VertRep

VertRep
Showing posts with label U.S. Navy Helicopters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. Navy Helicopters. Show all posts

Monday, April 21, 2014

Fire Scout? We don't need no stinkin' Fire Scout . . .

Every now and then CDR Salamander has been known to refer to some of my posts. Turnabout being fair play, let's look at his recent post on the proposed cancellation of the rotary winged MQ-8 Fire Scout drone "wonder copter" as set out in "Because after awhile, people tire of being made the fool"
The whole helo-drone program was a good experiment, but as with many experiments as of late - it was . . . oversold . . .

Some of you may recall that prototype of unmanned aerial vehicles, the Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH), which has graced these pages before. A program that wandered through the fleet and other places for something like 44 years ending in this final flight (long video - 46 minutes- flying stuff begins about 33:50):



During its day, DASH was used for ASW, gun spotting and as the butt of a zillion sea stories: "It went out and then disappeared over the horizon." In its evolution out of the fleet, some spotted a conspiracy:
The frequently asked question of "Why is it that an aircraft that was so ahead-of-its-time, then in the 1960s, is not used by our Navy/military, today" from our public and military visitors alike needs to be answered and here at the Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation (GHHF), we felt that the NAVY should answer that question.
Accordingly, here is an internal Navy memo, since declassified, written by Lieutenant Commander Ira B. Anderson USN in 1970 to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) which offers a glimpse of the internal struggle waged by the Naval Aviators which were frightened at the possibility of being replaced by Drones and the Drone supporters who were convinced that being freed of concern over the loss of human life, true expansion of the military applications of Drones/UAVs could be attained furthering our nations offensive and defensive capabilities.
In that struggle for control, the Navy failed to support its' state-of-the-art UAV program (the first of its kind in the world) and therefore failed DASH.

On the other hand, one of the highlights of the Navy League's Sea, Air and Space Exposition was a report on a software and hardware package that would allow any helicopter to be converted to an unmanned aircraft, as set out here:
A package of sensors and software that is claimed to be able to turn any helicopter into an unmanned craft has passed two demonstration flights.

"In the demonstration tests at Quantico, a Marine with no prior experience with the technology was given a handheld device and 15 minutes of training," said a press release from the Office of Naval Research. "The Marine was able to quickly and easily program in the supplies needed and the destination, and the helicopters arrived quickly-even autonomously selecting an alternative landing site based on last-second no-fly-zone information added in from the Marine.

The Autonomous Aerial Cargo/Utility System AACUS consists of a sensor and software package that can be fitted to manned helicopters to avoid obstacles in low visibility conditions. The same package also enables a helicopter to become an unmanned aircraft.

"A self-flying robot with laser beams. It doesn't get much cooler than that."

Okay. It's being used for cargo helicopters. How about if you put one of those packages on - say- a Super Cobra? A relatively low-cost anti-surface weapon system launched from an LCS? Or any ship with a flight deck?

We already own the aircraft - and they don't need to be state of the art to do that sort of mission. Just saying . . .

Office of Naval Research AACUS info here.

So, the basic question is whether the expense of Fire Scout can be re-directed to making AACUS available for non-cargo use? If so, why pay to develop Fire Scout?

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

The Littoral Combat Space Holder - I Mean "Combat Ship" Goes to War . . . for continued funding

CDR Salamander does the Full Monty of exposing the "The LCS Full Court Press".

Think continued funding and all will be as clear as The Emperor's New Clothes.

Well, as for me, I enjoy a fast ship as much as the next old SWO, but I think we ought to have some truth in advertising.

The single most valuable and powerful weapon system currently available to the LCS is . . . the MH-60 helicopter.

It seems to me then, the most powerful LCS is not the high speed little launch platform in the foreground of the picture below, but that big, slow thing next to it, which could hold a whole lot more MH-60's (with different mission packages) and other things like Marine Sea Cobras (which reminds me - why doesn't the Navy have it own Sea Cobras?).


I mean, if you want high speed and the ability to operate in the shallow waters of the world, those helicopter things work pretty well. And they don't cost $300 million each.

And if you want to go fast and look scary in shallow water, there is a school of thought that says you ought to explore this old technology:


Tuesday, January 22, 2013

One more hit for the Littoral Combat Ship - Assigned helicopters can't tow the minesweeping gear for LCS MIW ops

Mine sweeping helicopters used by the U.S. Navy have been big honking MH-53E's with three engines and huge rotors.

                               An MH-53E Sea Dragon conducts a mine sweeping exercise.                                                                      U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Martens
The plan was to replace them with a "kit" for the small MH-60S birds, which could then be flown off the Littoral Combat Ships as part of the "mine warfare package."

Well, it won't be happening.

As reported by Janes at MH-60S underpowered for MCM towing operations, report finds:
MH-60S AMCM version (Sikorsky photo)
The US Navy's (USN's) future airborne mine countermeasure (AMCM) MH-60S helicopter is unable to tow the minehunting sonar or minesweeping system forming part of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) mine countermeasures module (MCM) mission module, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT and E) revealed in his annual report, released 15 January.

"The navy determined the MH-60S helicopter cannot safely tow the AN/AQS-20A Sonar Mine Detecting Set (AQS-20A) or the Organic Airborne Sweep and Influence System (OASIS) because the helicopter is underpowered for these operations," read the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Fiscal Year 2012 report from DOT and E, Dr J Michael Gilmore.

"The MH-60S helicopter will no longer be assigned these missions operating from any ship, including LCS," it added.
One form of LCS
Among other things, there are many MH-60 pilots breathing a sign of relief that this mission may pass them by.

The actual money quote from the 2012 DOT and E report (pdf, numbered page 177):
The MH-60S helicopter and AQS-20A sonar are not operationally effective or suitable because the helicopter is underpowered and cannot safely tow the sonar under the variety of conditions necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations recently concluded that the MH-60S helicopter is significantly underpowered for the safe performance of the AMCM tow mission and provides limited tactical utility relative to the risk to aircrew, and cancelled that MH-60S mission. The decision to cancel the AMCM tow mission affects employment of both the AQS-20A sonar and Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep.
• As observed during the OA and developmental testing, the AQS-20A does not meet all Navy requirements in all operating modes. Contact depth (vertical localization) errors exceeded Navy limits in all AQS-20A operating modes. FCD also exceeded Navy limits in two of three search modes.
• The analysis of test data collected during Phase A of the OA of the MH-60S and ALMDS is still in progress. Preliminary evaluation of data collected during the OA suggests that the ALMDS does not meet Navy requirements for FCD or reliability. DOT and E expects to issue a formal test report in 2QFY13. Phase B testing was originally intended to provide early operational testing insight into the operational effectiveness and suitability of AMCM systems when operating from an LCS, and to identify risk to the successful completion of IOT and E. However, the Navy’s cancellation of Phase B testing will eliminate these intended benefits.
Plan B seems to involve surface robots.

Wow.

If you are going to run robots around, here's a lower cost alternative to the LCS for MIW ops:
Long linger time with nice deck chairs.

Just saying.