Interesting: China Testing Unmanned "Mini-Destroyer"

The Martime Executine reports China's Unmanned "Mini-Destroyer" Out on Sea Trials

The PLA Navy's well-armed unmanned surface vessel has conducted its first sea trials, according to Chinese trade outlet Ordnance Industry Science Technology.

The 50-foot-long vessel, dubbed JARI, is designed for remote-control or autonomous operation, like many projects developed by western navies and defense contractors. However, it may be unique in possessing all of the core capabilities of a surface combatant (at a small scale).

Its developers say that JARI has a phased-array radar, a sonar suite, a deck gun, two close-range air defense missiles, two vertical-launch silos for small anti-air / anti-ship missiles and two torpedo launch tubes. Given its equipment, Chinese state outlet Global Times has described it in ambitious terms as a combat-ready "mini Aegis-class destroyer."

Hmmm. That's a lot of technology and stuff in a small boat.

On Midrats 4 June 2017 - Episode 387: Looking at the Chinese Navy at 2030, with Patrick Cronin

Please join us at 5pm (EDT) on 4 June 2017 for Midrats Episode 387: Looking at the Chinese Navy at 2030, with Patrick Cronin

2030 is as close to us today as 2004, only 13 years.

As we look at various ways to maintain a Navy at the level at which we have become accustomed, the People’s Liberation Army Navy of China is building step by step as their economic power and global influence grows.

The world will see a dramatically different PLAN in 2030 relative to now, and as the present global naval superpower, our assumptions and plans need to be ready for it.

Our guest this Sunday to discuss this and more will be Dr. Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he was the Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, where he simultaneously oversaw the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs.

As a starting point for the discussion, we will review the major points of CNAS recent publication, Beyond the San Hai: The Challenge of China’s Blue-Water Navy.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can pick the show up later by clicking that link or by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Somali Pirates: Hijacking and "Thwarting"

From the Tribune of India: India, China warships thwart pirate attack off Aden coast

The Indian Navy and China’s People’s Liberation Army (Navy) jointly

OS-35

saved a bulk carrier named OS-35 which came under attack by pirates. The 178-metre ship was attacked by pirates on Saturday night in the Arabian Sea. The INS Mumbai provided air cover to the distressed merchant vessel, while the PLA Navy ship Yulin sent in a team of 18 to sanitise the merchant ship.

Previous reports were that OS-35 had been hijacked see Reuters: Somali Pirates "Suspected" in Bulker Hijack

Somali pirates are suspected of hijacking a bulk carrier ship, the head of

INS Mumbai

a maritime security company said on Saturday, in the latest in a string of attacks after years of calm.

A security source working at the Puntland Marine Police Force said the vessel was Tuvalu-flagged and is known as OS35.

Info on OS-35 here

PLAN frigate of type involved

Copyrighted photo of OS-35 by Julian De Lucas from Vesselfinder.com.

Excellent Read: "China and Asian Maritime Security" Testimony of Heritage's Dean Cheng Before the HouseSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs

You ought to read this testimony on China and Asian Maritime Security, which combines Chinese history and current strategy. Some good excerpts:

The rise of Chinese maritime capabilities makes it the first new maritime power to take to the seas since the end of the 19th century. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union, both of which fielded substantial navies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) actually relies upon the oceans for much of its economic activity. This dependence upon the sea also constitutes a radical break from that country’s millennia of history; the imperial treasure fleets of Admiral Zheng He were not nearly as central to Chinese power and livelihood. Thus, the transformation of the PRC from a land power to a maritime one constitutes one of the more fundamental changes in the international scene, certainly since the end of the Cold War, and arguably over the past century.
***
This growing dependence on the sea to operate various parts of its economy and maintain its society makes China unique. China is arguably the first continental power that is truly dependent upon the sea. Unlike Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, or the Soviet Union, China cannot look upon the sea as an optional area of operation, but as a vital area of national interest.
***
By contrast, since the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and the diversification of China’s manufacturing base, China’s economic center of gravity has shifted toward the the coast. This has allowed such economic centers as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Pudong to more easily access global trade routes for both imports of raw materials and exports of products. This has meant, however, that China’s recent economic development is also more vulnerable to potential attack from the sea.
***
An essential part of political warfare is legal warfare. From the Chinese perspective, legal warfare is not the “misuse” of the law, but rather, the exploitation of the law in support of broader political ends.
***
Such efforts also exploit not only the law, but also law enforcement agencies. For example, the use of the China Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce Chinese claims over the Senkakus, the Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal not only serves to limit the potential for escalation, but also is a political statement. China is using law enforcement vessels to enforce its laws over its territories, reinforcing its claim to these various features.
***
As important, China’s conception of naval operations has steadily expanded. From “near-shore operations,” which roughly equate with coastal and brown-water duties, it has shifted emphasis to “near-sea” and now “far-sea” operations, roughly comparable to green water and blue water activities, respectively. These operations are not necessarily power projection–oriented, however.

