VertRep

VertRep
Showing posts with label Chokepoints. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chokepoints. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 30, 2021

Once Again, Chokepoints, SLOCs, the Importance of Navies

First off, what is a "chokepoint?" There is very nice definition by John Daly here:

Ever since men first put to sea, conflicts have swirled around narrow maritime passages known as choke points. A subset of the broader category of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), maritime choke points act as funnels drawing in shipping from surrounding seas. As critical pressure points in naval struggles for "command of the sea," every navy seeks to secure them while denying their use to the enemy.

Oh, those "Sea Lines of Communication?" Back in 2011, I tried to clarify:

Back in the beginning days of this blog, I had a couple of posts about "sea lanes" and their importance. For example, from 2005, there was a post cleverly titled "Sea Lanes". I wrote then:

I keep posting about sea lanes. What are these things? Sea lanes are trade routes - almost like highways in the sea, where due to geography, ocean going vessels follow certain paths to avoid islands, shallows and other impediments to their travel. They are also generally the most efficient routes to get from Point A to Point B - as close to straight line travel as a ship can accomplish given the number of obstacles in its path.
Since then, there have been hundreds of posts here in which I refer to either "sea lanes" or "sea lines of communication" (see, e.g. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)). There can be a difference between the two terms, since SLOC can have a military meaning that I have generally ignored here.

However, what is important to know about sea lanes or SLOCs is that they exist and that they are a major reason that nations interested in international commerce have navies - to keep the sea lanes open. In discussing maritime security, keeping sea lanes open is a major topic.

We hear a lot about how many things travel by sea. From crude oil to grain to large screen TVs to cars and much more, cheaper shipping has allowed the entire world to benefit from global product distribution (see here and here). Where do these products travel? Sea lanes. An excellent example of these sea lanes is shown on this Naval War College slide (which I have borrowed without shame):

There it is, a picture of world commerce. Those are not war ships wending their way across oceans, those are merchant ships moving the goods that make the world go. You might note that there are places where the traffic converges to pass through narrow areas. These are referred to as "chokepoints", "Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes . . ."

Large ships sail on rigid schedules, carrying parts from Japan to the U.S. or to Europe in such a reliable manner that warehouse costs are reduced by planning for "just in time" deliveries of products.

So, when there is a disruption in the smooth flow of goods, say from the recent earthquake in Japan, there are ripple effects that impact more than the Japanese part manufacturers.

A similar effect is caused by things that interfere with sea lanes. These might be something like a catastrophe that strikes a chokepoint like a closure of the Suez Canal.

Over 16 years ago,  I first discussed the importance of "chokepoints" on this blog.  During that period, we have seen the effects of pirates and nations interdicting ships headed to and from key chokepoints leading to and from the Indian Ocean, in the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz. 

After the recent ship grounding in the Suez Canal which is, after all,  both a very long "chokepoint" and a SLOC, some people seem to have finally taken note that there is a world-wide system of movement of trade goods and vital energy cargo that takes place on the oceans and seas of the world. 

If they had been paying attention, they could have referred to the U.S. Energy Information Agency and its World Oil Transit Chokepoints Analysis Brief from whence comes the below illustration:

 

All estimates in million barrels per day. Includes crude oil and petroleum liquids. Based on 2016 data.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

In 1996, the U.S. National Defense University published Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia which I have added below. While the data contained therein is no longer valid, and probably hugely understated given the growth of the economies of the countries of Asia, the concerns expressed are not outdated, and, like the data, probably understated.

Strategic Chokepoints of So... by lawofsea

How do we keep these vital SLOCs and chokepoints open? We have navies and coast guards that patrol the seas to thwart pirates and sea robbers. We worry about the effects of local rebel or national forces who occupy territory adjacent to chokepoints who might do damage to ships as they transit them, as we see with the Houti rebels in Yemen or the forces of countries like Iran. Remember the attempted attack on a U.S. Navy destroyer in 2016?

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Peter J. Carney 

A U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer was targeted on Sunday in a failed missile attack from territory in Yemen controlled by Iran-aligned Houthi rebels, a U.S. military spokesman told Reuters, saying neither of the two missiles hit the ship.

***

The attempted strike on the USS Mason, which was first reported by Reuters, came just a week after a United Arab Emirates vessel came under attack from Houthis and suggests growing risks to the U.S. military from Yemen’s conflict.

***

Last week’s attack on the UAE vessel also took place around the Bab al-Mandab strait, in what the UAE branded an “act of terrorism.”

In 2013, more than 3.4 million barrels of oil passed through the 20 km (12 mile)-wide Bab al-Mandab each day, the U.S. Energy Information Administration says.

It was unclear what actions the U.S. military might take, but Davis stressed a commitment to defend freedom of navigation and protect U.S. forces.

"Defend fredom of navigation." Exactly. And which is why we need a large and strong Navy.

Thursday, June 18, 2020

Oman Sets Up Way for Arabian Gulf Oil Exporters to Avoid Strait of Hormuz

Oman Steps Up Plan for Middle East’s Biggest Oil-Tank Farm Bloomberg reports:
Oman’s ambitious goal of building the biggest oil-storage facility in the Middle East is finally progressing, more than seven years after the Gulf sultanate announced the plan.
Oman Tank Terminal Co. has almost finished constructing eight tanks to store crude for a new refinery near the town of Duqm on the Arabian Sea. It’s now pushing ahead with others that could be used by oil companies and traders, according to two people with knowledge of the project. That would eventually increase Duqm’s capacity to at least 25 million barrels, according to OTTCO’s website.
The Ras Markaz Crude Oil Park could provide an alternative for energy traders and exporters eager to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, a choke-point at the mouth of the Persian Gulf that’s seen numerous flareups in recent years, including Iranian seizures of tankers. The Omani facility lies roughly 600 miles (966 kilometers) from the waterway. The United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah, the region’s largest hub with 14 million barrels of commercial crude-storage capacity, is less than 100 miles from Hormuz.
“Crude storage that anybody can use outside the Strait of Hormuz, that can go either east or west, is probably a good thing,” said Alan Gelder, vice president for refining, chemicals and oil markets at consultant Wood Mackenzie Ltd. Iraq and Kuwait, a co-investor in the refinery, might see Duqm as an attractive place to park their crude outside the Gulf, he said.
Of course, Iran's fallback is to use its proxy Houit rebels in Yemen to clog up the Bab al Mandeb chokepoint and the lower end of the Red Sea to screw up shipping through the Suez Canal. OTTC info here:
Ras Markaz Crude Oil Park The first phase of the Ras Markaz Crude Oil Park will be operational in 2021, and will feature storage tanks of different sizes. The total capacity of Phase 01 will be up to 25 million barrels of crude oil of which Duqm Refinery will build and utilize approximately 6 million barrels. The tank storage terminal will feature offshore loading and unloading facilities to cater to Suezmax and VLCC tankers via Single Point Moorings. The terminal will be connected via a 70km pipeline to the Duqm Refinery and a potential of connecting to Oman's Main Oil Pipeline at Nahada 440km away.

