Bombarding the Kerch Bridge - It's all about logistics . . . Russian Logistics

Russia asserts the smoke is part of their defense of the Kerch Bridge. That it needs defending points to Ukrainian successes

Ukraine keeps pounding on the Kerch Bridge as asserted Bridge Attack: Chilling Moment Ukraine Launches Missile Attack On Crimea Bridge In Front Of Stunned Holidaymakers :

The Kerch Bridge stretches for 12 miles across the Kerch Strait. It is considered an important route for Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.

The Crimean Transport Ministry reported to The Wall Street Journal that the bridge currently is open to cars, but not heavy trucks. A rail section of the bridge remains open.

Stunned? Really? The bridge is a key logistics link to Russian forces in the field and a symbol of Russian power.

As this war has worn on, the Russian logistics effort has been targeted repeatedly. Troops in the field need ammunition, food, and other supplies. Hindering their logistics effort is key to grinding the Russian forces down.

Very good commentary piece from Bradley Martin of Rand's National Security Supply Chain Institute from February 2023 Will Logistics Be Russia's Undoing in Ukraine?:

Russia's experience in Ukraine one year in is an example of what happens when a nation tries to fight a war without fully considering the logistics and sustainment that go alongside such a fight. The war in Ukraine has shown that familiar concepts of economic mobilization, as well as the thorough alignment of operations with the necessary resources, continue to be central to not simply planning but sustaining a war. The consequences for failing to fully consider these concepts drove Russia into a prolonged conflict, one for which it was already ill-prepared a year ago, and one with increasingly dire consequences for its future.

Ukraine, by attacking the Russian logistics system, seems to be patiently squeezing the Russian field forces.

Expect them to keep hammering that system while holding the lines they have.

D-Day- Operation Pluto Oil for the Landed Forces (first published 6/24/2007)

Out in Nevada, one road across the Great Basin Desert, Highway 50, is referred to as "the Loneliest Road in America." Gas stations on this 287 mile road are few and far between, which means that some planning is required to make sure that you have fuel enough to complete the trip.

What is true in the high desert of Nevada is also true in war-fighting. If you plan an invasion, perhaps of occupied Europe, you need to have a plan to get the fuel needed by trucks, tanks, aircraft and other machines of war. In World War II, the plan for providing the invading Allied armies with fuel was ingenious, far ahead of its time and known by its acronym Operation PLUTO:

The Pipeline Under the Ocean (PLUTO) was designed to supply petrol from storage tanks in southern England to the advancing Allied armies in France in the months following D-Day.
***
A reliable supply of petrol for the advancing Allied forces following the D-Day landings was of the highest priority. Planners knew that the future invasion of Europe would be the largest amphibious landing in history and without adequate and reliable supplies of petrol any advance would at best slow down and at worst grind to a halt. A loss of momentum could jeopardise the whole operation as German forces would have time to regroup and counter-attack. Conventional tankers and 'ship to shore' pipelines were in danger of cluttering up the beaches, obstructing the movement of men, armaments and materials and, in all circumstances, were subject to the vagaries of the weather and sea conditions and they were easy targets for the Luftwaffe. The idea of a pipeline under the ocean, (the English Channel), was an innovative solution.
***
The terminals and pumping stations were heavily disguised as bungalows, gravel pits, garages and even an ice cream shop!
***
... systems had to be capable of laying down their pipes on the sea-bed in a fast single procedure. The HAIS pipe would be coiled on board the cable laying vessel and fed out as the vessel progressed across the Channel and the HAMEL pipe would be coiled around huge drums towed behind a tug-like vessel and fed out as they drum rolled along.
***
These pipe-lines were vital arteries, which enabled the Allied Air Fleets and Land Forces to maintain the vital momentum needed to secure victory. Moreover Operation PLUTO made it possible to dispense with the fleets of tankers, which otherwise would have been necessary and spared them the ordeal of concentrated enemy attacks in congested waters, thus undoubtedly saving many hundreds of gallant lives.

That the pipelines experienced delays in installation which meant that they were not fully operational until a couple of months after D-Day does not in any way diminish their importance. The volume of petroleum product transported was vital to the war effort and required a pretty hefty group to make it work:

By the time the two HAIS flexible pipelines and two HAMEL steel pipelines were pumping petrol the Allied armies were well on their way to Belgium. The length of the supply lines needed to be shortened so 11 HAIS pipelines and 6 HAMEL pipelines were laid in a swept channel two miles wide between Dungeness and Ambleteuse near Boulogne. In all about 500 miles of pipeline were laid in an average laying time over the 30 mile stretch of about 5 hours. In January 1945 the system delivered a disappointing 300 tons but by March this had increased to 3000 tons and later still to 4000 tons. This amounted to over 1,000,000 gallons per day giving a total of 172,000,000 gallons delivered in total up to the end of hostilities. During the operation to lay the cables an HQ ship, several cable ships, tugs, trawlers and barges were employed on this specialised work - a total of 34 vessels with 600 men and officers under Captain J.F.Hutchings.

