When Does China's "Water Cannon" Weapon Use Become an Act of Armed Conflict?

China's bullying of the Philippines may trigger a defense agreement with the U.S. as set out in China’s Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact

Six days after China Coast Guard cutters blasted out the windows of a Philippine resupply ship with a water cannon, Manila is weighing whether a 70-year-old mutual defense pact could compel the U.S. military to defend Filipino forces in the South China Sea as a result.

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The attack, the ninth and most aggressive since Chinese cutters restarted a campaign blocking the monthly resupply runs to the World War II-era Sierra Madre, is prompting politicians, analysts and lawyers across the Pacific to weigh the U.S. obligation to come to Manila’s aid under a 1951 mutual defense pact.

Both the U.S. State and Defense departments issued statements this week pledging commitment to the treaty.

“The United States reaffirms that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea,” reads the statement from Foggy Bottom.

While the worst-case scenario under the defense treaty could lead to open war with China, the agreement has options for the U.S. to support Manila diplomatically short of armed conflict. However, the 1951 treaty’s application in the 21st century raises questions about whether the Chinese use of water cannons constitutes an armed attack or if the resupply missions are categorized as civilian or military, opening up several legal interpretations.

Read the whole article.

The question of whether such use of water cannons by China constitutes an "armed" attack sufficient to trigger the defense pact has been frequently raised on our Midrats podcast. China's assertion of entitlement to vast areas of the South China Sea and its aggressive efforts to enforce those claims despite a lack of legal justification are an interesting test case in how close to a line it can walk before triggering similar counter activities or more. However, it is vital that the U.S. support, in every way possible, our allies and treaty partners in the region.

South China Sea Political Mess Summed Up

What the South China Sea tells us about the new geopolitics of Southeast Asia from ASEAN Today

Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, on the other hand, already offer key indications

of what this next stage of geopolitics in Southeast Asia will look like. As China projects its power amid the pandemic, Southeast Asian governments will increasingly see their economies and development defined by how they embrace or contest Beijing’s agenda.
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China asserts rights to 90% of the land, water and seabed that falls within a boundary known as the nine-dash line, which stretches 2,000 kilometres from the Chinese mainland and comes within a few hundred kilometres of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. To support China’s claims, its military has also built over 3,000 acres of artificial islands over the past 10 years.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague declared the claim illegal in 2016 after the Philippines brought a case under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The court also determined that China’s moves to build artificial islands, still ongoing, are illegal under international law, due in part to their extremely detrimental environmental impacts.

Last week’s incident shows that China is doing all it can to pursue its geopolitical and economic agenda during the pandemic. Beijing isn’t waiting to see how the effects of COVID-19 play out. In cases where it can pursue “face mask diplomacy,” China is stepping into a new role as benefactor—sometimes at a cost, but without all the debt attached to Belt and Road projects.

China is using the time to turn its claims to the energy-rich territory into geopolitical realities. In late March, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources announced that it had extracted a world record-breaking amount of natural gas from gas hydrates in the South China Sea.

In the days prior to the incident last Thursday, Radio Free Asia reported that another Chinese coast guard ship was patrolling in an area of the South China Sea near the Philippines, inside the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

“As countries look inward or are distracted [by the COVID-19 pandemic], like the U.S. and Japan, China has taken advantage of that by increasing its activities in the South China Sea,” said Jose Antonio Custodio, defense analyst at the Institute of Policy, Strategy and Developmental Studies in Manila. “We may soon see more unilateral exploitation of our EEZ.”

Southeast Asian governments are already seeking support from one another as well as China to combat COVID-19—both in terms of the virus and its economic and development impacts. As ASEAN or as individual states, they’re unable to challenge Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea.

This is indicative of how COVID-19 is cementing a geopolitics in which Southeast Asia’s prospects for development, security and trade are dictated by how its leaders support or reject Beijing’s goals. However long the pandemic lasts, ASEAN’s options for the future will be increasingly defined by how well governments balance domestic and Chinese interests and how well they partner with Beijing.

China apparently has a motto: "What we say is ours - is ours. What you say is yours - is ours."

In contrast to China, which seeks to shut off access to the South China Sea, even (or perhaps especially) to its neighbors, the U.S. and its allies have tried to keep the sea lines of commerce open and free. If there is any doubt that China is seeking to upset several hundred years of history, you don't have to look too far.

It Case You Didn't Know - The Government of China Lies About Almost Everything

Case in point:

China "Coast Guard" vessel runs down Vietnamese fishing boat. China claims fishing boat attacked the "Coast Guard" vessel, as reporte in Philippines backs Vietnam after China sinks fishing boat

The Philippines on Wednesday expressed solidarity with Vietnam after Hanoi protested what it said was the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat by a Chinese coast guard ship in the disputed South China Sea.
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China claims virtually the entire South China Sea and has built several islands equipped with military installations in the area, one of world's busiest shipping lanes. Vietnam has been the most vocal opponent of Beijing's territorial assertiveness.

The Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs recalled that 22 Filipino fishermen were left floating in the high seas after a Chinese vessel sank their boat at Reed Bank on June 9 last year. They were rescued by a Vietnamese fishing vessel.
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The Philippines warned that incidents like the sinking of the Vietnamese boat undermine the potential for a trusting relationship between the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China. It cited “positive momentum” in talks between ASEAN and China on a proposed “code of conduct” — a pact to prevent major clashes in the South China Sea, which many fear could be Asia’s next flashpoint.

China responded to Vietnam's diplomatic protest and demands for an investigation with its own statement accusing the Vietnamese boat of illegally entering Chinese waters. It said it collided with the Chinese ship Haijing 4301 after conducting “dangerous actions.”

All eight Vietnamese sailors were rescued by the Chinese and admitted to wrongdoing, China Maritime Police spokesman Zhang Jun was quoted as saying in a statement.

China seized the islands from Vietnam in 1974 and frequent confrontations have occurred there.

This is not the way civilized countries act, China. This is the way bullies act.

