Reports of Sinking Ship - Possibly a Warship - Following An Explosion Off Somalia

This is a somewhat odd report from VOA Witnesses in Somalia Report Sinking Ship After Explosion

Officials and residents in Somalia's Puntland region say they saw a large ship off the country's coast explode and gradually begin to sink Monday.

Witnesses in the coastal town of Muranyo describe the ship as looking like a warship, although it was not possible to immediately identify the vessel. They say two other ships in the area came to the aid of the sinking ship and rescued its crew.

Black dot is approx location of Alulu

The region is frequently patrolled by the European Union Naval Force Somalia to disrupt piracy and protect vulnerable shipping, including World Food Program vessels.

"The ship sank around sunset on Monday. Then, two warships came. Locals saw them evacuating the crew. No one has contacted us and we had no ability to extend a rescue at nighttime," said Ali Shire Osman, the chairman of the northern Somali port town of Alula.

One witness described the scene to VOA's Somali service: "A huge explosion happened, which sent plumes of smoke mixed with waves of water into the air. It was a deafening blast and then the ship started to gradually sink," said Mohamed Ahmed. "Then two white warships came to the scene and are still there."
***
The town near where the incident happened is 44 kilometers east of Alula, which has been one of the pirate hubs in Somalia.

The proximity to Yemen may be related.

UPDATE: A possibe explanation from Maritime BulletinShip sank after explosion off Somalia coast – probably RAMA 2?:

// June 27: UK Coast Guard was alerted by Yemeni Coast Guard in the morning June 26, reporting sinking tanker RAMA 2 and lack of capacities to launch SAR. UK CG coordinated SAR, directing to sinking tanker nearby merchant ships. 12 out of 14 crew were rescued by nearby merchant ships, 1 was rescued by UK Navy helicopter, 1 is missing. SAR was hampered by adverse weather. Tanker said to carry some 3,000 tons of fuel on board.

African Trade: China, India and others

Nice report by BBC News "China and India: The scramble for business in Africa":

Throughout Africa - at building sites, on the street, and at ports and airports - the Chinese presence is growing.

Competing for a slice of the wealth along with traditional stakeholders are new ones such as Brazil and South Korea - and India, China's neighbour.
***
India's $65bn (£44bn) of trade with Africa is dwarfed by China's $200bn.

Chinese companies are active across the continent with big infrastructure projects, including ports, railways and sports stadiums.

Hmm. No mention of U.S. companies vying for work?

But, to follow on, the BBC is helpful with, a report of $5 billion deal between China and Kenya.

Kenya is on the outs with the U.S. and the EU due to issues with Kenya's president, whose spokespeople suggest nothing but good things from their relations with China:

In a statement, his office said the deals with China were a "massive boost" to his government.

"The rail link, particularly, is important in the context of East Africa's shared goal of ensuring quicker movement of peoples, goods and services," it quoted Mr Kenyatta as saying.

It will link the Kenyan border town of Malaba with the port of Mombasa, one of the busiest in Africa.

Funny, I remember the days when China was attacking the "exploitation" of Africa by western countries. Now, in Wikileaks released message, a U.S. government official brightly notes:

"China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons," he says. "China is in Africa primarily for China."

I would think any person who ever attended a "Great Powers" course might understand that.

I suspect the Africans and the Chinese do.

So, if you find yourselves asking why China might need a blue water navy to protect its sea lanes - you might consider the routes from Africa to China and the chokepoints that they might see as problematic.

You might also speculate about the experience that Chinese fleet is getting operating in the Indian Ocean as part of the anti-Somali pirate forces.

More about that "pirate" attack off Sri Lanka

Following up on this earlier post Pirates Off Sri Lanka, here's a clarifying report "Asylum seekers turn pirates, seize boat, attack crew off Sri Lanka":

The man rescued by Capt Petersen said he believed two colleagues had drowned, though Sri Lankan police said it was possible they were still aboard the Theja.

"He told us he was a fisherman from Sri Lanka and their fishing boat was attacked ... by some people who wanted their boat for emigration to Australia," Capt Petersen said.

"There were six people on this fishing boat. At least four of them were tied up and thrown into the sea.

Worth reading the whole thing.

More here, which has the great quote, ''There was some degree of criminality,'' he said.

It is also possible this is one of those things where the would-be immigrants were facing attack by the boat crew they thought they had a deal with (not an uncommon thing in history - just ask Vietnamese boat people) and defended themselves with some vigor.

I still don't think we have the full story.

Things must be tough in Sri Lanka to prompt this sort of desperate action.

UPDATE: A nice piece on a portion of the human smuggling racket to Australia from last year at The Telegraph's "The inside story of people smuggling to Australia"

Somali Pirates: A Dry Spell in the Sea Pirate Business

"For Somali pirates, July was a very bad month" from CSMonitor.com:

Since June 19, Somalia’s pirates have not successfully taken any vessel hostage, and since June 26, they have not even tried to carry out a hijack.

This marks the longest unbroken stretch of peaceful shipping off Somalia since piracy emerged as a major menace in 2007, and the drop has been attributed to a greater use of armed guards on ships, international naval patrols, and the bad weather.

Weather, the interdiction of pirate "mother ships" by naval forces and the presence of armed security forces on many merchant ships might just cause an alteration in the pirate's business model . . .

On the other hand, let's see what happens when the weather gets better.

Here's the weather guesser prediction of piracy risk based on wind and waves for the next few days from ONI's Piracy Analysis and Weekly Warning Report of 1 Aug 12 (pdf):

In this case, green is good for shipping and bad for the pirates.

