On Midrats 24 September 2017 - Episode 403: Hezbollah, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and What's Next

Please join us at 5pm (EDT) on 24 September 2017 for Midrats Episode 403: Hezbollah, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and What's Next

As the Syrian conflict enters what looks to be its end game, one old player on the scene is emerging stronger than it has ever been, a point of concern for all the nations in the area.

How has the Syrian civil war changed Hezbollah and her allies, and what does it signal about the post-war order?

To discuss this and related issues will be our guest for the full hour, Solume Anderson.

Solume is journalist and author based between New York City and Beirut, Lebanon. An

alumna of Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism. She writes regularly for publications including Newsweek, The Atlantic, New York, Harpers, Foreign Policy, VICE, Village Voice and Vox.com. Her first book, The Hostage’s Daughter was published in 2016.

We will use her latest article, Hezbollah’s New Strength Leaves Israeli Border Tense, as a starting off point for our conversation.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can also pick the show up later by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Getting Out of the Gulf? Letting the Arabian Gulf Countries Fend for Themselves in Letting Oil Flow

Behind the pay wall at Foreign Affairs is this think piece by Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and U.S. Military Strategy which is really not about military strategy, but about national strategy for the Persian Gulf. This means tracing our involvement back to President Jimmy Carter:

In January 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter used his State of the Union address to announce that in order to protect “the free movement of Middle East oil,” the United States would repel “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf.” Carter and his successors made good on that pledge, ramping up U.S. military capabilities in the region and even fighting the Gulf War to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from dominating the region’s oil supplies. Although Washington has had a number of interests in the Persian Gulf over the years, including preventing nuclear proliferation, fighting terrorism, and spreading democracy, the main rationale for its involvement has always been to keep the oil flowing.

The authors point out that the world has changed since 1980 and pose a multi-billion dollar question:

Is Persian Gulf oil still worth defending with American military might?

I should note that back in 2004, I posited the need to plan a curtailment of Middle East oil in Contingency Planning 101: Preparing for an world oil shortage:

[A]n oil shortage may impel more rapid adoption of alternative fuel sources, including natural gas, hydrogen, nuclear power. Coal, of which the U.S. has a lot, can be "gasified".

Gasification, in fact, may be one of the best ways to produce clean-burning hydrogen for tomorrow's automobiles and power-generating fuel cells. Hydrogen and other coal gases can also be used to fuel power-generating turbines or as the chemical "building blocks" for a wide range of commercial products.

The authors of the Foreign Affairs article suggest:

First, if the United States ended its commitment, how much likelier would a major disruption of Gulf oil be? Second, how much damage would such a disruption inflict on the U.S. economy? Third, how much does the United States currently spend on defending the flow of Gulf oil with its military? Finally, what nonmilitary alternatives exist to safeguard against a disruption, and at what price? Answering these questions reveals that the costs of preventing a major disruption of Gulf oil are, at the very least, coming close to exceeding the expected benefits of the policy. So it’s time for the United States to give itself the option of ending its military commitment to protecting Gulf oil, by increasing its investment in measures that would further cushion the U.S. economy from major oil disruptions. And in a decade or so, unless the region becomes far more dangerous, the United States should be in a position to actually end its commitment.

They suggest some sort of economic disruption:

Assessments of the U.S. economy’s sensitivity to oil prices also vary widely, but a reasonable estimate is that a doubling of the price of oil would shrink U.S. GDP by three percent—or approximately $550 billion. Of course, smaller disruptions would result in smaller economic losses, and the most catastrophic disruption—a long, complete closing of the Strait of Hormuz—would cause larger ones.

But the actual costs to the United States would be far smaller, because Washington could draw on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its emergency underground oil stockpile, to relieve the pressure on prices. The roughly 700 million barrels currently stored in the SPR form part of the more than four billion barrels held by members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organization founded in 1974 to coordinate collective responses to major oil disruptions.

What all of this means is that if the world experienced a massive disruption of oil from the Persian Gulf, a coordinated international release of various reserves could initially replace the vast majority of the daily loss. In all but the worst-case scenarios—far more severe than anything seen before—the impact of a severe disruption would be greatly cushioned.

What they do not discuss is the cushioning effect of the U.S.'s increased oil and gas reserves through the use of new drilling techniques and fracking - there is simply no mention in the article that the U.S. is thought by some to be the leader in energy reserves, as set out in in Oil Price.com's "U.S. Has World’s Largest Oil Reserves":

The U.S. holds more oil reserves than anyone else in the world, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela.

That conclusion comes from a new independent estimate from Rystad Energy, a Norwegian consultancy. Rystad estimates that the U.S. holds 264 billion barrels of oil, more than half of which is located in shale. That total exceeds the 256 billion barrels found in Russia, and the 212 billion barrels located in Saudi Arabia.

