U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) for 19 June - 24 July 2019 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/SOUTHEAST ASIA Weekly Piracy Update for 18 - 24 July 2019

U.S. Navy Office of Naval I... by lawofsea on Scribd

U.S. Navy Office of Naval I... by lawofsea on Scribd

Not a Bad Idea: Trump tells other countries to protect own Gulf shipping

Trump tells other countries to protect own Gulf shipping

President Donald Trump on Monday told other countries to protect their own Gulf oil shipments, declaring that the United States has only limited strategic interest in the "dangerous" region.

In a pair of tweets, Trump said US aims regarding Iran boil down to "No Nuclear Weapons and No Further Sponsoring of Terror."

Stating that the United States is now the world's biggest energy producer, thereby weaning itself off decades of dependence on Middle Eastern oil, Trump said "we don't even need to be there."

And the US military should not be depended upon to keep the narrow sea routes along Iran's coast free.

"Why are we protecting the shipping lanes for other countries (many years) for zero compensation," he asked. "All of these countries should be protecting their own ships on what has always been a dangerous journey."

As for Tehran, Trump said, his only demand is that the country not pursue nuclear weapons and halts what the United States claims is backing for terrorist groups.

"The U.S. request for Iran is very simple," he wrote.
***
Trump's tweets add to his record of seeking a wider draw down of the US diplomatic and military footprint around the world.

Among the nations using oil from the Arabian Gulf area the French and the Brits have shared some of the sea lines of communication protection load, but since 1980 the laboring oar has been the U.S. Navy - which today has more sailors serving in that region of the world than anywhere else.

With the U.S. now perfectly capable of being energy independent, the vital national interest invoked by President Carter in the Carter Doctrine is no more, which is precisely what President Trump stated in his Tweets.

The Iranians count on U.S. reluctance to take Iran directly on or to directly confront Iran's effort to incite trouble throughout the area and to stage its small potato aggravations such as limpet mining ships or shooting down an unarmed drone. It's the "just not worth it" problem the U.S. faces - the aggravation level  of Iran's puny activity doesn't rise to the level of an existential threat to the U.S. Under the Weinberger Doctrine,  unless it does, there is no reason to go to war:

The Weinberger doctrine:

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
2. U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
3. U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
4. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.

You might note that the "burr under the saddle" approach the Iranians follow never really crosses that line which would justify the U.S. completely destroying Iranian maritime forces of the Iranian Navy or its Iranian Revolutionary Guard or taking out the dictators who head Iran.

Critics of the Weinberger Doctrine might invoke the lessons set out in Colin Powell's December 1992 Foreign Affairs article U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead
discussing the shift from a Cold War footing for the U.S. military to one based on dealing with "regional contingencies"

THE NEW NATIONAL military strategy is an unclassified document. Anyone can read it. It is short, to the point and unambiguous. The central idea in the strategy is the change from a focus on global war?fighting to a focus on regional contingencies. No communist hordes threaten western Europe today and, by extension, the rest of the free world. So our new strategy emphasizes being able to deal with individual crises without their escalating to global or thermonuclear war.

***
To help with the complex issue of the use of "violent" force, some have turned to a set of principles or a when-to-go-to-war doctrine. "Follow these directions and you can’t go wrong." There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous. First, it destroys the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy’s mind regarding our intentions. Unless part of our strategy is to destroy that ambiguity, it is usually helpful to keep it intact.

Second, having a fixed set of rules for how you will go to war is like saying you are always going to use the elevator in the event of fire in your apartment building. Surely enough, when the fire comes the elevator will be engulfed in flames or, worse, it will look good when you get in it only to fill with smoke and flames and crash a few minutes later. But do you stay in your apartment and burn to death because your plan calls for using the elevator to escape and the elevator is untenable? No, you run to the stairs, an outside fire escape or a window. In short, your plans to escape should be governed by the circumstances of the fire when it starts.

When a "fire" starts that might require committing armed forces, we need to evaluate the circumstances. Relevant questions include: Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?

As an example of this logical process, we can examine the assertions of those who have asked why President Bush did not order our forces on to Baghdad after we had driven the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. We must assume that the political objective of such an order would have been capturing Saddam Hussein. Even if Hussein had waited for us to enter Baghdad, and even if we had been able to capture him, what purpose would it have served? And would serving that purpose have been worth the many more casualties that would have occurred? Would it have been worth the inevitable follow?up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time thought not. They still do.

I left that last paragraph in as a reminder that even you are engaging in punitive strikes or limited wars there is always the potential of getting stuck in problems that are not yours to solve, as we now ought to know too well. You want unforeseen consequences? See the effects of the Somalia, Libya and Syria "humanitarian" interventions, though they were of limited scope.

Where's this leave the U.S.? The situation that caused President Carter to make up a doctrine for the Middle East has changed. The reality is that the U.S. has no "vital national interest" in the Arabian Gulf. Whether our "allies" do is unclear - if they do, they should be taking steps to protect them without depending on the U.S. taxpayers to provide that protection through its investment in its own military. We have other things and places to focus our attention on.

President Trump is correct in his statements about what we seek from Iran - no nukes (they threaten U.S. allies) and stop funding terrorism. If the Iranians want peace and security, they know what they have to do to get it.

The message for those who rely on oil shipped out of the Arabian Gulf? Grow up and look after your own interests. As Henry Kissinger said, “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests” The American interest in the waters off Iran is dwindling rapidly.