Thursday, November 20, 2014

If you are interested in the situation in Yemen

If you are interested in the situation in Yemen, there's no better web resource than Jane Novak's Armies of Liberation.

Go see for yourself.

Oh, wait, why would people with an interest in maritime matters be interested in Yemen? Look where it sits. Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb chokepoint and the Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea.

Not to mention its ownership of the islands of Socatra off Somalia.

See here:
Yemen’s control over one of the most important naval straits in the world, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, underscores this geostrategic importance. Commercial liners and oil tankers pass through the strait on their way to and from the Suez Canal. International stakeholders are concerned that al-Qaeda will take advantage of the current transitional conditions in Yemen to threaten shipping and international trade, contributing to the maritime piracy that is already blighting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Just saying.

By the way, two of the successful maritime attacks for which al Qaeda claims credit were in Yemeni waters. See here for info on USS Cole attack in 2000. And here for info on the attack on the tanker MV Limburg.

You might note that Saudi elements were involved in the attack on MV Limburg. And, at the time of the Cole attack, Saudi Osama bin Laden was still a warm body.

Connected reading: See this U.S. House Armed Services Committee Staff report on USS Cole:
The engagement with Yemen was initiated with a clear understanding that Yemen was a sanctuary for terrorists.
Note that cuts in naval logistics forces placed the Cole in Aden:
Reductions in force structure have left the Navy with signifcantly dimished assets. The reduction in the number of oilers, combatants, and weapons available may have led to operational decisions that contributed to the U.S.S. Cole’s vulnerability.

Tuesday, November 18, 2014

Al Qaeda Threatens Ocean Chokepoints! Again! Okay maybe the third or fourth time. Or more.

It seems Al Qaeda puts out a "slick" publicity flyer called "Resurgence" and in its latest issue there's an article "On Targeting the Achilles Heel of Western Economies" - those being the narrow places in the ocean through which Middle East oil is taken on ships. AQ suggests shutting those narrow places down to ruin the western economies.

You can read all about it at the previous link to the article by Sarah Kaufman at Vocativ.com. This "danger Will Robinson" theme was also picked up by Bill Gertz here.


The evil wits at AQ HQ have decided again that there are narrow places in the oceans through ships pass on their way from picking up oil to delivery points. In excited tones as if were something like an original thought, the AQ author suggests something could be placed blocking those - let's call them "chokepoints" - and thus causing a halt to all shipping of oil from the Middle East and driving the West to its knees. You know:
"Even if a single supertanker… were to be attacked in one of the chokepoints or hijacked and scuttled in one of these narrow sea lanes, the consequences would be phenomenal…"
Why, yes, Mr. Hamza Khalid, the author of this fantasy, it would be "phenomenal" though not like you might be thinking.

Let's go back in history. Seems like in 2004, al Qaeda was reported to have a "navy" of 15 ships as presented in Richard Minter's book, Shadow War:
How America captured the “al Qaeda admiral” and stopped his fifteen-ship fleet from being used as floating bombs.
Back in 2005, there appeared a series of "terrorists to close sea lanes" pieces which I addressed here and republish, in part, below:
A Foreign Affairs article from November/December [2004] "Terrorism Goes to Sea" sets out some interesting information:
Since many shipping companies do not report incidents of piracy, for fear of raising their insurance premiums and prompting protracted, time-consuming investigations, the precise extent of piracy is unknown. But statistics from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a piracy watchdog, suggest that both the frequency and the violence of acts of piracy have increased in recent years. In 2003, ship owners reported 445 attacks, in which 92 seafarers were killed or reported missing and 359 were assaulted and taken hostage. (Ships were hijacked in 19 of these cases and boarded in 311.) From 2002 to 2003, the number of those killed and taken hostage in attacks nearly doubled. Pirates have also increased their tactical sophistication, often surrounding a target ship with several boats and firing machine guns and antitank missiles to force it to stop. As Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan recently warned, "piracy is entering a new phase; recent attacks have been conducted with almost military precision. The perpetrators are well-trained, have well laid out plans." The total damage caused by piracy-due to losses of ships and cargo and to rising insurance costs-now amounts to $16 billion per year.
and
Whereas land targets are relatively well protected, the super-extended energy umbilical cord that extends by sea to connect the West and the Asian economies with the Middle East is more vulnerable than ever. Sixty percent of the world's oil is shipped by approximately 4,000 slow and cumbersome tankers. These vessels have little protection, and when attacked, they have nowhere to hide. (Except on Russian and Israeli ships, the only weapons crewmembers have today to ward off attackers are high-powered fire hoses and spotlights.)

However, the article is from the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security whose work I have found on another occasion to be good, "but a little overly dramatic." I make the same minor complaint here. For example, whereas the following is generally true, the potential disaster of a scuttled ship in a narrow strait is a bit overwrought as I'll explain later.
If a single tanker were attacked on the high seas, the impact on the energy market would be marginal. But geography forces the tankers to pass through strategic chokepoints, many of which are located in areas where terrorists with maritime capabilities are active. These channels-major points of vulnerability for the world economy-are so narrow at points that a single burning supertanker and its spreading oil slick could block the route for other vessels. Were terrorist pirates to hijack a large bulk carrier or oil tanker, sail it into one of the chokepoints, and scuttle it to block the sea-lane, the consequences for the global economy would be severe: a spike in oil prices, an increase in the cost of shipping due to the need to use alternate routes, congestion in sea-lanes and ports, more expensive maritime insurance, and probable environmental disaster. Worse yet would be several such attacks happening simultaneously in multiple locations worldwide.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point.
While there are some very narrow major waterways (the Bosphorus, for example - the U.S. Department of Energy produces a handy "chokepoint" list), for the most part, the Strait of Malacca is is 1.5 miles (7000+ feet) wide at its narrowest spot. Even a 1200 foot long ship placed sideways in that channel leaves some room to maneuver around it. The Strait of Hormuz is wider still. As we learned in the "tanker wars" these large tankers are hard to sink completely.
The Exocets and other small missiles generally failed to "kill" large merchant ships. They did, however, significant damage to 11 out of 17 tankers hit in 1984, which displaced over 50,000 tons, and slightly damaged six. The Exocets were more effective against smaller vessels, and against more complex or automated ships (the automated Safina al-Arab had to be written off because her machinery was too sophisticated to repair), and against ships where the hit happened to trigger a fire.
(Tanker War and the Lessons of Naval Conflict). Not that it can't happen.

