China’s armed forces. Chinese-language open sources reveal a tremendous amount about Maritime Militia activities, both in coordination with and independent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Using well-documented evidence from the authors’ extensive open source research, this report seeks to clarify the Maritime Militia’s exact identity, organization, and connection to the PLA as a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA.
***
Like a tetherball, the PAFMM may be sent in many different directions when contacted by different players in the Chinese security space, but is often directed by the PLA and always remains tied to the PLA.

Read it, download it and think about it.

China is a power using asymmetric tools in a world they want to change to be more China-centric.

More good stuff from James Kraska on The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia:

China operates a vast network of fishing vessels that form a maritime militia equipped and trained to conduct intelligence, communications, and targeting support for the People's Liberation Army Navy. Fishing vessels normally are exempt from capture or attack in the law of naval warfare unless they are integrated into the naval forces, but distinguishing between legitimate fishing vessels and maritime militia during naval warfare is virtually impossible.

You can download a copy at the link, but the key is that China continually is walking that narrow lawfare line.

Things to Think About: China's Anti-Satellite Weapons

U.S. AEHF satellite (USAF image)

For a country like the U.S.,  highly dependent on its satellites for a whole bunch of things including many defense missions, here is a worrisome development "China "successfully" tests an anti-satellite weapon

China has successfully placed low earth orbit satellites at risk, Air Force Lt. Gen. Jay Raymond told an overflow audience at the annual Warfighters Lunch at the Space Symposium here. “Soon every satellite in every orbit will be able to be held at risk,” the head of the 14th Air Force said.

China has claimed the test was for missile defense and noted that nothing was destroyed in the test. Raymond clearly wanted to dispel that impression and make certain everyone in the space community knew that China had executed another ASAT test and that it had worked.

More here.

Should we be surprised?

Only if we have been burying our heads in the sand.

A James Bond movie ASAT

I mean even in 1967 the James Bond movie You only Live Twice featured a satellite killer of sorts. The USSR had an ASAT program in starting in the 1970s.

The U.S. has a program since the 1950s. It was mentioned in the Tom Clancy book Red Storm Rising.

Think about it. Asymmetric warfare means finding ways to exploit your potential adversary's weak links. So China develops  ballistic missiles designed to take out carriers at sea, strengthened artificial islands ("unsinkable aircraft carriers"), numerous high velocity anti-ship cruise missiles mounted on low cost platforms, numbers of small relatively inexpensive submarines,  huge numbers of sea mines, and . . . anti-satellite weapons.

How does the U.S. counter? Drones. Satellite substitutes (high flying, long endurance drones), ballistic missile defense weapons.

Innovation.

One jump ahead.

Interesting post at Global Security from 2013:

China reported the launch of a suborbital high altitude sounding rocket [more properly, a vertical probe] on May 13 to an altitude of more than (but of order?) 10000 km, and possibly of order 30,000 km. The launch came only days after US Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter unveiled what he termed a "long overdue" effort to safeguard US national security satellites and to develop ways to counter the space capabilities of potential adversaries.

"Long overdue."

Mr. Carter is now the Secretary of Defense.

A good deal of background from the Union of Concerned Scientists in a 2012 paper by Laura Grego A History of Anti-Satellite Programs.

Disturbing Report: Pakistani Naval Officers Tried to Hijack Ship to Attack U.S. Navy

Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal reports AQIS claims plot to strike US warships was executed by Pakistani Navy officers

Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) claimed that Pakistani Navy officers were involved in the failed attempt to hijack a Pakistani warship and launch missiles at US Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean.

AQIS' spokesman, Usama Mahmoud, made the claim today in a statement released on his Twitter account. Mahmoud's statement was obtained by the SITE Intelligence Group.

Mahmoud had previously claimed on Sept. 13 that AQIS executed the attack on the Pakistani warship, and published a diagram purporting to show the layout of the PNS Zulfiqar. He said that the attackers had planned to take control of the PNS Zulfiqar and launch missiles at US warships in the Indian Ocean. The PNS Zulfiqar carries at least eight C-802 surface to surface anti-ship missiles.
***
While Mahmoud's claim that Pakistani naval officers executed the attack on the PNS Zulfiqar cannot be proven, Pakistani officials and press reports indicate that at least some of the attackers are members of the Pakistani military.

