Excellent Read: "China and Asian Maritime Security" Testimony of Heritage's Dean Cheng Before the HouseSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs

You ought to read this testimony on China and Asian Maritime Security, which combines Chinese history and current strategy. Some good excerpts:

The rise of Chinese maritime capabilities makes it the first new maritime power to take to the seas since the end of the 19th century. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union, both of which fielded substantial navies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) actually relies upon the oceans for much of its economic activity. This dependence upon the sea also constitutes a radical break from that country’s millennia of history; the imperial treasure fleets of Admiral Zheng He were not nearly as central to Chinese power and livelihood. Thus, the transformation of the PRC from a land power to a maritime one constitutes one of the more fundamental changes in the international scene, certainly since the end of the Cold War, and arguably over the past century.
***
This growing dependence on the sea to operate various parts of its economy and maintain its society makes China unique. China is arguably the first continental power that is truly dependent upon the sea. Unlike Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, or the Soviet Union, China cannot look upon the sea as an optional area of operation, but as a vital area of national interest.
***
By contrast, since the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and the diversification of China’s manufacturing base, China’s economic center of gravity has shifted toward the the coast. This has allowed such economic centers as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Pudong to more easily access global trade routes for both imports of raw materials and exports of products. This has meant, however, that China’s recent economic development is also more vulnerable to potential attack from the sea.
***
An essential part of political warfare is legal warfare. From the Chinese perspective, legal warfare is not the “misuse” of the law, but rather, the exploitation of the law in support of broader political ends.
***
Such efforts also exploit not only the law, but also law enforcement agencies. For example, the use of the China Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce Chinese claims over the Senkakus, the Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal not only serves to limit the potential for escalation, but also is a political statement. China is using law enforcement vessels to enforce its laws over its territories, reinforcing its claim to these various features.
***
As important, China’s conception of naval operations has steadily expanded. From “near-shore operations,” which roughly equate with coastal and brown-water duties, it has shifted emphasis to “near-sea” and now “far-sea” operations, roughly comparable to green water and blue water activities, respectively. These operations are not necessarily power projection–oriented, however.

The shift of China’s economic center of gravity to its coast, as noted earlier, means that Beijing is at least as interested in keeping foreign air and naval forces away from China’s shores. Indeed, Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) activities should be seen at least partly in this light. Given the range of modern precision-guided munition weapons, however, keeping an adversary away from China’s shores means being able to undertake A2/AD activities at ranges of a thousand miles or more.

To this end, China is likely to employ not only traditional naval forces, but civilian and commercial assets, in unorthodox ways that embody “hybrid” approaches to warfare. China’s fishing fleets, for example, include a substantial number of naval militia assets, essentially civilian vessels that respond to government (including military) assignments as necessary. Such forces could be exploited to provide everything from intelligence gathering to early warning for China’s navy.[16] CCG vessels, some of which were cascaded from the PLAN, can do the same. More disturbingly, China has reportedly installed radars typically found on patrol vessels on some of the oil rigs in the East China Sea.[17] This further blurs the line between military and civilian assets, and suggests a new means by which oil rigs can serve as “mobile national territory,” while further expanding China’s maritime situational awareness envelope.
***
The physical space of the South China Sea region itself is an invaluable resource, as it provides a strategic buffer. This is especially important as the PRC has built up the island of Hainan in the northwest corner of the South China Sea. Chinese military engineers have constructed a dock to handle its aircraft carriers, dedicated port facilities, including tunnels, for submarines, and a number of military airfields.[20] (The American EP-3 that collided with a Chinese fighter in 2001 crash-landed at one of these airfields.) In addition, China’s newest spaceport is located on Hainan Island, where it will be lofting future manned Chinese space missions. It is clearly not in the Chinese interest to allow foreign, and especially American, naval capability to make close approaches to Hainan.

Instead, it is in China’s interest to make the South China Sea as forbidding as possible, especially for American submarines, which remain qualitatively superior to their Chinese counterparts. It is therefore not surprising that there appears to be an effort to create a massive sonar surveillance network that would cover the region.[21] Indeed, military bases on the artificial islands China has built in the Spratlys, as well as in the Paracels and perhaps at Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank in the future, could provide convenient sites for processing data, and also for basing anti-submarine warfare aircraft and helicopters. Such deployments would make the deployment of American submarines into those waters far riskier.