And if it does, as the DOE puts it,
If the strait were closed, nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity. All excess capacity of the world fleet might be absorbed, with the effect strongest for crude oil shipments and dry bulk such as coal. Closure of the Strait of Malacca would immediately raise freight rates worldwide. More than 50,000 vessels per year transit the Strait of Malacca.
But any such closure would be relatively short-lived, given the incentives to salvage, raise or raze a ship interfering with the free passage through the Strait. How long would it take to clear such a ship? While the vessel didn't completely sink, in September 2003 the bulk carrier "Sea Liberty" was involved in a collision in the narrowest part of the Singapore Strait and was salvaged.

The vessel Hyundai No.105 (40,000 GRT) sank just outside the Singapore Strait in May 2004. In fact, the Singapore Strait is a busy, dangerous place and warnings have been issued like this one from Tokio Marine Nichido:
The Strait of Singapore in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, being the main seaway between ports in Europe and the Middle East and those in the Far East and South East Asia.

Singapore is the busiest port in the world with an average of 350 ships arriving per day. At any one time there are more than 800 ships in the port-a ship arrives or departs every 3 minutes. It is the focal port for some 366 shipping lines with links to 3,600 ports worldwide.

With congestion in many parts due to a daily traffic of 400 vessels on average, the Strait has become prone to ship collisions, oil spillage, strandings and sinkings. Therefore it is extremely important for ships to navigate safely in the Strait to avoid accidents which would adversely affect the three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and the marine environment.
These collisions and sinkings do not seem to interfere with other vessels transiting the Malacca Strait and its "subparts" such as the Singapore Strait.

Obviously, terrorism at sea is a serious threat and one that requires significant preventative measures. In the "worst case" scenerio, it is possible that some interference with international trade is likely. However, the probability of that worst case- a "perfect storm" of sea-going terrorism must be measured against other, more likely results.

Update: It occurs to me that since I have asserted that the seizure and scuttling of a ship in a narrow strait may not result in the shut down of the flow of world oil and other goods, it is incumbent on me to posit about what I would be more concerned.  Again, I am concerned with the "seizure and sink" scenario but just not as concerned as I am with some other possible terrorist acts involving ships. These areas of greater concern include the seizure of a major ship and turning it into a weapon - very similar, in fact, to the seizure of commercial airliners and turning them into guided missiles for the accomplishment of an act of war. Note that I am distinguishing between "terrorism" and "war." Al Qaeda has not declared "terrorism" on the United States - it has declared war.

Osama bin Laden has a vision of his objectives in that war:
The principal stated aims of al-Qaeda are to drive Americans and American influence out of all Muslim nations, especially Saudi Arabia; destroy Israel; and topple pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East. Bin Laden has also said that he wishes to unite all Muslims and establish, by force if necessary, an Islamic nation adhering to the rule of the first Caliph
cite. His strategy includes the economic crippling of the United States in such a way that it will be unable or unwilling to continue its presence in the Middle East. He seeks to raise the cost of our presence to a level beyond which we are willing to pay in blood and dollars. Part of his plan is to demonstrate the weakness of the U.S. and thus rally new members to the cause. 9/11 was both about hurting the US economy and showing that the "Great Satan" could be attacked. The joyous reaction in many parts of the world to the fall of the World Trade Center did demonstrate the power of the second prong. In my view, Al Qaeda needs another major "victory" against the U.S. As set out in prior posts, one such possible victory would be the attack and damaging of a major symbol of U.S. power - such as an aircraft carrier (the attack on the USS Cole and the failed attack on the USS The Sullivans show how much attacking these power symbols mean to Al Qaeda). In one of my posts, I indicated my major concern
What if the terrorists have or (use their speedboat tactics to) seize a "neutral" freighter or tanker and then use that ship as either a SIED (seaborne improvised explosive device) or as a "ram" to attack to attack our ships (for this purpose, I believe a tanker to be their preferred vessel because of the potential for fire and pollution and the attendant increase in publicity and spectacular television coverage -so for convenience I will use the word "tanker" alone to refer to this threat).
So, my concern is less with the damaging of international trade in the Malacca Strait (much of which flows to Japan and China) by blocking the chokepoints than with the use of such restricted areas (with limited maneuver room) as an area to engage in a vigorous attack on a prime U.S. warship in such a manner as to be visible to the world in an effort to rally more people to the Al Qaeda cause.
Well, a AQ again threatened to close the "chokepoints" as I set out in 2008 Al Qaeda Calling for Chokepoint Terrorism. See also 2007's "Al Qaeda's Maritime Threat" an essay by Akiva Lorenz of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

The point being that this AQ maritime threat is not new. Nor is it, as I hoped I made clear in my 2005 post, as easy as many people seem to think to cause a major disruption to the flow of oil by sinking one, two or even more ships.

In fact, take a look at the adjacent SLOC map of South East Asia - does it look like there is only one way to Japan, South Korea or China which can be blocked? Not to me. It just looks like the Strait of Malacca is the shortest route of the alternatives. And, directing your attention to the map at the top of this post, you might note that there is a way around the southern tip of Africa that allows oil to bypass the Bab el Mandeb. It just costs more to use that route.


Want to close the Strait of Hormuz? US EIA says:
At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles wide, separated by a two-mile buffer zone.
Let's see that 2+2+2= 6 miles of sea you want to close? You better have lots of ships to sink to do that.