UPDATE: More here.

Somali Pirates: Counter-Piracy Heat

MOD Photo

More counter-Somali pirate operations revealed at "We're coming to get you! Somali pirate boat blown up by chopper as Navy frigate crew arrest 12" from Mail Online:

Flames erupt into the sky from a skiff floating adrift in the Indian Ocean, a powerful demonstration of the Royal Navy’s might as it fights the scourge of Somali piracy.

HMS Westminster

The boat was blown out of the water by a Merlin helicopter, flown from HMS Westminster, which strafed the vessel, setting fire to fuel tanks.

Midrats Sunday 5 pm (Eastern U.S.): Episode 119 Offshore Balancing the Indian Ocean

CDR Salamander and I venture again into the world of live internet radio Sunday, April 15 at 5pm (1700) U.S. Eastern with our Episode 119 Offshore Balancing the Indian Ocean 04/15 by Midrats on Blog Talk Radio:

What is real, and what is a mirage? Can something be a cost effective strategic option, or a fool's errand?

As outlined by our guests in their lates work in the periodical, Asian Security: An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indian Ocean; the United States is beset by war weariness after over a decade of war and a half century plus of global committments. We find ourselves with a stagnant economy, and skyrocketing defense procurement costs. It is seductive to think of retiring from continental Eurasia, but if history calls us back - returning in times of systemic conflict would be problematic – even in the relatively accessible rimlands of Western Europe and East Asia.

In a part of the world with the planet's largest democracy - offshore balancing is close to impossible in the Indian Ocean.

As it turns out, offshore balancing in the Indian Ocean may be no balancing at all.

From "The complex network of global cargo ship movements" by Pablo Kaluza, et al. (oval added)

Our guest for the full hour to discuss their article will be U.S. Naval War College Associate Professors James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara.

Offshore balancing? What the heck is that? Tune in and find out - and, if you can't make the live show because you are buried in receipts and other paper as you try to reduce your tax burden before April 17 - well, join us in the "not so live" downloads from here or from the Midrats iTune page.

Somali Pirates: The Pirates Get a Vote in Counter-Piracy

Strategy Page makes the point that for every announced counter-piracy move there's a counter counter-piracy move, especially when if the pirates are media savvy - as set out in Sea Transportation: Pirates Preparing For The Worst.

Followed to its logical extreme, saying "There is no easy solution to the Somali pirates" is to acknowledge that the real solutions to Somali are hard - - because these answers involve killing people and breaking things.

If the counter-piracy forces are more afraid of bad publicity than they are willing to pay this hard price, then we might as well just bundle up a few million dollars every year and start paying "tribute" to the pirates to buy them off and cut out the pretense of fighting pirates using military force. It would probably prove cheaper in the long run.

Speaking of responses to piracy, if you go here, you can read a presentation by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, to the Center for American Progress on 27 Mar 2012, after a discussion of how piracy was "snowballing" during the administration in office prior to the current one and making a list of the international diplomatic and military efforts set in place (during which time the piracy continued to "snowball"), he hits on a key to the slowing of successful piracy of bigger ships due to the efforts of - well, you can guess - :

However, we must also recognize that even when fully implemented best management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. As a result, we have also supported the maritime industry’s use of additional measures to enhance their security – such as having armed security teams on board. To date, not a single ship with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated. Not one.

These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to counter-piracy. While many expected these teams to be made up of undisciplined “cowboys” that would cause an increase in the violence at sea, from what we have seen so far this has not been the case. We have not seen cases of pitched battles at sea between pirates and armed security personnel. In fact, in most engagements, the situation ends as soon as pirates are aware an armed security team is on board. In most cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security teams will use flares or loudspeakers to warn the pirates. If the pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots. That is usually when the interaction ends. Pirates break off the attack and turn their skiffs around and wait for another less protected ship to come by. These teams therefore have served as an effective deterrent.

To his credit, Mr. Shapiro also gets it right on the impact "mother-ships":

This demonstrates how pirates are constantly adapting their tactics in response to international efforts. One example of this is their expanded use of mother-ships – which are themselves pirated ships with hostage crews aboard. These ships launch and re-supply groups of pirates who use smaller, faster boats for attacks. They can carry dozens of pirates and tow many skiffs for multiple simultaneous attacks. This has made pirates more difficult to interdict and more effective at operating during monsoon season, which previously restricted their activities. Mother-ships have extended the pirates’ reach far beyond the Somali Basin. Somali pirates now operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles – an area equivalent to the size of the continental United States. Pirate activity has even extended as far as the waters off the coast of India. This increase makes it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to disrupt an ongoing attack. There is just too much water to patrol. (emphasis added)

Well, then he describes one part of the effort to shrink this "water":

Since discovering the use of mother-ships, international navies now seek to identify and interdict mother-ships when possible.

Well, as I have said before "shrink the ocean" available to the pirates by Make the Somali pirates’ sea smaller…. Yes, Somalia has a long coast line, but it is clear that not all that coast is used by pirates - in fact, we have long known the bases from which the majority of pirates operate.

I suspect that knowledge is one of the factors in the EU's announcement that the counter-pirate fight will be taken ashore . . .

Oh, and from the ICC CSS IMB Live Piracy Map, a look at the pirate's efforts so far in 2012 in the Indian Ocean and its tributaries:

 Finally, from the NATO Shipping Center, pirate activity over the last 3 months:

That yellow bar over there in the Gulf of Aden is the "transit lane."