Laugh of the Day: Beijing pledges ‘long term peace’ in South China Sea

From the Chinese Alibaba owned South China Sea Morning Post come this howlerBeijing pledges ‘long term peace’ in South China Sea where its Asean neighbours also stake claims:

China is hopeful for “new progress” to be made in ongoing talks with the Asean bloc for a code of conduct governing the disputed South China Sea, Premier Li Keqiang said at a summit on Sunday, as other regional leaders called for countries to exercise restraint over the row.
Li’s comments at the twice-yearly Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting comes amid flaring tensions between Vietnam and Beijing over the dispute triggered by a Chinese oil survey vessel that remained within waters claimed by the Southeast Asian country for more than three months.
“We stand ready to work with Asean countries building on the existing foundation and basis to strive for new progress in the [code of conduct], according to the three-year time frame, so as to maintain and uphold long term peace in the South China Sea,” Li said at the start of a plenary session with the 10 Asean leaders.

This bit of double talk - after all, which country is the one stirring up tension with its neighbors with excessive claims to rights that violate the other countries territorial and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) - was reported by the SCMP with the accompanying map:

You might notice that China's famous "9 dash line" encroaches on the sovereign waters of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and judging by the SCMP map, the Japanese Senkaku Islands. You might also note that the SCMP map leaves off the EEZs of the Philippines and Malaysia and Japan. For those, we need another map, this one from the Voice of America :

Or perhaps this one from the American Center for Democracy:

Recall that the claims of all parties, are in part, based on assertions of ownership of various islands or rocks in the SCS. China also bases its claims on a theory of historical usage. China claims were rejected by an international tribunal. As with so much else that is modern, China disavows that ruling:

China said it did not recognize the ruling, which it described as "null and void." The case was brought by the Philippines over China’s vast territorial claims and island-building in the region.

The ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, is the first to address competing claims and interests among a half-dozen countries fronting the South China Sea.

The panel said any historic rights to resources that China may have had were invalid if they are incompatible with exclusive economic zones established under a United Nations treaty.

The tribunal also ruled that China caused “irreparable harm” to the marine environment, “unlawfully” interfered with fishermen from the Philippines, and engaged in a massive land-reclamation and island-building campaign that is “incompatible” with international obligations.

In fact, Mr. Li has been pretty belligerent:

China is committed to peace but cannot give up “even one inch” of territory that the country’s ancestors left behind, Chinese President Xi Jinping told U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis on Wednesday during his first visit to Beijing.

Xi’s remarks underscored deep-rooted areas of tension in Sino-U.S. ties, particularly over what the Pentagon views as China’s militarization of the South China Sea, a vital transit route for world trade.

"Long term peace" in Chinese terms means acceding to all its demands.

From Foreign Affairs: Ely Ratner and "How to Stop China in the South China Sea"

Probably buried behind the paywall, but a good look in Foreign Affairs at the mess in the South China Sea in How to Stop China in the South China Sea by Ely Ratner:

Time is running out to stop China’s advance. With current U.S. policy faltering, the Trump administration needs to take a firmer line. It should supplement diplomacy with deterrence by warning China that if the aggression continues, the United States will abandon its neutrality and help countries in the region defend their claims. Washington should make clear that it can live with an uneasy stalemate in Asia—but not with Chinese hegemony.
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Then, in early 2014, China’s efforts to assert authority over the South China Sea went from a trot to a gallop. Chinese ships began massive dredging projects to reclaim land around seven reefs that China already controlled in the Spratly Islands, an archipelago in the sea’s southern half. In an 18-month period, China reclaimed nearly 3,000 acres of land. (By contrast, over the preceding several decades, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam had reclaimed a combined total of less than 150 acres.) Despite assurances by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2015 that China had “no intention to militarize” the South China Sea, it has been rapidly transforming its artificial islands into advanced military bases, replete with airfields, runways, ports, and antiaircraft and antimissile systems. In short order, China has laid the foundation for control of the South China Sea.
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President Barack Obama said in a joint press conference with Xi, “The United States welcomes the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in global affairs.” Yet Washington never made clear what it would do if Beijing failed to live up to that standard—as it often has in recent years. The United States’ desire to avoid conflict meant that nearly every time China acted assertively or defied international law in the South China Sea, Washington instinctively took steps to reduce tensions, thereby allowing China to make incremental gains.
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U.S. policymakers should recognize that China’s behavior in the sea is based on its perception of how the United States will respond. The lack of U.S. resistance has led Beijing to conclude that the United States will not compromise its relationship with China over the South China Sea. As a result, the biggest threat to the United States today in Asia is Chinese hegemony, not great-power war. U.S. regional leadership is much more likely to go out with a whimper than with a bang.
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Consider Beijing’s reaction to the landmark decision handed down in July 2016 by an international tribunal constituted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which ruled that most of China’s claims in the South China Sea were illegal under international law. The United States and other countries called on China to abide by the decision but took no steps to enforce it. So China simply shrugged it off and continued to militarize the islands and police the waters around them. Although the United States has continued to make significant shows of force in the region through military exercises and patrols, it has never made clear to China what these are meant to signal. U.S. officials have often considered them “demonstrations of resolve.” But they never explained what, exactly, the United States was resolved to do. With that question unanswered, the Chinese leadership has had little reason to reverse course.
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In order to alter China’s incentives, the United States should issue a clear warning: that if China continues to construct artificial islands or stations powerful military assets, such as long-range missiles or combat aircraft, on those it has already built, the United States will fundamentally change its policy toward the South China Sea. Shedding its position of neutrality, Washington would stop calling for restraint and instead increase its efforts to help the region’s countries defend themselves against Chinese coercion.
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And in the event that China failed to back down from its revisionist path, the United States could live with a more militarized South China Sea, as long as the balance of power did not tilt excessively in China’s favor. This is why China would find a U.S. threat to ratchet up military support for other countries with claims in the sea credible. Ensuring that countries in the region can contribute to deterring Chinese aggression would provide more stability than relying solely on Chinese goodwill or the U.S. military to keep the peace.
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Clarity of purpose is essential in dealing with the South China Sea. The alternative is for the very patient Chinese to present the region with its hememony as a fait accompli.

Weakness never works well in international relations. See, e.g. Munich Agreement

See also Progress in the South China Sea? by Lynn Kuok which is outside the paywall.

Oil and Gas in the South China Sea - Bones of Contention

This might be behind the paywall at the Oil & Gas Journal, but it's an interesting problem surfacing soon in the South China Sea Plan for Philippines bid round escalates drama with China:

Territorial conflict intensifies in the South China Sea.