FYI, AQ, there has been a revolution in the oil and gas business due to fracking. If the U.S. isn't now capable of being completely energy independent, with the help of its neighbors, Canada and Mexico, it is surely not dependent on Middle East oil as you suggest. Hell, you might just drive us to build more nuclear power plants to generate electricity for our new electric cars and really slow our imports.

So, nice try, AQ, but what you've set out is a poor strategic plan that is driven by a poor understanding of the geographic realities and of the current world energy situation. In addition to which if you were lucky enough to affect the flow of oil, you probably wouldn't just have the U.S. to worry about - seems like China and a whole lot of other countries get a lot of oil through those chokepoints. It might just make them mad enough to come looking for you in a serious way instead of sitting back while the U.S. and some of its allies carry the laboring oar.

Just saying.

Hmmm -"Resurgence" sounds like something you take Gas-X alleviate.

Friday, September 06, 2013

Chokepoint Attack: Small Rocket Attack on Merchant Ship in Suez Canal

UNSI News has the video and more at "Video: Terrorists Launch Rocket Attack at Commercial Ship in Suez Canal". Here's the YouTube video:

All this does is raise the cost of going through the Suez Canal. Will outriders be needed to clear the shoreline of "heroes" like these?

Most merchant hulls contain a great deal of empty space, which means that an attack like this is really just an annoyance. If these "warriors" had hit a container full of Air Jordans, well, then they would have crossed some sort of "red line."

More seriously, this sort of thuggery needs to be quashed.

In a hurry.

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

African Trade: China, India and others

Nice report by BBC News "China and India: The scramble for business in Africa":
Throughout Africa - at building sites, on the street, and at ports and airports - the Chinese presence is growing.

Competing for a slice of the wealth along with traditional stakeholders are new ones such as Brazil and South Korea - and India, China's neighbour.
***
India's $65bn (£44bn) of trade with Africa is dwarfed by China's $200bn.

Chinese companies are active across the continent with big infrastructure projects, including ports, railways and sports stadiums.
Hmm. No mention of U.S. companies vying for work?

But, to follow on, the BBC is helpful with, a report of $5 billion deal between China and Kenya.

Kenya is on the outs with the U.S. and the EU due to issues with Kenya's president, whose spokespeople suggest nothing but good things from their relations with China:
In a statement, his office said the deals with China were a "massive boost" to his government.

"The rail link, particularly, is important in the context of East Africa's shared goal of ensuring quicker movement of peoples, goods and services," it quoted Mr Kenyatta as saying.

It will link the Kenyan border town of Malaba with the port of Mombasa, one of the busiest in Africa.
Funny, I remember the days when China was attacking the "exploitation" of Africa by western countries. Now, in Wikileaks released message, a U.S. government official brightly notes:
"China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons," he says. "China is in Africa primarily for China."
I would think any person who ever attended a "Great Powers" course might understand that.

I suspect the Africans and the Chinese do.

So, if you find yourselves asking why China might need a blue water navy to protect its sea lanes - you might consider the routes from Africa to China and the chokepoints that they might see as problematic.

You might also speculate about the experience that Chinese fleet is getting operating in the Indian Ocean as part of the anti-Somali pirate forces.


Thursday, January 19, 2012

World Oil Transit Chokepoints - Add One More to the List

The U.S. Energy Information Agency has a dandy list of those narrow places on the earth where oil flowing in commerce on ships can be threatened by "pirates, terrorist attacks, and political unrest" at World Oil Transit Chokepoints. The list includes the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandab, the Bosporus, Panama Canal, and the Danish Straits.

Time to add another narrow area to the list, the "O Gap" sometimes located in Washington,DC and, unique to chokepoints, known to be more a part of a calculation than a real spot on the planet.

Shown below is a rare capturing of the "O Gap" as it begins to close off a route of oil to the U.S.:

Some might feel that the "O Gap" would be better known as the "Keystone Twist". Many people are unhappy with its existence, as set out in Expected Keystone XL permit rejection strongly criticized:
US Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), the primary sponsor of legislation that set a deadline for a decision, said the administration misled the American people on the pipeline. “In the face of Iranian threats against oil affordability, [it] once again is trying to blame Congress and the State of Nebraska instead of taking responsibility for American jobs and security,” he said during an appearance at a Greenwood, Ind., instruments and gauges manufacturer who potentially would be doing work for the project. “This political decision offers hard evidence that creating jobs is not a high priority for this administration,” said US Chamber of Commerce Pres. Thomas J. Donohue. “By placing politics over policy, the Obama administration is sacrificing tens of thousands of good-paying American jobs in the short term, and many more than that in the long term.”*** “Blocking the Keystone pipeline would be an enormous mistake by the Obama administration,” said National Center for Policy Analysis Senior Fellow H. Sterling Burnett. “We need the oil and we need the jobs it would bring. This is as ‘shovel ready’ as anything Obama has proposed, yet because his radical environmental constituency objects, he’s apparently halting the pipeline.”
Or, as set out in the video linked at Instapundit, “He chose Venezuela over Canada.”, which really ought to be watched.

China must like the result, Canada will look to China to sell its oil. I guess the oil tanker owners will be happy, too.

Remember the "O Gap" - the new chokepoint. UPDATE: Here, read Re-Election Obsessed Obama Goes Political On Keystone By ROBERT J. SAMUELSON

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

Speaking of Chokepoints

Just the other day I posted Refresher: World Trade Route Chokepoints and now comes along a related piece from George Friedman at STRATFOR, his recognition about Indonesia's position on major sea lanes and chokepoints and the problems that poses for . . . China at Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance (his words in blue - I added the maps):
I am writing this from Indonesia. Actually, that is not altogether a fair statement. I am at the moment in Bali and just came from Jakarta. The two together do not come close to being Indonesia. Jakarta, the capital, is a vast city that is striking to me for its traffic. It takes an enormous amount of time to get anywhere in Jakarta. Like most cities, it was not built to accommodate cars, and the mix of cars with motor scooters results in perpetual gridlock. It is also a city of extraordinary dynamism. There is something happening on almost every street. And in the traffic jams, you have time to contemplate those streets in detail.