Somali Pirates: Warning of a logical extension into new hunting grounds

A suggestion of a potential area of expansion for the pirates of Somalia, should they decide to venture further into the open ocean using their "mother ships" is found at "Piracy: Cape to Arabian Gulf and Malacca Shipping Lanes Are Latest Targets", which builds off an early February 2012 hijacking:

Red arrow points to referenced 8 Feb attack

NATO has issued an alert saying that a merchant vessel was attacked yesterday (8 February 2012) and is suspected to have been hijacked. At 14h38 UTC the vessel was in position 13 32 N 058 36 E.

***

The hijacking comes on the same day that a maritime security company whose services include the provision of armed guards on ships warns of “a critical shift in pirate focus.”

GoAGT (Gulf of Aden Group Transits) said on Thursday that over the past week it has received first-hand information from sources indicating that several Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) have begun to focus operations in a new regional area. These sightings suggest that pirates are targeting the Cape to Arabian Gulf shipping lane.

“There is a potential for PAGs to move east and endanger shipping along the Cape to Malacca route,” added GoAGT. “Shipping along these routes are vulnerable as many vessels are not hardened against piracy, and do not carry armed guards. This is due to these routes being outside of the traditional High Risk Area (HRA).”

"Mothership" dhow?

GoAGT says the activity east of the Seychelles is “likely motivated by the search for unprepared shipping. The operational range for PAGs has greatly increased due to the use of mothership vessels, which allow for extended operations at sea. It is also possible that PAGs can extend operations south of the Maldives.” “On 6 February,” says GoAGT, “a merchant vessel was approached by two skiffs in the central Indian Ocean Region at position 05°03'N 066°07'E. On 8 February, a second merchant vessel was attacked at position 04°18'S 059°59'E by a skiff with five pirates on board (POB). The distance between these attacks suggests that several PAGs are now operating in this area. “With the extensive concentration of anti-piracy measures in the Northern Indian Ocean, it is increasingly likely PAGs will attempt to target new areas to take advantage of unprotected shipping lanes,” warns GoAGT.

***

Nato said piracy activities have been recently reported in the Indian Ocean in vicinity of the Seychelles Islands and warned that approaches occurred on 28 January north of the Seychelles Islands in position 0455N 05814E and on 6 February east of the Seychelles Islands in the position of 0503S 06607E. “Masters are advised to proceed through these areas with extreme caution, and be advised that the PAG (Pirate Attack Group) responsible for the recent approaches (NSC4) in the Indian Ocean is still believe to be in the area.”

Okay, GoAGT might be attempting to drum up a little business, but its point is well made. Somali pirates have shifted their attacks to areas in which coverage by naval forces has been weak or non-existent and to locales where the perceived need for shipboard armed security teams has also been low. It is logical that the pirates might shift to a sea lane which, as yet, has not been bothered by pirate attacks.

What virginal sea lanes that are within the potential reach of the Somali pirates are in danger?

 What follows is a mashup chart I created by combining a chart from a study of "The complex network of global cargo ship movements" by Pablo Kaluza, et al. with a recent IMB Live Piracy Map showing attacks to 4 March 2012 in the Indian Ocean area:

EagleSpeak Mashup Map: The more yellow the line, the more heavily traveled the sea lane 

If it looks a little fuzzy, It's because of the overlay of the maps to allow me to make my point - there a number of heavily traveled sea lanes radiating (roughly) from South Africa to India, to the Strait of Malacca and to other points in eastern Indian Ocean. Given enough of a mothership, these areas are potentially vulnerable to pirate attacks, though, to date, none has occurred along them.

Here's another liberty I have taken from the Kaluza, et al piece, in which the green oval I have added highlights the area of concern:

Having a hypotheses of a potential area of attack - and one that covers a vast area of ocean at that- what is a viable way of providing some protection for these as yet "un-pirated" sea lanes?

One thought is to use modern airships as counter-pirate tools, as set out in an earlier pos,  Fighting Pirates with Airships, an idea apparently being examined by the Royal Navy. Another possibility is to keep the Somali pirates out of these sea lanes by a vigorous containment policy, though ultimately there has to be a "risk/reward" look at the potential which ways the costs of prevention of hijackings against the cost of paying ransoms.

Midrats on Sunday: It's Pirate Time Again

As noted in an earlier post, the weather in the upper Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is beginning to shift from monsoon back to that more favorable to the operations of pirates in the small open attack boats. After several weeks of slowed pirate activity, the pirates have managed to snag a new victim and her crew of 21.

Arrayed against the pirates are warships from the EU, NATO, China, India, Japan, Singapore, Iran, Russia and armed guard teams embarked on many merchant ships and fishing boats.

Naturally, it's a good time to talk pirates. So, on Sunday, February 12 at 5 pm (Eastern U.S.), that's what we are going to do.

Episode 110 The 21st Century Pirate Threat 02/12 by Midrats on Blog Talk Radio:

The problem with piracy is not going anywhere. Each year in places like Somalia it is becoming part of the local economy. In areas near poorlly governed areas, it threatens the free flow of goods at market prices through the world's sea lines of communication.

Is it an economic problem, a global security problem, a political problem, or a mixture of that and more?

What is the impact of international aid, military action, and the paying of ransom? What are the best solutions, and what is working and what is not working to slow the impact of piracy?

Join Sal from "CDR Salamander" and EagleOne (that's me!) from "Eagle Speak" for the full hour to discuss these issues and more with their guest, Rear Admiral Terry McKnight, USN (Ret.), former Commander of the anti-piracy CTF-151 off the horn of Africa.

Here's the link to listen live. If you miss the show you can download it later from here or from iTunes (podcasts under "Midrats").