Really, read it all.


Hat tip to James Kraska

Geography and National Strategy: Russia and China

If you listened to our discussion on Baltic Security with Dan Lynch and Bruce Acker (embedded below), you heard a great deal of talk about geography and the challenges faced by countries in confronting the realities that geography forces on them, especially in terms of national strategy and employment of forces.



In that vein, it seems useful to review some geographic challenges faced by some major countries. Dr. George Friedman had a nice article up on the Forbes website, back in February 2016, 10 Maps That Explain Russia's Strategy, which I commend to your reading.

Many people think of maps in terms of their basic purpose: showing a country’s geography and topography. But maps can speak to all dimensions—political, military, and economic.

Dr. Friedman uses maps to discuss Russia's issues:

1.  Russia Is Almost Landlocked;
2.  Europe Controls Russia’s Access to the Oceans;
3.  The Western Border is Critical to Russia’s Infrastructure;
4.  Russia Has Lost Its Buffer Against the West;
5.  Now Russia Has Nothing to Lose;
6.  Difficulties Unite the Russians;

Dr. Friedman compare Russia to Sparta and Athens comes down on the side that declares Russia is more akin to Sparta:

Therefore, Russia can’t be Athens. It must be Sparta, and that means it must be a land power and assume the cultural character of a Spartan nation. Russia must have tough if not sophisticated troops fighting ground wars. It must also be able to produce enough wealth to sustain its military as well as provide a reasonable standard of living for its people—but Russia will not be able to match Europe in this regard.

So it isn’t prosperity that binds the country together, but a shared idealized vision of and loyalty toward Mother Russia. And in this sense, there is a deep chasm between both Europe and the United States (which use prosperity as a justification for loyalty) and Russia (for whom loyalty derives from the power of the state and the inherent definition of being Russian).
***
All of this gives the Russians an opportunity. However bad their economy is at the moment, the simplicity of their geographic position in all respects gives them capabilities that can surprise their opponents and perhaps even make the Russians more dangerous.

Dr. Friedman also penned another Forbes piece, 5 Maps That Explain China's Strategy, in which he undertakes a review of China's geographic challenges:

In effect, China is an island in Eurasia. It can move money around and sometimes technology, but not large modern armies. Therefore, China is not a threat to its neighbors, nor are they a threat to China. China’s primary strategic interest is maintaining the territorial integrity of China from internal threats. If it lost control of Tibet or Xinjiang, the PRC’s borders would move far east, the buffer for Han China would disappear, and then China would face a strategic crisis. Therefore, its goal is to prevent that crisis by suppressing any independence movement in Tibet or Xinjiang.
***
The core strategy of China is internal. It has only one external strategic interest—the seas to the east.
***
China has vital maritime interests built around global trade. The problem is the sea lanes are not under its control, but rather under American control. In addition, China has a geographic problem. Its coastal seas are the South China Sea, south of Taiwan, and the East China Sea, to its north. Both seas are surrounded by archipelagos of island states ranging from Japan to Singapore with narrow passages between them. These passages could be closed at will by the US Navy. The US could, if it chose, blockade China. In national strategy, the question of intent is secondary to the question of capability. Since the US is capable of this, China is looking for a counter.

One counter would be to establish naval bases elsewhere in Asia. However, isolated by a US blockade from these bases, this would be of little use besides shaping regional psychology. Ultimately, the Chinese must create a force that would make it impossible to block access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
***
China’s stop-gap measure is its large number of anti-ship missiles. These missiles are designed to push the United States back from crucial choke points in the seas surrounding China. The problem with these missiles is that the US can destroy them. The US can’t close the choke points while the missiles are there, but the US has the capability to map China’s anti-ship network and attack it before moving into the choke points. China then must control at least some of these strategic passages from air, sea, and land on the islands of the archipelago. And the key island, Taiwan, is beyond China’s ability to seize.
***
China, therefore, has three strategic imperatives, two of them internal and one unattainable in any meaningful time frame. First, it must maintain control over Xinjiang and Tibet. Second, it must preserve the regime and prevent regionalism through repressive actions and purges. Third, it must find a solution to its enclosure in the East and South China Seas. In the meantime, it must assert a naval capability in the region without triggering an American response that the Chinese are not ready to deal with.