Bali is an island of great beauty, complete with mountains, white beaches, blue waters and throngs of tourists. Since I am one of those tourists, I will not trouble you with the usual tourist nonsense of wanting to be in a place where there are no tourists. The hypocrisy of tourists decrying commercialization is tedious. I am here for the beaches, and they are expensive. The locals with whom tourists claim to want to mingle can’t come into the resort, and tourists leaving the resort will have trouble finding locals who are not making a living off the tourists. As always, the chance of meeting “locals” as tourists usually define them — people making little money in picturesque ways — is not easy.

What is clear in both Jakarta and Bali is that the locals are tired of picturesque poverty, however much that disappoints the tourists. They want to live better and, in particular, they want their children to live better. We were driven by a tour guide to places where we bought what my wife assures me is art (my own taste in art runs to things in museums and tigers made of velvet). We spent the requisite money on art at places our guide delivered us to, I assume for suitable compensation.

The guide was interesting. His father was a rice farmer who owned some land, and now he is a tour guide, which in Bali, I gather, is not a bad job by any means if you have deals with the hotel (which he undoubtedly has). But it was his children who fascinated me. He had three sons, two of whom were in universities. The movement from rice farmer to university student in three generations is not trivial. That it happened with the leaders Indonesia had during that time is particularly striking, since by all reasonable measures these leaders have been, until recently, either rigidly ideological (Sukarno) or breathtakingly self-serving (Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati).

When I looked at some of Indonesia’s economic statistics, the underlying reason for this emerged. Since 1998, when Indonesia had its meltdown, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at roughly 5 percent per year, an amount substantial, consistent and above all sustainable, unlike the 8 and 9 percent growth rates before the collapse. Indonesia is now the 18th largest economy in the world, ranking just behind Turkey.

All of that is nice, but for this: Indonesia ranks 109th in per capita GDP. Indonesia’s population is about 237 million. Its fertility rate is only 2.15 births per woman, just above a stable population — though being just above stable still means substantial growth. Indonesia is a poor country, albeit not as poor as it was, and its GDP continues to rise. Given its stable government and serious efforts to control corruption, which systemically diverts wealth away from the general population, this growth can continue. But whether the stability and anti-corruption efforts of the past six years can continue is an open question, as is the prosperity in Jakarta, the tourism in Bali (recall the jihadist attacks there in 2002 and 2005) and whether our guide’s third son will receive a college education.

I saw three Indonesias (and I can assure you there are hundreds more). One was the Indonesia of Jakarta’s elite, Westernized and part of the global elite found in most capitals that is critical for managing any country’s rise to some degree of prosperity. Jakarta’s elite will do well from that prosperity, make no mistake, but they are also indispensable to it. Another Indonesia was the changing one that our upwardly mobile tour guide saw through his children’s eyes. The third was the one in which a little girl, perhaps four, begged in traffic on the road from the airport in Bali. I have seen these things in many countries and it is difficult to know what to make of them yet. For me, going to Indonesia is not the same as going to Eastern Europe. I know what is lurking under the current there. Indonesia is new for me, and I will be back. For now, let me describe to you not so much the country of Indonesia but how I try to learn about a place I know only from books (and even then relatively little).

Strategic Positions

Nietzsche once said that modern man eats knowledge without hunger. What he meant by that is that modern man learns without passion and without necessity. I didn’t go to Indonesia without either. What interests me most about Indonesia is not its economy or its people — although that might change as I learn more. What interests me now is Indonesia’s strategic position in the world at this point in time.

To determine that position, we must first look at China. China is building an aircraft carrier. Now, one aircraft carrier without cruisers, destroyers, submarines, anti-missile systems, satellite-targeting capabilities, mid-ocean refueling capabilities and a thousand other things is simply a ship waiting to be sunk. Nevertheless, it could be the nucleus of something more substantial in the coming decades (not years).

From Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (National Defense University (pdf))
When I look at a map of China’s coast I am constantly struck by how contained China is. In the north, where the Yellow and East China seas provide access to Shanghai and Qingdao (the home of China’s northern naval fleet), access to the Pacific is blocked by the line of Japan-Okinawa-Taiwan and the islands between Okinawa and Japan. Bases there are not the important point. The important point is that the Chinese naval — or merchant — fleet must pass through choke points that can be controlled by the United States, hundreds of miles to the east. The situation is even worse for China in the South China Sea, which is completely boxed in by the line of Taiwan-Philippines-Indonesia-Singapore, and worse still when you consider the emerging naval cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, which has no love for the Chinese.

The Chinese are trying to solve this problem by building ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. They say these are for commercial use, and I believe them. Isolated ports at such a distance, with tenuous infrastructure connecting them to China and with sea-lane control not assured, are not very useful. They work in peacetime but not during war, and it is war, however far-fetched, that navies are built for.

China’s biggest problem is not that it lacks aircraft carriers; it is that it lacks an amphibious capability. Even if it could, for example, fight its way across the Formosa Strait to Taiwan (a dubious proposition), it is in no position to supply the multi-divisional force needed to conquer Taiwan. The Chinese could break the blockade by seizing Japan, Okinawa or Taiwan, but that isn’t going to happen.

What could happen is China working to gain an economic toehold in the Philippines or Indonesia, and using that economic leverage to support political change in those countries. A change in the political atmosphere would not by itself permit the Chinese navy to break into the Pacific or eliminate the American ability to blockade Chinese merchant ships. The United States doesn’t need land bases to control the passages through either of these countries from a distance.

Rather, what would change the game is if China, having reached an economic entente with either country, was granted basing privileges there. That would permit the Chinese to put aircraft and missiles on the islands, engage the U.S. Navy outside the barrier formed by the archipelagos and force the U.S. Navy back, allowing free passage.

Now, this becomes much more complicated when we consider U.S. countermeasures. China already has massive anti-ship missiles on its east coast. The weakness of these missiles is intelligence and reconnaissance. In order to use those missiles the Chinese have to have a general idea of where their targets are, and ships move around a lot. That reconnaissance must come from survivable aircraft (planes that won’t be destroyed when they approach the U.S. fleet) and space-based assets — along with the sophisticated information architecture needed to combine the sensor with the shooter.

The United States tends to exaggerate the strength of its enemies. This can be a positive trait because it means extra exertion. In the Cold War, U.S. estimates of Soviet capabilities outstripped Soviet realities. There are many nightmare scenarios about China’s capabilities circulating, but we suspect that most are overstated. China’s ambitions outstrip its capabilities. Still, you prepare for the worst and hope for the best.