Part of an Old Debate Between the U.S. and Iran About the Strait of Hormuz: "Ships in Gulf should use Iran-defined routes"

Iran lays out its long-held contention that Iran has the right to control shipping entering the Arabian Gulf as reported by an Iranian "news" source in Ships in Gulf should use Iran-defined routes: official

In comments at a conference of maritime organizations in Tehran on Tuesday, Rear Admiral Fadavi said the Supreme National Security Council has passed a new regulation obliging all foreign ships, including American and British vessels, to take the waterway defined by Iran.

American vessels obey the Iranian rules when it comes to exercising sovereignty in the Persian Gulf, he said.

The general added that foreign vessels in the Persian Gulf do not dare to violate Iran’s instructions on the waterways.

He further explained that Iran Ports and Maritime Organization has the authority to announce the decision on new maritime routes, in accordance with the administrative and international regulations.

General Fadavi also expressed the IRGC’s readiness to detect and document environmental violations in the Persian Gulf through aerial and naval patrolling, as soon as the Ports and Maritime Organization and Iran’s Department of Environment authorize the IRGC forces.

In remarks in June 2016, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei underlined that security of the Persian Gulf region comes within the purview of the regional countries alone, and dismissed the US claim of seeking security in the region.

“The Persian Gulf security relates to the countries of the region which have common interests, and not to the US. So, security of the Persian Gulf region should be provided by the countries of this region itself,” the Leader said.
***

As Professor James Kraska noted in his 2013 article in the Virginia Journal of International Law, "Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz," the issue is complicated by the fact that neither Iran nor the U. S. is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which has a specific section pertaining to straits like the Strait of Malacca or, in this instance, the Hormuz Strait.

The standoff is especially complicated because the United States and Iran are not parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4 Both states have bypassed UNCLOS, the one multilateral treaty positioned to resolve their differences. Their status as holdouts colors every aspect of the bilateral legal relationship in the Strait of Hormuz. Their dispute is also layered and made more complex by both states subscribing to some terms of the treaty, but rejecting others. Without adherence to a common rule set, the rivals embrace incompatible views of the
source and content of the laws that govern passage through the strait.

As we now see in the South China Sea, part of the problem lies with there being two distinct types of passage through "territorial" waters, (1) innocent passage and (2) transit passage, with very different rules in play.

Under UNCLOS, a coastal state may declare an area out to 12 miles as "territorial sea." Under older law, the traditional "limit" of such claims was 3 miles. As Dr. Kraska puts it,

Ships of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.9 On the other hand, coastal States have broad and durable security interests in the territorial sea, and may prescribe and enforce laws that condition or preclude altogether the surface transit of foreign warships.

When overlapping territorial seas connect one area of the high seas or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to another area of the high seas or EEZ, this also constitutes a strait used for international navigation under the terms set forth in UNCLOS.10 States are entitled to exercise the right of transit passage through such straits used for international navigation. The regime of transit passage affords more rights to users of the strait than innocent passage. In most circumstances, innocent passage can be suspended by the coastal State; transit passage cannot be suspended. Transit passage also allows submerged transit and overflight of aircraft through the strait.11 Only surface transits are permitted for ships engaged in innocent passage. In the absence of acceptance of UNCLOS, however, the United States and Iran cannot use these clear rules as a guide and therefore must revert to legacy treaties, such as the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Territorial Sea Convention), 12 as well as customary international law, to determine their respective rights and duties in the strait.

As Iran would have it, unless a country has become a party to UNCLOS, there is no "transit passage" available to it. On the other hand, Iran also asserts it has the right to a 12 mile limit on its territorial waters. Using these two concepts, Iran argues that it has the right, applying rules applicable to "innocent passage" to control the "surface transit of warships."

The counter-argument is that, in order to invoke UNCLOS benefits (the 12-mile limit), you have to accept the totality of UNCLOS without "cherry-picking" those rules that benefit you while ignoring those that don't. Thus, if Iran wants to claim that "transit passage" not applicable in its "territorial sea" it is restricted to a 3 mile limit. Again, Dr. Kraska:

Iran is not a party to UNCLOS, and therefore is under no compunction to recognize legal regimes therein unless they have become customary law and therefore binding on all nations. Since Iran is not a party to UNCLOS, it does not enjoy a twelve nautical mile territorial sea and instead may claim only the historic three nautical miles.

While restricting Iran's territorial seas can be fun, the U. S. has its own issues with UNCLOS and has to fall back on asserting that "transit passage" rights are founded in customary international law which apply even if UNCLOS does not.

Since the United States is not party to UNCLOS, it does not automatically enjoy the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation if the coastal state also is not a party to the treaty. The United States counters that although the regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation is reflected in UNCLOS, it springs from customary international law, rather than being a creation of the terms of the treaty. Although transit passage is codified in article 38 of UNCLOS, it merely reflects long-standing state practice and opinio juris.
***
According to this view, even though the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, therefore, it nonetheless enjoys the right of transit passage through international straits as a matter of historical practice and a history of legal obligation among states. To put a final point on it, the United States rejects Iran’s claim of broad security competence over the territorial sea, since even article 16(4) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention precludes the coastal State from suspending innocent passage.

At the very least, it is better to say that dispute is not going to be readily resolved, though it is of vital import in a area of potential conflict. Both sides will argue their positions with vigor, but as Professor Kraska concludes in his article:

A coastal State, such as Iran, may not select a twelve nautical mile territorial sea over waters forming a strait used for international navigation, dispense with the navigational regime of transit passage, and instead insist on enforcement of innocent passage any more than the United States could recognize only a three nautical mile territorial sea and then demand to exercise the right of transit passage within it. Ultimately, it is unclear which of the two nations has the superior position to determine this legal landscape. Both the twelve nautical mile territorial sea and the right of transit passage through international straits have either entered, or are on the cusp of, customary international law. The barest tinge of irresolution to the matter means the onus is on Iran either to accept the post-1982 legal status quo or raise it as a challenge before a competent international tribunal.