The Chinese geopolitical reality is that it is an isolated country that is also deeply divided internally. Its strategic priority, therefore, is internal stability. Isolation amidst internal disorder has been China’s worst case scenario. The government of President Jinping Xi is working aggressively to avert this instability, and this issue defines everything else China does. The historical precedent is that China will regionalize and become internally unstable. Therefore, Xi is trying to avert historical precedent.

You should read the whole thing.

You may disagree with Dr. Friedman's assessments, but the underlying discussion of geography and its relation to national strategies is invaluable.

UPDATE: Nice reminder of the need for strategists (or would-be strategists) to revisit geography, in David Hansen's The Immutable Importance of Geography from 1997:

Misunderstanding or misusing geography can confuse our thinking and thwart our best efforts at developing effective national security strategy. Knowledgeably and sensibly applied, however, geography is a discipline that can clarify strategic issues and increase the chances of success in any political, economic, or military endeavor.

Do-It-Yourself Strategic Analysis: Sun Tzu and the South China Sea

Here's your chance to see if you can play strategist - a "do-it-yourself" strategic analysis, if you will.

The question before you is, "What is the applicability, if any, of Sun Tzu's The Art of War to the events unfolding in the South China Sea?"

The link contained in the question will take you to a good translation of Sun Tzu's work.

Of some interest to you might be the following, but there may be others that you may find more interesting to discuss:

[2.08] ". . . I have heard of military campaigns that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen military campaigns that were skilled but protracted. No nation has ever benefited from protracted warfare.
***
[03.02] Therefore, to achieve a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence.

[03.03] Therefore, the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy's plans, next is to attack alliances, next is to attack the army, and the worst is to attack a walled city.
***
[04.04] One takes on sufficiency defending, one takes on deficiency attacking."
***
[05.14] Therefore, those skilled in moving the enemy use formation that makes the enemy respond.

[05.15] They offer bait that which the enemy must take, manipulating the enemy to move while they wait in ambush.
***
[05.14] Therefore, those skilled in moving the enemy use formation that makes the enemy respond.

[05.15] They offer bait that which the enemy must take, manipulating the enemy to move while they wait in ambush.
***
[06.01] Generally the one who first occupies the battlefield awaiting the enemy is at ease; the one who comes later and rushes into battle is fatigued.

[06.02] Therefore those skilled warfare move the enemy, and are not moved by the enemy.

[06.03] Getting the enemy to approach on his own accord is a matter of showing him advantage; stopping him from approaching is a matter of showing him harm.
***
[06.12] Therefore, if we want to do battle, even if the enemy is protected by high walls and deep moats, he cannot but do battle, because we attack what he must rescue. If we do not want to do battle, even if we merely draw a line on the ground, he will not do battle, because we divert his movements.
***
[06.17] If the enemy prepares to defend many places, then his forces will be few in number.

[06.18] Therefore, if the enemy prepares to defend the front, the back will be weak. If he prepares to defend the back, the front will be weak. If he prepares to defend the left, the right will be weak. If he prepares to defend the right, the left will be weak. If he prepares to defend everywhere, everywhere will be weak.

[06.19] The few are those preparing to defend against others, the many are those who make others prepare to defend against them.

[06.20] Therefore, if one knows the place of battle and the day of battle, he can march a thousand kilometers and do battle.

[06.21] If one does not know the place of battle and the day of battle, then his left cannot aid his right, his right cannot aid his left, his front cannot aid his back, and his back cannot aid his front.

[06.22] How much less so if he is separated by tens of kilometers, or even a few kilometers.
***
08.09] Therefore, subjugate the neighboring rulers with potential disadvantages, labor the neighboring rulers with constant matters, and have the neighboring rulers rush after advantages.
***
[11.17] Ask: If the enemy is large in number and advances, what should be the response? I say: Seize what he values, and he will do what you wish.

