Getting Out of the Gulf? Letting the Arabian Gulf Countries Fend for Themselves in Letting Oil Flow

Behind the pay wall at Foreign Affairs is this think piece by Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and U.S. Military Strategy which is really not about military strategy, but about national strategy for the Persian Gulf. This means tracing our involvement back to President Jimmy Carter:

In January 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter used his State of the Union address to announce that in order to protect “the free movement of Middle East oil,” the United States would repel “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf.” Carter and his successors made good on that pledge, ramping up U.S. military capabilities in the region and even fighting the Gulf War to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from dominating the region’s oil supplies. Although Washington has had a number of interests in the Persian Gulf over the years, including preventing nuclear proliferation, fighting terrorism, and spreading democracy, the main rationale for its involvement has always been to keep the oil flowing.

The authors point out that the world has changed since 1980 and pose a multi-billion dollar question:

Is Persian Gulf oil still worth defending with American military might?

I should note that back in 2004, I posited the need to plan a curtailment of Middle East oil in Contingency Planning 101: Preparing for an world oil shortage:

[A]n oil shortage may impel more rapid adoption of alternative fuel sources, including natural gas, hydrogen, nuclear power. Coal, of which the U.S. has a lot, can be "gasified".

Gasification, in fact, may be one of the best ways to produce clean-burning hydrogen for tomorrow's automobiles and power-generating fuel cells. Hydrogen and other coal gases can also be used to fuel power-generating turbines or as the chemical "building blocks" for a wide range of commercial products.

The authors of the Foreign Affairs article suggest:

First, if the United States ended its commitment, how much likelier would a major disruption of Gulf oil be? Second, how much damage would such a disruption inflict on the U.S. economy? Third, how much does the United States currently spend on defending the flow of Gulf oil with its military? Finally, what nonmilitary alternatives exist to safeguard against a disruption, and at what price? Answering these questions reveals that the costs of preventing a major disruption of Gulf oil are, at the very least, coming close to exceeding the expected benefits of the policy. So it’s time for the United States to give itself the option of ending its military commitment to protecting Gulf oil, by increasing its investment in measures that would further cushion the U.S. economy from major oil disruptions. And in a decade or so, unless the region becomes far more dangerous, the United States should be in a position to actually end its commitment.

They suggest some sort of economic disruption:

Assessments of the U.S. economy’s sensitivity to oil prices also vary widely, but a reasonable estimate is that a doubling of the price of oil would shrink U.S. GDP by three percent—or approximately $550 billion. Of course, smaller disruptions would result in smaller economic losses, and the most catastrophic disruption—a long, complete closing of the Strait of Hormuz—would cause larger ones.

But the actual costs to the United States would be far smaller, because Washington could draw on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its emergency underground oil stockpile, to relieve the pressure on prices. The roughly 700 million barrels currently stored in the SPR form part of the more than four billion barrels held by members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organization founded in 1974 to coordinate collective responses to major oil disruptions.

What all of this means is that if the world experienced a massive disruption of oil from the Persian Gulf, a coordinated international release of various reserves could initially replace the vast majority of the daily loss. In all but the worst-case scenarios—far more severe than anything seen before—the impact of a severe disruption would be greatly cushioned.

What they do not discuss is the cushioning effect of the U.S.'s increased oil and gas reserves through the use of new drilling techniques and fracking - there is simply no mention in the article that the U.S. is thought by some to be the leader in energy reserves, as set out in in Oil Price.com's "U.S. Has World’s Largest Oil Reserves":

The U.S. holds more oil reserves than anyone else in the world, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela.

That conclusion comes from a new independent estimate from Rystad Energy, a Norwegian consultancy. Rystad estimates that the U.S. holds 264 billion barrels of oil, more than half of which is located in shale. That total exceeds the 256 billion barrels found in Russia, and the 212 billion barrels located in Saudi Arabia.

The findings are surprising, and go against conventional wisdom that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela hold the world’s largest oil reserves. The U.S. Energy Information Administration, for example, pegs Venezuela’s oil reserves at 298 billion barrels, the largest in the world. Rystad Energy says that these are inflated estimates because much of those reserves are not discovered. Instead, Rystad estimates that Venezuela only has about 95 billion barrels, which includes its estimate for undiscovered oil fields.

Some analysis is less aggressive in assessing U.S. reserves, because of a matter of "proven" reserves:

Proven oil reserves are those that have a reasonable certainty of being recoverable under existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology.

Let's parse that a little. The key part of the quote being "existing economic and political conditions," which exactly what we have seen play out with the reserves unleashed by fracking and unconventional technology being applied to the oil patch - as the price of oil from outside the U.S. rose, the ability and affordability of U.S. drillers to develop fields not cost effective under lower prices also rose. Now, as experience in using such techniques has grown, that "price point" has dropped, much to the regret of OPEC, which no longer has real cartel power over oil prices. See Why OPEC can't stop the shale oil industry:

Just as a cartel benefits from cutting output to raise price, it suffers from raising output to lower price. This would not be true if it could permanently eliminate competitors by temporarily lowering prices, but that is not the case here. The shale oil industry is resilient and flexible – just as it can be pushed out of the market by very low prices, it can promptly get back into the market when prices improve. So an extended attempt by OPEC to close down the shale industry is a lose-lose situation, and as such is very unlikely to happen.