Also of interest Iran's Maritime Claims.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 6 March - 5 April 2017

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 6 March - 5 April 2017 by lawofsea on Scribd

Getting Out of the Gulf? Letting the Arabian Gulf Countries Fend for Themselves in Letting Oil Flow

Behind the pay wall at Foreign Affairs is this think piece by Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and U.S. Military Strategy which is really not about military strategy, but about national strategy for the Persian Gulf. This means tracing our involvement back to President Jimmy Carter:

In January 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter used his State of the Union address to announce that in order to protect “the free movement of Middle East oil,” the United States would repel “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf.” Carter and his successors made good on that pledge, ramping up U.S. military capabilities in the region and even fighting the Gulf War to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from dominating the region’s oil supplies. Although Washington has had a number of interests in the Persian Gulf over the years, including preventing nuclear proliferation, fighting terrorism, and spreading democracy, the main rationale for its involvement has always been to keep the oil flowing.

The authors point out that the world has changed since 1980 and pose a multi-billion dollar question:

Is Persian Gulf oil still worth defending with American military might?

I should note that back in 2004, I posited the need to plan a curtailment of Middle East oil in Contingency Planning 101: Preparing for an world oil shortage:

[A]n oil shortage may impel more rapid adoption of alternative fuel sources, including natural gas, hydrogen, nuclear power. Coal, of which the U.S. has a lot, can be "gasified".

Gasification, in fact, may be one of the best ways to produce clean-burning hydrogen for tomorrow's automobiles and power-generating fuel cells. Hydrogen and other coal gases can also be used to fuel power-generating turbines or as the chemical "building blocks" for a wide range of commercial products.

The authors of the Foreign Affairs article suggest:

First, if the United States ended its commitment, how much likelier would a major disruption of Gulf oil be? Second, how much damage would such a disruption inflict on the U.S. economy? Third, how much does the United States currently spend on defending the flow of Gulf oil with its military? Finally, what nonmilitary alternatives exist to safeguard against a disruption, and at what price? Answering these questions reveals that the costs of preventing a major disruption of Gulf oil are, at the very least, coming close to exceeding the expected benefits of the policy. So it’s time for the United States to give itself the option of ending its military commitment to protecting Gulf oil, by increasing its investment in measures that would further cushion the U.S. economy from major oil disruptions. And in a decade or so, unless the region becomes far more dangerous, the United States should be in a position to actually end its commitment.

They suggest some sort of economic disruption:

Assessments of the U.S. economy’s sensitivity to oil prices also vary widely, but a reasonable estimate is that a doubling of the price of oil would shrink U.S. GDP by three percent—or approximately $550 billion. Of course, smaller disruptions would result in smaller economic losses, and the most catastrophic disruption—a long, complete closing of the Strait of Hormuz—would cause larger ones.

But the actual costs to the United States would be far smaller, because Washington could draw on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its emergency underground oil stockpile, to relieve the pressure on prices. The roughly 700 million barrels currently stored in the SPR form part of the more than four billion barrels held by members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organization founded in 1974 to coordinate collective responses to major oil disruptions.

What all of this means is that if the world experienced a massive disruption of oil from the Persian Gulf, a coordinated international release of various reserves could initially replace the vast majority of the daily loss. In all but the worst-case scenarios—far more severe than anything seen before—the impact of a severe disruption would be greatly cushioned.

What they do not discuss is the cushioning effect of the U.S.'s increased oil and gas reserves through the use of new drilling techniques and fracking - there is simply no mention in the article that the U.S. is thought by some to be the leader in energy reserves, as set out in in Oil Price.com's "U.S. Has World’s Largest Oil Reserves":

The U.S. holds more oil reserves than anyone else in the world, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela.

That conclusion comes from a new independent estimate from Rystad Energy, a Norwegian consultancy. Rystad estimates that the U.S. holds 264 billion barrels of oil, more than half of which is located in shale. That total exceeds the 256 billion barrels found in Russia, and the 212 billion barrels located in Saudi Arabia.

The findings are surprising, and go against conventional wisdom that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela hold the world’s largest oil reserves. The U.S. Energy Information Administration, for example, pegs Venezuela’s oil reserves at 298 billion barrels, the largest in the world. Rystad Energy says that these are inflated estimates because much of those reserves are not discovered. Instead, Rystad estimates that Venezuela only has about 95 billion barrels, which includes its estimate for undiscovered oil fields.

Some analysis is less aggressive in assessing U.S. reserves, because of a matter of "proven" reserves:

Proven oil reserves are those that have a reasonable certainty of being recoverable under existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology.

Let's parse that a little. The key part of the quote being "existing economic and political conditions," which exactly what we have seen play out with the reserves unleashed by fracking and unconventional technology being applied to the oil patch - as the price of oil from outside the U.S. rose, the ability and affordability of U.S. drillers to develop fields not cost effective under lower prices also rose. Now, as experience in using such techniques has grown, that "price point" has dropped, much to the regret of OPEC, which no longer has real cartel power over oil prices. See Why OPEC can't stop the shale oil industry:

Just as a cartel benefits from cutting output to raise price, it suffers from raising output to lower price. This would not be true if it could permanently eliminate competitors by temporarily lowering prices, but that is not the case here. The shale oil industry is resilient and flexible – just as it can be pushed out of the market by very low prices, it can promptly get back into the market when prices improve. So an extended attempt by OPEC to close down the shale industry is a lose-lose situation, and as such is very unlikely to happen.

