It Case You Didn't Know - The Government of China Lies About Almost Everything

Case in point:

China "Coast Guard" vessel runs down Vietnamese fishing boat. China claims fishing boat attacked the "Coast Guard" vessel, as reporte in Philippines backs Vietnam after China sinks fishing boat

The Philippines on Wednesday expressed solidarity with Vietnam after Hanoi protested what it said was the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat by a Chinese coast guard ship in the disputed South China Sea.
***
China claims virtually the entire South China Sea and has built several islands equipped with military installations in the area, one of world's busiest shipping lanes. Vietnam has been the most vocal opponent of Beijing's territorial assertiveness.

The Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs recalled that 22 Filipino fishermen were left floating in the high seas after a Chinese vessel sank their boat at Reed Bank on June 9 last year. They were rescued by a Vietnamese fishing vessel.
***
The Philippines warned that incidents like the sinking of the Vietnamese boat undermine the potential for a trusting relationship between the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China. It cited “positive momentum” in talks between ASEAN and China on a proposed “code of conduct” — a pact to prevent major clashes in the South China Sea, which many fear could be Asia’s next flashpoint.

China responded to Vietnam's diplomatic protest and demands for an investigation with its own statement accusing the Vietnamese boat of illegally entering Chinese waters. It said it collided with the Chinese ship Haijing 4301 after conducting “dangerous actions.”

All eight Vietnamese sailors were rescued by the Chinese and admitted to wrongdoing, China Maritime Police spokesman Zhang Jun was quoted as saying in a statement.

China seized the islands from Vietnam in 1974 and frequent confrontations have occurred there.

This is not the way civilized countries act, China. This is the way bullies act.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 8 May - 12 June 2019 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 6 - 12 June 2019

U.S. Navy Office of Naval I... by on Scribd

U.S. Navy Office of Naval I... by on Scribd

China and It's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" Clone Plan

Well now, it seems the gloves, if not coming off, are being tugged at. Bonnie Glaser notes in a tweet about the following South China Morning Post artice:

Chinese oceanographic researcher says this part of an effort to breach the Second Island Chain.

Breaching the second island chain? Why?

Andrew Ericson and Joel Wuthnow explain in Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the Pacific “Island Chains”:

The extensive chains of Pacific islands ringing China have been described as a wall, a barrier to be breached by an attacker or strengthened by a defender. They are seen as springboards, potential bases for operations to attack or invade others in the region. In a territorial sense, they are benchmarks marking the extent of a country’s influence.

“It’s truly a case of where you stand. Perspective is shaped by one’s geographic and geostrategic position,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.

“Barriers is a very Chinese perspective,” said Erickson. “It reflects a concern that foreign military facilities based on the islands may impede or threaten China’s efforts or influence.” …

An excellent discussion of China's island "layers of active defense" at Jon Solomon's Potential Chinese Anti-Ship Capabilities Between the First and Second Island Chains which includes a posting of this U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence graphic:

and this:

The sea lanes in question pass through the waters between the First Island Chain and the line stretching from Hokkaido through the Bonins and Marianas to the Palaus (e.g, the “Second Island Chain”). I’ve recently written about the PLAAF’s effective reach into the Western Pacific, and it’s been widely understood for years that late-generation PLAN submarines possess the technological capability to operate for several weeks in these waters before having to return to port. China would be hard-pressed to achieve localized sea control anywhere within this broad area; its own surface combatants and shipping would be just as vulnerable to attack. It wouldn’t need sea control, though, to achieve its probable campaign-level objectives of bogging down (or outright thwarting) an effective U.S. military response, or perhaps inflicting coercive economic pain upon one or more embattled American allies. The use of PLA submarines and strike aircraft to pressure U.S. and allied sea lines of communications would be entirely sufficient. And as Toshi Yoshihara and Martin Murphy point out in their article in the Summer ‘15 Naval War College Review, these kinds of PLA operations would be consistent with the Mao-derived maritime strategic theory of “sabotage warfare at sea,” albeit at a much greater distance from China’s shores than the theory originally conceived. Such operations have been widely discussed in Chinese strategic literature over the past two decades

That link regarding the "first island chain" goes to a Wikipedia piece:

The first island chain refers to the first chain of major archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast. Principally composed of the Kuril Islands, Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo; from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula. Some definitions of the first island chain anchor the northern end on the Russian Far East coast north of Sahkalin Island, with Sahkalin Island being the first link in the chain.[1] However, others consider the Aleutians as the farthest north-eastern first link in the chain.[2] The first island chain forms one of three island chain doctrines within the Island Chain Strategy.