The shift of China’s economic center of gravity to its coast, as noted earlier, means that Beijing is at least as interested in keeping foreign air and naval forces away from China’s shores. Indeed, Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) activities should be seen at least partly in this light. Given the range of modern precision-guided munition weapons, however, keeping an adversary away from China’s shores means being able to undertake A2/AD activities at ranges of a thousand miles or more.

To this end, China is likely to employ not only traditional naval forces, but civilian and commercial assets, in unorthodox ways that embody “hybrid” approaches to warfare. China’s fishing fleets, for example, include a substantial number of naval militia assets, essentially civilian vessels that respond to government (including military) assignments as necessary. Such forces could be exploited to provide everything from intelligence gathering to early warning for China’s navy.[16] CCG vessels, some of which were cascaded from the PLAN, can do the same. More disturbingly, China has reportedly installed radars typically found on patrol vessels on some of the oil rigs in the East China Sea.[17] This further blurs the line between military and civilian assets, and suggests a new means by which oil rigs can serve as “mobile national territory,” while further expanding China’s maritime situational awareness envelope.
***
The physical space of the South China Sea region itself is an invaluable resource, as it provides a strategic buffer. This is especially important as the PRC has built up the island of Hainan in the northwest corner of the South China Sea. Chinese military engineers have constructed a dock to handle its aircraft carriers, dedicated port facilities, including tunnels, for submarines, and a number of military airfields.[20] (The American EP-3 that collided with a Chinese fighter in 2001 crash-landed at one of these airfields.) In addition, China’s newest spaceport is located on Hainan Island, where it will be lofting future manned Chinese space missions. It is clearly not in the Chinese interest to allow foreign, and especially American, naval capability to make close approaches to Hainan.

Instead, it is in China’s interest to make the South China Sea as forbidding as possible, especially for American submarines, which remain qualitatively superior to their Chinese counterparts. It is therefore not surprising that there appears to be an effort to create a massive sonar surveillance network that would cover the region.[21] Indeed, military bases on the artificial islands China has built in the Spratlys, as well as in the Paracels and perhaps at Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank in the future, could provide convenient sites for processing data, and also for basing anti-submarine warfare aircraft and helicopters. Such deployments would make the deployment of American submarines into those waters far riskier.

Really, read it all.


Hat tip to James Kraska

Everyone Gets to Play with Sea-Going Drones: China's "High-Speed Unmanned Surface Vessel" for "Security Patrols"

Jane's IHC reports "China unveils 13 m high-speed USV concept and targets Southeast Asian navies". That "targeting" word is interesting, because the article really is about the Chinese marketing this vessel. On the other hand, who, exactly, is this thing designed to defend against?

A Chinese state-owned enterprise has unveiled a 13 m trimaran unmanned surface vessel (USV) concept with the intention of marketing the system to navies and law enforcement agencies in the Southeast Asian region.

The system, which the company refers to as the 13 m high-speed intercept boat, features a breadth of 4 m and a draught of 0.6 m.
****
According to further specifications provided by the company, the interceptor can reach a speed of 80 kt in a standard configuration that includes a high-resolution video camera and datalinks. The vessel can also be configured to follow a predetermined patrol route and track surface targets autonomously.

Not too different, then, from the Israeli-developed USV "Protector":

The Protector is an integrated naval combat system, based on unmanned, autonomous,

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd

remotely controlled surface vehicles. Highly maneuverable and stealthy, the Protector can conduct a wide spectrum of critical missions, without exposing personnel and capital assets to unnecessary risk.
The Protector's anti-terror mission module payload includes sensors and weapon systems. The search radar and the Toplite electro-optical (EO) pod enable detection, identification and targeting operations. The weapon systems are based on Rafael's Typhoon remote-controlled, stabilized weapon station, capable of operating various small caliber guns. The highly accurate, stabilized weapon station has excellent hit-and-kill probability.
Protector is mission reconfigurable through its plug-and-play design, allowing utilization of various mission modules:

- Anti-terror Force Protection (AT/FP)
- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
- Naval warfare: ASW, MIW, MCM, ASUW, EW
- Maritime, Port Security

Features and Benefits:

- Unmanned, highly autonomous, remote controlled
- Stealthy, highly maneuverable
- Reconfigurable mission modules

Singapore, Mexico and Israel already have Protectors.