The Philippines government plans to resume oil, gas, and coal licensing of acreage that includes offshore areas over which China asserts control.
A year ago, in a case brought by the Philippines, the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected Chinese claims to waters the island nation says lie within its exclusive economic zone.
China’s determination to ignore the ruling will be tested by a bidding round in December.
On July 13, Ismael Ocampo, director of the Department of Energy’s Resource Development Bureau, told reporters in Manila that the offering will include blocks on Rector Bank, the Philippines designation of Reed Bank.
China says history shows Reed Bank is Chinese. The arbitration court

disagreed.
The Philippines suspended exploration in the disputed area late in 2014 but craves domestically produced energy, now far below its expanding requirements.
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... Vietnam’s largely unchallenged exploration in disputed waters might have emboldened Duterte to test Beijing’s resolve with the bidding round.
Or maybe Duterte felt obliged, for political reasons, to address his allegations of bullying.
In May, Duterte said that at a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations, Chinese President Xi Jingping warned him not to implement the arbitration ruling, saying doing so would provoke war ...
Xi, according to Duterte, insisted China would explore for oil and gas where the Philippines government now says it will sanction drilling.
At this stage in an escalating drama, there’s no clear script plotting a tidy finale.

Earlier coverage of this issue at The Diplomat by Jeremy Maxey Philippines Faces Post-Arbitration Dilemma Over Reed Bank:

Considering the risks and tradeoffs, Beijing may instead choose to engage in a potentially less destabilizing option—presenting Manila with a choice between China’s unilateral exploration of Reed Bank or joint development on China’s terms. This could prove a compelling proposition for Manila since Reed Bank (Recto Bank), located approximately 80 nautical miles northwest of Palawan within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but claimed by China, is thought to hold one of the highest concentration of undiscovered resources within the SCS—764 million to 2.2 billion barrels of oil and 7.6 Tcf to 22 Tcf of natural gas.

While Reed Bank’s potential resources are modest relative to China’s massive energy consumption, the area is essential to Philippine future

energy security. In particular, the Philippines is looking to develop Reed Bank to replace the Malampaya gas field, also located offshore west of Palawan, that is expected to be depleted by 2024-2030. The Malampaya gas-to-power project, led by Royal Dutch Shell, currently supplies about 30 percent of the electricity demand of Luzon, the largest and most populous island in the Philippines.

Indeed, geography and economics suggest that the most viable option to monetize Reed Bank gas is the Philippine market. This implies that although China may flagrantly engage in unilateral exploration, it is highly unlikely to unilaterally develop the gas without first locking in the Philippine market. This is politically impossible without Philippine participation, which means that joint development may be the only pragmatic way forward. Manila’s only other option is to hold an offshore licensing round with the expectation of developing Reed Bank through a consortium of international oil majors over Chinese objections.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 6 February - 8 March 2017

Apparently some sort of armed folks are back and bobbing about in the Gulf of Aden:

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 6 February - 8 March 2017 by lawofsea on Scribd

Philippines Piracy: China, U.S. and Japan to Assist Philippines?

Crude Oil Flows in the South China Sea

The Republic of the Philippines sits on major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which makes those nations that use those SLOCs have a vested interest in keeping them open for use for ships to transit them free of action by pirates and/or terrorists who would disrupt the flow of goods and petroleum on these SLOCs.

The Philippines, about as near to a failed state as one can get without actually being Somalia, knows  that it needs help in patrolling its own waters from the scourge of entities like the formerly al Qaeda affiliated - now ISIS pledged Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist groups that seek to peel away the Muslim majority southern Philippine islands from the ROP. So, the Philippines seeks US, China help to fight pirates:

U.S. National Counterterrorism Center map

The Philippines is seeking US and Chinese help to guard a major sea lane as Islamic militants shift attacks to international shipping, officials said on Wednesday.
Manila does not want the Sibutu Passage between Malaysia’s Sabah state and the southern Philippines to turn into a Somalia-style pirate haven, coastguard officials said.
The deep-water channel, used by 13,000 vessels each year, offers the fastest route between Australia and the manufacturing powerhouses China, Japan and South Korea, they added.
In the past year Abu Sayyaf gunmen from the southern Philippines have boarded ships and kidnapped dozens of crewmen for ransom in waters between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, raising regional alarm.

Indonesia has warned the region could become the “next Somalia” and the International Maritime Bureau says waters off the southern Philippines are becoming increasingly dangerous.

In addition to the U.S. and China, the ROP reports that Japan has offered to "assist" in this situation, as set out here:

Japan has offered to send patrol ships to deal with a growing piracy threat in the southern Philippine waters bordering Indonesia and Malaysia, a senior Philippine defense official said on Tuesday.
A surge in piracy off parts of the southern Philippines is forcing ship-owners to divert vessels through other waters, pushing up costs and shipping times. Dozens of sailors have been taken captive by Abu Sayyaf.
Japanese vice minister Ro Manabe offered the assistance at a meeting in Tokyo on Friday and expressed readiness to contribute to efforts by the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia "in addressing piracy and terrorism", said Raymund Quilop, assistant defense minister for assessments and international affairs.
A senior Japanese defense ministry official, however, gave a different account of the Tokyo meeting and said no offer of patrols was made to the Philippines, just "capacity building".
Leaders from the two countries agreed last fall that Japan would give the Philippines high-speed small boats for its counter-terrorism efforts, but it was not clear if that was part of the apparent offer made by Manabe.

I don't think any of the nations that are mentioned have any desire to see the ROP actually fall into full failure mode and they surely want to have this affected SLOCs clear for normal merchant transits.

It should also be noted that Australia has made long-term commitments to aid the ROP. See here:

Total Australian Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Philippines will be an estimated $81.9 million in 2016-17. Our economic partnership with the Philippines will focus all elements of our trade, investment and aid initiatives working together to promote growth.

Australia delivers targeted advice and technical assistance that aims to have a catalytic effect both on reform efforts and capacity development of the Philippine Government. Given the Philippines’ current positive economic position we will shift focus from basic service delivery, such as classroom construction, towards supporting the Philippine Government to better manage its own resources.