The first island chain has its purpose in Chinese military doctrine. The People's Republic of China views the first island chain as the area it must secure and disable from American bases, aircraft and aircraft-carrier groups, if in defending itself it must tactically unleash a pre-emptive attack against an enemy. The aim of the doctrine is to seal off the Yellow Sea, South China Sea and East China Sea inside an arc running from the Aleutians in the north to Borneo in the south.[3] According to reports by American think tanks CSBA and RAND, by 2020, China will be well on its way to having the means to achieve its first island chain policy.[4]

The Yoshihara and Martin article (pdf here) notes China's Mao inspired concept of "active defense"

At length, in March 1956, the Central Military Commission issued military strategic guidance under the rubric of “active defense, defend the motherland.” “Active defense,” a concept that Mao developed and refined in the 1930s, called for the employment of offensive operations and tactics to achieve strategically defensive goals. The navy’s role was to support the army and the air force against the enemy on land. Under active defense, the PLAN’s missions were to conduct joint counter landing operations with ground and air forces; wreck the enemy’s sea lines of communications, severing the supply of materiel and manpower; weaken and annihilate the enemy’s seaborne transport tools and combat vessels; jointly operate with ground forces in contests over key points and locations along the coast; guarantee the security of our coastal base system and strategic locations; support ground forces in littoral flanking operations; act in concert with ground forces to recover offshore islands and all territories

For years China was not a true naval power, so it turned to the lessons it had learned from the guerrilla war its new leaders had fought and won. The leader of the PLAN, an army general, reached back:

After consulting Mao Zedong’s military writings from the 1920s and 1930s and those of Soviet experts, Xiao articulated the operational concept of “sabotage warfare at sea” (海上破袭战). Confronted with better-armed enemies, he understood that China was in no position to fight them head-on. Drawing on his own battlefield experiences, the admiral reasoned that inferior Chinese forces had to “use suddenness and sabotage and guerilla tactics to unceasingly attack and destroy the enemy, accumulate small victories in place of big wins, fully leverage and bring into play our advantageous conditions, exploit and create unfavorable conditions for the enemy, and implement protracted war.” Mao would have instantly recognized these ideas as his own.

Four key features characterized Xiao’s sabotage warfare at sea. First, it called for the use of all available weaponry to deliver all possible types of attacks against the enemy. Second, it emphasized covert action and sudden surprise attacks to overpower unsuspecting or unprepared adversaries, so as to seize the initiative. Third, it required offensive campaigns and tactics to assault unceasingly the effective strength of the enemy. Fourth, it demanded the agile use of troops and combat styles to preserve one’s own forces while annihilating the opponent. Xiao essentially codified what his forces had practiced out of sheer necessity in previous years. In contrast to a “naval strategy” as such, seeking to align available means with larger political aims, the admiral furnished a concept that was largely operational and tactical in nature. Xiao, in essence, identified methods for winning battles

This thinking breeds maritime militia, anti-ship ballistic missiles and a rapid expansion of a navy.

All this being prelude to the bit Ms. Glaser points to in this innocuously titled article,
US spy planes kept eye on Chinese scientists during research expedition near Guam

Xu Kuidong, a lead researcher with the mission who is affiliated with the Institute of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences in Qingdao, Shandong, said the scientists on board were “well aware” of the area’s sensitivity.

“It is all about the Second Island Chain,” he said, referring to a series of archipelagos that stretches from the eastern coast of Japan to the Bonin islands, to the Mariana islands, to Guam and the island country of Palau.
The US-controlled islands initially served as a second line of defence against communist countries in East Asia during the cold war. Today they are regarded as a major constraint on China’s rapidly expanding marine power and influence in the Pacific Ocean.
***
The team’s findings would be shared with the Chinese military and other interest groups in government, Xu said.
***
“There are many efforts going on to breach the Second Island Chain, this is part of them,” he said.
***
According to Tom Matelski, a US Army War College Fellow at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii, China was seeking to build a military base in Micronesia.
Micronesia, with a population of about 110,000, has received a large amount of aid and investment from China since 2003. The money helped build some of the nation’s largest farms, schools, bridges and power plants, as well as the residence for the president and other senior government officials.
Since Micronesia lacked its own military, it had “outsourced” its defence to the US since the end of the second world war. But in 2015 Micronesian lawmakers introduced a resolution to end the exclusive partnership with the US as early as 2018.