China's "Far Sea Operations"

From the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operations in a downloadble pdf format. The contents may prove interesting:

CHAPTER ONE Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security by Dale C. Rielage
CHAPTER TWO Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and Policy
Implications for China by Wu Zhengyu
CHAPTER THREE Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security by Xu Qiyu
CHAPTER FOUR Chinese Cooperation to Protect Sea-Lane Security:
Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden by Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and
Escort Missions by Zhang Junshe
CHAPTER SIX Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the
Twenty-First Century by Christopher D. Yung
CHAPTER SEVEN China’s Evolving Overseas Interests and Peaceful
Competition by Cai Penghong
CHAPTER EIGHT Freedom of the “Far Seas”? A Maritime Dilemma for China by Jonathan G. Odom
CHAPTER NINE SLOC Security and International Cooperation by Wang Xiaoxuan
CHAPTER TEN The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic: Catalyst for
Cooperation or Confrontation? by Mark Redden and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

It's the May 2015 edition, edited by Peter Dutton and Ryan Martinson.

I am still reading it, but this introduction to Chapter 6 is intriguing:

In the thirty-five years since inaugurating its “Reform and Opening” policy, China has become increasingly intertwined with the world outside its borders. China is currently the world’s largest trading nation, relying heavily both on foreign supplies of raw
materials for and on foreign consumers of its manufactured products.1 Chinese firms, answering the call of to “Go Out” (走出去), are expanding their overseas investments, and Chinese citizens are traveling the world in ever greater numbers in search of business, education, and pleasure. Though generally positive, these developments have increased the country’s vulnerability to events beyond its control.

Chinese leaders recognize the increasing challenges of safeguarding overseas interests. However, official Chinese policy rejects the type of initiatives that would enable the country to meet these new needs better—namely, overseas basing of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. In recent years, growing numbers of Chinese commentators have expressed views favoring revision of this traditional policy, suggesting that in due time China will have no choice but to take steps to enhance its far-seas support capabilities. This public discussion likely reflects a debate among Chinese policy makers about how best to protect the country’s expanding overseas interests. If China ultimately does
change its long-standing policy eschewing permanent overseas presence, what basing model is it likely to choose?

Dr. Yung lays out the options he sees.

It's interesting reading, as are the previous 12 issues of China Maritime Studies - which are also available for your reading pleasure here.

If you want more "PLA/PLAN cred," there is this Peter Mattis post at War on the Rocks So You Want to Be a PLA Expert? I don't know if you can get a special ribbon for reading all his links.

China Does Counter-Piracy, Gets Experience in Blue Water Naval Operations

Part of GOA PLAN anti-piracy drill in 2011. [Photo/Xinhua]

U.S. Naval War College Publication, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden by Andrew Ericson and Austin Strange (pdf). From the conclusion:

*** China’s process of gaining Far Seas experience is not simply one of increasing operational naval capabilities—it is far broader. Antipiracy operations conveniently enable China both to respond to internal and external pressures to act on the international stage and to raise significantly the overall ability of its increasingly powerful navy. The Gulf of Aden has challenged Beijing to adjudicate among multifarious, often contradictory, domestic and international forces. As the first major window into China’s Far Seas operations and its approach thereto, it foreshadows how Beijing will take its place in the world as its interests expand and its actions impact others more strongly.

Watching China's Aircraft Carrier Gets Interesting for U.S. Navy Cruiser

USS Cowpens

A Bill Gertz report on international naval gamesmanship in the South China Sea as "Chinese Naval Vessel Tries to Force U.S. Warship to Stop in International Waters":

A Chinese naval vessel tried to force a U.S. guided missile warship to stop in international waters recently, causing a tense military standoff in the latest case of Chinese maritime harassment, according to defense officials.

The guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens, which recently took part in disaster relief operations in the Philippines, was confronted by Chinese warships in the South China Sea near Beijing’s new aircraft carrier Liaoning, according to officials familiar with the incident.

“On December 5th, while lawfully operating in international waters in the South China Sea, USS Cowpens and a PLA Navy vessel had an encounter that required maneuvering to avoid a collision,” a Navy official said.

“This incident underscores the need to ensure the highest standards of professional seamanship, including communications between vessels, to mitigate the risk of an unintended incident or mishap.”
***
The encounter appears to be part of a pattern of Chinese political signaling that it will not accept the presence of American military power in its East Asian theater of influence, Fisher said.

“China has spent the last 20 years building up its Navy and now feels that it can use it to obtain its political objectives,” he said.

Fisher said that since early 2012 China has gone on the offensive in both the South China and East China Seas.

China has made major claims to the South China Sea and this is one way to fight back.