Perhaps this is a minor quibble, concerning the article, but the point I am attempting to make is that the economic impact of U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf may not be anything close to what is predicted in the article. In fact, it may further increase U.S. development of its own reserves and in alternatives (hydrogen fuels?) which may not be cost-effective in "existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology" but which may spur new technology and which would certainly increase American jobs for Americans, which, after all, is a pretty important governmental concern.

Now, let's circle back a little.

The U.S. government, in part due to the "Carter Doctrine", has maintained a very expensive presence

in the Arabian Gulf.

The authors of the article pose the right questions - "Is it still in the U.S. interest to expend any effort in guarding those oil sea lines of communication that flow out of the Arabian Gulf? In whose vital national interests is it to keep sending aircraft carriers and other ships to attempt to preserve the status quo in the Arab/Persian Middle East? Is it time for the U.S. to remove itself from the Gulf? Whose interests would be served by our doing so?"

Would Iran establish the regional hegemony it seems to so strongly desire? Would the Chinese rush in to replace the U.S.? Or would the Chinese be concerned that the U.S. might suddenly free up a large portion of its Navy to be deployed to other areas that, 36 years after Mr. Carter's speech, are now of much greater interest to the U.S.?

I would argue that the new administration should take a close look at these issues and at the issues raised by the "You broke it, you fix it" attitudes in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have thrown a lot of time, talent and money into trying to convert those states into something that looks like us. It is time to rethink our goals and leave the inhabitants of the region to sort themselves out? Are we doomed to play Sisyphus and keep trying to push uphill the burden that no one in the area seems ready to take up? Is it time for us to engage in a little "benign neglect" and back off?

Is it time to postulate a policy built more on "punitive expeditions" than on nation building? See Intervention in International Law (1921) (pdf):

When the territorial sovereign is too weak or is unwilling to enforce respect for international law, a state which is wronged may find it necessary to invade the territory and to chastise the individuals who violate its rights and threaten its security.

Had we smashed the Taliban in Afghanistan for their support of al Qaeda and then left with a stern warning that we would come back again should they continue in their evil ways, would we have been better off?

If we had gone after Saddam Hussein in 1991 and punished him for his violations of international law, would we have had to go back?

With a new administration coming, now is the time to ask such questions, and set national strategy accordingly.

Energy Wars: Fracking Our Way Ahead

America's not so secret new weapon, discussed again at The American Interest "Shale Boom Has America Sitting Pretty"

By lessening our dependence on foreign sources of oil and gas, the shale boom has given us more options abroad, and in some cases . . . has given America more clout in diplomatic standoffs.

Almost all of this "shale boom" has occurred, by the way, by private companies working their "magic" on private property - in many cases with local or regional opposition to this development.

Interesting look at the U.S. development of its resources from Aljazeera "American power and the fracking boom: What impact will America's oil and gas boom from fracking have on US power and global geopolitics?":

Fracking is giving rise to a new energy abundance in the United States that has major implications for American policy in the Middle East and the debate over climate change. Over the past five years, daily oil production in the US increased 3.7 million barrels, while US net imports of oil dropped 44 percent. A revolutionary technique to tap into oil and gas reserves by drilling horizontally into underground shale formations and using liquids pumped at high pressure to open cracks in the rock, fracking is reshaping the contours of American power.
***
For the past 35 years, securing access to Persian Gulf oil and protecting the shipping lanes to keep it flowing has been a central tenet of American military policy. It is known as the Carter doctrine because President Jimmy Carter first enunciated the commitment in his 1980 State of the Union address.

Historian and author Andrew Bacevich hopes that the shale oil and gas boom from fracking will cause a strategic rethinking of the Carter Doctrine in the United States. "What the new energy regime could do would be to make it clear that the United States does have choices and one of those choices will be to lower our profile in the Middle East more broadly and in the Persian Gulf specifically," he says.
***
According to Jeppe Kofod, a member of the European Parliament and representative from Denmark to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, about one-third of US military spending, or about $200bn a year, can be linked to efforts to keep oil flowing.
***
. . . President Barack Obama and administration officials emphasise that the US commitment to safeguarding access to Middle Eastern oil will remain strong despite America’s shrinking reliance on imports from the region. In a speech at the United Nations last year, Obama said that the US is prepared to use military force, “to ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world. Although America is steadily reducing our own dependence on imported oil, the world still depends on the region's energy supply."
***
Anti-fracking activists are trying to prevent the construction of terminals and pipelines needed to transport and export natural gas and oil. Robbie Cross, a member of a local group trying to stop fracking in Pennsylvania, is clear about the rationale. "After you frack it has got to go somewhere," he says. "If we don’t have ways of moving it, selling it, distributing it, it’s not going to work."
***
Richardson and other proponents of shale exports argue that they can be used as effective instruments of American power to counter the Russians in Europe. The Continent relies on Russia for 30 percent of its gas supplies, and half transits via the Ukraine. Some countries like Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic get 70 to 100 percent of their gas from Russia. Hungary’s ambassador–at-large for energy security, Anita Orbán, argues that American exports of natural gas to Europe can help diversify supplies and undermine Russia’s energy leverage there even if the flow does not begin for a few years. (emphasis added)

The impact of fracking on China is discussed in the country that uses the greatest percentage of coal in the world, China, in this Atlantic article, America's Fracking Boom Comes to China: Deep inside Beijing's campaign to wean the country off coal .

