Geography and National Strategy: Russia and China

If you listened to our discussion on Baltic Security with Dan Lynch and Bruce Acker (embedded below), you heard a great deal of talk about geography and the challenges faced by countries in confronting the realities that geography forces on them, especially in terms of national strategy and employment of forces.



In that vein, it seems useful to review some geographic challenges faced by some major countries. Dr. George Friedman had a nice article up on the Forbes website, back in February 2016, 10 Maps That Explain Russia's Strategy, which I commend to your reading.

Many people think of maps in terms of their basic purpose: showing a country’s geography and topography. But maps can speak to all dimensions—political, military, and economic.

Dr. Friedman uses maps to discuss Russia's issues:

1.  Russia Is Almost Landlocked;
2.  Europe Controls Russia’s Access to the Oceans;
3.  The Western Border is Critical to Russia’s Infrastructure;
4.  Russia Has Lost Its Buffer Against the West;
5.  Now Russia Has Nothing to Lose;
6.  Difficulties Unite the Russians;

Dr. Friedman compare Russia to Sparta and Athens comes down on the side that declares Russia is more akin to Sparta:

Therefore, Russia can’t be Athens. It must be Sparta, and that means it must be a land power and assume the cultural character of a Spartan nation. Russia must have tough if not sophisticated troops fighting ground wars. It must also be able to produce enough wealth to sustain its military as well as provide a reasonable standard of living for its people—but Russia will not be able to match Europe in this regard.

So it isn’t prosperity that binds the country together, but a shared idealized vision of and loyalty toward Mother Russia. And in this sense, there is a deep chasm between both Europe and the United States (which use prosperity as a justification for loyalty) and Russia (for whom loyalty derives from the power of the state and the inherent definition of being Russian).
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All of this gives the Russians an opportunity. However bad their economy is at the moment, the simplicity of their geographic position in all respects gives them capabilities that can surprise their opponents and perhaps even make the Russians more dangerous.

Dr. Friedman also penned another Forbes piece, 5 Maps That Explain China's Strategy, in which he undertakes a review of China's geographic challenges:

In effect, China is an island in Eurasia. It can move money around and sometimes technology, but not large modern armies. Therefore, China is not a threat to its neighbors, nor are they a threat to China. China’s primary strategic interest is maintaining the territorial integrity of China from internal threats. If it lost control of Tibet or Xinjiang, the PRC’s borders would move far east, the buffer for Han China would disappear, and then China would face a strategic crisis. Therefore, its goal is to prevent that crisis by suppressing any independence movement in Tibet or Xinjiang.
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The core strategy of China is internal. It has only one external strategic interest—the seas to the east.
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China has vital maritime interests built around global trade. The problem is the sea lanes are not under its control, but rather under American control. In addition, China has a geographic problem. Its coastal seas are the South China Sea, south of Taiwan, and the East China Sea, to its north. Both seas are surrounded by archipelagos of island states ranging from Japan to Singapore with narrow passages between them. These passages could be closed at will by the US Navy. The US could, if it chose, blockade China. In national strategy, the question of intent is secondary to the question of capability. Since the US is capable of this, China is looking for a counter.

One counter would be to establish naval bases elsewhere in Asia. However, isolated by a US blockade from these bases, this would be of little use besides shaping regional psychology. Ultimately, the Chinese must create a force that would make it impossible to block access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
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China’s stop-gap measure is its large number of anti-ship missiles. These missiles are designed to push the United States back from crucial choke points in the seas surrounding China. The problem with these missiles is that the US can destroy them. The US can’t close the choke points while the missiles are there, but the US has the capability to map China’s anti-ship network and attack it before moving into the choke points. China then must control at least some of these strategic passages from air, sea, and land on the islands of the archipelago. And the key island, Taiwan, is beyond China’s ability to seize.
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China, therefore, has three strategic imperatives, two of them internal and one unattainable in any meaningful time frame. First, it must maintain control over Xinjiang and Tibet. Second, it must preserve the regime and prevent regionalism through repressive actions and purges. Third, it must find a solution to its enclosure in the East and South China Seas. In the meantime, it must assert a naval capability in the region without triggering an American response that the Chinese are not ready to deal with.