Another useful short version of this advice at Eric Jackson's Sun Tzu's 31 Best Pieces Of Leadership Advice:

When strong, avoid them. If of high morale, depress them. Seem humble to fill them with conceit. If at ease, exhaust them. If united, separate them. Attack their weaknesses. Emerge to their surprise.

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

You might also consider how the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)("carrier killers") affects strategy. Are they like mine warfare? Along the lines of, "How many mines does it take to close a port? Answer: Perhaps none because the threat of a mined port may be enough to delay or deny its use." How much time, money and planning is required to counter the threat of ASBMs? Is that a strategic weakness?

Other possible questions: Alliances and allies? What about the strength of the Chinese economy in the region? What are the limitations of China's resources both in food and fuel? Who has greater issues with time and distance?

Just some things worth pondering. Have fun with it.

Spread the Word: China's Stealth Navy - Its "Maritime Militia"

China has two major blue water forces - its navy (PLAN) and its coast guard. It also has a huge merchant fleet. But there is another force it doesn't want you to notice - an asymmetric force trying to fly under the radar. A force as our guest on Midrats, Andrew Ericson, points out that has not been officially recognized by the U.S. government, though it has been engaged in all sorts of adventures - including the disruption of the operations of USNS Impeccable and much more. It is the Chinese "maritime militia" - designed to be a plausibly deniable force multiplier.

There are many issues that arise from the existence of such a militia, some of which Dr. Ericson discusses during our show:




Other issues are discussed in James Kraska's and Michael Monti's The Law of Naval Warfare and China's Maritime Militia (pdf):

The militia is positioned to conduct a “people’s war at sea” in any future conflict. This strategy exploits a seam in the law of naval warfare,
which protects coastal fishing vessels from capture or attack unless they are integrated into the enemy’s naval force. The maritime militia forms an irregular naval force that provides the PLAN with an inexpensive force multiplier,raising operational, legal and political challenges for any opponent.

The sheer size and scope of the vast network of China’s maritime militia complicates the battlespace, degrades any opponent’s decision-making process and exposes adversaries to political dilemmas that will make them more cautious to act against China during a maritime crisis or naval war. The legal implications are no less profound. This article concludes that the maritime
militia risks erasing the longstanding distinction between warships and civilian ships in the law of naval warfare. Although the law of naval warfare permits warships to engage civilian fishing vessels that assist enemy forces, it may be virtually impossible to distinguish between legitimate fishing vessels and those that are integrated into the PLAN as an auxiliary naval force. Regardless
of whether the maritime militia plays a decisive combat role, its presence in the theater of war confronts opponents with vexing legal and operational dilemmas.

Yes, it's legal brief of sorts, but with the Chinese engaging in some serious lawfare, it is a must read to understand the issues confronting our forces.

China: South China Sea Dominance is Us

China's goals for the South China Sea and dominance of the SCS area laid out excellently in the Sydney Morning Herald's South China Sea: The fight China will take to the brink of war:

Then, last week, in another unmistakeable sign of hardening Chinese determination, Xi made his first public appearance in military uniform and formally claimed the title of commander in chief of China's war-fighting headquarters.

What is Xi doing? What does China hope to achieve? And where is this dispute heading? An eminent Chinese expert, Dr Shi Yinghong, provides answers.

Xi has declared the pursuit of "China's Dream", a national resurgence after centuries of foreign domination. Shi, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, says there are three international implications. First, Xi wants China to be acknowledged as a superpower equal to the US. Second, he wants China to become the co-manager of global affairs with the US, a Group of Two for world governance. Third, "China must be the preponderant power in the Western Pacific and have some advantage over the US", he told me. Shi's definition of Chinese aims supports that of the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry Harris, who says China seeks "hegemony in East Asia".

Shi, who has been an adviser to the State Council, China's cabinet, for the past five years, says this will be "based on an arms build up and the strategic ability to go tit-for-tat with the US and to force the US finally to recognise Chinese preponderance" in China's claimed sphere.

"China," Shi explains, "must be number one in diplomatic influence and economic clout and maybe in [military] force. It wants to prevent the US military's freedom of navigation eventually, and gradually squeeze Vietnam, the Philippines and all the others out of the South China Sea." This is precisely what the region's governments fear.