Somali Pirates: Pirate Weather Coming

As indicated in the Office of Naval Intelligence's Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly, the weather in the Somali pirate areas of major activity is beginning to shift to that more favorable to small boat operations (better for the pirates), so an increase in pirate efforts can be expected through the Gulf of Aden, upper Arabian Sea and the Mozambique Channel:

The redder the color, the increased probability that the weather and sea conditions are good for pirate operations.

Strait of Hormuz: Triple Carriers (Briefly?)

Let's see now, one carrier leaves the Arabian/Persian Gulf and hangs about the Northern Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea because its replacement is inbound, the replacement has nearly arrived, and a third is lurking about the area.

USS John C. Stennis

Why, that's three of the big beasts in the region. Hmmm. What message does this send to the self-proclaimed "gatekeepers" of the Strait of Hormuz? Well, none if you believe this sort of headline, "U.S. military moves carriers, denies Iran link":

The U.S. military said on Wednesday that a new aircraft carrier strike group had arrived in the Arabian Sea and that another was on its way to the region, but denied any link to recent tensions with Iran and portrayed the movements as routine.

USS Carl Vinson

The shift in the powerful U.S. naval assets comes at a moment of heightened tensions with Iran, which has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz - the world's most important oil shipping lane - if U.S. and EU sanctions over its nuclear program cut off its oil exports.

The U.S. military has said it will halt any blockade of the strategic strait and the top U.S. naval officer acknowledged on Tuesday that preparing for a potential conflict there was something that "keeps me awake at night."

Still, the Pentagon denied any direct link between recent tensions and the movement of aircraft carriers.

USS Abraham Lincoln

"I don't want to leave anybody with the impression that we're somehow (speeding) two carriers over there because we're concerned about what happened, you know, today in Iran. It's just not the case," said Captain John Kirby, a Pentagon spokesman.

Military officials said the USS Carl Vinson arrived in the Arabian Sea on Monday to replace the outgoing USS John C. Stennis carrier strike group, which Iran last week warned not to return to the Gulf after departing in late December.

The Stennis was due to return to its home port in San Diego but the Pentagon did not say when that would happen.

Another carrier strike group, led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, concluded a port visit to Thailand on Tuesday and was now in the Indian Ocean. It is on track to join the Vinson in the Central Command area of operations, which begins in the neighboring Arabian Sea.

Why would anyone think there was a message involved?

By the way, carriers do not travel alone. They have escort services.

Somali Pirates: Counter-Pirate Forces Short of EU Ships - Budget Issues

Too expensive to use for the designed purpose

Reported here:

The European Union(EU)’s anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia is plagued by a shortage of warships due to budget cuts, the bloc’s top military officer said on Tuesday.

"I can imagine that there are many different reasons for this, but one is of course economy and also the budget cuts," said General Hakan Syren, chairman of the EU Military Committee.

EU’s Atalanta operation requires a minimum of four to six ships, but the number would fall "below the red line" in December, the general said after a meeting of military chiefs from the bloc’s 27 member countries.

"We are all aware of that. We are near the end of Novermber now. I think it is no repairable in this short time. But in March, we will above the red line again," he said.

"When it comes to this kind of assets, I can imagine that member states have felt a bit insecure about the situation in the Mediterranean Sea connected to the Arab Spring and the Libyan crisis, but primarily it is a question of resources," he said.

EU nations contributed about 10 warships to the Atalanta operation when it was launched in 2008 to fight against pirates off the coast of Somalia.

However, there are only six or seven EU warships that are taking part in the operation, which has been extended until the end of next year.

Given all the stirring resolutions about fighting the pirate menace, I guess it just a matter of priorities and "All hat, no cattle," as the Texas saying goes.

I suspect private security companies will fill in part of the security gaps caused by this issue.

Photo of the ship? Old U.S. Navy battleship.

Somali Pirates: The Past 30 Days

From the NATO Shipping Center All Alerts. The most recent incidents:

Arrow points to Alert 239 (NATO map, my arrow)

ALERT 239 21/11/2011 05:35 -4.6 43.3
Attacked WARNING WARNING WARNING
AT 0536 UTC 21 NOV A MERCHANT VESSEL WAS ATTACKED BY 2 SKIFFS IN POSITION 0404S 04302E. THERE WERE 3 POB EACH SKIFF. WEAPONS WERE FIRED.

***THIS VESSEL MANAGED TO EVADE HIJACK***
*** THE VESSEL IS SAFE***
***THE PIRATE ACTION GROUP IS STILL IN THE AREA***
VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION WHEN NAVIGATING WITHIN 100 NAUTICAL MILES OF THE POSITION GIVEN IN THIS REPORT AND MAITAIN MAXIMUM CPA WITH ANY SHIP ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY
***

EU NAVFOR Photo

NSC 13/11 19/11/2011 14:20 22.6 59.85
Approached WARNING WARNING WARNIG
VESSEL WAS APPROACHED BY A SKIFF WITH 3 PEOPLE ON BOARD, IN POSITION 2204N 05951E. SKIFF WAS TRAVELLING AT A SPEED OF 21 KTS. CREW SHELTERED IN THE CITADEL AND BMP4 MEASURES WERE IMPLEMENTED. THE SKIFF ABORTED THE APPROACH. VESSEL IS REPORTED SAFE.

VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION WHEN TRANSITTING THIS AREA.