What the EIA says:

Most of China's proven shale gas resources reside in the Sichuan and Tarim basins in the southern and western regions and in the northern and northeastern basins. EIA estimates from its most recent report on shale oil and gas resources that China's technically recoverable shale gas reserves are 1,115 Tcf, the largest shale gas reserves in the world.
***
China's NOCs are in discussion with several IOCs for partnering on potential shale gas projects in order to gain necessary technical skills and investment for developing these geologically challenging resources. CNPC and Shell signed the first PSC for the Fushun-Yonghchuan block of shale gas in the Sichuan Basin in March 2012. Shell also has partnered with Sinopec and CNOOC on two other shale gas plays. After investing $950 million between 2011 and 2013 on shale gas exploration in China, Shell plans to spend another $1 billion each year for the next five years to develop these resources. Sinopec is working with Chevron and ConocoPhillips to explore shale gas resources in the Qiannan and Sichuan basins, respectively. On the reverse side, Chinese NOCs have been actively investing in shale oil and gas plays in North America to gain technical expertise in this arena. (NOC=National Oil Company, IOC= International Oil Company)

It's interesting that people who have previously argued that we should not fight "wars for oil" in our own national interest are willing (1) to commit our national forces and dollars to possibly fighting "wars for oil" for the interests of other countries and (2) that people who who are opposed to U.S. fracking on environmental grounds seem to be totally okay with the status quo of pushing environmental damage off to those second and third world countries who are resource rich but not in the protesters back yards - and condemning others in the world to be dependent on the whims of leaders in Russia and other undemocratic countries.

Given the huge amount of pollution created by the use of coal by China (about 50% of the world's use) - see China's coal emissions responsible for 'quarter of a million premature deaths', it is to the benefit of the entire world that China be given all the assistance it needs to wean itself from coal and to develop its access to those much cleaner burning natural gas reservoirs.

It also behooves Europe and Japan that the U.S., Canada and Mexico develop LNG export facilities to allow the export of natural gas to offset the Russian and Iranian power in using the "oil and gas weapon" against Europe.

The U.S. government should be encouraging U.S. companies to help Poland to explore its shale gas reserves as an offset to the Russians. While the estimated levels of Polish shale gas are fluctuating, there is gas there and it is both Polish and European interests to develop it.

It's not just the U.S. that has the potential to be "sitting pretty" as a result of the the shale boom.

Oil Matters: Iran Is Thinking of Oil Terminal Outside the Arabian/Persian Gulf

Most of Iran's ability to get oil and gas products to the world outside the Arabian/Persian Gulf can be blockaded by putting a "stopper" in the entrances to the sea line of communication chokepoint that is the Strait of Hormuz. That "stopper" could be naval forces or mines or air power sufficient to threaten shipping trying to leave the A/P Gulf.

To an extent, the great worry to many of those outside of Iran who rely on shipments of oil and gas from the area has been that Iran might place its own cork in the mouth of the Gulf and cut off vital supplies, creating an international energy shortage and chaos in energy markets.

Other oil and gas producing states in the A/P Gulf have taken steps to reduce the risk of economic harm caused by Iranian action by developing alternative paths (by which I mean pipelines) to carry products away from the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. See the nearby map of such alternatives. Click on it to enlarge it.

Iran's potential to close the Strait of Hormuz is a double-edged sword, however, because a truly effective Iranian cork (perhaps using mines) in the Strait of Hormuz might also hobble the Iranian oil and gas export business which is also dependent on an open Strait. This limitation affects the ability of Iran to apply "energy supply" leverage on the world to get what it wants.

This Iranian dependency on an open Strait also constitutes a powerful strategic lever against the Iranian government when international disputes arise. Due to the alternative export routes developed by its neighbors and that are currently unavailable to Iran, it is possible that through - a blockade or other action closing the Strait to it - Iran could be boxed in the Gulf with oil and gas but no way to get it to market. No sales of such products could wreak havoc on the economy of Iran. A Iranian economy that gets bad enough could lead to internal strife in Iran and an overthrow of the present "republic."

Recognizing this problem, Iran is pondering a way to build itself a way out of this "box." One possibility is to set up an oil and gas port outside of the chokepoint Strait of Hormuz. The Tehran Times reports on just such a plan, in "Iran to invest $2.5b to build oil terminal at Sea of Oman port" :

Iran is planning to invest $2.5 billion to build a new crude oil export terminal at Jask Port on the Sea of Oman, bypassing the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the only way in and out of the Persian Gulf, the managing director of the Iran Oil Terminals Company announced on Saturday.

Most of Iran’s exports are funneled through the big terminal on Kharg Island in the northern Persian Gulf, then shipped southward in supertankers through the Strait of Hormuz, the Mehr News Agency quoted IOTC Managing Director Pirouz Mousavi as saying.

Iran also plans to lay a pipeline running from the Caspian Sea in the north to Jask, Mousavi added.

An older look at Iran's oil and gas infrastructure (2004)

Since a large number of joint oil and gas fields are located in the Persian Gulf, such a terminal will help the country expedite oil storage and export operations, he stated.

The Jask oil terminal will be comprised of storage facilities with a total capacity of 20 million barrels, loading and unloading docks, as well as onshore and offshore facilities, Mousavi said.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said in a meeting with domestic researchers in Tehran on Saturday that the diversification of oil export routes is one of the most strategic policies of his administration.


Mohsen Qamsari, the deputy director for international affairs of the National Iranian Oil Company, recently said that Iran is exporting an average of one million barrels of oil per day based on the November 2013 interim nuclear deal with the 5+1 group (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany).

Under the deal, the six countries undertook to provide Iran with some sanctions relief in exchange for Iran agreeing to limit certain aspects of its nuclear activities.

The two sides agreed to extend the nuclear talks until November 24, with a view to achieving a permanent accord.