Oh, if you are surprised by these antics, you may have missed China Kindly Sends Its "Slightly Used" Aircraft Carrier on Training Mission for U.S. Submarines in South China Sea.

Expect more of the same as the wanna-be "Bullies of the South China Sea" get push back from their neighbors and their neighbor's friends.

Is the U.S. a neighbor? Guam is good and in the neighborhood.

China's Naval Power

A brace of articles by James R. Holmes: The second of which refers to the first - here's the second - How to Measure China’s Maritime Power :

Bumper sticker: it's tough to predict how swiftly and surely PLA Navy hardware and crews will mature, but China will remain a seafaring power in the broadest sense of the term. It will remain a power to reckon with.

And, the first, which lies behind a Foreign Policy login
Red Tide: Just how strong is China's navy, really?:

Presently, there's reason to question the PLA Navy's battle-worthiness. If the PLA Navy operates at a higher tempo over the next decade, keeping task forces at sea for weeks or months at a time, it will evolve into a formidable force.

Well, as most military thinkers know, it helps to have interior lines of communication, which China seeks inside the "first island chain."

We discussed some of the issues involving China with Professor Holmes's frequent partner in writing on Midrats recently in Episode 187: From I to C of the BRIC with Toshi Yoshihara

Southeast Asia: India, China and Sea Power

Interesting piece at the Foreign Policy website, "India's Ocean" by Dhruva Jaishankar, posing one of those fundamental questions, "What is the role of the Indian Navy as China asserts dominance to India's east?":

For its part, China needs to appreciate that its aggressive pursuit of maritime territory compels India to cooperate more closely with Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing's issuing of passports this November featuring a map showing the fullest extent of its territorial claims was a remarkably clumsy gesture, provoking simultaneous outrage in India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China may have only itself to blame if these states find greater common cause with one another, and with other regional maritime powers.

The map above indicates key Chinese sea lines of communication. You might take note of India's position relative to them.

You also might take a look at the Thomas X. Hammes piece, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict (pdf), which suggests a "distant blockade" (or "Offshore Control") of China as a possible strategy:

The strategy of Offshore Control works with willing Asia-Pacific nations to ensure that the United States can interdict China’s energy and raw material imports and industrial exports, while protecting our partners.

Col. Hammes's thoughts are also set out in December 2012 U.S. Naval Institute article, "Offshore Control is the Answer":

Offshore control would deny China the use of the sea inside the first island chain, at the same time defend those islands, and dominate the air and sea outside that theater. It envisions a stand-off military campaign focusing on a war of economic strangulation rather than on penetrating Chinese airspace to physically destroy its infrastructure. It seeks to force China to fight in ways that maximize U.S. strengths while minimizing China’s. In essence, OC provides a strategic context for an operational approach that goes beyond Air-Sea Battle to use the U.S. geographical advantage to maximize the effectiveness of a campaign using our air, sea, and land assets.

Oh, and if you were wondering about the value of a strong U.S. Navy - this discussion is right on point. Being able to project power even when it needs to be done without local help - that's a big chunk of the Navy's job description.

Keep in mind that it is the job of the military strategist to work through "unlikely" scenarios just in case. Next time some idiot media hack reports on secret U.S. plans to re-take Midway Island based upon some outlandish event occurrence, it shouldn't really be a shock to you.

UPDATE: There has been some notice of the fact I used an "oil flow" map to illustrate this post. Here is a more recent map that shows vital sea lanes (click on it to enlarge), followed up by a closer view in the China region:

China: Using Presence to Build Dominance in the South China Sea

Interesting read at gCaptain, discussing "another" Chinese fleet (meaning not the PLAN) - more specifically, the Chinese Maritime Surveillance force- dubbed there as "China’s Great White Fleet".

Floating under that tag will be a planned 350 or so ships which already are establishing themselves as a "presence" in what are hotly contested sea areas.

One such area is the portion of the South China Sea falling under the "nine dotted line," (see the nearby "Nine Dotted Line" map) sometimes referred to as "China's Cows Tongue" (see also China and the South China Sea: Back to the "Cow's Tongue").