NSC 12/11 19/11/2011 06:00 12.48 43.53
Approached Suspicious Approach
A merchant vessel reported a suspicious approach by 2 skiffs in the area 1229N 04332E. Vessel is safe

ALERT 238 18/11/2011 04:50 12.55 43.55
Attacked WARNING WARNING WARNING
AT 0450Z 18 NOV A PIRATE ACTION GROUP CONSITING OF 1 SKIFF WAS REPORTED IN POSITION 1233N 04333E. MORE THEN ONE MV REPORTS BEING ATTACKED.

*** THE VESSELS MANAGED TO EVADE HIJACK***
*** THE VESSELS ARE SAFE ****

VESSELS ARE URGED TO OPERATE AT A HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS, IMPLEMENT SELF PROTECTIVE (DEFENSIVE) MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 4.

NSC 11/11 16/11/2011 07:40 -11.733333 42.6666667
Approached Suspicious Approach
Vessel reported a suspicious approach in the Northern Mozambique Channel. 1144S 04240E. The vessel was approached by 3 skiffs. Vessel is safe. Masters are advised to exercise extreme vigilance while transiting this area.

Winds off Kenya, Northern Mozambique Channel

Looks like the winds are up to over 10 knots in much of the northern pirate operating areas, so that my account for some slowing of piracy. Along with the escorts and armed guards and the like, of course.

Wind and waves seem more amenable to small boat operations in the Northern Mozambique Channel as shown in the nearby map from WeatherOnline. See also WeatherOnline info in the right column.

Piracy Updates from ONI Through 3 Nov 11

You can get both ONI reports on piracy at Office of Naval Intelligence.

Among the notable events reported is the hijacking of the tanker Liquid Velvet (see here), about which the ONI Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly Report states:

(U) GULF OF ADEN: Tanker (LIQUID VELVET) hijacked by six pirates on 31 October at 0842 UTC while underway in position 12:00N – 045:33E, approximately 55 nm southeast of Aden, Yemen. The crew (21 Filipinos and one Greek) were able to lock themselves in the citadel, but the pirates were able to breach it. (UKMTO, Operator)

Some sources, e.g. Shiptalk have reported speculation the odd man out was a Greek security guard. It is noteworthy that the "citadel" was breached. Not sure if this means the pirates were better prepared to breach the citadel on this visit, or if the citadel itself was not well designed or . . . your speculation is as good as mine.

Other recent activity reported:

I. (U) INDIAN OCEAN–EAST AFRICA:
1. (U) INDIAN OCEAN: Petroleum tanker (DYNATANK) fired upon by pirates on 1 November at 0050 UTC while underway in position 08:10S – 046:06E, approximately 407 nm southeast of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The onboard security team returned fire, and after 30 minutes the pirates aborted their attack. (UKMTO)
2. (U) INDIAN OCEAN: Fishing vessel (TORRE GIULIA) attacked by pirates in two skiffs on 1 November at 0936 UTC while underway in position 01:21S – 052:21E, approximately 591 nm southeast of Kismaayo, Somalia. Vessel had protection detachment onboard. A mothership was detected in the vicinity. (Operator)
***
4. (U) INDIAN OCEAN: Tuna fishing vessel attacked by pirates on 31 October at 1415 UTC while underway in position 02:23S – 049:29E, approximately 444 nm southeast of Kismaayo, Somalia. The vessel had a protection detachment onboard the vessel. (Operator)
5. (U) INDIAN OCEAN: Petroleum tanker (SCF PLYMOUTH) fired upon by four to five pirates in one skiff on 30 October at 1254 UTC while underway in position 04:20S – 043:41E, approximately 245 nm southeast of Mombasa, Kenya. Vessel was traveling at a speed of 14.7 knots. Pirates fired six rounds towards the vessel; armed security in turn fired six rounds back at the skiff. RPG and guns spotted, no ladders seen. (UKMTO)
***
G. (U) WEST AFRICA:
1. (U) NIGERIA: Petroleum tanker (HALIFAX) hijacked by pirates on 29 October at 1219 UTC while in position 03:26.5N – 006:42.3E, approximately 62 nm southwest of Bonny. Vessel was awaiting further berthing instructions from its charterers. Vessel has a crew of 24 Filipinos and one Bulgarian. (IMB)
***
K. (U) SOUTHEAST ASIA:
1. (U) MALAYSIA: Tanker (NAUTICA JOHOR BAHRU) hijacked 27 October while underway in the Singapore Straits. The vessel had a cargo of oil and gas worth $4.5 million USD onboard. Malaysian Navy and Indonesian vessels intercepted the hijacked vessel, and the ten pirates fled in a speedboat. The pirates took everything of value. (Open Source)
2. (U) MALAYSIA: Barge hijacked 26 October while underway in Indonesian waters while carrying a cargo of $2.6 million USD worth of palm oil. Authorities located the barge before the pirates returned from a trip to get a tug boat to move it. (Open Source)

Using the future weather as a tool for piracy likelihood, ONI show two maps, the first being a large view of the Indian Ocean. As color increases to red, weather favorable for small boat piracy increases. And, as noted on this map, don't attempt to use this for navigation, it's an informational chart.

This is followed by a "close up" of key areas. I took the liberty of adding a red arrow and the test "Gulf of Aden" for those unable to spot this on their own.

All of which is to say, it's dangerous out there for the under-prepared.