The strategic direction of Australian aid to the Philippines is informed by the Australian Government’s development policy Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability; Australia’s national interests; by our ability to add value; and our previous development results. Australia’s aid will align with the priorities of the Philippines Government which is seeking to put the country on the path of accelerated and inclusive development. The Philippine Government has had an ambitious reform agenda in recent years to tackle poverty, improve governance and address corruption, while pushing through important social sector reforms, including education, and promoting peace in the Southern Philippines.

UPDATE: Fixed a portion that was somehow turned into gibberish when first posted.

Philippines as Failing State: President Duterte Asks China to Patrol Philippine Waters

The Republic of the Philippines President invites the nose of the Chinese camel into the Philippines Philippines' Duterte asks China to patrol piracy-plagued waters

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on Tuesday said he had asked China to help in the fight against Islamic State-linked militants by sending ships to patrol southern waters plagued by raids on commercial vessels.

Speaking to newly promoted army generals, Duterte said he had sought China's help in dangerous waters in the south to check the activities of Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim rebel group sustained by piracy and kidnap-for-ransom activities.

A surge in piracy off parts of the Philippines is forcing ship-owners to divert vessels through other waters, pushing up costs and shipping times.

Duterte said piracy in the Sulu Sea between eastern Malaysia and the southern Philippines would escalate to levels seen in Somalia, and raise insurance costs for firms and increase prices of consumer goods and services.

"We would be glad if they have their presence there ... just to patrol," Duterte said, adding that China could send coastguard vessels, not necessarily "gray" warships.

The Philippines has a loose cannon.

I have a Horace E. Scudder fable:

ONE cold night, as an Arab sat in his tent, a Camel thrust the flap of the tent aside, and looked in.
"I pray thee, master," he said, "let me put my head within the tent, for it is cold without."
"By all means, and welcome," said the Arab; and the Camel stretched his head into the tent.
"If I might but warm my neck, also," he said, presently.
"Put your neck inside," said the Arab. Soon the Camel, who had been turning his head from side to side, said again:—
"It will take but little more room if I put my fore legs within the tent. It is difficult standing without."
"You may also put your fore legs within," said the Arab, moving a little to make room, for the tent was very small.
"May I not stand wholly within?" asked the Camel, finally. "I keep the tent open by standing as I do."
"Yes, yes," said the Arab. "I will have pity on you as well as on myself. Come wholly inside."
So the Camel came forward and crowded into the tent. But the tent was too small for both.
"I think," said the Camel, "that there is not room for both of us here. It will be best for you to stand outside, as you are the smaller; there will then be room enough for me."
And with that he pushed the Arab a little, who made haste to get outside the tent.
It is a wise rule to resist the beginnings of evil.

Emphasis added.

China Lies Again and the New Drone War

It is time, in the opening days of the new year, to discuss in some depth the Chinese capture of a U.S. UUV off the coast of the Philippines. For those of you caught up in other matters, a good recap of the events can be found at Chris Cavas's Defense News article*, China Grabs Underwater Drone Operated by US Navy in South China Sea:

A Chinese Navy ship intercepted and grabbed a small, unmanned underwater vehicle

U.S. Navy Photo

(UUV) being operated by a US Navy survey ship on Thursday in waters west of the Philippines, US defense officials confirmed Friday.

It is not clear what — if anything — prompted the interception of an ocean glider, described by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as “an autonomous, unmanned underwater vehicle used for ocean science.”

From the beginning, China has lied about the incident and then has engaged in a disinformation campaign to justify their acts, all the while subtly seeking to expand their power over the South China Sea.

Get the picture as set up by Pentagon spokesman:

Area of incident off Philippines

Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook issued a statement Friday afternoon calling upon the Chinese government to immediately return the drone.

"Using appropriate government-to-government channels, the Department of Defense has called upon China to immediately return an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that China unlawfully seized on Dec. 15 in the South China Sea while it was being recovered by a U.S. Navy oceanographic survey ship," Cook said in the statement.

"The USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 62) and the UUV -- an unclassified "ocean glider" system used around the world to gather military oceanographic data such as salinity, water temperature, and sound speed - were conducting routine operations in accordance with international law about 50 nautical miles northwest of Subic Bay, Philippines, when a Chinese Navy [People's Republic of China] DALANG III-Class ship (ASR-510) launched a small boat and retrieved the UUV.

"Bowditch made contact with the PRC Navy ship via bridge-to-bridge radio to request the return of the UUV," Cook continued. "The radio contact was acknowledged by the PRC Navy ship, but the request was ignored. The UUV is a sovereign immune vessel of the United States. We call upon China to return our UUV immediately, and to comply with all of its obligations under international law."

The Chinese ship was roughly 500 yards away from the Bowditch when the incident occurred, said Capt. Jeff Davis, Pentagon spokesman. Davis added that a crane was used to lift the unmanned system aboard the Chinese vessel.

The defense official noted the location in the South China Sea was not in the proximity

Area of incident in South China Sea

of Scarborough Shoal, the site of a disputed Chinese island-building operation. “It’s not even close to Scarborough. It’s about 150 miles away,” the defense official said.

It's unclear what the Dalang 510 did after seizing the ocean glider. The Bowditch, the defense official said Friday, “remains in the area conducting normal operations.”

A few days after pirating the UUV, China returned the glider while lying about its actions, as set out in Sam LaGrone's USNI News piece China Returns U.S. Navy Unmanned Glider:

Chinese officials claimed the glider was a hazard to navigation and they recovered the unmanned vehicle for the safety of the water. The U.S. took issue with Beijing’s interpretation of events.

Interpretation? It was a flat out lie.