The CombinedOps site has much more, including many photos of the PLUTO Operation.

The map and the PLUTO joint image are from that site. See also here:

Along with the Mulberry Harbours that were constructed immediately after D-Day, Operation Pluto is considered one of history's greatest feats of military engineering. The pipelines are also the forerunners of all flexible pipes used in the development of offshore oil fields.

According to this site, the drum used to unreel the pipeline was nicknamed "HMS Conundrum." Photo of the drum from here. The ABS has a nice piece on PLUTO here.

Escorts were provided for the pipeline laying ships, as set out here:

In June of 1944 both the "Campanula" and the "Dianthus", together with the sloop "Magpie" acted as escorts to two ocean going Tugs (escapees) from Holland that were renamed the HMRT Bustler and the "Growler" and one other smaller Tug , but I can't remember her name (possibly the HMRT Marauder or HMRT Danube V), towed huge "spools" of two inch pipe from Ryde to Cherbourg, 72 miles give or take a few.

In the WWII Pacific Theater, the Army Quartermaster Corps was responsible for getting fuel to the equipment on the beaches, as set out here:

Class III products (or POL) consisted of various grades of gasoline, kerosene, aviation fuel, diesel oil, fuel oil, and an assortment of petroleum based lubricants. It is absolutely critical for sustainment of mechanized forces. More vital even than clothing and general supplies. For without it the engines of war – planes, ships, tanks, motorized vehicles, and all the generators for electrical use – would cease to operate. Neither fighting units, nor logistical support units, could accomplish their varied missions without POL. As General Patton once said: "My troops can eat their belts. But my tanks gotta have gas."

Class III generally had fewer problems in the Pacific than did other areas of Quartermaster supply. The high priority accorded POL usually kept shipping delays to a minimum, and helped with efforts to build up needed reserves. U.S. Quartermasters were also able to draw from private oil company reserves in Australia, and made full use of their excellent bulk storage and handling facilities. Also because petroleum is less fragile and does not deteriorate quite so easily as other materials, it suffered fewer storage hazards. Still there were problems.

Lack of Bulk Storage and Distribution. Allied Class III personnel found they could rely on Australian refineries and their excellent bulk storage facilities for support in the Southwest Pacific until the action moved to New Guinea in 1943. Thereafter their assault had to move forward with limited access to bulk storage facilities. Engineers in New Guinea constructed medium-sized tanks for a few grades of gasoline and diesel oil, and created special dumps and laid aviation fuel pipelines in the vicinity of airports. But even these medium- to small-sized temporary storage facilities failed to meet all needs.

The problem became more acute in later 1943 and early 1944 as the island-hopping campaign got into full swing, and a succession of new bases and sub-bases were built. Larger petroleum vessels had difficulty moving into shallow waters. And when they got in, they often found that hastily built storage tanks were too small to permit complete pacific unloading of petroleum. What they needed, but seldom received, were smaller vessels capable of hauling fuel between bases and to forward supply points.

In the South Pacific area, the Quartermaster Corps had a responsibility to provide POL to New Zealand ground forces, and land-based US Navy and Marine units, as well as the Army. They established massive POL storage areas on Guadalcanal when that became available, at Green Island, and Espiritu Santo.

The Packaged Alternative. The virtual absence of permanent type bulk storage facilities and pipelines throughout the Pacific meant that almost all POL was stored and distributed in containers – mostly in 55-gallon drums. This contrasted sharply with experience in Europe. There QM Gasoline Supply Companies received most of their POL from huge fixed storage facilities, barges or railroad tanker cars, and promptly decanted it into 5-gallon jerricans. These were stacked in warehouses, open dumps, and along roads. And moved to user units in 2 ½-ton trucks and ¼-ton trailers. In the Pacific, they found the use of the much smaller jerricans neither practical nor desirable.

The 55-gallon drums were bulkier, heavier, and more difficult to handle. But they got around that by using forklifts and winches to load drums onto cargo trucks. When these were not available, they simply used planks and manually rolled them onto the trucks. Petroleum Supply Companies also attached pipes and nozzles right on to the drums, and used them to fill vehicles directly. They found that nearly twice the amount of fuel could be loaded on a standard 2 ½-ton truck using 55-gallon drums rather than jerricans.

Despite a persistent shortage of drums, and the absence of modern bulk storage and distribution facilities, Quartermaster efforts to furnish Class III supplies to Allied troops in the Pacific can be judged an overall success.