The Chinese geopolitical reality is that it is an isolated country that is also deeply divided internally. Its strategic priority, therefore, is internal stability. Isolation amidst internal disorder has been China’s worst case scenario. The government of President Jinping Xi is working aggressively to avert this instability, and this issue defines everything else China does. The historical precedent is that China will regionalize and become internally unstable. Therefore, Xi is trying to avert historical precedent.

You should read the whole thing.

You may disagree with Dr. Friedman's assessments, but the underlying discussion of geography and its relation to national strategies is invaluable.

UPDATE: Nice reminder of the need for strategists (or would-be strategists) to revisit geography, in David Hansen's The Immutable Importance of Geography from 1997:

Misunderstanding or misusing geography can confuse our thinking and thwart our best efforts at developing effective national security strategy. Knowledgeably and sensibly applied, however, geography is a discipline that can clarify strategic issues and increase the chances of success in any political, economic, or military endeavor.

Do-It-Yourself Strategic Analysis: Sun Tzu and the South China Sea

Here's your chance to see if you can play strategist - a "do-it-yourself" strategic analysis, if you will.

The question before you is, "What is the applicability, if any, of Sun Tzu's The Art of War to the events unfolding in the South China Sea?"

The link contained in the question will take you to a good translation of Sun Tzu's work.

Of some interest to you might be the following, but there may be others that you may find more interesting to discuss:

[2.08] ". . . I have heard of military campaigns that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen military campaigns that were skilled but protracted. No nation has ever benefited from protracted warfare.
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[03.02] Therefore, to achieve a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence.

[03.03] Therefore, the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy's plans, next is to attack alliances, next is to attack the army, and the worst is to attack a walled city.
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[04.04] One takes on sufficiency defending, one takes on deficiency attacking."
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[05.14] Therefore, those skilled in moving the enemy use formation that makes the enemy respond.

[05.15] They offer bait that which the enemy must take, manipulating the enemy to move while they wait in ambush.
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[05.14] Therefore, those skilled in moving the enemy use formation that makes the enemy respond.

[05.15] They offer bait that which the enemy must take, manipulating the enemy to move while they wait in ambush.
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[06.01] Generally the one who first occupies the battlefield awaiting the enemy is at ease; the one who comes later and rushes into battle is fatigued.

[06.02] Therefore those skilled warfare move the enemy, and are not moved by the enemy.

[06.03] Getting the enemy to approach on his own accord is a matter of showing him advantage; stopping him from approaching is a matter of showing him harm.
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[06.12] Therefore, if we want to do battle, even if the enemy is protected by high walls and deep moats, he cannot but do battle, because we attack what he must rescue. If we do not want to do battle, even if we merely draw a line on the ground, he will not do battle, because we divert his movements.
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[06.17] If the enemy prepares to defend many places, then his forces will be few in number.

[06.18] Therefore, if the enemy prepares to defend the front, the back will be weak. If he prepares to defend the back, the front will be weak. If he prepares to defend the left, the right will be weak. If he prepares to defend the right, the left will be weak. If he prepares to defend everywhere, everywhere will be weak.

[06.19] The few are those preparing to defend against others, the many are those who make others prepare to defend against them.

[06.20] Therefore, if one knows the place of battle and the day of battle, he can march a thousand kilometers and do battle.

[06.21] If one does not know the place of battle and the day of battle, then his left cannot aid his right, his right cannot aid his left, his front cannot aid his back, and his back cannot aid his front.

[06.22] How much less so if he is separated by tens of kilometers, or even a few kilometers.
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08.09] Therefore, subjugate the neighboring rulers with potential disadvantages, labor the neighboring rulers with constant matters, and have the neighboring rulers rush after advantages.
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[11.17] Ask: If the enemy is large in number and advances, what should be the response? I say: Seize what he values, and he will do what you wish.

Another useful short version of this advice at Eric Jackson's Sun Tzu's 31 Best Pieces Of Leadership Advice:

When strong, avoid them. If of high morale, depress them. Seem humble to fill them with conceit. If at ease, exhaust them. If united, separate them. Attack their weaknesses. Emerge to their surprise.