Why would China grab a vessel clearly under control of a U.S. Naval vessel - and one that was also clearly in the process of being recovered by USNS Bowditch? Some interesting thoughts from a Japan Times opinion piece by Mark Valencia U.S.-China drone spat: more than meets the eye:

Let’s be clear at the outset. The seizure of the UUV was certainly inappropriate and probably illegal — either as a simple theft or perhaps as a violation of the “sovereign immunity” of warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The U.S. military said the Bowditch — and the UUV — were carrying out scientific research in “international waters.” According to U.S. Navy spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis “the drone was seized while collecting unclassified scientific data.” The U.S. Defense Department said that “the incident was inconsistent with international law and standards of professionalism for conduct of navies at sea.”
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China’s Defense Ministry explained that the Chinese Navy had taken an “unidentified object” (the UUV) out of the water “in order to prevent the device from causing harm to the safety of navigation and personnel of passing vessels.” Arguably this is a duty of mariners. China criticized U.S. hyping of the incident as a “theft.” China also argued that the activities of drones are a legal “gray area” in which the law is unclear. This is true. Relevant legal questions are whether the “sovereign immunity” clause extends to drones or any “equipment” launched from state vessels; does it apply to “non-ratifiers;” and did the Bowditch, by deploying the drones in the vicinity of another vessel, violate the duty to exercise “due regard” for the rights of other states, e.g. the duty not to present a hazard to navigation? After all the drone was not a “warship” as defined by UNCLOS because it was not “manned by a crew” and it is not a “vessel” because it is not used as a means of transportation.”
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This analysis is not a justification of China’s action. But it offers possible explanations and background as to why it did what it did. At the least it gives a glimpse of the “cat and mouse” game going on between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea. Both sides are pushing — and even tearing — the legal envelope as they jockey for advantage. (note: "Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, China)"

So, Mr. Valencia notes the power struggle while offering up China's weak justifications for its actions. The Chinese rationale was repeated by another scholar in Yan Yan's The US Underwater Drone is not Entitled to Sovereign Immunity, which is set out below in its entirety:

On 20 December, 2016, the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that had been seized by the Chinese Navy was handed back to the US Navy, bringing a conclusion to what US President-elect Donald Trump had labeled as an “unpresidented” event. The Chinese defense spokesman said that the UUV had been removed from the water to ensure the navigational safety of passing ships, but the US asserted that the UUV enjoyed sovereign immunity and that the Chinese action was in violation of international law. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, described the UUV as a “sovereign immune vessel, clearly marked in English not to be removed from the water,” and said that it is US property and was lawfully conducting a military survey in the waters of the South China Sea. In a commentary written by James Kraska and Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, the authors hold the same argument that the UUV is a “vessel” that enjoys sovereign immune status, and as such the Chinese activity was a violation of international law.

The US argument is legally flawed if one takes a closer look at the rules of sovereign immunity in the law of the sea and how the US navy applies the UUV to its missions. Two types of ships are granted the sovereign immune status in the oceans according to articles 32, 95, and 96 of the 1982 UNCLOS: “warship” and “other government ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service.” First of all, I agree with Kraska and Pedrozo that the UUV is not a warship as defined by the 1982 UNCLOS. Article 29 of the UNCLOS defines “warship” as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” Although the Pentagon stated that the drone was US property, it was not “manned by crew,” and not clearly listed as a warship on active service.

But is the UUV a government “ship” owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service?

Kraska and Pedrozo hold that the UUV fits with the definition of “vessel” under Article 3 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea as “every description of watercraft, including non-displacement craft, WIG craft, and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.” But if one looks at the applications of the UUV by the US Navy, it is easy to see that it is not at all used “as a means of transportation on water,” but mostly for purposes of reconnaissance and submarine warfare.

The UUV is a subject that is able to operate underwater without a human occupant, and usually is divided into two categories: remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). For a long time in its history, application of the AUV was highly limited by the available technology. It was not until the last decade that, with more sophisticated processing capabilities and more efficient power supply systems, it could be used for an increased number of tasks.

The US Navy released the Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Master Plan in 2000 and updated it in 2004, describing the missions, capabilities, and technological and engineering issues of the UUV. The Master Plan is chartered by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the Submarine Warfare Division. The nine Sub-Pillar capabilities as identified and prioritized in the UUV Master Plan are: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; mine countermeasures; anti-submarine warfare; inspection/identification; oceanography; communication/navigation network nodes; payload delivery; information operations; and time-critical strike. Among all, the top-priority mission is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In addition to collecting data concerning the ocean surface (like electromagnetic and meteorological conditions) and underwater currents (like salinity and water temperature), the UUV is also capable of performing missions such as offshore surveillance, nuclear/biological detection, and satellite positioning. This is part of the reasons why global military powers have attached great importance to developing UUV-related technology. Highly adaptive to physical conditions and capable of performing multiple tasks in a highly efficient manner, the UUV has been widely viewed as a critical factor in future sea battles. In the wake of the Iraq War, the US began to see it as a primary threat to naval operations, and began to develop new types of UUV-based mine countermeasures.

Therefore, it’s very obvious to the author that the UUV is not used by the US Navy for the purpose of transportation and cannot be classified as a vessel that enjoys sovereign immune status. Rather, considering its functions and applications in the Navy, it is a lot more reasonable to classify it as a “machine,” “robot” or “military device,” which is not entitled to sovereign immunity.

In recent years, the rapid development of China’s Navy, particularly the development of its submarines, has drawn great attention from the US. By conducting intelligence gathering missions, the US has gradually built up an underwater surveillance and detection network covering China’s surrounding waters. It is reported that the US military has completed such networks in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, and is now trying to build one in the South China Sea. It is predictable that more UUVs will be deployed by the US Navy in the South China Sea in the future. Although there are no definite rules on the application of such a “machine” or “device,” it is reasonable to assert that, like in any other international practice under the framework of the law of the sea, the operators of UUVs shall adhere to the spirit of peaceful use of the sea and ocean, show due regard to navigational safety, respect the coastal states’ laws and regulations, and refrain from using the UUV to perform such missions as undermining or threatening the coastal states’ security. Pointing fingers at each other is not conducive to the bilateral mil-mil relationship, or to the peace and stability in the South China Sea, as China and the US are now the two most important players in the region. (note:"Yan Yan is Deputy Director of the Research Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China.")