Today planning for petroleum delivery to combat shore areas is on-going. As noted here, the basic system is the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). OPDS is defined as

Provides a semipermanent, all-weather facility for bulk transfer of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) directly from an offshore tanker to a beach termination unit (BTU) located immediately inland from the high watermark. POL then is either transported inland or stored in the beach support area. Major offshore petroleum discharge systems (OPDS) components are: the OPDS tanker with booster pumps and spread mooring winches; a recoverable single anchor leg mooring (SALM) to accommodate tankers of up to 70,000 deadweight tons; ship to SALM hose lines; up to 4 miles of 6-inch (internal diameter) conduit for pumping to the beach; and two BTUs to interface with the shoreside systems. OPDS can support a two line system for multiproduct discharge, but ship standoff distance is reduced from 4 to 2 miles. Amphibious construction battalions install the OPDS with underwater construction team assistance. OPDS are embarked on selected ready reserve force tankers modified to support the system.

All of which means that the Navy runs a pipeline to the beach from a mooring buoy offshore to which product tankers can connect and pump their cargo to storage facilities operated by the Army on the shore. This system is operated by the Military Sealift Command:

The U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command awarded a $26.6 million contract with options to Edison Chouest Offshore, based in Galliano, La., for the time charter of one Offshore Petroleum Discharge System, or OPDS.

The OPDS consists of two ships -- a support ship and a tender -- that work together to pump fuel for U.S. military forces from a commercial oil tanker moored at sea to a temporary fuel storage area ashore.

To begin the process, the 348-foot support ship and 165-foot tender work together to install up to eight miles of eight-inch-diameter flexible pipe. Next, the support ship positions the tanker for safe off-load operations. While the tender holds the tanker in place, the tanker's lines connect to the flexible pipe through the support ship. Booster pumps aboard the support ship increase the pressure of fuel, pushing the fuel to shore.

The OPDS is especially valuable in areas where fuel piers are unavailable, and tankers are unable to tie up ashore to off-load fuel. The OPDS can pump up to 1.7 million gallons of fuel per day.

The system has been recently exercised. And, no, that ship is not sinking, it's just positioning itself to offload the Single Anchor Leg Moor component of OPDS.

All of which just reaffirms the original point - planning ahead matters, whether on the "Loneliest Highway" or getting ready for combat.

UPDATE: Comparison of "old" OPDS with new contract OPDS:


From PowerPoint presentations which can be reached from here and here.
The new system allows for use of other tankers, greater offshore distance and more flexibility.

Friday Films*- "Replenishment at Sea" (1965) and "Refueling at Sea"

Logistics. logistics, logistics:

If it was easy, anyone could do it. Doing the hard things safely as possible? The U.S. Navy way.

*Friday is loose concept on this site.

It's Always Logistics, Logistics, Logistics

U.S. Naval War College presentation U.S. Transportation Command Leader Discusses Power Projection in Great-Power Competition:

Army Gen. Stephen Lyons, commander of U.S. Transportation Command, spoke to U.S. Naval War College students on Oct. 22 about the importance of power projection as the nation faces peer competitors.

"Our ability as a nation to be able to project military power over global distances at our time and place of choosing is indeed a strategic, competitive advantage," Lyons told his audience in Spruance Auditorium.

"It presents multiple options for senior leadership, and it creates multiple dilemmas for potential adversaries," he said.

USTRANSCOM, based at Scott Air Force Base in western Illinois, has overseen air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense since the command was established in 1987. Its motto is "Together, We Deliver."

Lyons said the 2018 National Defense Strategy has changed the way the U.S. military thinks about strategic logistics and the nation's ability to sustain forces as they travel across oceans and between continents.

"That fundamentally shifts the way that we have to approach and think about competition and responding to a near-peer competition," Lyons said.

The challenges are only increasing, he said. The level of complexity, the demand signature and diplomatic access are all challenges to his command's ability to project power, Lyons said.(emphasis added)

Some of us have been talking about this logistics stuff for some time - and sometimes people begin to listen:

I don't know what the hell this "logistics" is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it. - Admiral E. J. King

If you missed the 2018 National Defense Strategy, here's the official summary:

2018 National Defense Strat... by lawofsea on Scribd

75th anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy

Landing forces in war is hard, sustaining forces you've put ashore is very hard.

So, on this 75th anniversary of the landing in Normandy, a re-posting of a logistics post from a couple of years ago.

You can read a lot about those landing here:

The Normandy invasion took place in the Bay of the Seine, on the south side of the English Channel between the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Le Havre. Some fifty-five miles broad and twenty deep, its waters were shallow, had a considerable tidal range, and, when the wind blew from the northward, could be very choppy. The planned landing beaches covered about forty-five miles of the Bay's shoreline. Westernmost was "Utah" Area, stretching eight miles southward along the low-lying southeastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Directly to the east was "Omaha" Area, covering twelve miles of generally hilly terrain. United States forces were assigned to take both of those areas, with important assistance from the navies of Great Britain and other Allies. British and Canadian troops would assault the areas code-named "Gold", "Juno", and "Sword", which ran twenty miles eastward from "Omaha". This sector ended at the mouth of the Orne River, some fifteen miles west of Le Havre, where the German Navy based a group of potentially very dangerous torpedo boats.