Read the whole thing.

Russia Apparently Declares the End of "International Waters," Joining China

Under the United Nations Convention on the the Law of the Sea, "international waters" means waters not part of the "territorial sea" of a nation and there is a 12-mile limit:

Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles . . .

"High Seas" (what most of think of as "International Waters") are defined in Art.86 of UNCLOS:

all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State

As we have seen, China has taken a a more aggressive position on "territorial waters" apparently to include "historic waters we have once sailed in" or "historic fishing areas." See here, here, and here for examples.

It occurs to me that Russia, seeing how this unlawful but also virtually unanswerable (short of war) brute force approach has succeeded for China, is now playing the same game in both the Baltic and Black Sea. See here and here.

Take a look at this nice bit of political jujitsu which blames the U.S. and its allies of the "crime" of coming too close to Russian waters (not in them, but close) and provoking the latest incident of Russian planes low flying over a U.S. ship, as set out in

Russia sought to turn the tables on the United States on Wednesday, accusing the U.S. Navy of maneuvering aggressively near the Russian border in the Baltics and promising it would use “all necessary measures” to address future incidents.

According to the Russians, the incident in question occurred Apr. 11, when a U.S. destroyer drew near Kalingrad in the Russian territorial enclave between Lithuania and Poland.

“This is about attempts to exercise military pressure on Russia,” Russian envoy to NATO Alexander Grushko told reporters after a NATO-Russia council meeting on Wednesday, according to Reuters. “We will take all necessary measures, precautions, to compensate for these attempts to use military force.”

On the nearby map, I have circled the Russian territory of Kahlingrad Oblast, which is, as you see,

surrounded by independent countries, i.e. isolated from Russia, a situation I am sure Putin would like to change. But there are those pesky NATO countries in the way, Lithuania and Poland.

In any event, we are seeing the old bully ploy of "it's your fault that I will attack you." Picture Putin as "Biff," if you will.

Bullies will be bullies, of course, so long as they can get away with it.

Worse, though, is that the concept of some sort of international law governing where Russian (or Chinese, for that matter) right end and begin is very obviously broken.

Putin has pushed this with his "little green men" in Ukraine and with his prior incursion into Georgia. The Chinese have pushed it by just grabbing parts of the South China Sea and daring anyone to push them off their artificial islands.

If you think either one of these thug nations won't hesitate to play the 12-mile limit when it suits them as a means of expanding their territory, you are most naive. And just wait until we get to the Arctic.

U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 23 February - 23 March 2016

Note the 7 Mar 2016 report of a ramming of a Vietnamese fishing vessel.

U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 23 February - 23 March 2016

China and Its Australian Gambit

Very interesting NYTimes piece by Jane Perlez on China's 99 year lease on up by Darwin - a very strategic locale "U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Australian Port Leased by Chinese":

The port in this remote northern Australian outpost is little more than a graying old wharf jutting into crocodile-infested waters. On a recent day, there was stifling heat but not a ship in sight. “Our pissy little port,” as John Robinson, a flamboyant local tycoon, calls it.

The financially hurting government of the Northern Territory was happy to lease it to a Chinese company in October for the bargain price of $361 million, raising money for local infrastructure projects.

“We are the last frontier; you take what you can get,” said Mr. Robinson, who is known as Foxy. “The Northern Territory doesn’t have the money for development. Australia doesn’t have it. We need the major players like China.”

But the decision has catapulted the port of Darwin into a geopolitical tussle pulling in the United States, China and Australia.

This month, the United States said it was concerned that China’s “port access could facilitate intelligence collection on U.S. and Australian military forces stationed nearby.”

Read it all, it'll make you say, "Hmmmm."

Not really a brand new story, back in November, The Australian Financial Review reported US 'stunned' by Port of Darwin sale to Chinese:

Richard Armitage, a former United States Deputy Secretary of State, said he was "stunned" that Australia blindsided the US on a decision to allow a Chinese company with alleged links to the People's Liberation Army to lease the Port of Darwin.