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

You might also consider how the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)("carrier killers") affects strategy. Are they like mine warfare? Along the lines of, "How many mines does it take to close a port? Answer: Perhaps none because the threat of a mined port may be enough to delay or deny its use." How much time, money and planning is required to counter the threat of ASBMs? Is that a strategic weakness?

Other possible questions: Alliances and allies? What about the strength of the Chinese economy in the region? What are the limitations of China's resources both in food and fuel? Who has greater issues with time and distance?

Just some things worth pondering. Have fun with it.

In Case You Missed It: U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter at CNAS 2016 Conference

UPDATE:
An interesting interview featuring Jerry Hendrix of CNAS on, among other things, the effect of a too small Navy:

"Surprise, Surprise, Surprise" - What Happens When You Lack Strategic Vision

Ah, the not so strategic corporal know what happens when you lack strategic vision:


The Obama administration, which seems to have the idea that the U.S. should walk softly and carry a tiny stick, keeps getting those "unexpected" surprises from around the world.

Russia makes a move on Crimea? Surprise!

Russia makes a move on Ukraine? Surprise!

Russia threatens the Baltic states? Surprise!

China makes moves to claim the South China Sea as its "home waters?" Surprise!

North Korea acts crazy? Surprise!

People leave the completely FUBAR'd Middle East in droves? Surprise!

Waving potential immigration amnesty in front of people living in poverty in Central and South America causes a rise in "undocumented" migrants? Surprise!

Russia makes moves in the Arctic? Surprise!

Leaders of nations around the world, stunned by the weakness of the U.S. begin to panic a little? Surprise!

There's chaos in Libya after "liberation" without a follow-on plan? Surprise!

The Junior Varsity ISIS team fails to fall to air power alone? Surprise!

ISIS is spreading into more of Africa? Surprise!

There are ISIS converts in the U.S.? Surprise!

I could go on, but why bother?

Many of us have seen corporations go through a time of "surprise, surprise, surprise" when they have lost their "strategic vision." Yeah, yeah, business buzzword but, as I learned as a ship's navigator many years ago, when mapping a course, is good to know where you are headed.

In Navy navigation, you get orders from above - "Chart a course to Fiji." Somewhere up the food chain there is someone with a plan - a vision - of why my ship is to sail to Fiji and above them is someone who has a vision of how that trip to Fiji will help fulfill the national strategic vision.

In business, you develop a business plan based on the leadership's vision of what your company is all about. It is future oriented. It is what the business team - employees and management - rally around.

What is the U.S. "strategic vision?"

A couple of years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski questioned whether we have one in his book, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. As set on in a NYTimes book review:

Mr. Brzezinski notes that President Obama has “failed to speak directly to the American people about America’s changing role in the world, its implications, and its demands,” ...

Also missing from this book are any substantive discussions of how the United States might overcome “its staggering domestic challenges and reorient its drifting foreign policy” and how the current European debt crisis might affect the United States and the future fortunes of the West.

What Mr. Brzezinski does do here — lucidly, and for the most part with great persuasiveness — is explore the consequences that a steady slide by America into impotence and irrelevance might have on the rest of the world. Such a development, he argues, would probably not result in the “ ‘coronation’ of an effective global successor” like China, but would likely lead to a “protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers.”

An America “in serious decline for domestic and/or external reasons,” he says, would lead to a breakdown in the ability of the international system to prevent conflict once it became evident that “America is unwilling or unable to protect states it once considered, for national interest and/ or doctrinal reasons, worthy of its engagement.” As he sees it, a more Darwinian world of tumbling dominoes would most likely result: there would be little to prohibit regional powers (like Russia) from exerting claims on neighbors falling within traditional or claimed spheres of influence (like Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine). Taiwan would become increasingly vulnerable, and so too would Israel.

Surprise, surprise, surprise.

In 2013, the President said the following in his second inaugural address:

We will defend our people and uphold our values through strength of arms and rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully –- not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.

America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation. We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom. And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice –- not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity, human dignity and justice.

Compare that to President Kennedy's first inaugural address where he laid out this vision:

We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom--symbolizing an end as well as a beginning--signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forbears prescribed nearly a century and three-quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe--the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

One is a vision and a promise.

The other? A way to slide into "impotence and irrelevance?"

Surprise!