Iran produced 2.762 million barrels of oil per day in July, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) said in its latest report. (emphasis added)

Bandar-e-Jask Area

So, Iran is sitting on a million+ barrels of oil that it can't legally export under its agreement in the interim nuclear deal.

It needs an alternative path for its oil and gas. It has a small port at Jask on the Gulf of Oman - so . . . it has now floated a plan to enlarge that port and get an alternative out of the Gulf.

The arrow on the nearby map points to Jask.

Jask is also home, since 2008, to an Iranian naval base which it has asserted gives it the ability control the Strait of Hormuz:

"We are creating a new defence front in the region, thinking of a non-regional enemy," Adm Sayyari told state run Iranian radio.

"In this region we are capable of preventing the entry of any kind of enemy into the strategic Persian Gulf if need be," he said.

Is this proposed oil port real? If so, is it a sound and smart strategic plan or a bargaining chip for the nuclear talks? Or both?

International Navies to Conduct Mine Countermeasures Exercise

In the world of mine warfare that may involve a narrow but valuable strait that is part of major sea lane vital to economies around the world, it's a great idea to get many interested parties together and practice counter-mine warfare and - well, golly, could you pick a better spot to hold an exercise of this type at this time than in the Arabian Gulf?

 Read all about it at International Navies to Conduct Mine Countermeasures Exercise:

In September, the U.S. Fifth Fleet will host its first International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX). With more than 20 nations participating from Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and North America, IMCMEX 2012 will be the largest of its kind ever in this region.

Operating together in a series of at-sea maneuvers, international air, sea, and undersea forces will respond to simulated sea-mine attacks in international waters and clear maritime routes to restore freedom of navigation. The cooperation of navies from around the world promises high tactical value for the ships, aircraft, and divers involved; while demonstrating international resolve in defending maritime security against potential threats.

IMCMEX 12 focuses on interoperability among navies and also among the triad of air, ship and undersea platforms that deliver full-spectrum mine countermeasures capability. The inherent flexibility of naval forces allows IMCMEX to demonstrate capability in additional areas also, including logistics, rendering assistance to mariners and coordination with commercial shipping. Conducted in two phases, IMCMEX begins with a symposium ashore in Bahrain followed by maneuvers at sea in key locations in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden. The at-sea maneuvers will involve a number of mine-countermeasure techniques for defending key maritime areas around the world, including strategic chokepoints. Forces from various nations will include minesweeping and minehunting ships, helicopters, and undersea vehicles; command and support ships equipped to serve as afloat bases for MCM forces; and naval dive platoons for mine detection and disposal.

IMCMEX 12 is a defensive exercise aimed at preserving freedom of navigation in international waterways in the region. The international community has a critical shared interest in the free flow of commerce via strategic waterways.

Note the use of "Arabian Gulf" in the release. It just irritates the heck out of some of the leaders of a nearby nation which borders the Strait of Hormuz.

UPDATE: Speaking of which, did you happen to come across this report from the ever reliable Iranian Fars News Agency about Iranian Mines, Missiles Can Easily Shut Hormuz:

In addition to its short, mid, and long missiles, Tehran has a range of other weapons it can use to close down the vital oil artery.

These include the hard-to-detect "rocket mine" that's triggered by the distinctive magnetic our acoustic signature of a ship, such as a US aircraft carrier, and then launches a propelled 600-popund warhead at the target.

Then there's the Russian MDM6, equally difficult to detect, that can tackle multiple targets. It lies on the seabed that fires a torpedo-like warhead when it senses a vessel.

Both these mines can be laid by Iran's Kilo-class submarines.
***
Iran isn't planning to fight a conventional war with the US and its allies. Rather it plans to employ what's known as asymmetric warfare, in which the weaker forces uses unconventional means to overcome the power of a strong opponent.

Asymmetric warfare is specially appropriate for the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz which are too narrow for the huge US warships to maneuver.

That means mines, anti-ship missiles and swarm attacks by small heavily armed boats.

By some accounts, Iran is believed to have as many as 3,000 sea mines. Some estimates go as high as 5,000, but no one knows the exact number as Iran never discloses all its capabilities and arsenals.

Whatever, it's the fourth largest sea mine arsenal in the world after the United States, Russia and China.

The EM-52 is probably the most dangerous mine Iran has. But the bottom-influence EM-11 and the EM-31 moored mine can also play havoc with surface craft.

So the United States and its allied naval forces face a formidable foe.
***

"Iran's ability to lay a large number of mines in a short period of time remains a critical aspect of the stated capability to deny US forces access to the Persian Gulf and impede or halt shipping through the strait," cautioned US analyst Anthony Cordesman in a March analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Iran has hundreds of anti-ship missiles, including 300 C-201 Seersucker weapons and 200 C-801 indigenous Noor systems, deployed along its long Persian Gulf coastline, as well as air-launched weapons and cruise missiles.

Breaking: Reported Attack on Merchant Ship in Northern Arabian/Persian Gulf

Unconfirmed early report of an attack on a merchant ship in the the NAG/Northern Persian Gulf:

Merchant Vessel attacked in position 2941N 04840E. DTG 083030LT Aug10. Vessels are warned that if passing within 100nm of this area they are to exercise extreme caution.

That's up near Iraq if I plot it correctly.

More details as I get them.

UPDATE: Sea robbers? Yes, if the attacks described here are the same as the above (again, unconfirmed):

Gunmen robbed the crews of four ships anchored off Iraq's southern oil hub Basra last week in Iraqi regional waters patrolled by the U.S. Navy, a Navy official said on Sunday.

The attackers targeted the Antigua-flagged Arminia, North Korea's Crystal Wave, Syria's Sana Star and the American ship Sagamore last Sunday and took personal belongings from the crews, Lieutenant John Fage of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet said.
***
The ship robberies took place about 145 km (90 miles) from the port at Basra, one of Iraq's largest cities and the heart of the oil industry.