If the Chinese military got a foothold on a Micronesian island, “the US could potentially lose their access to the strategic lines of communication that connect the Pacific Ocean to the vital traffic of the East and South China Seas”, Matelski wrote in an article published on the website of The Diplomat magazine in February last year.
Possession of portions of the Second Island Chain would give China a “springboard against foreign force projection,” he said.

So, China - currently through obstensibly peaceful means - seeks to do what the Japanese tried to do before the start of WWII - developing bases on trade routes, expanding their presence, developing what amounts to a clone of the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Or, more accurately:

As noted here by Andrew Ericson:

“Back when imperial Japan was trying to gain control of the first, second and even a third chain – the Aleutians – there was a concern that if Japan didn’t control the Philippines, Guam and Hawaii the Americans would, to Japan’s geostrategic detriment,” said Erickson. “At the outset of World War II, Japan made an extraordinary effort to use part of the chains as a springboard, and they were indeed benchmarks of Japanese military progress. That was only halted then the US turned island-hopping in the other direction.”

“Today, Japan is concerned about Chinese attempts to influence and control areas and to develop weapon systems vis-a-vis these island chains,” Erickson added. “And there’s a lot of Japanese concern about ongoing Chinese efforts to penetrate the chains using increasingly powerful and complex groups of naval vessels. I think Japan feels very much connected to these island chains. As China looks to the chains and aspires to do things, I think Japan feels very targeted by that, it feels it very acutely.” …

“Many Chinese sources emphasize their view of Taiwan’s status as a key node on the first island chain,” Erickson said. “Some Chinese sources see this not only as a springboard against mainland China, but a number of sources express aspirations of eventually [bringing the island] under mainland control, perhaps in a very robust fashion that would allow for some form of Chinese-controlled military facilities. We see discussion of ports, particularly on the east coast of Taiwan, allowing for China to conclusively break out of the confines of the first island chain once and for all.”

“I see no other part of an island chain that is really in the category of what some Chinese strategists ultimately aspire to control and own themselves,” Erickson said. “That definitely sets Taiwan apart.”

And while most attention is focused on the first island chain running south along the eastern edge of the South China Sea, the significance of the second chain, which includes the US territory of Guam, could grow.

“A number of Chinese sources see this as a rear staging area for US and allied forces,” Erickson said.

“But the second island chain will grow in China’s geostrategic thinking. As China continues to send naval forces afield, it will be a benchmark.”

Over time, he added, “China can do more to hold Guam and other parts of the second island chain at risk.”

Not just the "second island chain" either, as James Holmes points out in Island Chains Everywhere: Some Chinese strategists see Hawaii as Asia’s ‘third island chain.’ What does this view say about US-China ties?

At least some Chinese strategists think of Hawaii as an appendage of Asia rather than a geographic feature of the Pacific Ocean, placed closer to the Americas than to the Chinese coastline. The concept of first and second island chains is familiar to Asia specialists, but the concept of a third island chain, positioned only 2,400 miles from San Francisco, is a novel one. It appears on a map of the Pacific found in a recent translation of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783—the same translation whose front cover blares, ‘Does China Need an Aircraft Carrier?’

For Hawaii to fit the island chain template, however, it would need to be (1) a very long series of islands that (2) runs north-south fairly close to Asian shores, (3) encloses the Asian mainland, and (4) is inhabited by a prospective rival or rivals of China able to project military power seaward. Hawaii meets the last test but fails the first three miserably. We may as well describe the Americas as Asia’s fourth island chain. That the island chain metaphor sounds outlandish to American ears when applied to Hawaii, while many Chinese take it seriously, nonetheless reveals something discomfiting about US-China relations.

As Chinese naval proponents see it, the first and second island chains complicate their nation’s nautical destiny so long as they remain in potentially hostile hands—as they will in the case of Japan, to take the most obvious example. Japan’s combination of geographic position, multiple seaports suitable for military shipping and resources makes it a permanent factor in Chinese strategy. Forces stationed along the island chains can encumber the Chinese navy’s free access to the Western Pacific while inhibiting north-south movement along the Asian seaboard. How to surmount or work around these immovable obstacles understandably preoccupies scholars and practitioners of naval affairs in China.