Perhaps this is a minor quibble, concerning the article, but the point I am attempting to make is that the economic impact of U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf may not be anything close to what is predicted in the article. In fact, it may further increase U.S. development of its own reserves and in alternatives (hydrogen fuels?) which may not be cost-effective in "existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology" but which may spur new technology and which would certainly increase American jobs for Americans, which, after all, is a pretty important governmental concern.

Now, let's circle back a little.

The U.S. government, in part due to the "Carter Doctrine", has maintained a very expensive presence

in the Arabian Gulf.

The authors of the article pose the right questions - "Is it still in the U.S. interest to expend any effort in guarding those oil sea lines of communication that flow out of the Arabian Gulf? In whose vital national interests is it to keep sending aircraft carriers and other ships to attempt to preserve the status quo in the Arab/Persian Middle East? Is it time for the U.S. to remove itself from the Gulf? Whose interests would be served by our doing so?"

Would Iran establish the regional hegemony it seems to so strongly desire? Would the Chinese rush in to replace the U.S.? Or would the Chinese be concerned that the U.S. might suddenly free up a large portion of its Navy to be deployed to other areas that, 36 years after Mr. Carter's speech, are now of much greater interest to the U.S.?

I would argue that the new administration should take a close look at these issues and at the issues raised by the "You broke it, you fix it" attitudes in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have thrown a lot of time, talent and money into trying to convert those states into something that looks like us. It is time to rethink our goals and leave the inhabitants of the region to sort themselves out? Are we doomed to play Sisyphus and keep trying to push uphill the burden that no one in the area seems ready to take up? Is it time for us to engage in a little "benign neglect" and back off?

Is it time to postulate a policy built more on "punitive expeditions" than on nation building? See Intervention in International Law (1921) (pdf):

When the territorial sovereign is too weak or is unwilling to enforce respect for international law, a state which is wronged may find it necessary to invade the territory and to chastise the individuals who violate its rights and threaten its security.

Had we smashed the Taliban in Afghanistan for their support of al Qaeda and then left with a stern warning that we would come back again should they continue in their evil ways, would we have been better off?

If we had gone after Saddam Hussein in 1991 and punished him for his violations of international law, would we have had to go back?

With a new administration coming, now is the time to ask such questions, and set national strategy accordingly.

Iran's Fingers in the Many Middle East Puppets

Interesting insight into Iran's proxies in the various Middle East messes from Amir Toumaj at The Long War Journal's IRGC commander discusses Afghan militia, ‘Shia liberation army,’ and Syria:

Discussing Iran’s military commitments, Falaki noted that Iran’s proxies are fighting on three major fronts: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

“One front of this army is in Syria, the other in Iraq, and another in Yemen,” he stated.

The first two are well known, though the claim about Yemen reflects the IRGC’s ultimate goal more than facts on the ground. The Houthis are known to be militarily and politically supported by the IRGC, though the Guard may not exercise full control over the Houthis. The IRGC’s objective is to use the Houthis as a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, on Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The suspicion of the Houthis being a full Iranian proxy is precisely the reason the Saudis and allies have launched a war in Yemen.

The Houthis, however, are not IRGC proxies like the Fatemiyoun and Iraqi militias. Houthi leaders have publicly complained about IRGC claims of full support. A senior Houthi official in March lashed out at a senior IRGC commander who claimed that the Guard would support the Houthis anyway it could, criticizing Tehran for “exploiting” the Yemeni file.

The Houthis exercise some measure of independence, and do not presently appear to be inclined to serve as the IRGC’s proxy in a perpetual fight against Saudi Arabia, as noted by Yemen scholars.

What is clear is the IRGC’s strategy to exploit the war in Yemen, primarily to be a thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side. They want to perpetuate the perception that Houthis are full Iranian proxies to elicit harsher Saudi reactions. The IRGC hopes that the continuation of conflict will leave the Houthis no choice but to fight and fully embrace the IRGC in order to survive.

Recommended reading, just like Long War Journal always is.

Good thing we have paid so much money to Iran to advance their peaceful intentions.

Sometime it seems we forget how relatively small an area we are dealing with in the Middle East. Here's a nice U.S. government map I liberated from here that might help put things in some perspective:

CNAS2016: ISIS Study Group - Presentation and Discussion

A truly excellent discussion of fighting ISIS from the Center for a New Anerican Security 2016 conference

Expensive Lessons in Governing Captured in NYTimes "More Is Needed to Beat ISIS, Pentagon Officials Concludes"

First, you have to read this Joshua Foust's Staff: The Forgotten Metric of Presidential Success (hat tip to Brett Friedman):

Obama did not rely on his functional experts to do this work, the people who would have to mobilize the enormous apparatus of government to accommodate any big change in policy; he went to personal, trusted associates whom he knew would always defer to his judgment. His staffing decisions had the effect of cutting the State Department out of statecraft (at a speech last year in Cuba, John Kerry made it a point not to acknowledge Rhodes’ work while praising Obama’s other adviser, a subtle but unmistakable snub).