The actual landing beaches occupied a fraction of the width of each area, but were

intended to provide sufficient initial footholds to allow rapid reinforcement and expansion inland, with the attacking soldiers joining their flanks to create a continuous beachhead perimeter before the enemy could mount a major counterattack. Each area would be assaulted by approximately one army division, with initial landings being made by much smaller units at 6:30AM in the American areas and about an hour later in the British. Their arrival on the shore was to follow a bombardment by ships' guns and aircraft ordnance, kept relatively brief to maintain as much as possible of the element of surprise. As a result, German shore defenses frequently remained intact, and would prove troublesome to both the landing forces and ships offshore.

To protect the invasion zone's western extremity, and to facilitate the "Utah" landing

force's movement into the Cotentin Peninsula, the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions descended by parachute and glider in the small hours of "D-Day", 6 June 1944. Though badly scattered and lacking much of their equipment, these brave paratroopers kept the Germans occupied and helped ensure that the "Utah" Beach assault went relatively easily. The British and Canadian attacks, assisted by an air-dropped division on their eastern flank and a longer naval bombardment, generally also went well.

Not so in the "Omaha" area, where deep beaches backed by steep hills meant that the U.S. troops landing there were exposed to withering fire from enemy small arms, machine guns and artillery. Casualties were very heavy and the assult only succeeded after a day of brutal fighting, with warships coming in close to provide direct gunfire in support of the hard-pressed soldiers.

By nightfall on the sixth of June, the situation was favorable, even on Omaha. Entered the popular culture as THE "D-Day", a name it has retained ever since.

As impressive as the landing were, it is important to remember that the landings would not have been

possible without the huge build up of men, material and machinery that went into Normandy, too. Today we should give pause to honor those in the world of logistics who made these landings and those in North Africa, Italy, and the islands of the Pacific possible.

And by honor I mean thinking about what it took to mine the iron, smelt the metal, design and build ships, aircraft, landing craft, rifles, artillery pieces, tanks, bombs, bullets, drill for and produce and refine the petroleum products that powered the fleets of ships, air forces, tanks, trucks, grow and harvest the grains, raise the cattle and other food for the forces abroad and at home . . . to the often overlooked merchant shipping industry ships and crews who transported all these things to England, Italy, North Africa and throughout the Pacific, thereby sustaining not only the fleets, Marines, armies but also much of the civilian populations of countries like Great Britain.

For more background on U.S. logistics during WWII, you can get a version of the whole story at The Big 'L'--American Logistics in World War II:

A remark by a captured German soldier best summarizes the importance of logistics in the battle for Europe in World War II. As he was marched past one of the many roadside supply dumps that dotted the Normandy landscape in the wake of the invasion, he was heard to remark "I know how you defeated us. You piled up the supplies and then let them fall on us." He was right. The war in Europe was what the Germans called materialschlact, "matériel battle." It was a "matériel battle" on a scale greater than any other conflict in history, a contest pitting the industrial capacities of Germany and the United States against each other. In the end, triumph was the result of the ability, of the United States to mobilize its industrial capacity" to provide the instruments of war for its troops and those of its allies and to deliver them where and when they were needed--to pile them up and let them fall.

Logistics in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) is a massive and complicated subject, one that accounts for thousands of pages in the official histories of the war. Although these events are over a half century past, the fundamental issues that concerned World War II logisticians--how to know what you need and how to get it where you need it when you need it--are the same problems their successors face today. . .
***
The story of theater logistics in WWII is not a unitary one; rather, it is two distinct stories. The Pacific and European theaters of operation were each unique in their strategic geography and military situation. In the European theater, the basic logistical task was to mass strength in a secure forward base to support operations--both land and air--against a nearby enemy. The United States entered the war after the British had forestalled Hitler's plans for a cross-Channel invasion. Therefore, Great Britain afforded a large, secure staging ground for the buildup of combat power. Moreover, as an advanced industrial nation, Great Britain possessed the ports, rail lines, and other facilities to support a massive influx of material and personnel. This buildup would require large numbers of ships to transit a single, highly vulnerable line of communication, the Atlantic route from the United States to England.

With the notable exception of the Battle of the Atlantic, the war in Europe is largely an Army story. The Army provided the theater commander and virtually the entire theater logistical structure. ... (Barry Dysart, Chapter VII)

Here's quick summary of what D-Day meant in terms of logistics:

d Day Fact Sheet the Supplies by lawofsea on Scribd

Sustainment of forces in the field is a challenge in any war. D-Day and its aftermath was the creation of a huge number of unsung heroes.