In this case, the primary battlefield is not yet the passages through the archipelago. It is the future of our Indonesian driver’s third child. If he gets to go to college, the likelihood of Indonesia succumbing to Chinese deals is limited. The history of Chinese-Indonesian relations is not particularly good, and little short of desperation would force an alliance. American Pacific strategy should be based on making certain that neither Indonesia nor the Philippines is desperate.

A Focus of History

Indonesia has another dimension, of course. It is the largest Muslim country in the world, and one that has harbored and defeated a significant jihadist terrorist group. As al Qaeda crumbles, the jihadist movement may endure. The United States has an ongoing interest in this war and therefore has an interest in Indonesian stability and its ability to suppress radical Islam inside its borders and, above all, prevent the emergence of an Indonesian-based al Qaeda with an intercontinental capability.

Thus, Indonesia becomes a geopolitical focus of three forces — China, Islamists and the United States. This isn’t the first time Indonesia has been a focus of history. In 1941, Japan launched the attack on Pearl Harbor to paralyze the American fleet there and facilitate seizing what was then called the Netherlands East Indies for its supplies of oil and other raw materials. In the first real resource war — World War II — Indonesia was a pivot. Similarly, during the Cold War, the possibility of a Communist Indonesia was frightening enough to the United States that it ultimately supported the removal of Sukarno as president. Indonesia has mattered in the past, and it matters now.

The issue is how to assure a stable Indonesia. If the threat — however small — rests in China, so does the solution. Chinese wage rates are surging and Chinese products are becoming less competitive in the global marketplace. The Chinese have wanted to move up the economic scale from being an exporter of low-cost industrial products to being a producer of advanced technologies. As the recent crash of China’s high-speed train shows, China is a long way from achieving that goal.

There is no question that China is losing its export edge in low-grade industrial products. One of the reasons Western investors liked China was that a single country and a single set of relationships allowed them to develop production facilities that could supply them with products. All the other options aside from India, which has its own problems, can handle only a small fraction of China’s output. Indonesia, with nearly a quarter-billion people still in a low-wage state, can handle more.

The political risk has substantially declined in the last few years. If it continues to drop, Indonesia will become an attractive alternative to China at a time when Western companies are looking for alternatives. That would energize Indonesia’s economy and further stabilize the regime. A more stable Indonesian regime would remove any attraction for an alignment with China and any opportunities for Chinese or Islamist subversion — even if, in the latter case, prosperity is not enough to eliminate it.

When we look at a map, we see the importance of Indonesia. When we look at basic economic statistics, we see the strength and weakness of Indonesia. When we consider the role of China in the world economy and its current problems, we see Indonesia’s opportunities. But it comes down to this: If my guide’s third son can go to college, and little girls no longer have to dart into traffic and beg, Indonesia has a strong future, and that future depends on it becoming the low-cost factory to the world.

Life is more complex than that, of course, but it is the beginning of understanding the possibilities. In the end, few rational people looking at China in 1975 would have anticipated China in 2011. That unexpected leap is what Indonesia needs and what will determine its geopolitical role. But these are my first thoughts on Indonesia. I will need to come back here many times for any conclusions.

Read more: Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance | STRATFOR
In my recent refresher post on chokepoints, I pointed out that they don't change position - what is a chokepoint today will be one tomorrow, and was one in the past. As a proof of this proposition, take a look at the map below, which shows how the Japanese were planning to protect the vital sea lanes and chokepoints of their empire in 1941:

From the University of Texas Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection
You might want to take a look at China: Sri Lanka and the Chinese String of Pearls
and the links therein. From that post:
Map is from JOE 2008 published by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and downloadable as a pdf here. I have modified it by adding the Chinese Navy's deployment off Somalia in its anti-piracy role (see here) where China can try out out of area operations in a relatively benign environment while observing/working with other navies (see China's "Maritime Chess').


Chokepoints, sea lines of communications - Navy work.

Geopolitical Journey: Indonesia's Global Significance is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

Monday, August 01, 2011

Refresher: World Trade Route Chokepoints

Every now and then it's a good idea to get back to basics and refresh ourselves on basic principles. In this post, I revisit one of the reasons why we have a navy and why navies are important. "Revisit" because I have done this before Sea Lines of Communication or Sea Lanes .

Closely tied to sea lines of communication are "chokepoints" - and there is no better illustration of these vital places on the planet than this article from the U.S. Energy Information Agency in its look at trade route "tight places" - with an emphasis on oil - at World Oil Transit Chokepoints:
World oil transit chokepoints are a critical part of global energy security. About half of the world s oil production moves on maritime routes.
Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes, some so narrow that restrictions are placed on the size of vessel that can navigate through them. They are a critical part of global energy security due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow straits.
Blue arrows point to chokepoints
***
In 2009, total world oil production amounted to approximately 84 million barrels per day (bbl/d), and about one-half was moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes. With the onset of the global economic downturn that began in mid-2008, world oil demand declined, and along with it the volumes of oil shipped to markets, both via pipelines and along maritime routes such as these chokepoints. By volume of oil transit, the Strait of Hormuz leading out of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans are two of the world s most strategic chokepoints.
For more fun reading about chokepoints, see Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (National Defense University (pdf)) which is about 15 years old (but then it's not like the chokepoints move around much, it it?), from which come another couple of illustrations of chokepoints and the flow of commerce.


A "SLOC" is a "Sea Line of Communication" - and a vital thing to keep open in time of war and peace. As you might imagine, sealing off "chokepoints" on a SLOC pretty much puts that SLOC out of use.

Now, suppose you wanted to cut off the flow of oil to Japan - where would you place submarines or ships or aircraft to impose that embargo with the least expenditure of equipment and personnel? Could it be done solely by shore bases? By aircraft?

How about Somali pirates - what key SLOCs and chokepoints can they interfere with? See Where the Somali Pirates Operate and Why, where I put this up:
That's an overlay of shipping lane usage and pirate attacks. You should note that most of the attacks occur as ships leave one chokepoint and are en route to another. This overlay was done in February 2011. A more current version, which I may get to soon, will show an increasing number of attacks around the Bab el Mandeb at the lower end of the Red Sea.