Read the whole thing.

Yes, Bill is quoting a AQIS spokesman so take those comments for what it they are worth. However, even if they are mostly a tissue of deceit, there is still the underlying premise of the remarks - that AQIS thinks there is a way to hijack a modern technology to threaten U.S. naval forces operating in the vicinity.

Disturbing. On the other hand, U.S. naval forces are now forewarned.

General characteristics of the Zulfigar class can be found here:

The F-22P or Zulfiquar-class frigate (Urdu: ذوالفقار ‎ English: Sword class), is a general purpose frigate built by Pakistan and China for the Pakistan Navy (PN). They are an adaptation of the Type 053H3 frigates of China but include elements of the Type 054 frigates as well.
***
The frigate's primary surface-to-surface missile armament comprises eight C-802 subsonic anti-ship missiles carried in two launchers with four cells each, fitted between the foremast and the funnel.

Built by China. Those box launchers circled in the nearby photo contain the C-802's.

Info on the C-802 here:

The Ying-Ji-802 land attack and anti-ship cruise missile [Western designation SACCADE], is an improved version of the C-801 which employs a small turbojet engine in place of the original solid rocket engine. The weight of the subsonic (0.9 Mach) Yingji-802 is reduced from 815 kilograms to 715 kilograms, but its range is increased from 42 kilometers to 120 kilometers. The 165 kg. (363 lb.) warhead is just as powerful as the earlier version. Since the missile has a small radar reflectivity and is only about five to seven meters above the sea surface when it attacks the target, and since its guidance equipment has strong anti-jamming capability, target ships have a very low success rate in intercepting the missile. The hit probability of the Yingji-802 is estimated to be as high as 98 percent. The Yingji-802 can be launched from airplanes, ships, submarines and land-based vehicles, and is considered along with the US "Harpoon" as among the best anti-ship missiles of the present-day world.

Photo shows a C-802 launching from a from truck mounted box launcher.

Disposing of ISIS and Preemptive Thoughts

Yes, I know the President is due to speak on this topic, yet again, on the morrow.

Still, before that happens, I strongly suggest that you listen to our last Midrats show featuring Bill Roggio:

Check Out Military Podcasts at Blog Talk Radio with Midrats on BlogTalkRadio

And the one we did with Bill about 4 months before that:

Check Out Military Podcasts at Blog Talk Radio with Midrats on BlogTalkRadio

Somewhere in the more recent episode, it came up that fighting a group like ISIS and its spawn begins, like the journey of a recovering alcoholic, with an admission that you have a problem.

Well, not just a problem - but a problem that is interfering with your life and the lives of the people who depend on you.

My hope for this President is that he truly accepts that fact that ISIS and its ilk (henceforth "ISISI") are a problem that he needs to act on. In other words, that is not a matter of "optics" or "politics" or "my predecessor did it" or one of those "straw men" that his is wont to set up. I would like him to accept the idea that he may not be the "subject matter expert" in fighting ISISI and that he needs to reach out to those who have, by years of experience, gained that expertise. That even if he feels Israel is the source of all problems in the Middle East (it isn't, but he appears to me to feel that way), the solution is not ISISI. That if the Middle East is ready to adjust some borders of countries laid out by long gone empires post-WWI, ISISI is not the path to that. That the slaughter of innocents cannot be justified on the basis of some doctrinal differences between sects or religious groups. That if he can cobble together a coalition, it is one in which the laboring oar is local as much as possible, but with U.S. troops and air power if needed.

The world is a complicated and dangerous place. But we are a part of that - and we cannot pretend it will go away if we say some "magic words" or give a great speech.

                               Facta Non Verba

Oil Matters: Iran Is Thinking of Oil Terminal Outside the Arabian/Persian Gulf

Most of Iran's ability to get oil and gas products to the world outside the Arabian/Persian Gulf can be blockaded by putting a "stopper" in the entrances to the sea line of communication chokepoint that is the Strait of Hormuz. That "stopper" could be naval forces or mines or air power sufficient to threaten shipping trying to leave the A/P Gulf.