Give them a little thought and a tip of the hat.

Logistics, Logistics, Logistics: Can We Get the Army to the Fight?

Important question posed by David Larter ar Defense News The US Army is preparing to fight in Europe, but can it even get there?

The decline of U.S. surge capacity has been raising alarm bells in Washington as the National security structure comes to grips with facing dual threats from China and Russia, and has spurred efforts in Congress to try and get the Navy moving on a new class of logistics ship — also suggesting a look on the open market for used commercial ships to bridge the modernization gap.

But the list of issues the Ready Reserve Force faces in the meantime is ponderous. And solving them is going to mean the Navy, on the hook for the funding, will have to spend a lot of money on ships that largely stay in port during anything but national emergencies. This at a time that the Navy is trying to buy a new class of ballistic missile submarines, frigates and a new large surface combatant.

Shaking the dust off its long-range logistics plans has been a priority in the Army. A recent Navy report to Congress from March estimated that about 90 percent of all equipment used by the Army and Marine Corps in a major contingency would be transported by sea and the Army has been practicing moving large numbers of troops and equipment to Europe.

Go read it.

Not our first visit to this topic, see:
Warning Shot: "[T}he rapid depletion of the U.S. commercial fleet size" and a shortage of civilian mariners as threat to National Security

Sea Power Logistics: Fourth Arm of Defense:Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War by Salvatore R. Mercogliano and links therein.

Not Sexy But Important: "IG launches review of Military Sealift Command readiness problems"

Protecting the Military Sea Logistics Stream

and

Before D-Day and The Day After: Logistics, Logistics, Logistics

Yes, yesterday was the 73rd anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy. You can read a lot about those landing here:

The Normandy invasion took place in the Bay of the Seine, on the south side of the English Channel between the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Le Havre. Some fifty-five miles broad and twenty deep, its waters were shallow, had a considerable tidal range, and, when the wind blew from the northward, could be very choppy. The planned landing beaches covered about forty-five miles of the Bay's shoreline. Westernmost was "Utah" Area, stretching eight miles southward along the low-lying southeastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Directly to the east was "Omaha" Area, covering twelve miles of generally hilly terrain. United States forces were assigned to take both of those areas, with important assistance from the navies of Great Britain and other Allies. British and Canadian troops would assault the areas code-named "Gold", "Juno", and "Sword", which ran twenty miles eastward from "Omaha". This sector ended at the mouth of the Orne River, some fifteen miles west of Le Havre, where the German Navy based a group of potentially very dangerous torpedo boats.

The actual landing beaches occupied a fraction of the width of each area, but were

intended to provide sufficient initial footholds to allow rapid reinforcement and expansion inland, with the attacking soldiers joining their flanks to create a continuous beachhead perimeter before the enemy could mount a major counterattack. Each area would be assaulted by approximately one army division, with initial landings being made by much smaller units at 6:30AM in the American areas and about an hour later in the British. Their arrival on the shore was to follow a bombardment by ships' guns and aircraft ordnance, kept relatively brief to maintain as much as possible of the element of surprise. As a result, German shore defenses frequently remained intact, and would prove troublesome to both the landing forces and ships offshore.

To protect the invasion zone's western extremity, and to facilitate the "Utah" landing

force's movement into the Cotentin Peninsula, the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions descended by parachute and glider in the small hours of "D-Day", 6 June 1944. Though badly scattered and lacking much of their equipment, these brave paratroopers kept the Germans occupied and helped ensure that the "Utah" Beach assault went relatively easily. The British and Canadian attacks, assisted by an air-dropped division on their eastern flank and a longer naval bombardment, generally also went well.

Not so in the "Omaha" area, where deep beaches backed by steep hills meant that the U.S. troops landing there were exposed to withering fire from enemy small arms, machine guns and artillery. Casualties were very heavy and the assult only succeeded after a day of brutal fighting, with warships coming in close to provide direct gunfire in support of the hard-pressed soldiers.

By nightfall on the sixth of June, the situation was favorable, even on Omaha. Entered the popular culture as THE "D-Day", a name it has retained ever since.

As impressive as the landing were, it is important to remember that the landings would not have been

possible without the huge build up of men, material and machinery that went into Normandy, too. Today we should give pause to honor those in the world of logistics who made these landings and those in North Africa, Italy, and the islands of the Pacific possible.

And by honor I mean thinking about what it took to mine the iron, smelt the metal, design and build ships, aircraft, landing craft, rifles, artillery pieces, tanks, bombs, bullets, drill for and produce and refine the petroleum products that powered the fleets of ships, air forces, tanks, trucks, grow and harvest the grains, raise the cattle and other food for the forces abroad and at home . . . to the often overlooked merchant shipping industry ships and crews who transported all these things to England, Italy, North Africa and throughout the Pacific, thereby sustaining not only the fleets, Marines, armies but also much of the civilian populations of countries like Great Britain.