Ms. Yan repeats the Chinese government misrepresentation of facts, ignores the proximity of the USNS Bowditch to the captured drone and then chooses to quibble about the definition of the term "vessel" as used by two distinguished maritime legal scholars, Kraska and Pedrozo. Their referenced piece is China’s Capture of U.S. Underwater Drone Violates Law of the Sea:

“Vessels” are broadly defined in international maritime law, and are generally synonymous with “ships.” The London Dumping Convention defines a “vessel” as a “waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever.” This expression includes in article 2(3) “air cushioned craft and floating craft, whether self-propelled or not.” Article 1(6) of the 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping Convention also includes “waterborne crafts and their parts and other fittings.” Similarly, article 3 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea defines “vessel” as “every description of watercraft, including non-displacement craft, WIG craft, and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.” This definition includes autonomous and even expendable marine instruments and devices, such as the U.S. drone stolen by the Chinese. The variation between manned systems and unmanned systems, such as size of the means of propulsion, type of platform, capability, endurance, human versus autonomous control and mission set, has not been a defining character of what constitutes a “vessel” or “ship.” Moreover, the seizure of the U.S. drone was a violation of COLREGS itself, which requires mariners to take affirmative steps to avoid closing on other vessels in the water.

Worth noting among the various treaties which define a "vessel" is the International Convention On Salvage, 1989 which contains the following definition:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Chapter I - General provisions
9
Article 1 - Definitions
10
For the purpose of this Convention:
11
(a) Salvage operation means any act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel or any other property in danger in navigable waters or in any other waters whatsoever.
12
(b) Vessel means any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation.

***
Article 4 - State-owned vessels
23
1. Without prejudice to article 5, this Convention shall not apply to warships or other non-commercial vessels owned or operated by a State and entitled, at the time of salvage operations, to sovereign immunity under generally recognized principles of international law unless that State decides otherwise.
24
2. Where a State Party decides to apply the Convention to its warships or other vessels described in paragraph 1, it shall notify the Secretary-General thereof specifying the terms and conditions of such application.

Let's look at the type of "glider" UUV-napped by the Chinese. As set out in Slocum Glider,

The Slocum Glider is a uniquely mobile network component capable of moving to specific locations and depths and occupying controlled spatial and temporal grids. Driven in a sawtooth vertical profile by variable buoyancy, the glider moves both horizontally and vertically.

I would assert that being able to move to "specific locations" is a pretty clear indicator that a UUV of the Slocum glider type is capable of "navigation" and is, thereby, a "vessel" as defined by the Convention on Salvage.

Now, Ms. Yan argues that the key element of a "vessel" is that must be "used for transportation" - this assertion represents a rather lengthy legal history of of various court trying to distinguish "vessels" from other things that float but which are not capable of navigation unless towed by or otherwise moved by an outside force. A recent analysis is set out in A Vessel Defined discussing the Lozman case:

A majority of the justices on the US Supreme Court disagreed with the district court and Eleventh Circuit and held the floating home was not a vessel and could not be subject to a maritime lien. It focused its analysis on the meaning of the statutory phrase “capable of being used…as a means of transportation on water”. It declined to interpret the phrase broadly to encompass every item that can float. It reasoned some objects that float such as a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a door taken off its hinges, or “Pinocchio when inside the whale,” are clearly not vessels. Rather, the court held a structure does not fall within the scope of the statutory definition of a vessel unless “a reasonable observer” looking at the structure’s physical characteristics and activities “would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water.”

To quote from the decision itself:

Not every floating structure is a “vessel.” To state the obvious, a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale) are not “vessels,” even if they are “artificial contrivance[s]” capable of floating, moving under tow, and incidentally carrying even a fair-sized item or two when they do so. Rather, the statute applies to an “artificial contrivance . . . capable of being used . . . as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U. S. C. §3 (emphasis added). “[T]ransportation” involves the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.” 18 Oxford English Dictionary 424 (2d ed. 1989)(OED). Accord, N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1406 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter eds. 1873) (“[t]he act of transporting, carrying, or conveying from one place to another”). And we must apply this definition in a “practical,” not a “theoretical,” way. Stewart, supra, at 496. Consequently, in our view a structure does not fall within the scope of this statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water.

So "transportation" includes carrying "things" as well as people.

Again, the glider in question was undoubtedly transporting "things" including sensors and data relating to its navigation.

Ms. Yan's argument is legally insufficient.

Mostly what appears is a disinformation effort by the Chinese to forcefully claim more and more dominance in the South China Sea, even in areas clearly not within any arguable area of Chinese jurisdiction - thus the weak tea assertion of protecting "sea lanes" from a glider - a glider being closely monitored by the USNS ship and, in fact, in the process of being recovered by the US ship.

This aggressive assertion of hegemony over both waters in the high seas and in the EEZ of other countries (in this case the Republic of the Philippines) needs to be forcefully rejected and the Chinese lies about the circumstances of such incidents need to be vigorously countered.

UPDATE: Suggestions that China's own "glider" program is not up to the level of those of the West and a possible motive for why it was grabbed here. Hat tip to Ryan Martinson and to Scott Cheney-Peters.

UDPATE2: Interesting discussion at Hybrid Warfare in the South China Sea: The United States’ ‘Little Grey (Un)Men':

There should be little doubt that the use of unmanned systems sets a strong political signal. Not only does it unambiguously establish the Washington and its allies’ willingness to counter Beijing’s “Little Blue Men,” it demonstrates the United States’ capacity to maintain its presence and reach into highly contested territory. Moreover, while providing additional intelligence to the United States and its allies, it signals an eagerness not only to challenge China’s posture but also to expand in another direction within the framework of hybrid/political warfare.

Perhaps a little overstated, since the UUV in question was not in what most would consider "highly contested territory" unless one grants China's claims to most of the South China Sea, claims already rejected by a tribunal as set out here.



*All emphasis added by me

"U.S. has lost" - Philippines Chooses the Strong Horse says its President

Leadership is an odd thing, since so much of it depends on perception - and the current president of the Philippines has perceived that China is the big dog in his region, as Reuters reports in "Duterte says U.S. has lost, aligns Philippines with China":

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced his "separation" from the United States on Thursday, declaring that it had "lost" and he had realigned with China as the two agreed to resolve their South China Sea dispute through talks.

Duterte made his comments in China, where he is visiting with at least 200 business people to pave the way for what he calls a new commercial alliance as relations with longtime ally the United States deteriorate.

His trade secretary, Ramon Lopez, said $13.5 billion in deals would be signed

Duterte's efforts to engage China, months after a tribunal ruling in the Hague over South China Sea disputes in favor of the Philippines, marks a reversal in foreign policy since the 71-year-old former mayor took office on June 30.