The findings are surprising, and go against conventional wisdom that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela hold the world’s largest oil reserves. The U.S. Energy Information Administration, for example, pegs Venezuela’s oil reserves at 298 billion barrels, the largest in the world. Rystad Energy says that these are inflated estimates because much of those reserves are not discovered. Instead, Rystad estimates that Venezuela only has about 95 billion barrels, which includes its estimate for undiscovered oil fields.

Some analysis is less aggressive in assessing U.S. reserves, because of a matter of "proven" reserves:

Proven oil reserves are those that have a reasonable certainty of being recoverable under existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology.

Let's parse that a little. The key part of the quote being "existing economic and political conditions," which exactly what we have seen play out with the reserves unleashed by fracking and unconventional technology being applied to the oil patch - as the price of oil from outside the U.S. rose, the ability and affordability of U.S. drillers to develop fields not cost effective under lower prices also rose. Now, as experience in using such techniques has grown, that "price point" has dropped, much to the regret of OPEC, which no longer has real cartel power over oil prices. See Why OPEC can't stop the shale oil industry:

Just as a cartel benefits from cutting output to raise price, it suffers from raising output to lower price. This would not be true if it could permanently eliminate competitors by temporarily lowering prices, but that is not the case here. The shale oil industry is resilient and flexible – just as it can be pushed out of the market by very low prices, it can promptly get back into the market when prices improve. So an extended attempt by OPEC to close down the shale industry is a lose-lose situation, and as such is very unlikely to happen.

Perhaps this is a minor quibble, concerning the article, but the point I am attempting to make is that the economic impact of U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf may not be anything close to what is predicted in the article. In fact, it may further increase U.S. development of its own reserves and in alternatives (hydrogen fuels?) which may not be cost-effective in "existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology" but which may spur new technology and which would certainly increase American jobs for Americans, which, after all, is a pretty important governmental concern.

Now, let's circle back a little.

The U.S. government, in part due to the "Carter Doctrine", has maintained a very expensive presence

in the Arabian Gulf.

The authors of the article pose the right questions - "Is it still in the U.S. interest to expend any effort in guarding those oil sea lines of communication that flow out of the Arabian Gulf? In whose vital national interests is it to keep sending aircraft carriers and other ships to attempt to preserve the status quo in the Arab/Persian Middle East? Is it time for the U.S. to remove itself from the Gulf? Whose interests would be served by our doing so?"

Would Iran establish the regional hegemony it seems to so strongly desire? Would the Chinese rush in to replace the U.S.? Or would the Chinese be concerned that the U.S. might suddenly free up a large portion of its Navy to be deployed to other areas that, 36 years after Mr. Carter's speech, are now of much greater interest to the U.S.?

I would argue that the new administration should take a close look at these issues and at the issues raised by the "You broke it, you fix it" attitudes in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have thrown a lot of time, talent and money into trying to convert those states into something that looks like us. It is time to rethink our goals and leave the inhabitants of the region to sort themselves out? Are we doomed to play Sisyphus and keep trying to push uphill the burden that no one in the area seems ready to take up? Is it time for us to engage in a little "benign neglect" and back off?

Is it time to postulate a policy built more on "punitive expeditions" than on nation building? See Intervention in International Law (1921) (pdf):

When the territorial sovereign is too weak or is unwilling to enforce respect for international law, a state which is wronged may find it necessary to invade the territory and to chastise the individuals who violate its rights and threaten its security.

Had we smashed the Taliban in Afghanistan for their support of al Qaeda and then left with a stern warning that we would come back again should they continue in their evil ways, would we have been better off?

If we had gone after Saddam Hussein in 1991 and punished him for his violations of international law, would we have had to go back?

With a new administration coming, now is the time to ask such questions, and set national strategy accordingly.

Yemen Backgrounder

Nice, short video on the situation in Yemen from the Wall Street Journal:

Middle East Mess: Turkey Claims Russian Arms on Moscow to Damascus "Airliner" Forced to Land in Turkey

The Republic of Turkey, which has, for the most part, tried to stay clear of the Syrian disaster unfolding on its border, now has pushed further into the mess by following up on some intelligence and forcing an aircraft headed from Moscow to Damascus to land in Ankara and undergo a search. This investigation reportedly resulted in a veritable hit, as reported by the NY Times in "Turkish Leader Says Russian Munitions Found on Syrian Jetliner":

The Turks, saying they had acted on an intelligence tip, forced the Air Syria flight with 35 passengers aboard to land at an airport in the Turkish capital, Ankara, on Wednesday.