There are alternatives to the Red Sea/Suez Canal route - but they are longer.  See below for a graphic illustration of that point which I stole liberated from someone who should get credit for it.

Should the Southeast Asia chokepoints become closed, there are alternatives for Japan, too, like sending ships on routes to take them across the sometimes ice free Arctic route (see here) or sending ships down below Australia and out into the Pacific. Money and time, though, are both eaten up in using alternate routes.

Better to keep chokepoints and SLOCs open.

How?

That's why we have a Navy.

Monday, June 13, 2011

Sea Lines of Communication or Sea Lanes

Back in the beginning days of this blog, I had a couple of posts about "sea lanes" and their importance. For example, from 2005, there was a post cleverly titled "Sea Lanes". I wrote then:
I keep posting about sea lanes. What are these things? Sea lanes are trade routes - almost like highways in the sea, where due to geography, ocean going vessels follow certain paths to avoid islands, shallows and other impediments to their travel. They are also generally the most efficient routes to get from Point A to Point B - as close to straight line travel as a ship can accomplish given the number of obstacles in its path.
Since then, there have been hundreds of posts here in which I refer to either "sea lanes" or "sea lines of communication" (see, e.g. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)). There can be a difference between the two terms, since SLOC can have a military meaning that I have generally ignored here.

However, what is important to know about sea lanes or SLOCs is that they exist and that they are a major reason that nations interested in international commerce have navies - to keep the sea lanes open. In discussing maritime security, keeping sea lanes open is a major topic.

We hear a lot about how many things travel by sea. From crude oil to grain to large screen TVs to cars and much more, cheaper shipping has allowed the entire world to benefit from global product distribution (see here and here). Where do these products travel? Sea lanes. An excellent example of these sea lanes is shown on this Naval War College slide (which I have borrowed without shame):

There it is, a picture of world commerce. Those are not war ships wending their way across oceans, those are merchant ships moving the goods that make the world go. You might note that there are places where the traffic converges to pass through narrow areas. These are referred to as "chokepoints", "Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes . . ."

Large ships sail on rigid schedules, carrying parts from Japan to the U.S. or to Europe in such a reliable manner that warehouse costs are reduced by planning for "just in time" deliveries of products.

So, when there is a disruption in the smooth flow of goods, say from the recent earthquake in Japan, there are ripple effects that impact more than the Japanese part manufacturers.

A similar effect is caused by things that interfere with sea lanes. These might be something like a catastrophe that strikes a chokepoint like a closure of the Suez Canal.

Taking the map above, I added some blue arrows to point at a few chokepoints, like the Suez Canal, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Bab el-Mandab, Strait of Gibraltar, and the general area of straits leading from the Caribbean into the Gulf of Mexico (see below).


Want to look at Caribbean chokepoints? I added some destroyer images to make the point - most of the oil imported into the U.S. by ship has to pass through these straits. In turn, these straits need to be protected if our economy is to work.


Finally, let me again refer to an older post about the Somali pirates and how cleverly they've been in moving out into the major sea lanes of the Indian Ocean area as they ply their trade. See Where the Somali Pirates Operate and Why where I put up this consolidated image of the Indian Ocean sea lanes and pirates strikes:

While there seem to be logistical limits on the Somali pirates as to the number of captive ships and hostages they can host at any given time and this limits their impact on the sea lane flow of commerce, they are certainly well-versed in the exploitation of the known sea lanes. Even this relatively minor bump in the flow of traffic, though, has been enough to get 20 or more naval vessels from many different countries out into the Indian Ocean attempting to thwart interference by the pirates of these vital sea lanes.

The greater lesson of the Somali pirates is how relatively easy it may be to cause trouble on sea lanes or at chokepoints and why it is vital to have in place assets to counter any such attempted trouble making.

We have now reviewed sea lanes, sea lines of communication and choke points and their importance to the global flow of commerce on the highway of the sea.

I suppose we also have covered why we, a nation dependent on maritime commerce, have a Navy and a Coast Guard out there keeping the sea lanes open. As noted here:
70% of the world is water, 80% of the world lives on or near the coastline and 90% of our commerce sails across it. Any disruption in that chain caused by instability has a direct impact on American quality of life.

Friday, January 28, 2011

Egypt: Threat to Suez Canal Raises Concerns

Energy and shipping security issues arise as Egypt's situation muddies - see here:
Crude-oil prices surged 3.4%, to above $89 a barrel.

"That's the most immediate concern, what's happening in Egypt and how that might affect oil prices if the Suez Canal gets closed, which is a real possibility," said Ed Cowart, lead manager of Eagle Asset Management's Large Cap Value and All Cap Value and Equity Income Strategies. He noted if the canal is closed, it could add substantially to the travel time for oil to get from the Middle East to the West.

Shares of tankers and shippers climbed as investors bet on a shutdown of the Suez Canal. Frontline jumped 8.5%, Overseas Shipholding leapt 5.9% and General Maritime advanced 6.9%.
As set out by the U.S. Energy Information Agency, the Suez Canal is a major energy chokepoint:
The Suez Canal is located in Egypt, and connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea, covering 120 miles. Petroleum (both crude oil and refined products) accounted for 16 percent of Suez cargos, measured by cargo tonnage, in 2009. An estimated 1.0 million bbl/d of crude oil and refined petroleum products flowed northbound through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea in 2009, while 0.8 million bbl/d travelled southbound into the Red Sea. This represents a decline from 2008, when 1.6 million bbl/d of oil transited northbound to Europe and other developed economies.

Almost 35,000 ships transited the Suez Canal in 2009, of which about 10 percent were petroleum tankers. With only 1,000 feet at its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to handle the VLCC (Very Large Crude Carriers) and ULCC (Ultra Large Crude Carriers) class crude oil tankers. The Suez Canal Authority is continuing enhancement and enlargement projects on the canal, and extended the depth to 66 ft in 2010 to allow over 60 percent of all tankers to use the Canal.
***
Closure of the Suez Canal and the SUMED Pipeline would divert tankers around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, adding 6,000 miles to transit.
Additional distance raises shipping costs and slows delivery - possibly leading to temporary shortages.

A graphic presenting the alternative to the Suez Canal from here:






Hat tip: MDB from his comment to a post below.