More prosaically, Obama has made choice after choice that belie a worrying ignorance of the power that good staff can have.
***

That provides a context for this NYTimes piece by Michael S. Schmidt and Helene Cooper More Is Needed to Beat ISIS, Pentagon Officials Conclude

In the past, the Pentagon’s requests for additional troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been met with skepticism by Mr. Obama, and his aides have said he has resented what he has regarded as efforts to pressure him. But the rise of the Islamic State has alarmed the White House, and a senior administration official said Thursday that the president is willing to consider raising the stakes in both Iraq and Syria.

I suppose we will be debating whether the final withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 under President Obama was precipitous and whether that allowed ISIS to "pop up" for the rest our natural lives. The debate will include whether Mr. Obama was responsible for the withdrawal or was merely playing out the hand dealt to him by his predecessor. See this NPR "fact check" which contains an interesting assessment of Mr. Obama's inaction:

Thousands of American troops had died, and by the time Obama announced the withdrawal, fully three-quarters of Americans supported the withdrawal (though a majority of Republicans did not).

Still, many had real concerns al Qaeda wasn't done for. And there were some, including U.S. senators, saying the troops should stay just in case things went downhill. They say Obama should have sold the idea, hard, to Maliki.

Iraq analyst Kirk Sowell said Obama never really tried.

"This is one of the criticisms of Obama — that he sort of wanted the negotiations to fail," Sowell said, "and, so, he didn't even talk to Maliki until it was basically all over."

You can sort out your own issues of "sins of omission" vs. "sins of commission," but in my world the person who relieves the previous officer of the deck (OOD) and then does not change course to avoid a collision that was not apparent to the previous OOD cannot then blame the prior watch for "putting the ship on a course to a collision." As the saying goes, "That dog won't hunt."

Worst of all is the apparent lack of a strategy in the U.S. effort in the Middle East. As the NYTimes reporters have it:

The Pentagon’s desire to expand the military presence on the ground comes as the American public remains skeptical of the United States’ getting more deeply involved in another conflict in the Middle East. Polls have shown that Americans are not convinced the Obama administration has a plan to defeat the Islamic State, which has maintained control of nearly all the large cities it took over in 2014.

How can you have plan to defeat ISIS unless you have an idea of what the Middle East should look like when ISIS is defeated? Mr. Obama has already called for Syria's Assad to "go away" though he seems lately to have been more wishy-washy on that view. Russia and Iran are involved in Syria now and had we decisively acted earlier they might not have been so.

Perhaps Mr. Obama feels strongly diffident and, taking the easy path, has simply voted "present" again. Those deferred decisions tend to catch up with you, though. So, now, more U.S. boots on the ground.

Shoulda, woulda, coulda done this earlier and squashed ISIS at the gitgo.

See also here, here and here.

War Against Terrorists: Al Qaeda is back in the news and gets attacked to forestall "imminent attack"

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Carlos M. Vazquez II

Al Qaeda makes the news again, and gets attacked in Syria, as set out here

Pentagon spokesman Rear Adm. John Kirby confirmed Tuesday that the plotting was far along.

“This is a very dangerous group,” Kirby told Fox News. “We had information, good information that they were very actively plotting and very close to the end of that plotting -- and planning an attack on targets either in Europe or the U.S. homeland.”

As for the result of the airstrikes, he said: “We think we hit what we were aiming at.”

More from the Long War Journal:

The US-led bombing campaign in Syria is targeting the Al Nusrah Front, an official branch of al Qaeda, as well as the Islamic State, an al Qaeda offshoot that is one of Al Nusrah's fiercest rivals.

Before they were launched, the air strikes were framed as being necessary to damage the Islamic State, a jihadist group that has seized large swaths of territory across Syria and Iraq. But in recent days US officials signaled that they were also concerned about al Qaeda's presence in Syria, including the possibility that al Qaeda operatives would seek to use the country as a launching pad for attacks in the West.

Several well-connected online jihadists have posted pictures of the Al Nusrah Front positions struck in the bombings. They also claim that al Qaeda veterans dispatched from Afghanistan to Syria, all of whom were part of Al Nusrah, have been killed.
***
Among the Al Nusrah Front positions targeted in the bombings are locations where members of the so-called "Khorasan group" are thought to be located. Ayman al Zawahiri, the emir of al Qaeda, sent the group to Syria specifically to plan attacks against the US and its interests. The group, which takes its name from al Qaeda's Khorasan shura (or advisory) council, is reportedly led by Muhsin al Fadhli, an experienced al Qaeda operative who has been involved in planning international terrorist attacks for years.