To an extent, the great worry to many of those outside of Iran who rely on shipments of oil and gas from the area has been that Iran might place its own cork in the mouth of the Gulf and cut off vital supplies, creating an international energy shortage and chaos in energy markets.

Other oil and gas producing states in the A/P Gulf have taken steps to reduce the risk of economic harm caused by Iranian action by developing alternative paths (by which I mean pipelines) to carry products away from the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. See the nearby map of such alternatives. Click on it to enlarge it.

Iran's potential to close the Strait of Hormuz is a double-edged sword, however, because a truly effective Iranian cork (perhaps using mines) in the Strait of Hormuz might also hobble the Iranian oil and gas export business which is also dependent on an open Strait. This limitation affects the ability of Iran to apply "energy supply" leverage on the world to get what it wants.

This Iranian dependency on an open Strait also constitutes a powerful strategic lever against the Iranian government when international disputes arise. Due to the alternative export routes developed by its neighbors and that are currently unavailable to Iran, it is possible that through - a blockade or other action closing the Strait to it - Iran could be boxed in the Gulf with oil and gas but no way to get it to market. No sales of such products could wreak havoc on the economy of Iran. A Iranian economy that gets bad enough could lead to internal strife in Iran and an overthrow of the present "republic."

Recognizing this problem, Iran is pondering a way to build itself a way out of this "box." One possibility is to set up an oil and gas port outside of the chokepoint Strait of Hormuz. The Tehran Times reports on just such a plan, in "Iran to invest $2.5b to build oil terminal at Sea of Oman port" :

Iran is planning to invest $2.5 billion to build a new crude oil export terminal at Jask Port on the Sea of Oman, bypassing the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the only way in and out of the Persian Gulf, the managing director of the Iran Oil Terminals Company announced on Saturday.

Most of Iran’s exports are funneled through the big terminal on Kharg Island in the northern Persian Gulf, then shipped southward in supertankers through the Strait of Hormuz, the Mehr News Agency quoted IOTC Managing Director Pirouz Mousavi as saying.

Iran also plans to lay a pipeline running from the Caspian Sea in the north to Jask, Mousavi added.

An older look at Iran's oil and gas infrastructure (2004)

Since a large number of joint oil and gas fields are located in the Persian Gulf, such a terminal will help the country expedite oil storage and export operations, he stated.

The Jask oil terminal will be comprised of storage facilities with a total capacity of 20 million barrels, loading and unloading docks, as well as onshore and offshore facilities, Mousavi said.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said in a meeting with domestic researchers in Tehran on Saturday that the diversification of oil export routes is one of the most strategic policies of his administration.


Mohsen Qamsari, the deputy director for international affairs of the National Iranian Oil Company, recently said that Iran is exporting an average of one million barrels of oil per day based on the November 2013 interim nuclear deal with the 5+1 group (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany).

Under the deal, the six countries undertook to provide Iran with some sanctions relief in exchange for Iran agreeing to limit certain aspects of its nuclear activities.

The two sides agreed to extend the nuclear talks until November 24, with a view to achieving a permanent accord.

Iran produced 2.762 million barrels of oil per day in July, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) said in its latest report. (emphasis added)

Bandar-e-Jask Area

So, Iran is sitting on a million+ barrels of oil that it can't legally export under its agreement in the interim nuclear deal.

It needs an alternative path for its oil and gas. It has a small port at Jask on the Gulf of Oman - so . . . it has now floated a plan to enlarge that port and get an alternative out of the Gulf.

The arrow on the nearby map points to Jask.

Jask is also home, since 2008, to an Iranian naval base which it has asserted gives it the ability control the Strait of Hormuz:

"We are creating a new defence front in the region, thinking of a non-regional enemy," Adm Sayyari told state run Iranian radio.

"In this region we are capable of preventing the entry of any kind of enemy into the strategic Persian Gulf if need be," he said.

Is this proposed oil port real? If so, is it a sound and smart strategic plan or a bargaining chip for the nuclear talks? Or both?