"I couldn't believe the Australian defence ministry went along with this," Mr Armitage told The Australian Financial Review in an interview.

"And I was further stunned to find out that apparently this did not come up in the A-US talks [Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations]."

Mr Armitage's comments come amid growing controversy about the $506 million deal between the Northern Territory Government and the Chinese Company, Landbridge Corporation to lease the Port of Darwin for 99 years. The furore comes ahead of final bids being lodged for the $9 billion purchase of the NSW electricity grid, which also includes the purchase of sensitive optic fibre cables used by the defence establishment.

More hmmmm.

Check out the map above. Darwin is a vital port right on alternative sea lanes to China, Japan, Korea, etc, from the Middle East. It's that little red dot in the yellow box.

Nice strategic purchase you got there, China.

China's "Far Sea Operations"

From the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operations in a downloadble pdf format. The contents may prove interesting:

CHAPTER ONE Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security by Dale C. Rielage
CHAPTER TWO Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and Policy
Implications for China by Wu Zhengyu
CHAPTER THREE Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security by Xu Qiyu
CHAPTER FOUR Chinese Cooperation to Protect Sea-Lane Security:
Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden by Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and
Escort Missions by Zhang Junshe
CHAPTER SIX Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the
Twenty-First Century by Christopher D. Yung
CHAPTER SEVEN China’s Evolving Overseas Interests and Peaceful
Competition by Cai Penghong
CHAPTER EIGHT Freedom of the “Far Seas”? A Maritime Dilemma for China by Jonathan G. Odom
CHAPTER NINE SLOC Security and International Cooperation by Wang Xiaoxuan
CHAPTER TEN The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic: Catalyst for
Cooperation or Confrontation? by Mark Redden and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

It's the May 2015 edition, edited by Peter Dutton and Ryan Martinson.

I am still reading it, but this introduction to Chapter 6 is intriguing:

In the thirty-five years since inaugurating its “Reform and Opening” policy, China has become increasingly intertwined with the world outside its borders. China is currently the world’s largest trading nation, relying heavily both on foreign supplies of raw
materials for and on foreign consumers of its manufactured products.1 Chinese firms, answering the call of to “Go Out” (走出去), are expanding their overseas investments, and Chinese citizens are traveling the world in ever greater numbers in search of business, education, and pleasure. Though generally positive, these developments have increased the country’s vulnerability to events beyond its control.

Chinese leaders recognize the increasing challenges of safeguarding overseas interests. However, official Chinese policy rejects the type of initiatives that would enable the country to meet these new needs better—namely, overseas basing of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. In recent years, growing numbers of Chinese commentators have expressed views favoring revision of this traditional policy, suggesting that in due time China will have no choice but to take steps to enhance its far-seas support capabilities. This public discussion likely reflects a debate among Chinese policy makers about how best to protect the country’s expanding overseas interests. If China ultimately does
change its long-standing policy eschewing permanent overseas presence, what basing model is it likely to choose?

Dr. Yung lays out the options he sees.

It's interesting reading, as are the previous 12 issues of China Maritime Studies - which are also available for your reading pleasure here.

If you want more "PLA/PLAN cred," there is this Peter Mattis post at War on the Rocks So You Want to Be a PLA Expert? I don't know if you can get a special ribbon for reading all his links.

China Weaponizes Built Up Islands in South China Sea

Yes, I know, shocking. Australia's The Age reports, China moves weapons on to artificial islands in South China Sea:

China has moved weaponry onto artificial islands that it is building in contested areas of the South China Sea, adding to the risks of a confrontation with the United States and its regional security partners including Australia.

Australian officials are concerned that China could also introduce long-range radar, anti-aircraft guns and regular surveillance flights that will enable it to project military power across a maritime expanse which include some of Australia's busiest trading lanes.

Well, it's not like we didn't know this was coming.

I suspect the reaction will be more hand-wringing, strong memos and some increase in overflights while China consolidates its positions. Why? As stated here:

When a land power wants to set up locations for bases to control the air and sea in areas of interest to them ...

China is thinking like a land power, setting up fixed bases for expansion of its alleged rights in the South China Sea.

It will keep doing this until it has a reason to stop. The threat of "international law" is a joke to China, which knows that international law means little unless there is some means - and the will to use that means - to enforce it.