For more background on U.S. logistics during WWII, you can get a version of the whole story at The Big 'L'--American Logistics in World War II:

A remark by a captured German soldier best summarizes the importance of logistics in the battle for Europe in World War II. As he was marched past one of the many roadside supply dumps that dotted the Normandy landscape in the wake of the invasion, he was heard to remark "I know how you defeated us. You piled up the supplies and then let them fall on us." He was right. The war in Europe was what the Germans called materialschlact, "matériel battle." It was a "matériel battle" on a scale greater than any other conflict in history, a contest pitting the industrial capacities of Germany and the United States against each other. In the end, triumph was the result of the ability, of the United States to mobilize its industrial capacity" to provide the instruments of war for its troops and those of its allies and to deliver them where and when they were needed--to pile them up and let them fall.

Logistics in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) is a massive and complicated subject, one that accounts for thousands of pages in the official histories of the war. Although these events are over a half century past, the fundamental issues that concerned World War II logisticians--how to know what you need and how to get it where you need it when you need it--are the same problems their successors face today. . .
***
The story of theater logistics in WWII is not a unitary one; rather, it is two distinct stories. The Pacific and European theaters of operation were each unique in their strategic geography and military situation. In the European theater, the basic logistical task was to mass strength in a secure forward base to support operations--both land and air--against a nearby enemy. The United States entered the war after the British had forestalled Hitler's plans for a cross-Channel invasion. Therefore, Great Britain afforded a large, secure staging ground for the buildup of combat power. Moreover, as an advanced industrial nation, Great Britain possessed the ports, rail lines, and other facilities to support a massive influx of material and personnel. This buildup would require large numbers of ships to transit a single, highly vulnerable line of communication, the Atlantic route from the United States to England.

With the notable exception of the Battle of the Atlantic, the war in Europe is largely an Army story. The Army provided the theater commander and virtually the entire theater logistical structure. ... (Barry Dysart, Chapter VII)

Here's quick summary of what D-Day meant in terms of logistics:

d Day Fact Sheet the Supplies by lawofsea on Scribd

Sustainment of forces in the field is a challenge in any war. D-Day and its aftermath was the creation of a huge number of unsung heroes.

Give them a little thought and a tip of the hat.

A Pair of Good Things to Read

Here's an excellent argument about the high :costs of using the wrong tool for the job at hand by Mike Pietrucha, Logistical Fratricide: The Cost of Fast Jet TACAIR Measured in Purple Hearts. If you understand Maslow's quote ""I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail," you will see how having a limited tool kit has far-reaching effects - especially, as argued in this piece on the support forces.

Combat operations drive high fuel consumption. In 2006, as Central Command argued for a surge in Iraq, the majority of the U.S. military’s fuel use (58 percent) was jet fuel, dwarfing the next largest category (marine diesel) at 13 percent. In 2008, total fuel deliveries to Iraq and Afghanistan exceeded 90 million gallons per month — 20 percent of the entire Defense Department consumption. Because of the poor in-ground petroleum transport infrastructure in Iraq and especially in Afghanistan, the heavy use of fuel in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom can be directly tied to casualties incurred by ground operations required to get the fuel to U.S. bases, particularly airbases. Overall, roughly half of the total tonnage hauled overland was fuel, with the Army bearing the lion’s share of the ground transportation burden for all of the services. Air Force airpower supported the Army’s wider campaign, but the Army itself moved and protected the fuel needed to make that happen.

You might also find an underlying argument in this piece for some light tactical Navy planes flying off smaller carriers that mitigate that vulnerable Army log chain.

The other piece for morning reading is B.A. Friedman's John Boyd’s Revenge: How ISIS got inside our OODA Loop - which covers a lot more than ISIS:

But the most reliable test for one’s strategic ideas is history. Or in this case, history in the

making. John Boyd’s ideas are evident in three modern day strategic actors and the success they’re currently enjoying is self-evident. Despite the loyalty of his acolytes, the best advocates for Boyd’s ideas are Russia, China, and the Islamic State. Each of these actors, probably without knowing it, are demonstrating Boydian strategic methods. Each of them is using an adroit mix of ambiguity, deception, distribution, and propaganda, all while demonstrating a keen awareness of the moral plane of war and warfare in a way that is serving their ends. To those of us aware of Boyd’s ideas, it comes as no surprise. Everyone else is trying to figure out if there is even a war.

Probably could have included Iran in that mix, too.

So. Happy Tuesday.