Somali Pirates: Latest ONI Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (to 27 Oct 11)

You can download the latest U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence reports here, including the "Piracy Analysis and Weekly Warning" - the latest of which runs to 27 Oct 2011. Generally, Somali piracy seems to have slowed, with but one reported attempt:

(U) Vessels Fired Upon/Attempted Boarding:
(U) INDIAN OCEAN: Cargo ship (HR CONSTELLATION) fired upon by pirates in two skiffs on 20 October while approximately 275 nm northeast of Port Victoria, Seychelles. One of the two skiffs approached to within 50-100 meters of the vessel. The armed security team on board the cargo ship fired warning shots and the skiff broke pursuit with the pirates returning fire. The crew had mustered in the safe room while the Master, chief mate, and security team remained on the bridge. The Master reported that the vessel had implemented version 4 Best Management Practices, reported to UKMTO, and had conducted weekly counter-piracy drills. The master later reported the vessel safe. (UKMTO, Owner)

One of the reasons successful attacks are in decline is contained in the report - in the part I emphasized above - merchant ships carrying armed guards and are shooting back at the pirates instead of playing the role of passive victims and letting themselves be taken by ragtag pirates.

It should be noted that the British government has now authorized the use of such armed teams on merchants carrying their flag. See here for a Navy Times report:

Ships sailing under Britain’s flag will be permitted to carry armed guards on some perilous routes to combat the threat from pirates, the prime minister said Sunday.

David Cameron said Britain was reversing its opposition to the use of weapons aboard ships, amid mounting concern about the risks of vessels and crew being seized by pirates — particularly off Somalia’s coast.

Cameron’s office said the use of weapons on British-flagged ships is banned under firearms laws, but that new rules would be in place within a month.

Britain’s announcement follows the decision in February of the International Chamber of Shipping, the major trade association of ship owners, to support members hiring private security companies to provide protection.

“The evidence is that ships with armed guards don’t get attacked, don’t get taken for hostage or for ransom, and so we think this is a very important step forward,” Cameron told the BBC during a visit to a Commonwealth summit in Australia, where he discussed the issue with leaders from the Seychelles and Mauritius.

The ONI PAWW report is important, too, because of its maps representing the weather impact on possible pirate activity, such as the one below (though, to be candid, in between monsoons, the weather in the upper Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, etc, is generally pretty favorable to pirates operating in small boats which explains a great deal of their success over the years during those non-monsoon months):

A Week's Worth of Piracy 18 Oct - 25 Oct 2011

From reports found here:

Singapore Strait attack

Date of Occurrence: 10/25/2011 Reference Number: 2011-438 Geographical Subregion: 71 Geographical Location: 1° 15' 30" N 104° 02' 00" E
Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: TUG BOAT AND BARGE Description: SINGAPORE STRAITS: Pirates in two boats approached and followed a barge towed by a tug. The crew directed searchlights towards the barge but could not detect the small boats. Master contacted other vessels including a security vessel in their convoy. Later a Singapore navy warship contacted and alerted the tug's Master that there are two small skiffs hiding behind his barge. Master altered course and spotted the two pirates boats resulting in the skiffs moving away. At 0200 local time, skiffs once again approached the barge. The navy warship spotted the skiffs and alerted the Master. Even with the presence of the warships the pirates boarded the barge. Upon inspection propertes and stores of the barge were found stolen.

Sulu Sea attack off Philippines

Date of Occurrence: 10/24/2011 Reference Number: 2011-439 Geographical Subregion: 92 Geographical Location: 6° 59' 54" N 119° 44' 48" E
Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: BULK CARRIER Description: SULU SEA, PHILIPPINES: Pirates in six speed boats chased and attempted to board a bulk carrier underway. Master raised alarm, took evasive manuevers, crew mustered and activated fire hoses. The pirates chased the ship for 15 minutes and then aborted the attempted attack. The boats were last seen heading towards a fishing vessel in the vicinity.

Last 3 report locations

Date of Occurrence: 10/23/2011 Reference Number: 2011-440 Geographical Subregion: 63 Geographical Location: 4°59' 00" N 54° 29' 00"E
Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: TANKER Description: 360 MILES EAST OF HOBYO, SOMALIA: Armed pirates in two skiffs chased and attempted to board a tanker underway. Mother ship in the vicinity. Master increased speed, carried out evasive maneuvers and onboard security team fired warning shots. Ship evaded the attack.

Date of Occurrence: 10/20/2011 Reference Number: 2011-443 Geographical Subregion: 61 Geographical Location: 1°11' 30" S 58°32' 18" E
Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: HEAVY LOAD CARRIER Description: 270 MILES OFF SEYCHELLES: Armed pirates in two skiffs chased and fired upon a heavy load carrier underway with intent to hijack. Master raised alarm, increased speed, took evasive maneuvers, contacted CSO and all crew mustered at citadel. Onboard security team returned fire. Later the pirates aborted the attack and moved away.

Date of Occurrence: 10/20/2011 Reference Number: 2011-436 Geographical Subregion: 61 Geographical Location: 1° 12' 00" S 58° 32' 00" E Aggressor: PIRATES Victim: MERCHANT VESSEL Description: WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN: Merchant vessel attacked in 01-12S 058-32E at 1432Z on 20 Oct. Vessels are advised to keep 100 miles clear of this position and to exercise extreme caution.

One of the most interesting reports is that of an attack in the Sulu Sea near the Philippines. It's been awhile since that was an active area.