U.S. Navy's Asymmetric Payloads: "Mine and Undersea Warfare for the Future"

An interesting free article from the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings, Mine and Undersea Warfare for the Future by Joshua J. Edwards and Captain Dennis M. Gallagher, U.S. Navy:

Vice Admiral Conner recognizes that the United States’ and its allies’ current and future interests in national security will depend on a survivable, lethal undersea force. Such a force will consist of smart payloads and unmanned vehicles in an affordable manner to satisfy financial and industrial constraints. Technical advances have opened a floodgate of possibilities for asymmetric solutions, and clandestine, unmanned offensive mining is just the beginning. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has invested in an affordable idea to minimizing risk and task to traditional forces.

The Advanced Undersea Weapon System (AUWS) is a group of unmanned systems (sensors, effectors, communications, and vehicles) that can be pre-positioned to autonomously and persistently influence the adversary at a time and place of our choosing. The ONR capabilities are specific components of the AUWS program currently being developed in conjunction with a large unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV), a relatively few miniature torpedoes, and many distributed mine sensors to address the threat of adversary ships and submarines. The AUWS will give commanders the ability to deploy sensors and weapon nodes as a minefield while maintaining the capability to remotely activate and deactivate the weapons. It will also maintain positive control of lethal weapons throughout the operation to ensure the ability to recover unused weapons when desired. The AUWS is a lower-cost force multiplier that will force adversaries to invest in mine-countermeasures capabilities.

This concept provides asymmetric clandestine solutions that will free traditional platforms to be more effectively employed in a capacity for which they were designed. The AUWS provides commanders with unique operational and tactical options in contested waters without regard to air superiority or water depth, freeing them to act aggressively with autonomous inexpensive tools. Its modular design will allow operators to integrate a wide variety of sensors and weapons, thus tailoring the system for specific missions. Sensors of choice may include short-, mid-, and long-range devices. Kinetic options include submarine-launched mobile mine (SLMM) warheads, torpedoes (CRAW or Mk-54), AIM-9X missile, and projectile explosives. Commanders may also apply deliveries to distort an adversary’s tactical picture through deception (decoys, noisemakers, etc.), ISR packages, and real-time intelligence. The AUWS may be delivered from surface ships, submarines, or aircraft, or it may self-deploy from a friendly port within range. Unmanned vehicles to transport AUWS deliveries may be reusable or expendable.

While the initial focus will be offensive mining, future AUWS missions will include defensive mining, antisubmarine, antisurface, and antiair warfare, intelligence, surveillance. and reconnaissance, pre-positioning of electronic-warfare and strike assets, supporting protective safe havens for resupply, and political leverage through deterrence. This modular architecture allows warfighters, military planners, and engineers to work symbiotically to maximize current capabilities while simultaneously developing new configurations of the AUWS.***

There is discussion of a DARPA approach here:

No matter how capable, even the most advanced vessel can only be in one place at a time. U.S. Navy assets must cover vast regions of interest around the globe even as force reductions and fiscal constraints continue to shrink fleet sizes. To maintain advantage over adversaries, U.S. Naval forces need to project key capabilities in multiple locations at once, without the time and expense of building new vessels to deliver those capabilities.

DARPA initiated the Hydra program to help address these challenges. Hydra aims to develop a distributed undersea network of unmanned payloads and platforms to complement manned vessels. The system would innovatively integrate existing and emerging technologies to deliver various capabilities above, on and below the ocean’s surface. By separating capabilities from the traditional platforms that deliver them, Hydra would serve as a force multiplier, enabling faster, scalable and more cost-effective deployment of assets wherever needed.

Hydra intends to develop modular payloads that would provide key capabilities, including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Mine Counter-Measures (MCM). Each payload module would plug into a standardized enclosure that would securely transport, house and launch various payloads, while sustaining payload functionality for weeks to months. The Hydra system would emphasize scalability, rapid reconfiguration and maximization of payload. Naval forces could deliver the Hydra system by ship, submarine or airplane to littoral ocean zones (shallow international waters near shorelines).

More here:

“The climate of budget austerity runs up against an uncertain security environment that includes natural disasters, piracy, ungoverned states and the proliferation of sophisticated defense technologies,” said Scott Littlefield, DARPA program manager. “An unmanned technology infrastructure staged below the oceans’ surface could relieve some of that resource strain and expand military capabilities in this increasingly challenging space.”