Al Fadhli's presence in Syria was first reported by the Arab Times in March. Shortly thereafter, The Long War Journal confirmed and expanded on this reporting. [See LWJ report, Former head of al Qaeda's network in Iran now operates in Syria.] The Long War Journal reported at the time that al Fadhli's plans "were a significant cause for concern among counterterrorism authorities."

The New York Times reported earlier this month that al Fadhli leads the Khorasan group in Syria.

Unconfirmed reports on jihadist social media sites say that al Fadhli was killed in the bombings. Neither US officials, nor al Qaeda has verified this reporting. The fog of war often makes it difficult to quickly confirm whether an individual jihadist has been killed, wounded, or survived unscathed. Initial reports should be treated with skepticism and there is no firm evidence yet that al Fadhli has been killed.

Read more: here

More on the Al Nusrah Front here:

Al-Nusra Front (also the Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra) was formed in late 2011, when Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent operative Abu Muhammad al-Julani to Syria to organize jihadist cells in the region. The Nusra Front rose quickly to prominence among rebel organizations in Syria for its reliable supply of arms, funding, and fighters—some from donors abroad, and some from AQI. Considered well trained, professional, and relatively successful on the battlefield, they earned the respect and support of many rebel groups, including some in the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, al-Nusra also made some enemies among the Syrian people and opposition by imposing religious laws, although the group has shied away from the types of brutal executions and sectarian attacks that made AQI unpopular. Al-Nusra was also the first Syrian force to claim responsibility for terrorist attacks that killed civilians. (footnotes omitted)
***
Al-Nusra is affiliated with AQ and has pledged allegiance to the organization, serving as its only official branch in the Syrian conflict after global AQ emir Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly disowned ISIS following months of ISIS disobedience to AQ orders.

So, it's not really that the Al Nusrah Front and the Khorasan group just sprang up - but have been around and have enjoyed the chaos of Syria as providing recruiting and a safe haven.

Until now.

Killing ISIS 2: What Bing West Says

Bing West has thoughts on how to kill ISIS (a/k/a ISIL) at "How to Defeat ISIL":

U.S. policymakers must commit themselves clearly to containing, disrupting, and defeating it.

You should read the whole thing.

Mr. West makes many good points, but as with solving most problems, the first step is recognizing you have a problem and then choosing a plan of action to eliminate that problem. I have serious doubts about the ability of the Administration and its aiders and abettors in the press to do that with ISIS, because, as Mr. West notes:

If the commander-in-chief does not perceive a mortal threat and if the press grossly underreports the persecution of Christians and other minorities, then the public will see no reason for our military to become heavily involved.

With the Obama administration, nothing is ever what it was or may be in the future. There is no constancy. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has described the threat in terms of “some of the most brutal, barbaric forces we’ve ever seen in the world today, and a force, ISIL, and others that is an ideology that’s connected to an army, and it’s a force and a dimension that the world has never seen before like we have seen it now.” The Visigoths, Attila, and Tamerlane have a new rival. Obviously this new scourge upon mankind must be destroyed.

But wait: Then Mr. Hagel delivered the punch line. “I recommended to the president, and the president has authorized me, to go ahead and send about 130 new assessment-team members.” Mr. Hagel is holding the rest of our force in reserve in case the Martians attack. One hundred thirty assessors are sufficient to deal with “the most barbaric forces we’ve ever seen.”

It occurs to me that the Administration having charted its course ("withdrawal by date X" and "no U.S. combat forces in country Y"), plods along, adjusting only its portrayal of the facts to rationalize that course. A ship's navigator who failed to alter course to allow for the effects of winds and currents is headed for rocks which cannot be avoided by repeating phrases such as "the plan was to steer 270 degrees and we are on that plan" or "most of the crew likes the course we are on" or "once we steered course 270 and ended up where we were supposed to be."

As noted in Killing ISIS? you need more than an announcement of what you want the end result to be ("We put a bell on the cat!" or ""ISIS must be destroyed") to make things happen. If the U.S. goal is to kill ISIS, then the planners better be put to work to use the tools available to make that happen. If it requires U.S. combat ground forces to cut off the ISIS logistics train - well, conditions on the ground have changed since there were promises made to withdraw our forces from Iraq. The Administration can blame it on unexpected ocean currents or winds or on the way the world works - as in the way bad guys tend to rush in to fill vacuums of power.

Killing ISIS?

NYTimes map

Robert W. Merry at The National Interest writes, "America Must Destroy ISIS":

. . . ISIS represents an ominous threat to U.S. security if it is allowed to establish itself permanently as a state or quasistate in the heart of the Middle East. It’s easy to bemoan the tragic American foreign-policy folly of the past eleven years that has destabilized this crucial region and paved the way for this horrendous turn of events. But that doesn’t obviate the reality that those events now pose a serious threat to regional stability and the safety of the West and America.