Worldwide Piracy to 13 Oct 11

From the file of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, weekly
Worldwide Threat to Shipping Report. A highlight of some areas around the globe:

G. (U) WEST AFRICA:
.
1. (U) NIGERIA: Product Tanker CAPE BIRD boarded and hijacked 08 October at 2040 UTC, near position 04:55N, 004:51E, approximately 90 nm south of Lagos, Nigeria. Recent reporting indicates that the ship has not yet been released. (IMB)
.
2. (U) BENIN: Chemical tanker fired upon, boarded, and robbed 2 October at 2337 LT while drifting in position 04:06N, 002:51E, approximately 136 nm southeast of Cotonou, Benin. Pirates armed with automatic weapons approached in two small boats and boarded the vessel. The crew retreated into the citadel and stayed there the whole night, when they emerged the
next day they found that the pirates had stolen ship cash. (IMB)
.
3. (U) GUINEA: Cargo ship (THOR LIGHT) boarded and robbed 29 September at 0505 UTC while anchored in position 09:24N, 013:43W, Conakry anchorage. Ten to twelve robbers armed with guns and knives boarded the vessel and assaulted the eleven crew members. Robbers stayed onboard for approximately 40 minutes, during which time they stole ship's and crew's cash and crew's personal belongings before escaping. Port authorities were contacted but received no response. (Open Source, IMB)
.
4. (U) TOGO: A chemical tanker experienced an attempted boarding on 24 September at 0130 UTC while anchored in position 06:01N, 001:15E at the Lome Anchorage. Two small boats approached shipside, the duty officer told them to move away, but was ignored. Later, two more boats approached the vessel from the stern and secured themselves to the ship's rudder. The master informed the Togo Navy, which responded and detained all four boats. Nothing was stolen from the vessel. (IMB)
.
5. (U) TOGO: Bulk carrier experienced an attempted boarding on 16 September at 0340 LT while anchored in position 06:03.7N, 001:17.5E at the Lome Anchorage. Seven robbers in a fast boat approached the vessel, one of the robbers had a hook attached to a rope. The duty crew spotted the robbers, contacted the bridge, and informed another watchman. Master
raised the alarm, sounded the shipís horn, and the crew directed search lights. The pirates aborted the attack upon seeing the alerted crew. The Togo Navy was contacted but did not respond; later, a naval boat patrolled the area. (IMB)
.
6. (U) BENIN: Product tanker (MATTHEOS I) hijacked on 14 September at 0121 UTC during ship-to-ship (STS) transfer operations approximately 62 nm southwest of Cotonou (see below incident). The vessel had 23 crew members, composed of Filipinos and Spanish, Peruvian, and Ukrainian officers. The pirates sailed the vessel to an unknown location. (IMB)
.
7. (U) BENIN: Product tanker boarded on 14 September at 0121 UTC during STS operations approximately 62 nm southwest of Cotonou. Master sent out an SSAS alert and the crew locked themselves into the engine room. The pirates later left the vessel, and when the crew left the engine room there were no pirates onboard. (IMB)

Somali Pirates: The Attacks of Early October 2011 and Setting the Pirate Stage

The season of increasing Somali pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean has arrived. It is useful to see how early activity is shaping up and where NATO sees "Pirate Action Groups (PAGs)" forming up. So, take a look at the following:

From the NATO Shipping Center All Alerts, this list of October 2011 Somali pirate action and the accompanying map showing the incidents:

Alert 226 / 2011 06/10/2011 16:20 0601S 04220E Attacked At 1620 UTC / 06 OCT 11/ a merchant vessel was under attack by 2 skiffs in position 06-01S 042-20E. 2 skiffs, unknown POB, Weapons fired

click on map to enlarge

**This vessel managed to evade hijack**
The pirate action group is still in the area.

Alert 225 / 2011 03/10/2011 05:30 04 59N 058 00E Attacked
-- WARNING WARNING WARNING --
A fishing vessel was attacked by 2 skiffs in vicinity 04-59N 058-00E at 030532Z OCT 11.
***The Pirate Attack Group is still in the area***
***Vessel evaded hijack***
***Vessel is safe***
Vessels are advised to keep well clear of this position and exercise extreme caution if in the vicinity. While navigating in the region, vessels are urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness and implement Self Protective Measures in accordance with Best Management Practices. For further details, please see www.mschoa.org. or http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/BMP.aspx
***
Alert 224 / 2011 02/10/2011 09:20 1606N 06247E Attacked At 0921 UTC / 02 OCT 11 / a merchant vessel has been attacked by one dhow and two skiffs in position 16 06 N 062 47.0 E
***This vessel managed to evade hijack*** ***Vessel is SAFE*** The Pirate Attack Group is still in the area.

Alert 222 / 2011 02/10/2011 04:25 0355N 05620E Attacked At 0403 UTC / 02 OCT 11 / a merchant vessel has been attacked by skiff in position 03 55 N 056 20 E.

***This vessel managed to evade hijack***
***The vessel is safe***
The Pirate Attack Group is still in the area.
Vessels are advised to exercise extreme caution when navigating within 100 nautical miles of the position given in this report and maintain maximum CPA with any ship acting suspiciously.
Experience has shown that to transit W of 60E significantly increases the risk of piracy, although attacks have and will occur E of this area.
MSCHOA advises all vessels navigating in the Indian Ocean to consider keeping East of 60E when routing North/South and to consider routing East of 60E and South of 10S when proceeding to and from ports in South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya.
Vessels should report to UKMTO Dubai *** on entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) bound by Suez,78E and 10S.
Thereafter vessels should report their position, course and speed daily.

Throughout the UKMTO VRA vessels should implement Self Protective Measures in accordance with Best Management Practices. For further details, please see www.mschoa.org. or http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/BMP.aspx

Upon receiving the vessels initial report, UKMTO will reply giving specific threat guidance relevant at the time.