Not every dangerous weapon needs to be . . . large, expensive and . . . dumb.

UPDATE: A NAVSEA presentation:

Developments in Mining by lawofsea

Interesting Question: "Could Asymmetric Warfare “Sink” the U.S. Navy?"

An interesting question (probably overstated in its headline) from The National Interest blog Could Asymmetric Warfare “Sink” the U.S. Navy? Starting with the Russian use of sunken ships to block the harbor mouth of Ukraine's Southern Naval Base, the authors write:

American ships are not adequately prepared for this tactic, and would have been hard-pressed to escape the bay. In the open sea, US Navy ships are powerful actors, protecting sea-lanes and projecting American power abroad. Near shore, however, their advantage is lost and they are vulnerable to asymmetric attacks. The US Navy must put more resources into preparing for and countering this sort of unconventional threat.

The answer is, of course, that the U.S. Navy, like every other force in the world, can be "vulnerable to asymmetric attacks." Like the Boy Scouts, the need is to "Be Prepared."

Is it a good idea to assemble a "Red Cell" to think about how these vulnerabilities could be exploited by a determined enemy? Sure. Just ask the folks who ran into the swarm attack of Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper at Millennium Challenge 2002.

On occasions when concerned with protecting an area or a unit, it is always a good plan to brainstorm with your team how you would attack that position or unit and make contingency plans on a "what if" basis. Some lessons we learn from flaming datum. I doubt waterside security now is "assumed" after USS Cole took its IED hit.

Given some of the ports the U.S. Navy operates in, a ship sinking in a harbor mouth may not even be intentional, but it can happen.

The good news is that our Navy is dispersed and a large portion is "out there" operating. This makes it unlikely that the entire fleet could be trapped by the sort of tactics employed by the Russians in the Ukraine matter.

As far as removal of a ship in a channel goes, our capabilities far exceed those of the Ukraine.

Now, if you want to talk about mining harbors and fairways, that's a really good topic.

However, there are always innovators who lurk about- remember this improvised diver delivery vehicle developed by some Tamil Tiger whiz kid? It was a torpedo powered by an outboard and guided by a diver with suicidal tendencies . . .

So . . . couldn't sink the whole Navy, but the unwary could pay a price.

Drone war payback? "Mystery ‘drone’ plane spotted near JFK"

Not the "drone" in question, but a design from Clemson U.

Could bad guys build a "remotely piloted aircraft" capable of interfering with flight patterns at major airports?

For those of you following al Qaeda's system of asymmetric warfare, you've got to wonder if this is a AQ "proof of concept" of a possible UAV attack when you see a headline like this one from the NY Post, "Mystery ‘drone’ plane spotted near JFK":

The pilot told investigators the object was flying at about 1,800 feet and looked like “a black drone about a meter square, with helicopter rotors on the corners.”

You might as well ask how such an attack might work. Well, a goose can bring down an airplane:

Bird strikes, or the collision of an aircraft with an airborne bird, tend to happen when aircraft are close to the ground, which means just before landing or after take-off, when jet engines are turning at top speeds.

The incidents are serious particularly when the birds, usually gulls, raptors and geese, are sucked into a jet engine and strike an engine fan blade. That impact displaces the blade such that it strikes another blade and a cascade can occur, resulting in engine failure.

You can take the concept from there.

You'll be pleased to note that "The Joint Terror Task Force is now probing the sighting of the mysterious flying object . . ."

Of course, it might just be some amateur out playing with his new toy.

Could you build a four rotor flying thingie? Heck, you can buy a small one here for about $100:

When the time comes . . . Mine Iran!

When I was a young naval officer, the gloves finally came off in the protracted war against what was then North Vietnam and we loaded up on various sea mines and took the war to the enemy (meaning those countries supporting NVN by sea) by sowing mines in the harbors of the North. Interdiction, blockade and power projection were all on display in one or two long days of dropping mines into the right place to shut down the North Vietnamese war material machine.

Now, there is at least one voice pointing out that the old favorite of the Iranians - the sea mine - could be used to halt their economy - for example. Commentary: "How to Defeat Iran" by George J. Gilboy:

One such option worthy of consideration: using mines around Iran's naval ports and oil-export terminals. This might create better leverage than a campaign of air strikes—without generating the death and destruction that could give Iran a cause for perpetual grievance. Mining would shut in both the Iranian navy and Iran's oil exports.