Okay, suppose Mr. Merry has a case that we need to "bell the cat", but his answer of exactly how to accomplish the destruction of ISIS is . . . well, mouse-like:

 . . .[O]nce the decks have been cleared and a policy devised that is both coherent and comprehensive, the United States must move not just to thwart the ISIS menace, but to destroy it. It isn’t clear what that will take, but whatever it takes must be brought to bear.

Robin Simcox at the Foreign Affairs website has suggestions in, "Go Big or Go Home: Iraq Needs U.S. Ground Troops More Than Ever:

The U.S. government has set entirely understandable political goals for Iraq, but it has almost certainly chosen the wrong strategy for achieving them. Since the Iraqi city of Mosul fell to the extremist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in June, U.S. President Barack Obama has insisted that Iraq needs an inclusive government capable of winning support among not only the country’s Shia majority but also its Sunni minority. Obama also declared that the formation of such a government must precede any attempt to defeat ISIS. Washington’s current military intervention reflects that analysis: until Baghdad agrees to Washington’s political vision, the United States has declared that it will commit only to conducting limited air strikes -- that is to say, air strikes that are sufficient to halt the extremists’ progress but not to defeat them.

Washington’s strategy is backward. Any diplomatic leverage in Iraq would come from demonstrating that it can defeat ISIS. In other words, if the United States wants to influence the political situation in Iraq, it must first make itself an indispensable military player there.

If there is a consistent pattern in U.S. policy toward Iraq over the past several decades, it is that Washington can achieve significant diplomatic gains only if it is prepared to make significant military investments.
***
If Obama’s diplomatic goals are as significant as he claims, his military ambitions ought to match them. The United States should actively assume responsibility for decisively defeating ISIS. Needless to say, limited air strikes outside the northern Iraqi city of Erbil will not be sufficient to the task. Instead, the U.S. military should be actively ordered to attack ISIS positions in strongholds such as Mosul. The Iraqi air force has launched such attacks, but the United States’ military precision is greatly needed -- ISIS can be overthrown only if the Sunni civilian population agrees to support the mission, and that will happen only if civilian casualties are kept low.

Given their vast experience and world-class capabilities, U.S. special forces should be deployed to Iraq so that they can conduct counterterrorism operations, gather intelligence, and advise Iraqi forces. Washington should also extend military assistance to the Kurds in northern Iraq, and offer to provide their militias with the heavy military equipment they need to properly defend themselves. (Given that the Kurdish government is not a sovereign state, the provision of these arms may need to be organized by the CIA or other covert agencies rather than by the Pentagon.)

This mission would require a long-term commitment; in the absence of sustained attention and military force, terrorist networks tend to regenerate. It’s true that the mission would put the lives of U.S. troops in danger. But it’s the only military strategy that could accomplish a significant military goal -- namely, the decisive defeat of ISIS, a group that over the last decade has presented a clear threat to the West.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Margaret Keith/Released

At the same site, Michael O"Hanlon offers up How to Win in Iraq: Why Air Strikes Might Not be Enough:

Although the president has been correct to use only limited airpower so far (even while warning that U.S. involvement in Iraq could last for months), he needs to avoid any sense of complacency that he can limit the United States’ role to modest actions taken several thousand feet up in the air. For now, the United States’ only realistic goal in Iraq is to prevent further ISIS advances. But ultimately, the collective aim of the United States, Iraq, and others in the region should be to fully push back the radical and brutal group, which is committed to the creation of a caliphate throughout much of the broader Middle East and even parts of Europe, and is willing to employ brutal tactics to achieve its aims. This group simply cannot be allowed to remain in power in large sections of Iraq and Syria indefinitely.
***
But then we come back to the difficult questions. After containing ISIS, the United States will need to consider what comes next -- how to help form a suitable government in Baghdad and assist it in expelling ISIS from cities such as Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, and Tikrit, where its legions have by now largely infiltrated civilian populations. And here, Obama needs to be fair to his critics and avoid suggesting that those in favor of doing more want to return to the Iraq mission of 2003–2011. In fact, there are many options in between an all-out use of U.S. combat forces and the limited measures employed in recent days.

The history of using limited airpower in wars like this one shows that a few pinpricks from the sky rarely make a difference on the ground.
***
One option is to deploy a significant number of special operations teams, well above the very modest number that may be in in the theater now as part of the detachments of several hundred U.S. planners sent to Iraq over the last month. But how many? If there are 10,000 dedicated ISIS fighters that U.S. and Iraqi units must ultimately remove from the battlefield, experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that the U.S. and Iraqi units will need to conduct perhaps several thousand raids informed by good intelligence. Ideally, the United States would strike hard, fast, and early in any operation so that the enemy does not have time to adjust. To do that, it would need up to several dozen in-country commando teams (or those based in neighboring countries in some cases), making for a grand total of 1,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops. In all likelihood, such a mission would last perhaps several months at peak intensity. However, the United States need not take the lead on most such operations and need not continue them indefinitely.