Iraq is counting on oil sales, which provide about 95 percent of federal revenues, to supply the billions of dollars needed to rebuild after years of war, international sanctions and economic decline.

The attacks did not qualify as piracy under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea because they took place in Iraqi regional waters and not on the high seas.

Somali Pirates Abandon Captured Ship

BBC reports Pirates abandon sugar ship Syria Star seized off Horn:

Pirates have abandoned a sugar cargo ship a day after seizing it in the Gulf of Aden, the EU naval task force operating off Somalia says.

Two members of the 18,838-tonne Syria Star's crew of 22 Syrians and two Egyptians were injured during the hijacking.

EU Navfor said it was giving medical assistance to the two members.

MSC(HOA) report here:

Late at night on Friday 6 August the MV SYRIAN STAR requested medical assistance for two crewmembers that were injured in the initial hijack. The MV SYRIAN STAR was hijacked on Thursday 5 August in the eastern part of Gulf of Aden and is now free. Initial reports are that the pirates left the ship of their own accord utilising one on the rescue boats.

EU NAVFOR warship FGS SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN was in the vicinity of the MV SYRIAN STAR and sent her helicopter with a medical team onboard in order to assist the vessel. On arriving on the SYRIAN STAR they found a third member of the crew who had been injured in a work related incident. FGS SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN is standing by to conduct a medical evacuation if required.

EU NAVFOR Force Commander Rear Admiral Jan Thörnqvist said: ‘It is always good to hear a hijacked ship is free and now EU NAVFOR will give the injured crew members the medical assistance they require’.

EU NAVFOR is continuing to monitor the situation.

Why there might be an increase in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden in the next few days

Because the winds are down,making small boat operations easier. See Sailing: Gulf of Aden | Wind Charts.

UPDATE: From Office of Naval Intelligence Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report (Horn of Africa) for 10-17 February 2010:

5. (U) Forecast for the Week of 18-24 February 2010

(U) Weather continues to hinder small boat operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region as the northeast (winter) monsoon continues. However, it is likely that a few pirate groups will still get underway and try to hijack ships as shown by the continued activity in the Gulf of Aden. Recently, pirates have used currently hijack dhows as motherships to get underway and conduct operations. Mariners are warned that although we do expect a decrease in overall pirate activity in the HOA region, the possibility of pirate attack is still high, and mariners should continue to maintain all counter-piracy measures when transiting the area. Somali pirates currently hold fewer vessels for ransom than they have shown the ability to hold. This week, ONI assesses the risk of pirate attacks is moderate in the Indian Ocean. Please note pirates south of the equator in the Indian Ocean have demonstrated the ability to operate in the capability range of Medium. In addition, the area due east of Socotra Island out as far as 600NM off the Socotra is still considered high risk and mariners are warned to avoid this area if possible. The area northeast of Seychelles is also still considered very high risk. The Gulf of Aden remains a prime operating area for Somali pirates.

Somali Pirates: CTF 151 Stops Attack, Apprehends 8 "Suspects"

Reported by NavCent here:

Singapore Led Flagship Apprehends Pirates
By Commander Combined Maritime Forces

MANAMA, Bahrain – Coalition warships from Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 have apprehended suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The Tanzanian-flagged MV Barakaale 1 came under attack whilst transiting through the region and the timely response by the Master in alerting vessels in the region by bridge-to-bridge radio communication enabled ships from CTF 151 to come to its aid.

A SH-60B Seahawk helicopter, from USS Farragut, was immediately dispatched to the MV Barakaale and subsequently gave chase to the skiff which withdrew its attack.

During the pirate attack on the MV Barakaale 1, the crew adopted defensive maneuvers which resulted in a suspected pirate falling overboard whilst attempting to board the vessel. The skiff rescued their accomplice and attempted to board MV Barakaale a second time, but they were again unsuccessful.

The helicopter intervened and the skiff attempted to speed away. After repeated warnings to the skiff, warning shots were fired by the helicopter across the bow of the skiff, which resulted in its coming to a stop. A boarding team from USS Farragut boarded the vessel and the eight suspected pirates were taken aboard the Farragut. The quick action by CTF 151 and the crew of the Barakaale prevented a successful pirate attack from occurring.

Commander, CTF 151, Rear Adm. Bernard Miranda, Republic of Singapore Navy, applauded the effort by all parties in coordinating the response to the incident. “The merchant community has clearly demonstrated that they can defend themselves by being the first line of defence against piracy by adopting the recommended ‘best management practices’. A helicopter from USS Farragut was able to be dispatched and go to the aid of the MV Barakaale and subsequently gave chase of the skiff. The Master of the Barakaale did the right thing by not stopping his vessel and adopting non-kinetic measures like evasive maneuvers, to deter the pirates from getting on board,” Miranda said.

Persian Gulf: Pirate Attack

Report of an attack on a dhow in the area between UAE and Bahrain in Ship with Indian crew attacked by pirates in the Gulf:

A traditional wooden ship with Indian crew sailing from the United Arab Emirates toward Bahrain was the target of the first act of sea piracy reported in Persian Gulf waters in years, according to details of the attack that emerged on Sunday.

The Bahraini dhow was intercepted on Friday night by another ship with an armed crew, security sources said.

The four pirates threatened the six-man Indian crew with guns and assaulted them before taking their cargo of fish and mobile phones, sources said. The crew members said they believed the pirates were Iranian, but their nationality could not be positively confirmed.

The Indian sailors were unharmed. They were released and arrived in a Bahraini port on Sunday.