But what about Hawaii? That the archipelago commands enormous strategic value for the United States has been axiomatic for American strategists for over a century. For example, Mahan—whom the Timesof London colorfully dubbed the United States' ‘Copernicus’ of sea power—lauded its geopolitical worth. Unlike their forebears from the age of sail, steamships could defy winds and currents, but they also demanded fuel in bulk to make long voyages. Accordingly, he exhorted a United States with commercial interests at stake in Asia to forge a ‘chain’ of island bases to support the transpacific journeys of steam-propelled merchantmen and their guardians, armoured men-of-war.
***
Taken to extremes, Beijing’s habit of appraising Pacific and Indian Ocean geography through the island chain lens—that is, seeing geographic features as an adversary’s defense perimeter that must be punctured, or a wall that must be fortified for defense—could misshape Chinese maritime strategy. Prodded by such conceptions, the Chinese leadership could take an unduly pessimistic view of the strategic surroundings, needlessly straining relations with the many seafaring powers that ply the Western Pacific and China’s near seas.

The game is afoot.

It's why we have a Navy to limit this before it gets out of hand. But we need a bigger force, one well thought out to insure international trade routes stay free.

Russia's Asia Pivot

Headline in the Moscow Times "Russia Wants Quicker Build-Up of Military Facilities on Disputed Islands". The disputants being, in this case, Japan and Russia:

Old map of "disputed islands"

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has ordered the speeding up of construction of military and civilian infrastructure on a chain of islands in the Pacific Ocean where Moscow and Tokyo have rival territorial claims.

Dispute over the islands, known as the Kurils in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan, has strained relations between the two countries since World War II, when Soviet forces occupied four islands at the southern end of the chain.

Which, of course, ties in this Matthew Sussex article in The National Interest, Russia's Next Big Strategic Move (And It Has Nothing to Do with Ukraine):

But the Ukraine crisis—and the broader Russia-West tensions tat it has stoked—obscures the fact that Moscow has been quietly but rapidly re-orienting its strategic posture. And it is doing so to the east, not the west.

For Putin, the logic of an Asian pivot is threefold.

The first concerns consolidating Russia's prosperity as an energy and resource giant. He knows that Indo-Pacific appetites for oil and gas will increase massively over the next twenty years. Within the same time frame, European clients will diversify their energy sources once the U.S. shale gas and oil revolution brings American exports on-line. Russia therefore has a relatively small window of opportunity to begin crowding out competitors for Asia's energy demands.

Second, whereas Moscow's strategic posture has long stressed the need to look east, it has now begun increasing its Indo-Pacific trade and security footprint, including in Southeast Asia, in order to give its intended policy substance.

Third, Russia is betting that the 21st century will be an Asian one--and it is betting on China as the main driver of change in regional and global order. Until recently, the main question hanging over Sino-Russian relations was whether Moscow could live with being a junior partner to Beijing. It seems that question has now been answered in the affirmative, at least for the moment.

More fodder, from the Sputnik News Russia, China Hold Joint Naval Drills in the Far East:

The second stage of Russia-China "Joint Sea 2015" maritime exercises is underway in Russia’s Far Eastern Primorsky Territory, the Russian Defense Ministry’s Eastern Military District press service said in a Wednesday statement.

The joint exercise is taking place on June 8-11.

Upcoming drills will include troop landing practice that will take place at a Pacific Fleet range near Mys Klerk (Cape Klerk), the statement said.

On Tuesday, the Russian Defense Ministry said that officers from the Russian Eastern Military District, the Pacific Fleet Headquarters and representatives from the Chinese Navy held a reconnaissance mission at the Knevichi Airfield as part of the "Joint Sea 2015 (II)" naval exercise.

Russia is, in many ways, an Asian country (well, of course, especially given how much of it sits in Asia). You also have got to believe Putin is enjoying the heck out of tweaking the Obama administration with all this.

The pivot for Russia is not as long as that required by the U.S.

Japan is a strong U.S. ally.

Then there are the North Koreans.

Never a dull moment.

To paraphrase the movie Jaws, "We're going to need a bigger Navy"

Fun in the South China Sea: Islands in the Stream

In the South China Sea (SCS) China is rushing to present the world with a fait accompli by hurrying to place runways and port facilities on what were, a couple of years ago, mere high spots in the water constituting hazards to ship navigation.

This has been behind my re-tweeting a number of James Kraska's tweets on the legal aspects of China's aggressive activity in the South China Sea in "developing" islands in contested waters.