The other option involves a type of military unit, developed in recent years in Afghanistan, called a Security Force Assistance Team. This is a small team of 10­–20 U.S. soldiers who are embedded at the small-unit level within indigenous forces. Since elements of the Iraqi army have, in some cases, already dissolved, such advisory teams -- which live with and deploy into the field with their counterparts -- could be crucial for rebuilding good tactics, unit cohesion, confidence in the leadership, and tenacity, as well as designating targets for air strikes. Assuming that such teams might be deployed with most of Iraq’s army battalions, and assuming roughly ten battalions per division, there could be a need for up to 100 such U.S. teams. Again, these would need to stay in Iraq for a period of several months to perhaps one or two years.

Foreign Policy's website has its doubters about the "commitment" of this administration to keeps U.S. troops out of combat in Iraq against ISIS, as set out in Gordon Lubold's "Obama Pledge to Keep Troops Out of Combat May Fall Flat":

James Dubik, a retired Army three-star general who commanded U.S. forces in Mosul, said it's hard to square the administration's words when it comes to defining the U.S. mission there without accepting that U.S. forces are in combat. "Pretty narrow splitting of hairs," he said in an email.

I suspect someone will have to tell those folks on the ground in Iraq and the pilots flying missions over the country that it's not "combat" if the Administration says it isn't.

But there is that other thing that this Administration keeps forgetting - telling the other side that you are not really going to go to war with them or stay the course if you do get involved just allows the "bad guys" the comfort of knowing that you are, as the Chinese used to refer to the U.S. back in the Cold War days, a "paper tiger" whose words are ". . . full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing." Or to go back to the Foreign Policy piece:

Breen, who left the Army in 2006 and believes fighting IS is in the nation's security interests, said the White House is sending dual messages while trying to avoid acknowledging that American military personnel are operating in a war zone.

"Attempting to convey to the American people that this is an operation that is limited in its goals and limited in its scope, unfortunately conveys something to [IS] and others in the region that is not helpful," he said.

As we say in the South, "it's time to fish or cut bait" for this Administration.

They have the tools if they need them.

USNS Robert E. Peary (T-AKE 5), left, conducts a vertical replenishment with USS Bataan (LHD 5). USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) is in the background. Bataan is the flagship for the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and, with the embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU), is deployed in support of maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class RJ Stratchko/Released)

UPDATE: The side of the fight Cut funding to ISIS and ISIS: World’s scariest terrorist group also the richest.

Where does ISIS get its logistical support?

There is this, "The Economist explains: What ISIS, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, really wants"

ISIS originated as an al-Qaeda offshoot in Iraq. Composed of fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, the group targeted the Iraqi government and American forces in Iraq, as well as Shia Muslims and Christians (both of whom it considers heretics) and killed civilians of all faiths in indiscriminate attacks. It expanded into Syria when that country's uprising turned into a war between President Bashar Assad (who is backed by Iran's Shia leadership) and the rebels he had tried to crush. One of the best-equipped and funded militias on the ground—although its sources of cash are murky—ISIS took control of the eastern rebel-held city of Raqqa in 2012 and expanded along the border with Turkey. Foreign fighters flocked to Syria to join it.

As ISIS’s name suggests, the interests of the group and its current leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi go beyond Syria. Its members believe that the world's Muslims should live under one Islamic state ruled by sharia law.

Murky? In this day and age? Others sites have been less reluctant to point fingers. See CFR's Backgrounder "Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria":

Supporters in the region, including those based in Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, are believed to have provided the bulk of past funding. Iran has also financed AQI, crossing sectarian lines, as Tehran saw an opportunity to challenge the U.S. military presence in the region, according to the U.S. Treasury and documents confiscated in 2006 from Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives in northern Iraq. In early 2014, Iran offered to join the United States in offering aid to the Iraqi government to counter al-Qaeda gains in Anbar province.

The bulk of ISIS's financing, experts say, comes from sources such as smuggling, extortion, and other crime. ISIS has relied in recent years on funding and manpower from internal recruits. Even prior to ISIS's takeover of Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, in June 2014, the group extorted taxes from businesses small and large, netting upwards of $8 million a month, according to some estimates.

The Old Caliphate

Of course, now there are reports of an ISIS bank heist of over $400 million in Mosul, which ought to pay for a lot of those "out of area volunteers" and their AK-47s.

Cutting off the ISIS supply chain might have been easier before they apparently captured so much equipment from those elements of the Iraqi Army that decided to beat feet in the face of the enemy.

Ah, Sunni v. Shiite and a turf war over an oil rich country. Might want to dust off those books on the 30 years war when the Catholics vs. Protestant dust-up morphed into the battle for dominance of Europe. Of course, that was 500 400 years ago (1618- 1648) (updated).

This will get even uglier. Not much middle ground in the sectarian/clan battlefield.

Good stuff at The Long War Journal. Go see.

UPDATE: ISIS has big money for a gang of thugs, see How an arrest in Iraq revealed Isis's $2bn jihadist network (hat tip to War on the Rocks).