The case represents the first time an act of piracy has been reported inside the Gulf since the issue of piracy again came to the forefront of international attention off the Somali coast in recent years.

UPDATE: Speaking of Iran, the Iranian Navy is making another deployment to the Arabian Sea to counteract pirates, as set out here. Meanwhile, the IRGC "navy" asserts "mission accomplished" as a result of its deployment to the Gulf of Aden:

The IRGC Navy completed its trans-regional mission to provide security for the Iranian commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden, brigadier general Ali Fadavi said in a ceremony to welcome the naval unit.

During the 107-day mission, tens of Iranian and non-Iranian ships safely sailed across the Gulf Aden and pirates never dared to approach any commercial ships, Fadavi added.

He said the IRGC used special tactics to foil the pirates'' attacks on the Iranian ships; he added the IRGC once again proved its capability in establishing security outside Iran’s geographical borders.

The general went on to say that the U.S. and European countries have failed to repel the piracy threat facing their vessels, while their advanced naval fleets are present in the region.

No, really. Protecting "tens" of ships. And allowing the sun to rise and set all at the same time. It's a wonder.

Persian Gulf: Warning Flare

It was not, apparently, as some sources have it, warning shots (see here), but rather a "warning flare" - reported here

A Navy patrol ship in the Persian Gulf fired a flare to warn off three approaching high-speed boats late Thursday, the Navy said, and although a Navy spokesman said the boats were unidentified, U.S. news agencies reported they were Iranian.

The coastal patrol ship Typhoon was in the central Persian Gulf on its way north when it encountered the three boats, said Lt. Nathan Christensen, a spokesman for 5th Fleet in Bahrain. The Typhoon’s crew made what Christensen called “standard queries” over the bridge-to-bridge marine radio, warned the ships to stay away, and then fired the flare. As the Typhoon continued its transit, the three boats fell behind out of sight, he said.

Persian/Arabian Gulf: Pakistani Navy Thwarts Attack?

As reported in a very brief article here:

The Pakistan Navy (PN), working as part of the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) to avert maritime terrorist attacks, prevented an attack on a South Korean ship by a speedboat loaded with rockets on April 1, the PN said in a statement on Friday.

It said the PN ships “Tariq” and “Moawin” prevented the attack on the South Korean ship “Mt Sunshine Sky” earlier this month, as it sailed to Bandar Imam Khomenei, Iran, from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Iran's Revolutionary Guards at Sea

An Iranian power shift in the Arabian Gulf, with the Revolutionary Guard in charge, as noted in Iran's Revolutionary Guards patrol Persian Gulf, U.S. says:

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has taken command of Iranian naval operations in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. military has revealed.

That means U.S. naval forces are operating in the same waters as an organization the United States considers a major supporter of terrorist activity.
***
Afterward, in a written statement, the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet in Bahrain said, "Based on activities observed in the Arabian Gulf over the past several months, it appears the Iranian navy has shifted its patrol areas to the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman -- leaving the IRGC navy to provide the primary Iranian naval presence in the Arabian Gulf."

The move is of concern to the U.S. Navy, which has long viewed the IRGC's forces as more antagonistic than Iran's regular navy.

Mullen said Iran made a "strategic decision" in recent months to "essentially give the entire Gulf to the IRGC over the next four or five years."

"That's a big deal, because I think part of the leading-edge challenge with Iran is the IRGC specifically," Mullen said.

For the past several months, IRGC forces have occupied a sunken barge and crane near Iraqi oil terminals at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. The IRGC is using the site as an observation post for the area, which is patrolled regularly by U.S. and coalition naval forces.
***
The IRGC was formed in 1979. Under Iran's constitution, the corps' task is to protect the revolution, which generally means that it makes sure that domestic forces don't threaten the theocratic state, said analyst William Samii of the Center for Naval Analyses. The center is a government-funded think tank for the Department of the Navy in Alexandria, Virginia.

In contrast, the conventional forces are tasked with protecting the country's borders and guaranteeing its security.

The naval move "makes perfect sense," Samii said in a telephone interview.

In recent years, the Iranian military has recognized that, in a toe-to-toe fight with the U.S. military, "they'd get squashed," Samii said.

In response, it has been focusing more on alternative tactics, in which the Revolutionary Guards excel, such as setting mine fields and using large numbers of small boats either packed with explosives or manned by personnel carrying rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The thinking is that at least one would be able to get close enough to a large enemy military vessel to attack it, Samii said.

"Iran is trying to send a signal that it is ready for any military eventuality and that it is prepared to defend itself aggressively," he said.

On a related note, it appears the Iranian "Kilo-class" submarines have been underway, according to Navy Times:

Officials aboard the cruiser Vicksburg spotted and photographed two surfaced Iranian Kilo-class submarines in the Persian Gulf a few weeks ago, the ship’s skipper told Navy Secretary Donald Winter during a visit to the ship on Saturday.

The Russian-designed diesel-electric attack subs were tracked and photographed by sailors onboard the Mayport, Fla.-based ship, said Capt. Chip Swicker. Crew members showed Winter the photographs of the surfaced subs. The Vicksburg did not communicate with either of the subs, Swicker said.

“They watched us and we watched them,” he said.

Crew members aboard the cruiser didn’t consider the encounters hostile, although it wasn’t clear if the Iranian boats surfaced within view of the cruiser or if the U.S. warship happened to see the Iranian subs while they were already running on the surface. Iran has a fleet of three Kilo-class SSKs, according to Jane’s Fighting Ships.

Galrahn has a whole lot more on the Iranian subsurface threat here, here and Bubblehead also keeps an eye on them - as he does here.