How do we know their intent? As have many others, I have watched the CNN footage here. China is being very assertive. None of the local countries affected by this aggression are strong enough to muster any sort of response to this bully-boy tactics.

Now comes this Reuters piece, written by William Johnson, "Why a forceful U.S. response to China’s artificial island-building won’t float" which questions whether the downsized U.S. Navy (and by extension, the U.S. government) has the "wherewithal" to do anything except rely on "diplomacy" to deal with this Chinese strategy.

China's dotted line claim in the SCS

The question then becomes how best to deal with this possibility. Today the United States doesn’t have the resources in place for a major effort in the area unless it is willing to take some very great risks.

Well, you can bet the Chinese have counted on that as they have moved forward.

More irksome (at least to me) is this analysis:

In order to justify an aggressive approach, the United States must determine that the creation of these islands is threatening some vital U.S. interest. The claim that the new islands are disrupting the United States’ freedom of navigation is a red herring. To date, China has done nothing in the South China Sea to disrupt shipping. It has countered activities by other countries who assert their ownership and control in the region, notably Vietnam and the Philippines, and has asserted its own ownership and control by intercepting fishing vessels and placing oil rigs in the area. Yet none of these actions have disrupted shipping in the region. It is disingenuous for the United States to claim that by using military force to counter the island-building, it is asserting the freedom of international shipping to sail close to rocks and submerged reefs — an action no merchant vessel is likely to take.


Another flawed justification for U.S. military involvement is to defend peace and stability in the region. There have so far been no major military confrontations in the disputes between the five other countries that lay claims to the South China Sea. Journalists as well as President Obama argue that this is simply because the smaller countries are afraid to confront China due to an imbalance in military might. While this imbalance exists, it isn’t a reason for the United States to step in. The United States has taken no position on any of the territorial claims, and has urged the parties to settle their disagreements peacefully. As long as the disputing countries are not coming to blows, the United States would be rash to risk a fight with a nuclear-armed China over China’s pursuit of its claims.

A final hollow justification for military action is that the United States needs to reassure its partners and allies in the region.***

So, If I understand Mr. Johnson correctly then, there is no threat until China finishes its new "island wall" with bases that it will assert extend its national waters and then begins to exercise its new "right" to keep those waters free and clear of unwelcome guests - like the U.S. Navy.

Well, then, wow. Just wow.

I've been involved in some "freedom of navigation" actions like that shown in the CNN video. In this case, I would consider them to be the absolute minimum activity that the U.S. needs to undertake to keep the air/sea/subsea areas that these new islands might threaten from becoming something more than just a verbal threat.

Some nice analysis by Dr. Kraska in his "How China Exploits a Loophole In International Law in Pursuit of Hegemony in East Asia".

China's playing the long game for all it is worth. The U.S. needs to step up its response.

UPDATE: Another ally in the area has concerns in the SCS as set out by Bonnie Glaser in "High stakes for Australia in limiting China's South China Sea incursions":

China is seeking to exercise greater control over the waters and airspace in ways that pose threats to all nations that have interests in preserving freedom of navigation, international law and norms, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peace and stability in the South China Sea.

Watching China's Aircraft Carrier Gets Interesting for U.S. Navy Cruiser

USS Cowpens

A Bill Gertz report on international naval gamesmanship in the South China Sea as "Chinese Naval Vessel Tries to Force U.S. Warship to Stop in International Waters":

A Chinese naval vessel tried to force a U.S. guided missile warship to stop in international waters recently, causing a tense military standoff in the latest case of Chinese maritime harassment, according to defense officials.

The guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens, which recently took part in disaster relief operations in the Philippines, was confronted by Chinese warships in the South China Sea near Beijing’s new aircraft carrier Liaoning, according to officials familiar with the incident.

“On December 5th, while lawfully operating in international waters in the South China Sea, USS Cowpens and a PLA Navy vessel had an encounter that required maneuvering to avoid a collision,” a Navy official said.

“This incident underscores the need to ensure the highest standards of professional seamanship, including communications between vessels, to mitigate the risk of an unintended incident or mishap.”
***
The encounter appears to be part of a pattern of Chinese political signaling that it will not accept the presence of American military power in its East Asian theater of influence, Fisher said.

“China has spent the last 20 years building up its Navy and now feels that it can use it to obtain its political objectives,” he said.

Fisher said that since early 2012 China has gone on the offensive in both the South China and East China Seas.

China has made major claims to the South China Sea and this is one way to fight back.