The Argument: "Why America Invaded Iraq"

You never seem to get it from the mainstream news and "entertainment" sources, but there was a rationale behind our ."humanitarian intervention" in Iraq, set out nicely from this piece from Prager University in about 5 minutes:



Me, well, I'd just say that Saddam never complied with the terms of surrender following Desert Storm and that was reason enough. Peace treaties don't mean a thing unless you enforce them.

As for the U.S. support of Saddam against Iran - well, which side would you have supported? Life is full of tough choices.

Naive you are . . .

Interesting read about a disconnect between the State Department and the Army about the possible consequences of that long ago invasion of Iraq at The Skeptical Bureaucrat: Odierno: "We Came In Naive".

And, yes, in my experience there is a tendency among the military to not play well with the DOS folks.

And vice-versa.

More's the pity.

Our Mission is Finally Accomplished… Anyone Care? | David Bellavia

Our Mission is Finally Accomplished… Anyone Care? | David Bellavia


Yes, more than you know.

The people whose voices are not found in the editorial columns of Washington or New York.

People with purple fingers.

People with free speech.

Thank you.

Iraq Takes Over Control of Vital Oil Terminal

An important milestone: Iraq assumes control of offshore oil terminal:

The Iraqi Navy assumed control of the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) during a ceremony held today aboard the terminal in the North Arabian Gulf.

This turnover is the first step of a multi-step naval transition plan that will eventually transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi Navy.

"The Iraqi Navy is ready and capable of assuming security responsibility for KAAOT," said Rear Adm. T.C. Cropper, Commander, Task Force Iraqi Maritime (CTF-IM). "This milestone represents another indication of increasing Iraqi operational independence. It's very important to the way ahead and the future of Iraq."

U.S. and Coalition forces have maintained a presence on KAAOT since April 2004, assisting the Iraqi Navy by helping provide security to their oil platforms, which account for approximately 70 to 85 percent of Iraq's gross domestic product.

Coalition forces have operated jointly with Iraqi Navy sailors and marines, training them in point-defense force protection and visit, board, search and seizure operations.

"Our Sailors have labored diligently to make this day possible, working by, with and through the Iraqi Navy in a very close partnership," said Capt. Karl Van Deusen, Commander, Combined Task Force (CTF) 55, which is responsible for providing security to the oil platforms. "They have brought great credit upon our Navy and our nation."

U.S. and British forces will continue to operate jointly with the Iraqi Navy to provide training and assistance in support of future security transfers in accordance with a security agreement, to include Iraq's other key oil platform, the Al Basrah Oil Platform.

"It's my duty to defend the oil terminal", said an Iraqi Marine aboard KAAOT. "It belongs to my country. It belongs to my people. Our economy is based on it. I take pride in doing so."

The U.S. Navy will continue to conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the North Arabian Gulf and provide assistance as requested. MSO help set the conditions for security, which promotes stability and prosperity in the North Arabian Gulf. These operations protect Iraq's sea-based infrastructure, which provides the Iraqi people the opportunity for self-determination. MSO complement the counterterrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists' use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel,weapons or other material.

Photo captions:

Top: Iraqi sailors raise the Iraqi flag at a ceremony on the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) in the North Arabian Gulf during which the Iraqi Navy assumed control of the terminal. This turnover is the first step of a multi-step naval transition plan that will eventually transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi Navy. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist (AW) 2nd Class D. Keith Simmons. (Released)

Lower: U.S. and Iraqi Sailors march on the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) in the North Arabian Gulf during which the Iraqi Navy assumed control of the terminal. This turnover is the first step of a multi-step naval transition plan that will eventually transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi Navy. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist (AW) 2nd Class D. Keith Simmons. (Released)

The U.S. sailors look like IUW guys to me. BZ!

An earlier post regarding the oil terminals.

Iranian UAV Shot Down Over Iraq

Coalition Jets Shoot Down Iranian Drone Over Iraq:

March 16, 2009 – Coalition jet fighters shot down an Iranian drone that was hovering over Iraq late last month, Multinational Force Iraq officials confirmed today.

The incident occurred Feb. 25, about 60 miles northeast of Baghdad, officials said in a statement.

Two coalition aircraft were directed to visually identify the unmanned aerial vehicle after it was detected hovering inside the Iraqi border. The pilots confirmed that it wasn’t a coalition aircraft and that no collateral damage would result from a shoot-down.

Coalition air forces tracked the UAV for nearly one hour and 10 minutes before the pilots engaged and shot it down "well inside Iraqi airspace," officials said.

Officials said they believe the drone to be an Iranian-made Ababil 3 model UAV.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and military leaders have long accused Iran of interference in Iraq. Iran poses “a real problem,” Gates said on PBS’ “Tavis Smiley Show” March 11.

“I think it’s one of the significant challenges that we’re going to face over the next several years,” he said.

Information on the Iranian UAV Global Security.

Mission and Logistics

Not to mention all the ships that would be needed to load all the gear and sail it home...