As set out in the gCaptain post:

Worries extend not only over the larger nation’s diplomatic claims over the region – claims in which China argues span centuries of maritime history – but in China’s increasing military strength in the region. At the heart of the problem is the aggressive newbuild strategy of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) agency, a paramilitary maritime law enforcement agency created on 19 October 1998 under the auspices of China’s State Oceanic Administration and responsible for law enforcement within the territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and shores of the People’s Republic Of China.
***
Painted white with the English words, “China Marine Surveillance” emblazoned in tall blue letters across the sides of their hulls, the vessels being built for CMS are reminiscent of the great battleships built by the United States at the turn of the last century...
***
While the CM ships are relatively small, between 78 and 98 meters in length, and may be only lightly armed, they are certainly enough to intimidate fishing vessels and may prove effective in future actions against larger targets.
***
The CMS fleet has the proven audacity and speed to harass vessels of sizes ranging from small fishing boats to the 281 foot (85.78 m) USNS Impeccable, but unarmed fixed structures may be the primary target. Agency vessels are keeping a close eye on offshore oil and gas structures in the region and, in March of this year, CMS issued a press release citing the successful surveillance of “illegal exploration of oil and gas fields” in the South China Sea . . .

The gCaptain post goes on to note a report of a small Indian "convoy" being "welcomed" to the South China Sea by Chinese naval forces which then escorted the Indian vessels for several hours. Such a "welcome" might just be one way to let people know who the dominant power in the area is.

Using the combination of CMA and PLAN ships to "surveill" is damn clever way to assert maritime dominance.

A report on the CMS can be found at China Daily's
"Expansion of fleet to safeguard sea rights":

An SOA [State Oceanic Administration] official, who requested anonymity, told China Daily on Wednesday that the lack of ocean surveillance ships has hindered the country's ability to protect its maritime rights.

***

Sea disputes between China and other countries have surged in recent months.

Sino-Japanese relations have been strained since a collision between two Japan Coast Guard patrol boats and a Chinese trawler on Sept 7 in waters off the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.

Beijing suspended all high-level contacts with Tokyo after Japan illegally detained the Chinese captain. China has since sent several fishery administrative ships to monitor the region.

In the South China Sea, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei all have competing claims over some Chinese islands.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in July that sovereignty issues in the South China Sea were a "diplomatic priority" for the US and proposed dealing with them in the international arena.

"The new ships (joining the fleet) can be interpreted as China's response to recent sea disputes," said Wang Hanling, a maritime law specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

One more thing to keep an eye on.

UPDATE: Salamander is on the case with a nice link to Professor Holmes at China’s Monroe Doctrine, which points out the differences in the current situation.

UPDATE2: About that "escort service" provided to the Indians from The Indian Express .
Indian Navy in South China Sea: Beijing’s unwelcome escort:

The PLAN’s challenge to India was presented in a typical and exquisite Chinese style. In ‘welcoming’ and ‘escorting’ the Indian naval unit, the PLAN was showing India its velvet covered fist.

The message is this: “nice to see you here, but you are in our territorial waters and within them there is no right to ‘freedom of navigation’ for military vessels. You are here at our sufferance.”

China: Small Footprint in Seychelles?

As a follow on to my earlier post regarding Seychelles offer of some sort of anti-piracy base to the Chinese at Somali Pirates: Seychelles asks China for counter-pirate "presence"

Reuters reports "China considers Seychelles port offer, denies base plan":

"According to escort needs and the needs of other long-range missions, China will consider seeking supply facilities at appropriate harbours in the Seychelles or other countries," the ministry said on Monday, according to the China Daily.

"This approach is transparent, and there's no cause for worry," the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin told reporters, referring to those discussions.

"China has no plans for establishing military bases abroad," said Liu, adding that he had not heard of any ideas of stationing personnel or aircraft on the Seychelles, an archipelago of 115 islands.

China's Navy: "Peaceful Development?"

Some recent comments by the Chinese president seem to indicate an interest in instilling a bellicose attitude in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy:

A day before Chinese and US military officials started military talks in Beijing, Chinese President Hu Jintao told it's navy to accelerate modernisation and prepare for war.

Speaking to military officials on Tuesday, Xinhua, China's official media agency quoted President Hu as commanding the Party congress of People's Liberation Army Navy to "make extended preparations for warfare in order to make greater contributions to safeguarding national security and world peace."

Many observers believe that President Hu's blunt comments are in stark contradiction to his often repeated claims of China's "peaceful rise".

Peaceful rise? Well, here's a little background in an interesting read from Eurasiareview, "PLA And China's Peaceful Development - Analysis":

China has thus found a near justifiable way of modernizing its Defence Forces, particularly its Navy by emphasizing on the importance of non-traditional roles for its forces. The 2008 ‘White Paper on China’s National Defence’ enunciated for the first time that China now sees the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as an important form of applying military force. The PLA Navy has accordingly widened its scope of operations to include “…integrated offshore operations in distant waters …” The uninterrupted anti-Piracy patrols mounted by the PLA Navy ships since December 2008 in the Gulf of Aden and off Somali coast, wherein nine task Forces have been deployed till date for escort duties, is the most notable instance of MOOTW.