Are the U.S and/or any of its allies willing to go to war to stop China's island campaign? Will we send in the Marines to dig the Chinese off these sand spits?

China, acting in its own interest as it sees it, understands the "paper tiger" nature of threats rendered impotent by politics, thus they will keep going at this until they have their own South China lake.

Can you imagine the protests about "our kids" going off to war over man-made islands in the middle of nowhere?"

In their defense against U.S. protests they will point to the Monroe Doctrine, the events that lead to the Panama Canal and centuries of European imperialism. Given their history, they probably won't use "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" as the title of their empire building effort - but whatever they call it, it follows a similar thought process.

Here's an interesting WWII OSS (CIA predecessor) analysis of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere:

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

You might note the mention of the Monroe Doctrine:

In 1962, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked symbolically when the Soviet Union began to build missile-launching sites in Cuba. With the support of the Organization of American States, President John F. Kennedy threw a naval and air quarantine around the island.

I don't know what the Chinese equivalent of "goose/gander" is, but I suspect we'll hear it at some point.

China's Interest is China's Interest

Kick off the Memorial Day Weekend - mindful that many Americans died fighting helping to free China during WWII - by suggesting a couple of reads on China.

First is Jeff Smith's Foreign Affairs piece, Beware China's Grand Strategy

Ask ten China scholars to define Chinese grand strategy and you will get ten answers. In a formal sense, it does not exist. Yet observers can discern coherent strategic priorities that, in aggregate, resemble the elements of a grand strategy. Today, the first priority is arguably driven by the Communist Party’s preoccupation with mitigating key vulnerabilities in pursuit of stability and growth.
***

Ah, those "key vulnerabilities" - which support China's need for economic growth:

Externally, Beijing is keenly sensitive regarding the vulnerability of the energy imports that sustain China’s economy, the bulk of which must traverse thousands of miles of open sea patrolled by the U.S. Navy and through the narrow naval chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca. The naked vulnerability of these imports (particularly in war time) is intolerable to Chinese strategists.

China's Port and Canal Developments

The goals of Chinese grand strategy can therefore be assumed to be attaining diverse and defensible sources of energy and rapid economic growth bolstered by a healthy supply of export markets in an increasingly connected Asia.

The AIIB [Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank] has the virtue of advancing both agendas, but it represents just one finger in a Chinese hand grasping Asia in an ever-tighter embrace. China’s “String of Pearls” investments in port facilities along the Indian Ocean rim represent another. Just this past February, a Chinese state-owned enterprise assumed control of the “crown pearl,” Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. Another finger is the web of new oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar (also called Burma) to Kazakhstan, and new industrial and commercial rail links spanning from Western China to Europe. Last year a Chinese cargo train made the longest continuous train ride in history, a 21-day, 8,000-mile round trip from China’s Zheijang province to Spain and back. Meanwhile, Russia and China are currently negotiating the details of a largest-ever gas pipeline and supply contract worth up to $40 billion. Finally, Beijing is still unveiling the details of a “One Belt, One Road” New Silk Road Initiative, an ambitious vision for an interconnected Asia with each spoke linking back to the hub of the Chinese economy.

As the article notes, China has a nationalist movement that is unhappy with things that happened during China's weak years and that anger leads directly to efforts to "get back" that which this movement feels was "stolen." One symbol of this effort is the infamous 9- or 10-dashed line which China uses to justify its actions in the South China Sea.

As far as strategy goes, China is not straying too far from a Mahanian approach (see Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?).

The other big read is from the Council on Foreign Relations, Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis authors, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China , which is downloadable as a pdf:

"Because the American effort to 'integrate' China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy."

Is China a boogie man or just a major country asserting its will in a world where other major powers have risen and fallen? Does China's ascendance require confrontation? What is "international law" but the will of the strongest glossed over as "proper behavior?" Will the behavior of past "western" empires come back to haunt their descendants?

It also might be a good idea to read Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations (book available here) as well as critics of that work (see e.g. here). Another approach to ponder, John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. There's also, perhaps more directly on point, Henry Kissinger's On China.