H/T Powerline

UPDATE: I see Cdr Salamander hits the same note. Good. Professionals talk logistics.

Statistics: "Violence in Iraq in Perspective"

Somewhere out there, facts are lurking that provide some perspective that the daily news does not. A case in point is found at (big hat tip to Chap)Back Talk: Violence in Iraq in Perspective:

Right now, the violent death rate in Iraq is comparable to that in South Africa [note: the number for Iraq comes in a little higher now that I have corrected the population estimate]. Did you know that? It caught me by surprise because I generally only hear good things about that country.

In the U.S., the homicide rate for African Americans is about 20 per 100,000. As such, it is still quite a bit more dangerous to be an Iraqi civilian living in Iraq than it is to be an African American living in the U.S. Back in the early 1990s, however, the rate was about 40 per 100,000...
***
Thus, violence in Iraq today is comparable to violence in black America in the early 1990s. Although it might not be a fair comparison, the same cannot be said for young black males living in the U.S.:

African-American males between the ages of 15 and 24 have the highest firearm homicide rate of any demographic group. Their firearm homicide rate of 103.4 deaths per 100,000 is 10 times higher than the rate for white males in the same age group (10.5 deaths per 100,000).

Of course, if we selected out young Muslim males in Iraq, their violent death rate would be extremely high as well (higher than for young black males here at home, I would assume). Still, it is sobering to realize that it is twice as dangerous to be a young black male living in the U.S. than it is to be an Iraqi civilian living in Iraq.

Of course, I again commend Darrell Huff's classic How to Lie with Statistics as a cautionary warning of trusting one statistical analysis or another.

The War with Iran: Quds Force Officer arrested in Iraq

CENTCOM Press Release here.:

Coalition forces arrested an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – Quds Force officer in Sulimaniyah today.

Contrary to recent diplomatic initiatives, this individual has been involved in transporting improvised explosive devices and explosively formed penetrators into Iraq. Intelligence reports also indicate he was involved in the infiltration and training of foreign terrorists in Iraq.

The Quds Force is a covert action arm of the Iranian government responsible for aiding lethal attacks against the Iraqi government and Coalition forces.

He was probably just on "vacation"...

And another one bites the dust

CENTCOM News Release: AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ LEADER KILLED, referring to the guy who has been stirring up trouble:

Coalition forces killed an al-Qaeda in Iraq military advisor during an operation Aug. 31 west of Tarmiyah.
Coalition forces conducted a precision operation west of Tarmiyah Aug. 31. The assault force followed a vehicle containing two suspected terrorists and attempted to get the driver to stop. When the driver resisted capture, the assault force fired on the vehicle. Both the driver and the passenger were killed in the operation. Coalition forces later identified one of the men as Abu Yaqub al-Masri.

Al-Masri, who is also known as Zakkariya or Doctor, was a military advisor to al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders in Baghdad and the surrounding belts. He provided guidance and direction for attack planning, coordination and execution.

Intelligence reports indicate al-Masri was directed by senior al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders to plan attacks that would cultivate sectarian strife. The former al-Qaeda in Iraq military emir of Baghdad, now detained by Coalition forces, described al-Masri as director of the “car bomb division.”

Al-Masri was one of the primary architects behind the Nov. 26 car bombings in Sadr City that killed 181 Iraqi civilians and injured another 247. He also planned major attacks on the bridges in the Rusafa area to isolate the Shi’ite population there.

Al-Masri previously fought against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and is linked to several senior leaders of al-Qaeda.

Time for "Another One Bites the Dust"

Inshore Boats Units cover Maritime Security Operations boarding teams

Reported here:

Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron (NCWRON) 5 Oil Platform (OPLAT) Detachment provided security for USS Chinook (PC 9) and USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332) visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) teams while conducting Interaction Patrols (IPATS) Aug. 5 in the north Persian Gulf.

NCWRON 5 OPLAT Det.’s mission is to protect VBSS teams while they are maintaining security in the region’s shallow waters.

“We assist in Maritime Security Operations (MSO), in particular, in the shallow water region of the area,” said Lt. Cmdr. Mike Merrill, Inshore Boat Unit (IBU) 51 officer in charge. “Using our patrol craft, we provide a 360-degree ring of security around boarding teams as they board commercial vessels.”

VBSS and IPATS are elements of MSO that help generate support and awareness amongst commercial vessels sailing in the region of the coalition's efforts to ensure a safe and secure maritime environment. Coalition forces also conduct MSO under international maritime conventions to ensure security and safety in international waters so that commercial shipping and fishing can occur safely in the region.

In addition, the sailors are training Iraqi Marines to take over the job-
Photo caption:

Photo - Gunner's Mate 2nd Class Nickel Samuel assigned to Mobile Security Detachment (MSD) 24 observes Iraqi marines participating in a live-fire exercise. MSD-24 is training Iraqi marines to maintain security in and around the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminals, which provides the Iraqi people the opportunity for self-determination. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Christopher T. Smith.