***
Alert number 223 / 2011 02/10/2011 04:20 1302N 04851E Attacked At 0410Z UTC / 02 OCT / a merchant vessel was attacked by pirates in position 13 02 N 048 51 E.
***The vessel is safe***
While navigating in the region vessels are urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness, implement Self Protective (defensive) measures in accordance with Best Management Practices. For further details, please see www.mschoa.org. or http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/BMP.aspx

Merchant vessels are requested to report any suspicious activity to UKMTO Dubai ***

Now, as set out in Where the Somali Pirates Operate and Why, we can safely assume the pirates are aware of the more heavily traveled "sea lanes" or shipping routes that ships use to transit the Indian Ocean and will send out PAGs to allow interdiction of unwary, underprepared, low in the water and slow speed ships traveling those lanes.

You would expect then, that the pirates might have 4 or 5 areas where they would find the "hunting" particularly good.

And, if you overlay 2010 shipping info over the current NATO activity map, as I have done nearby, you see that the early PAGs are setting up at areas where the shipping is including a rich area (area marked "B" on my map) where shipping in and out of the Arabian Gulf is "choked" into a small area by the Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Area "A" is traffic "choked" by the narrow Bab el Mandab entrance/exit from the Red Sea, Area "C" is a catch point for traffic diverting to east on Madagascar, and Area "D" covers the coastwise chokepoint of entry into Kenya, Tanzania and the Madagascar Channel.

Exactly where you would expect smart pirates to be.

Somali Pirates: "Governments have ceded control of the Indian Ocean to pirates"

From an International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) Press Release:

Governments have ceded control of the Indian Ocean to pirates and the small deployment of naval forces to the region is like putting a band-aid on a gaping wound - so says ICS Chairman Spyros M Polemis.

And in a damning indictment of western governments, Mr Polemis will controversially suggest they would be acting differently if the many seafarers held hostage off the coast of Somalia were "Americans or Europeans".

Speaking at next week's Maritime Cyprus conference in Limassol on Monday (October 3rd) Mr Polemis will tell shipping professionals: "The fundamental problem is the lack of navy ships that are committed to protecting shipping - a band aid on a gaping wound, although the navies do an excellent job under the circumstances and we commend them for this."

In a straight-talking speech Mr Polemis is set to tell delegates that "by their own admission, the military advise that no ship is completely safe". He will say: "Sadly, one can only conclude from the current response of many governments that those thousands of seafarers that have so far been captured have simply had the wrong nationality. If they were all Americans or Europeans, the governments' attitude might have been somewhat different. It is really unacceptable that so many governments seem to feel that the current situation can somehow be tolerated, and that a box has been ticked by making a relatively small number of navy ships available to police Somalia's waters and the entire Indian Ocean."

Apologising for his "depressing" remarks he is set to conclude: "We appreciate that governments have many competing priorities, but I am afraid that they still seem to be lacking a coherent strategy to tackle the pirates head on."

While acknowledging that adherence to Best Management Practices and the use of private armed guards can both reduce the risks of capture, Mr Polemis will say that the escalating use of armed guards represents a failure by the international community to find an effective solution to the situation and will call for an increase in military force deployed to the Indian Ocean.

"I do wish to stress that, despite acknowledging their use, private armed guards do not represent a long term solution. Rather, their use actually signifies a failure on the part of the international community - and those governments with significant military forces - to ensure the security of maritime trade on which the whole world depends. Governments don't like it when we say this, but the reality is that they have ceded control of the Indian Ocean to the pirates.

He will continue: "The use of private guards does not mean that military forces are no longer needed. Far from it - they are needed more than ever and should be greatly increased in number."

ICS is in close contact with both EUNAVFOR and NATO discussing practical solutions to the problems in the Indian Ocean including a possible blockade of the Somali coast and tackling pirate 'motherships'. ICS is also in discussion with Flag States to ensure they take a coherent pan-industry approach to producing a proper framework for the use of armed guards.

Mr. Polemis is off base in suggesting that there is some sort of racial or ethnic reason behind the limited supply of naval forces protecting commercial shipping from men in small craft in a huge ocean. Quite simply, there are simply not enough available warships to do the job.

I have suggested a way around the shortage of warships, as set out in Department of Cheaper Pirate Fighting and the links therein.Notably, a number of private firms have taken up this challenge by providing their own security vessels.

The bias toward the high number of Third World nationals held by pirates lies in the hiring by commercial shipping companies of the lowest cost labor to sail the ships. {UPDATE: Sort of an aside (but in keeping with the topic) Shiptalk has a report of wage cheating of Filipino sailors here). These are generally Third World sailors getting extremely low pay and few benefits. "Europeans" and "Americans" are too high cost to sail these ships. These sailors often serve on ships not capable of meeting the speed standards necessary to out run a pirate attack and also serve on ships whose flag states do not allow private armed security teams on board. Further, many of the ships attacked are not sailing in convoys protected by the naval escorts that are out there.

Convoys are run by the Japanese, Russians, Thais and South Koreans.

Somali Pirates: A Danish Admiral Discusses the Issue

Op-Ed: A possible solution to Somali piracy (Includes first-hand account):

“The piracy problem is not just a problem between the ship industry and the pirates. The spill-over effect in my point of view would be a threat to stability in the whole East Africa region and that is why it should create a sense of urgency both in the UN framework and in the African Union framework.”
***
He also tackled the issue of rising piracy, despite the fact that some 35 ships from numerous international navies and at least two alliances, the EU and NATO, are operating in an area the size of the continental United States. He did point out that more than 35 police cruise[r]s would be needed to police the US.

Go to the source to read more.