"America has lost now," Duterte told Chinese and Philippine business people at a forum in the Great Hall of the People, attended by Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli.

"I've realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to (President Vladimir) Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world - China, Philippines and Russia. It's the only way," he added.

Lord Palmerston had it right:

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

President Duterte may not be everyone's cup of tea, but he does seem to have a strong view of where the interests of the Republic of the Philippines lie. He's decided that China is the stronger horse, or as that now dead chap Osama bin Laden said:

“When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse”

While thinking about protecting U.S. interests in the Pacific, it might be time to look hard at those islands that are U.S. territory out there in the Pacific, like Wake, Midway, etc, and building up our attack submarine force.

UPDATE: Vietnam announces an "enemy of my enemy is my friend" hedging strategy as set out here:

Vietnam supports US “intervention” in the Asia-Pacific if it helps keep peace and stability, the defence ministry said, in a timely endorsement of a continued U.S. presence amid uncertainty over Washington’s faltering “pivot”.
Vice-defence minister, Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, met on Monday with Cara Abercrombie, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for South and Southeast Asia, and told her Vietnam backed a positive US role.
The general’s words of support, conveyed by a normally reclusive defence ministry, come when the United States most needs them, with its “rebalance” – aimed at boosting its Asian foothold and tempering China’s rise – now under strain in the run-up to a US presidential election.
Vinh “affirmed that Vietnam will support the US and other partners to intervene in the region as long as it brings peace, stability and prosperity”, he said in a statement.
Vietnam will support the US and other partners to intervene in the region as long as it brings peace, stability and prosperity.
At the dialogue, Abercrombie said the United States would not change its rebalance strategy, the statement added.
***
Washington’s traditional defence alliances in Southeast Asia are currently being tested, with ties with Thailand frosty since a 2014 coup and questions about the future of a tight military relationship with the Philippines under volatile new President Rodrigo Duterte, a staunch US critic.

You might note that Vietnam has couched its "support" with a few "ifs."

South of the South China Sea Fun: Indonesia and U.S. to Work Together Off Indonesian Waters

ABS-CBN News reports "Indonesia, US plan joint patrols on edge of Indonesian waters":

Indonesia and the United States have planned to carry out joint patrols around the outer maritime boundaries of Indonesian territorial waters in an effort to combat illegal fishing and human trafficking, Indonesia's Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries said Wednesday.

Indonesia has been cracking down on illegal fishing recently as set out by Nick Wadhams and Bill Faries of Bloomberg in"Blowing Up Boats Sets Indonesia’s Scarce Fish Swimming Again":

Since the end of that year, Indonesia has destroyed 220 foreign boats. It has also faced increased Chinese claims that waters surrounding the gas-rich Natuna Islands are part of traditional Chinese fishing grounds.
“We catch them and we sink them,” Pudjiastuti said of the boats. “That’s the new rule, the national consensus.”
“If you fish in my EEZ, that’s illegal fishing,” she said, referring to Indonesia’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. “If that fish is in my EEZ, that’s mine. If that fish swims past the EEZ, that’s anybody’s.”

See my previous posts on Indonesia and its push back against China's aggressive claim to SCS ownership China's Fishing Fleet: Apparently Only Chinese Waters Are Sovereign and Malaysia Complains About Chinese Fishing Fleet "Intruding" Into Its Waters, Indonesia Continues Protest of Chinese Incursions.

Why the fuss? Nice discussion of part of the issues in the SCS region at Fishing, not oil, is at the heart of the South China Sea dispute:

For a relatively small (around 3 million square kilometres) patch of the oceans, the South China Sea delivers an astonishing abundance of fish. The area is home to at least 3,365 known species of marine fishes, and in 2012, an estimated 12% of the world’s total fishing catch, worth US$21.8 billion, came from this region.

These living resources are worth more than money; they are fundamental to the food security of coastal populations numbering in the hundreds of millions.

Indeed, a recent study showed that the countries fringing the South China Sea are among the most reliant in the world on fish as source of nutrients. This makes their populations especially susceptible to malnutrition as fish catches decline.

These fisheries also employ at least 3.7 million people (almost certainly an underestimate given the level of unreported and illegal fishing in the region).
***
The South China Sea’s fisheries are seriously over-exploited.

Last year, two of us contributed to a report finding that 55% of global marine fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea. We also found that fish stocks have declined 70% to 95% since the 1950s.

Over the past 30 years, the number of fish caught each hour has declined by a third, meaning fishers are putting in more effort for less fish.

This has been accelerated by destructive fishing practices such as the use of dynamite and cyanide on reefs, coupled with artificial island-building. The coral reefs of the South China Sea have been declining at a rate of 16% per decade.

Even so, the total amount of fish caught has increased. But the proportion of large species has declined while the proportion of smaller species and juvenile fish has increased. This has disastrous implications for the future of fishing in the South China Sea.

Over-fished and vital to the local populations surrounding the SCS.

Perfect source for conflict.

Indonesia has also entered into a joint patrol agreement with the Philippines:

The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Wiranto said Indonesia and the Philippines have reached an agreement to conduct joint patrol on the Sulu waters in the Philippines.

“Joint maritime patrols will be carried out to monitor Sulu waters, which is prone to piracy,” Wiranto said yesterday, September 14, 2016, at Senayan Parliamentary Complex Jakarta.

According to Wiranto, the respective countries’ armed forces will be allowed to handle pirates in the Sulu waters. The agreement will enable Indonesian personnel to pursue and subdue pirates even if they crossed the Philippine borders. Previously, Indonesia had encountered difficulty for its inablility to cross the Philippine waters in hot pursuit of pirates. “It’s a key issue,” he said.

For those who may have forgotten, Indonesia is the world's fifth most populous country (if you count the EU as a single entity) with 255+ million people. 6000 inhabited islands (out of 17,000) and a bumper crop of volcanoes.

Once Again, China and Its Sea Lines of Communication

It's about time to revisit the importance of "sea lines of communication" or, as I referred to them back in 2005, "sea lanes":

I keep posting about sea lanes. What are these things? Sea lanes are trade routes - almost like highways in the sea, where due to geography, ocean going vessels follow certain paths to avoid islands, shallows and other impediments to their travel. They are also generally the most efficient routes to get from Point A to Point B - as close to straight line travel as a ship can accomplish given the number of obstacles in its path.

Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington,D.C. (National Defense University, 1996)
(color and bursts added)

Of particular interest in recent days are the sea lanes China is working to find ways to protect. As you can see from the following (which just reference crude oil shipments) these lanes are heavily travelled. In the first chart, I have marked U.S. allies in blue (yes, Singapore is oversized) and areas that China is making claims or working to establish relations as red bursts. Note that the red bursts sit athwart the sea lanes.

China has a problem, though, in that all the approaches to its ports must first pass through various chokepoints - some of which are very narrow like the Strait of Malacca and some of which are wider.

As set out SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific by Professor Ji Guoxing (2000):

The South China Sea provides shipping routes connecting Northeast Asia with Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The Spratly Islands are located in the southeast quadrant of the sea, an area known to seafarers as 'dangerous ground' due to the shallowness of the waters surrounding the islands and numerous submerged reefs around. Thus most merchant ships steer clear of the Spratlys, and major routes pass well west of the Spratlys. ''Through the South China Sea pass more than 41,000 ships a year, more than double the number that pass through the Suez Canal and nearly treble the total for the Panama Canal.''[2]

There are several straits of strategic importance in the region, such as the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar in Southeast Asia, and the Straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, Osumi, and Soya (La Perouse) in Northeast Asia. Major shipping routes in the Asia Pacific are through these key straits. Due to their potential for closure, these straits are known as chokepoints.

The Strait of Malacca, 600 miles long, is relatively shallow (only 21.8 meters) at some points. The maximum draught recommended by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for passing ships is 19.8 meters. The navigable channel at its narrowest point in the Singapore Strait at its eastern end is only 1.5 miles wide. This creates a natural bottleneck, with the potential for collision, grounding, or oil spill.

The Strait of Malacca, being the main corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, has as many as 220 ship movements in both directions per day at present, and would have 275 ship movements by the year 2000. ''About 26 tankers, including three fully loaded supertankers heading for Asian ports, pass through the strait daily.''[3] Tankers using the waterway by 2010 will be two to three times more numerous than today. ''If the strait were closed, nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity.''[4]

The Lombok Strait is wider and deeper than the Strait of Malacca, and passing through it is only 150 miles longer. As its depths are greater than 150 meters, it is not draught-limited, and its minimum passage width is 11.5 miles. It is thus used by largest ships over 100,000 DWT (dead weight tonnage). Most ships transiting the Lombok Strait also pass through the Makassar Strait, which has an available width of 11 miles and a length of 600 miles. Its depth is 930-3392 meters, mostly suitable for submarines and large ships.

The Sunda Strait is 50 miles long and is another alternative to the Malacca Strait. Its northeastern entrance is 15 miles wide. But because its northern part is relatively shallow with dangerous currents, it is not heavily used, and deep-draught ships of over 100,000 DWT do not transit the Strait.

The Strait of Tsushima, being part of the Korea Strait, is the major link between the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. It is 137.9 miles long. Its narrowest point is 25 miles wide, and its deepest point is 129 meters. It is heavily used by vessels traveling to and from the east coast of South Korea, western Japan, and Vladivostok of Russia.

The Strait of Tsugaru, located between Japan's Hokkaido and Honshu Islands, connects the Sea of Japan with the North Pacific Ocean. It is 71.5 miles long. Its narrowest point is 10.1 miles wide, and the deepest point of the navigable channel is 521 meters.

The Osumi Strait is a major connection from the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea to the Pacific.

The Strait of Soya (La Perouse) connects the Sea of Japan with the Sea of Okhotsk. Its narrowest point is 20 miles wide, and its depth is 30-60 meters.

For straits used for international navigation, some regional countries have modified the width of their territorial sea. In spite of their declaration of 12 nautical miles (nm) territorial seas, both Japan and South Korea have modified their territorial seas to 3 nm in the Korea Strait, thus providing a high seas ''corridor'', through which ships may transit without entering the territorial seas of Japan and South Korea. Japan has also declared territorial seas of 3 nm wide in the Tsugaru, Osumi, and Soya (La Perouse) straits.
***
The Asian Pacific countries rely heavily on intra-regional and inter-regional trade for their economic development, and seaborne trade is the most efficient and economical means of transporting large volume and heavy weight cargoes. Shipping routes are thus described as the arteries of the regional economy.

Through these chokepoints must flow the petroleum and other resources China needs to continue its growth.

However, none of these chokepoints are under Chinese control. Yet.

With the development of it artificial islands in the South China Sea, China is taking steps to be able to control access to that sea. There is an excellent piece by Thomas Shugart at War on the Rocks, China's Artificial Islands Are Bigger (And a Bigger Deal) Than You Think:

But the potential combination of China’s premier anti-ship and anti-air capabilities — along with the sheer, breathtaking scale of China’s island-building — call for serious consideration of the faux islands’ potential impact to U.S. diplomacy and contingency planning, as well as the need to take all possible measures to prevent their full militarization.

Ah, you ask, Why?" The best answer is this graphic from the Shugart article:

 "Range arcs depicting potential coverage of HQ-9 SAMs, YJ-62 ASCMs, and DF-21 ballistic missiles from China’s larger South China Sea island bases."

Should China have malice in their plans, you can seen that bases in the South China Sea give them some degree of control of access to not only the SCS but also threaten access to neighboring countries and limit the sea routes available in the region.

There are currently alternatives:

From "Maritime Economic Interests & the Sea Lines of Communication Through the South. China Sea: The Value of Trade in Southeast Asia," Noer and Gregory (1996)

The cost or re-routing shipping, of course, is time and money. The other cost is the ability of China to force the nations within the range of its weapons to capitulate to China's demands or be cut off from the rest of the world. That might be a little uncomfortable for an old foe like Vietnam. Or for major cities that sit on the ocean:

UN GRID-Arendal graphic

China continues to insist these developments are not martial in nature. It is clear, however, that China is taking steps to protect its sea lines of communication, so China's assertions ought to invoke a "Oh, come on" response from the rest of the world.