Friday Fun Films: Allied Military Assistance to China in WWII

Overview:






Flying the Hump:

U.S. Army WWII History: China Defensive 4 July 1942–4 May 1945

U.S. Army WWII History: China Offensive 5 May–2 September 1945

The Hidden Side of the U.S. Navy: Military Sealift Command

On Sunday 20 July 2014, we had a discussion on Midrats with Salvatore R. Mercogliano, Ph.D. about the "Military Sealift Command - Past, Present and Future." Many of you may have heard of MSC, but not know all that much about it. So, if you missed the show, here's a chance to catch up:

Online Military Radio at Blog Talk Radio with Midrats on BlogTalkRadio

Professor Sal also sent along this PowerPoint presentation that helps further the discussion:

MSC Background

Professionals talk logistics.

Because tactics and strategy are driven by it.

Beaches of Red- Amphibious Operations in WWII

As we honor those men who, during WWII, landed in Europe and in the islands of the Pacific, it is also proper to note the contributions of the logistics team behind them.

Now, Navy Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Sheppard and All Hands offer such a note in "a five part documentary series highlighting the development of the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) and its use in amphibious operations in WWII."

A Little Known Tale from World War II: Sherwood Forest, American Oil Workers and the War Effort

An article in the Oil and Gas Journal put me on to this fascinating saga from the American Oil and Gas Historical Society,

"Roughnecks of Sherwood Forest"

Two bronze statues separated by the Atlantic Ocean commemorate the achievements of World War II American roughnecks. The first stands in Dukes Wood near the village of Eakring in Nottinghamshire, England. Its twin greets visitors at Memorial Square in Ardmore, Oklahoma.

The seven-foot bronze statues, separated by more than 2,400 miles, commemorate 44 Americans who – during a critical time during the war – produced oil. They drilled in Sherwood Forest.

Why?

England’s principal fuel supplies came by convoy from Trinidad and America and were subjected to relentless Nazi submarine attacks. Meanwhile, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s rampaging North African campaign threatened England’s access to Middle East oilfield sources.

So, the Brits sought some American help and got 44 oil field workers ("roughnecks" in U.S. oil field terms), whose efforts helped create an "unsinkable tanker" during Britain's hours of great need for oil and its products to fight and to survive the war which had been raging for 3 years . . .

Using innovative methods, the Americans drilled an average of one well per week in Duke’s Wood, while the British took at least five weeks per well.

Submarine warfare, an American oil roughneck buried in a military cemetery in England and all of it a secret . . .

Read it all, it's a great story that ought to be more widely known.

More on Management

U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis

Yesterday I noted that one of my favorite business books is available on Kindle and added a couple of quotes from the book, Up the Organization: How to Stop the Corporation from Stifling People and Strangling Profits.

Thinking it over, I left out my favorite quote:

Excellence: Or What the Hell Are You Doing Here?

If you can't do it excellently, don't do it at all. Because if it's not excellent it won't be profitable or fun, and if you're not in business for fun or profit, what the hell are you doing here?

More than that, one of the fundamental concepts of Mr. Townsend's work is the importance of management's primary job - that being giving the employees the right tools they need to do their jobs.

Not tools that "sorta maybe kinda" allow them to get the job done (often by using
work around" of their own creation), but the right tool in the right hand at the right time.

Not tools that have the "potential" to get the job done in some idealized future, but tools that work right now - tested before they are introduced to the workforce.

Any lessons that you choose to take from that concept and apply, say, to the Littoral Combat Ship, well, that's entirely up to you.

Of course, there is this from Phil Ewing:

“We’re making it up as we go” and “We don’t even know what it is yet!” are two Big Navy rallying cries for LCS, and they’re also two reasons why the program continues to have so many skeptics in and out of uniform. People want a ship to be a ship, not for a multi-billion dollar defense program to be a free-form jazz odyssey.

You know, what prompted some of my return to Up the Organization was our conversation on Midrats a couple of weeks ago concerning "Disruptive Thinkers" and by Galrahn's post over at the USNI Blog, Diversity Is Currently Dead in the DoD, Redundancy Reigns, referring, of course, to intellectual diversity - replaced, at least in Galrahn's view, by apparent "group think."

Which leads me to another Townsend quote:

Disobedience and Its Necessity: A commander in chief [manager] cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare [business] an order given by his minister [boss] or his sovereign [boss's boss], when the person giving the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware or wholly unaware of the latest state of affairs. It follows that any commander in chief [manager] who undertakes to carry out a plan which he considers defective is at fault; he must put forth his reasons, insist on the plan being changed, and finally tender his resignation rather than be the instrument of his army's [organization's] downfall. citing Napoleon, Military Maxims and Thoughts

Pakistan: NATO Suppy Routes to Afghanistan Closed, New Rules of Engagement Adopted

Following the confusion of the attack on a Pakistan border post (see here), the words continue to fly fast and furious, with the truth of what happened becoming less and less relevant.