Monday, August 23, 2010

Adding to the Maritime Security Mix: First deepwater oil discovered off East Africa

Oil & Gas Journal reports "First deepwater oil discovered off East Africa" :
An exploratory well off Mozambique has penetrated 38 m of net oil and gas saturated sands in the upper of two Cretaceous fan lobes, signaling the first documented occurrence of liquids hydrocarbons in deep water off East Africa.
The Ironclad-1 well, operated by Anadarko Petroleum Corp. in Area 1 off Mozambique, is in the Rovuma basin 110 km south of the Windjammer dry gas discovery, drilled earlier in the same six-well exploratory program to 16,930 ft in 4,800 ft of water 30 miles off the coast ...
Map is from Anadarko, with my addition of a guesstimate as to the location of the Ironclad well site (yellow star). Click on them to enlarge images.

The Mozambique Channel is a chokepoint for shipping traffic off Africa. During WWII, the Japanese found it to be a "target-rich" environment as set out here:
Churchill telegraphed to Roosevelt: "A Japanese air, submarine, and/or cruiser base at Diego Suarez [on the northern tip of Madagascar, halfway between Cape Town and Colombo] would paralyse our whole convoy route both to the Middle East and to the Far East...."
Now, of course, there are pirates in the waters north of the entrance to the Channel. UPDATE: In November 2009, MV Delvina was captured at the northern end on the Mozambique Channel as shown on the nearby map. See here and here.

The map below shows the area with the red arrow pointing generally at the location of these wells.

Further, there are disputed territorial claims to areas that now may be worth a vigorous defense (see here):
At the northern entrances of the Mozambique Channel occur a number of islands, reefs and submarine banks. The largest land masses in this area are those of the Comoros Islands. With an area of 2,170 km² this volcanic group consists of 4 main islands: Ngazidja, Nzwani, Mwali, Mayotte and several smaller islets that lie off the main islands.

Farther in to the channel occur a trio of widely separated coral reefs and islands that form overseas possessions of France: Bassas da India, Juan de Nova and ÃŽle Europa. These islands are strategically important — their ownership is disputed between France and Madagascar. All are small, flat and uninhabited. The islets of Europa and Juan de Nova are important habitats for migrating landbirds and breeding seabirds.

Northwards, lying at the entrances in to the Channel, lie the French-owned ÃŽles Glorieuses (Glorioso Islands) and the submerged reefs of Banc du Geyser and Banc du Leven (Banc du Zelee), both of which lie in international waters.
Could get to be an interesting area.

UPDATE: Info on the Rovuma Basin from the National Petroleum Institute of Mozambique (NIP) here.

Wednesday, August 18, 2010

Maritime Security: Suspicious Vessels Detected Near Tanker Attacked in Strait of Hormuz

A couple of weeks ago, a Japanese oil tanker was damaged by something in the Strait of Hormuz - that something later determined to be an attack by explosives delivered as the ship was in transit - see Maritime Security: Tanker Damage in Strait of Hormuz Was Due to Explosives, Report Says for details.

Now comes a further, and disturbing, report about the incident, reported by Japan Today as "2 small ships detected near Japan tanker damaged in Strait of Hormuz":
Japanese authorities have found radar data showing two small unidentified ships near the Japanese tanker that was damaged in a suspected attack in the Strait of Hormuz in late July, transport ministry sources said Tuesday.

The data retrieved from the tanker’s voyage data recorder showed two small ships changing directions many times and making other suspicious moves, raising the possibility that they may have been involved in the purported attack.
***
The National Police Agency’s National Research Institute of Police Science is also checking substances collected from the damaged part of the tanker to see if they were components of an explosive.

The 160,292-ton tanker M. Star was damaged in a suspected explosion while sailing in Omani waters in the western part of the Strait of Hormuz on July 28, leaving one person slightly injured.

The radar data showed the small ships sailing parallel to the tanker, passing it and then turning around. They also showed that at some point, one of the ships disappeared from the radar, a move believed to indicate that it had moved to its blind spot around the tanker, according to the sources.
Again, the question is where did those little ships come from? And who is supporting such an attack?

Hat tip to Saturn 5.

Friday, August 06, 2010

Maritime Security: Tanker Damage in Strait of Hormuz Was Due to Explosives, Report Says

Maritime security game changer in the Strait of Hormuz?

BBC News reports "Japan tanker was damaged in a terror attack, UAE says":
"'An examination carried out by specialised teams had confirmed that the tanker had been the subject of a terrorist attack,' the news agency said, quoting an unidentified coastguard source.

'UAE explosives experts who collected and examined samples found a dent on the starboard side above the water line and remains of home-made explosives on the hull,' it said.

'Probably the tanker had encountered a terrorist attack from a boat loaded with explosives,' the source was quoted as saying."
The Strait of Hormuz is a vital link in the world energy chain and scattered terrorist attacks in the area are not a good thing.

See here for a good discussion of the importance of the Strait:
Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of 16.5-17 million barrels (first half 2008E), which is roughly 40 percent of all seaborne traded oil (or 20 percent of oil traded worldwide). Oil flows averaged over 16.5 million barrels per day in 2006, dropped in 2007 to a little over 16 million barrels per day after OPEC cut production, but rose again in 2008 with rising Persian Gulf supplies.
The Strait is not "international" waters, part of it is in Iranian or Omani territorial waters as set out here:
To traverse the Strait, ships pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman under the transit passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although not all countries have ratified the convention, most countries, including the U.S., accept these customary navigation rules as codified in the Convention . . .
As a result, Omani and Iranian authorities have police and security jurisdiction over those waters.

While sinking a ship in the Strait will not close the passage, this attack raises the stakes in providing security for vessels transiting the Strait.

Lots of questions to be answered:
  1. Assuming the report is accurate, where did the boat full of explosives come from?
  2. What sort of support network is there for the suicide boat operation?
  3. Is this a "one off" or will there be more attacks?


Update (7 Aug 10): NYTimes coverage:
Despite the seemingly amateurish nature of the alleged attack, its implications are serious, analysts said.

“Before, the Iranian naval threat was seen as key,” said Mustafa Alani, a security analyst at the Gulf Research Institute in Dubai. “Now, we have the possibility of Qaeda-type groups that appear to be learning from the tactics of pirates.”

One crucial question, Mr. Alani added, was where the presumed attacker would have come from. The coasts in the region are closely watched.