Oh, if you are surprised by these antics, you may have missed China Kindly Sends Its "Slightly Used" Aircraft Carrier on Training Mission for U.S. Submarines in South China Sea.

Expect more of the same as the wanna-be "Bullies of the South China Sea" get push back from their neighbors and their neighbor's friends.

Is the U.S. a neighbor? Guam is good and in the neighborhood.

Japan's East China Sea Response to China: A new base near the dispute

China and Japan are engaged in a dispute over some islands in the East China Sea (see here and here).

China has sent fleets of fishing vessels and aircraft and ships of its "State Oceanic Administration" to the area.

Japan has a response:


UPDATE: It should be note this plan has been in works for a couple of years, as seen here:

***The government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan has since vowed to beef up defenses for Japan’s “outlying islands,” and it appears close to a decision on the small Yonaguni garrison, a plan that has been under discussion for years.***

China's "patrols" of the disputed area have included warships:

A flotilla of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy patrolled waters near the Diaoyu Islands on Monday after returning from a training exercise in the west Pacific.

The patrol marked the first time for China to confirm its naval operations in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands on the very day when the Navy warships conducted such patrol.

The flotilla, consisting of the DDG-136 Hangzhou and DDG-139 Ningbo destroyers, as well as the two frigates FFG-525 Ma'anshan and FFG-529 Zhoushan from the Navy's Donghai Fleet, passed through the Miyako Strait and entered the West Pacific for a routine training exercise on Nov. 28.

After finishing a series of training operations, the flotilla sailed through a strait near the Yonaguni and Iriomote Islands and arrived in waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands Monday morning.

China: Japan Asserts China Violated Japanese Airspace

ABC News reports Japan Accuses China of Intruding Air Space, Scrambles Fighter Jets.

The disputed islands are in the area of the red arrow. See here.

Eight F-15 fighters were dispatched, according to this:

Japan scrambled eight fighter jets on Thursday after a Chinese state-owned plane breached its airspace for the first time, over islands at the center of a dispute between Tokyo and Beijing.

It was the first incursion by a Chinese state aircraft into Japanese airspace anywhere since the country’s military began monitoring in 1958, the defense ministry said.

The move marks a ramping-up of what observers suggest is a Chinese campaign to create a “new normal”—where its forces come and go as they please around islands which Beijing calls the Diaoyus, but Tokyo controls as the Senkakus.

It also comes as ceremonies mark the 75th anniversary of the start of the Nanjing Massacre, when Japanese Imperial Army troops embarked on an orgy of violence and killing in the then-Chinese capital.

F-15 jets were mobilized after a Chinese Maritime Surveillance aircraft ventured over the islands just after 11 a.m., Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura told reporters.

China asserts the islands over which one of its planes flew is "Chinese" airspace, playing the "It's really our territory card":

"The Diaoyu and its affiliated islands are China’s inherent territory since ancient times . . ."

The Chinese have posted pictures of their adventure above the islands here:

The Google translation of that page is:

State Oceanic Administration organized the China Marine Surveillance carry out the Diaoyu Islands, sea and air stereo cruise

Beijing time 10 am, the China Marine Surveillance B-3837 aircraft arrived I Diaoyu Islands airspace rendezvous with China ocean surveillance, 50,46,66,137 boat fleet within the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands cruise, cruise on the Diaoyu Islands to carry out sea and air stereo. During the China Marine Surveillance formation on the Japanese side activist propaganda solemn statement of the government's position, urged the Japanese side vessel immediately leave China's territorial waters.

Kinda takes the "accuses" part of the ABC headline out of the discussion, since the Chinese have admitted being in and above the islands - the dispute moves to one of those wonderful international law things about whose turf those islands are.
My guess is the "stereo" part refers to the effort being joint between the air and sea units. As reported here, the Chinese already had ships in the territorial waters around the islands:

According to the coast guard's 11th regional headquarters in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture, the three ships moved into Japanese waters west of Uotsuri, one of the Senkakus, at around 3:20 p.m. Japan Coast Guard ships warned the three vessels to leave. But crew members on the Chinese ships responded by saying the area 12 nautical miles from Diaoyu constitutes Chinese territorial waters.

Meanwhile, a Chinese fishery patrol ship entered the contiguous zone surrounding the Japanese territorial waters at a point northwest of Kubajima, another of the Senkakus, on Wednesday morning.

Nice historical tie-in. Lots of long memories out there.