Modern U.S. naval mines are not indiscriminate weapons. They have programmable sensor-trigger mechanisms. These mines can be set to arm after a delay for a warning period, select targets based on a ship’s magnetic, pressure and acoustic signature, and they can be neutralized or cleared after a conflict.
***

But mining Iran's naval facilities could degrade Iran's ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz or attack U.S. forces on patrol. Iranian minelayers, submarines and missile-armed surface ships would be trapped in their ports or unable to return to them safely.

Beyond that, mining Iran's oil-export terminals would impose considerable costs on the regime. According to the IMF, oil-export revenues account for more than 20 percent of Iran's $475 billion gross domestic product (GDP). Assuming that 80 percent of oil exports by sea can be halted by mines, and accounting only for lost oil profits, the net impact could be a loss of Iranian GDP equal to $59 billion over one year. This would be the equivalent of reducing Iran's GDP growth from today's 3 percent to around negative 12 percent.

And the impact could be even greater. Iran also imports a large portion of its refined oil products. With imports also interrupted, the total lost GDP could be in the range of $66 billion in one year. In the context of an economy that now suffers from 11 to 13 percent unemployment, this would put intense pressure on an already-divided Iranian society and its rulers.

While the author of the piece is bent on seeing mine warfare as an alternative to other sorts of bombing, missile attacks and more, I am not sure he appreciates the all risks incurred in playing the mine war card.

On the other hand, there may come a time when options have played out, and when that time comes . . . unleash the mines of war!

And standby with all the other tools.

You can gain some information on U.S. sea mines at the Current Mine Inventory section of this larger NavSea web publication, "U.S. Navy Mine Familiarizer." You might note that the pictures above that are not drawing of mines aremine delivery vehicles.

You might also note that Iran doesn't seem to have much of a mine countermeasures force.  You know that just might make mines - asymmetric . . .

Just a thought worth thinking about.

Islamist cleric Anwar Awlaki 'killed in Yemen'

Short note for the end of a wasted life -BBC News - Islamist cleric Anwar Awlaki 'killed in Yemen'.

"Cleric?" Sure, in a death cult.

Terrorist.

A U.S. born traitor.

More coverage than he deserved.

Iran: "Stealth" Flying Boats Join IRGC Force As Squadron

A little (okay, much) overlap in the following videos showing Iran's latest asymmetric weapon system being deployed by the Iranian Republican Guard (IRGC):





In Western terms, these might be called "targets."

However, the Iranian Press TV report:

Iran takes the design and manufacturing of domestic-built military hardware to a new level by delivering stealth flying boats to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC).

"Bavar 2," is a radar-evading fixed-wing seaplane capable of patrol and reconnaissance missions. At least 11 flying boats joined the IRGC fleet on Tuesday after an official ceremony.

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said the new delivery was in line with the country's efforts to boast regional security.

"Equipping the country's Naval and Armed forces with advanced and modern weaponry will bolster the stability and security of the region and play an effective role in consolidating Iran's deterrent power," a statement on the Defense Ministry's website quoted Vahidi as saying.

The country has finished several major defense projects this year, despite several rounds of UN Security Council sanctions targeting Iranian military and financial sectors over Western allegations that Tehran is following a military nuclear program.

Iran will soon unveil and launch the second generation of Jamaran destroyers, Sina class frigates as well as a new generation of submarines, Commander of the Iranian Army Major General Ataollah Salehi announced last Wednesday.

In August, the Iranian Navy was equipped with four more domestically-made stealth Ghadir class mini-submarines.

And, actually, these mini-wing in ground thingies have been mocked before here.

UPDATE: Of course, one question for the IRGC is - suppose your initial stealthy attack doesn't send your hated enemy to the sea floor? And you lose almost all of your boats and WIGs. What's your follow up?

Just asking . . .

Memo to fleet. Order some more 20mm ammo and a few more Hellfires. Suicide attacks en masse are back in fashion for the IRGC.

And you might wanna rustle up a AC130-like version of the Osprey. Just for fun.