“From Russia, an institution equivalent to our Machinery and Chemical Industry has sent military tools, equipment and ammunition to the Syrian Defense Ministry,” Mr. Erdogan was quoted as saying about the plane inspection. He was drawing a comparison to Turkey’s Machinery and Chemical Industry Institution, or MKEK, a leading provider of defense equipment to the Turkish military.

“Upon the intelligence received, research there was conducted and it was unfortunately seen that there was such equipment inside,” Mr. Erdogan said.

Since the Turks have been exchanging intermittent artillery fire with Syrian forces, they might just be a little put out by anyone supplying more ammunition to the Syrian regime.

The Turkish Hurryiet Daily News has more, with a Turkish Foreign Ministry official sounding a little like Captain Renault from the movie Casablanca (bolded below and I mean that movie reference in a good way):

A civilian Syrian passenger airplane flying from Moscow to Damascus was forced to land at Ankara’s Esenboğa Airport late on Oct. 10, and some of the cargo aboard was seized due to intelligence that it included material in violation of international civil aviation rules. Turkey allowed the aircraft to take off and continue on its route after seizing its cargo and grounding it for nine hours.

Turkish F-16

Ankara issued a diplomatic note to the Syrian Consulate in Istanbul yesterday. “The plane’s cargo was inconsistent with its bills of lading, and the cargo may have had a military purpose. The receiver [of the cargo] was listed as the Syrian Defense Ministry,” a Turkish Foreign Ministry official told Hürriyet Daily News yesterday. The cargo has been seized, not confiscated as yet, but probably will be confiscated, he said. “We are not prepared to comment on the description of the cargo. We will discuss it after we finish examining it,” he said.

“We are determined not to allow arms supply via Turkish airspace to a regime that is resorting to cruelty against its own people. Trying to do so by using our airspace is unacceptable,” Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said, a few hours after the plane landed, escorted by two Turkish F-16 jets. Turkish planes do not use Syrian airspace any longer because Syrian air space is not secure for Turkish planes, he said.

UPDATE: Syria call the Turks liars, according to the BBC:

Syria has accused Turkey of lying over its claim that a Syria-bound plane forced to land in Ankara was carrying Russian-made defence equipment.

Syria's foreign ministry challenged Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who made the claim, to show publicly the "ammunition" that had been seized.

Now, that's an interesting "good neighbor" approach taken by the Syrians. ... and the Russians who have joined in the name calling.

Iranian Ship With Weapons Cargo Under Inspection In Cyprus

Iranian Ship With Weapons Cargo Under Inspection In Cyprus:

Authorities in Cyprus on Friday began searching an Iranian cargo ship earlier intercepted by a U.S. Navy anti-piracy ship and found to be carrying weapons.

The Cypriot inspectors remain mum about the cargo inside the Monchegorsk docked in the port of Limassol after arriving Thursday in Cyprus from Port Said, Egypt.

Last week, the Monchegorsk was sailing the Red Sea when it was intercepted by a U.S. Navy ship guarding the area against pirates. Artillery and mortar shells were found onboard in violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution banning Iran from selling arms.

However, the U.S. Navy let the vessel go without confiscating the weapons because there was no legal basis to seize the contraband. The U.S., instead, asked Egyptian authorities to inspect the vessel.

Lawfare . . .

More here:

Quoting a European Union diplomatic source, it said Cyprus had acted after Israel and the United States requested that the Cypriot-flagged vessel be stopped.

Authorities contacted the ship and demanded that it dock in Limassol for inspection. Customs officials had unloaded part of the cargo and a large amount of weaponry, including artillery rounds and rockets, the paper said.

Cypriot authorities declined comment.

Israel believes the weapons were destined for the Lebanese Islamist guerrilla group Hezbollah or for Islamist Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip, Haaretz quoted Israeli sources as saying.

On Wednesday, U.S. military officials said personnel from the U.S. Navy vessel San Antonio last week boarded the Cypriot-flagged "Monchegorsk", a cargo vessel travelling from Iran to Syria, and found a weapons shipment but for legal reasons did not confiscate the cargo.

The officials declined to say what kind of weapons were found or how many. They also would not be specific about where or when the incident occurred.
***
Officials in Washington said the search was conducted as part of the U.S. Navy's normal maritime security role in regional waters that stretch from the Arabian Sea to the Mediterranean.

The U.S. officials said the arms could not be shown to violate U.N. weapons sanctions against Iran and the vessel was allowed to continue on to Syria.

The incident came to light amid media reports that the U.S. navy has been ordered to intercept suspected Iranian shipments to rearm Hamas following Israel's 22-day Gaza offensive against the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas.

The controversy seems to revolve around Un Resolution 1747, which reads, in part:

5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or
related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of Iran;

6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or
missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance
or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilising accumulation of
arms . . .