The U.S. claims a couple of defenses in the incident, including an assertion by Afghan forces that they called in the airstrike.

"Whatever" - as the saying goes- the Pakistanis are not in the mood to listen to explanations. As the story notes,

Pakistan's army claims the attack was unprovoked and insists there was no militant activity in the area.

Meantime, Islamabad has closed its border to the trucks that deliver supplies to coalition troops and is demanding the U.S. vacate a base thought to be used for launching drones.

Further, Reuters reports, "After NATO strike, Pakistan adjusts rules of engagement,

"I do not want there to be any doubt in the minds of any commander at any level about the rules of engagement," Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani said in a communique on Friday.

"In case of any attack, you have complete liberty to respond forcefully using all available resources. You do not need any permission for this."

A military source explained that this amounted to a change in the rules for Pakistani forces guarding the Western border against militant movements to and from Afghanistan.

"In the past, we were only guarding ourselves or reacting against militants," said the source, who requested anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media.

An analysis of the potential impact of the closed Pakistani border can be found at Oilprice.com where reporter John Daly lays out the logistics issues posed by the Pakistan border closing in Furious at Latest U.S. Attack, Pakistan Shuts Down Resupply Routes to Afghanistan "Permanently",

So, what does this mean for logistical support of ISAF forces? According to Nesar Ahmad Nasery, the deputy head of Torkham Customs, around 1,000 trucks cross into Afghanistan on a daily basis, nearly 300 of which are NATO contractors carrying NATO supplies in sealed containers. Khyber Transport Association chief Shakir Afridi said that each oil tanker has a capacity of 13,000-15,000 gallons. In October 2010 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen said that fossil fuels are the number one import to Afghanistan.

Noting the obvious, as Afghanistan has no indigenous hydrocarbon supplies, every drop must be brought in, with transit greatly increasing the eventual cost. For 2001-2008, almost all U.S. and NATO supplies were trucked overland to Afghanistan through parts of Pakistan effectively controlled by the Taliban.

Source: US TRANSCOM
Credit: Alyson Hurt/NPR

As shown on the map from NPR and Transcom (Logistics into Afghanistan), the logisticians have come up with alternative routes - which Mr. Daly discusses in his report:

But NATO and the Pentagon have a backup plan – since 2009 they have been shifting their logistics to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a railway link running from Latvia’s Riga Baltic port through Russia and Kazakhstan terminating in Uzbekistan’s Termez on the Afghan border.

There is also another route, involving ships entering the Black Sea with several modal transfers. These alternative routes are much more costly. I suggest reading the excellent Oilprice.com piece for details.

Logistics, logistics, logistics. Can't fight wars without it.

Logistics into Afghanistan

Source: US TRANSCOM
Credit: Alyson Hurt/NPR

Preceding the latest contretemps with Pakistan but after some discussions on Midrats about the difficulty of the logistic flow in the current war, a nice NPR piece, U.S. Now Relies On Alternate Afghan Supply Routes:

"This is the logistics challenge of our generation," says Vice Adm. Mark Harnitchek, deputy commander of the U.S. military's Transportation Command, and a student of military logistics history. "The challenge of my father's generation was escorting convoys across the north Atlantic when we didn't know how to do that very well. Convoys in 1943 would lose 16 of their 32 ships. The Army had their challenge supplying Patton in his race across France, keeping him resupplied. Supporting operations in Afghanistan is our generational challenge."

Logistics, always logistics.

Libya: How are the rebel logistics?

You know the scenario - the government troops fall back and consolidate, the rebels rush helter skelter after them along a long highway. How far can the rebel forces pursue before they run into a logistics problem? Food, shelter, ammo, petrol - where will these things come from to support a rebel "army" in the field.

Who is planning for rebel logistics and force sustainment?

See BBC News - Libya: Rebels pushed back by Col Gaddafi's forces:

US President Barack Obama earlier said he did not rule out arming the rebels.

France and the US say they are sending envoys to the rebel-held city of Benghazi in the east to liaise with the interim administration there.

And see also Arming Libya rebels not allowed by UN resolutions, legal experts warn US:

The US is likely to be in breach of the UN security council's arms embargo on Libya if it sends weapons to the rebels, experts in international law have warned.

After Hillary Clinton said it would be legal to send arms to support the uprising, lawyers analysing the terms of the UN's 26 February arms embargo said it would require a change in the terms for it not to breach international law.

"The embargo appears to cover everybody in the conflict which means you can't supply arms to rebels," said Philippe Sands QC, professor of international law at University College London.

His view was backed by other experts in international law who said they could not see how the US could legally justify sending arms into Libya under the current resolutions.

Lord knows we wouldn't like to run afoul of UN resolutions.

Thinking Logistics

Thanks to UPS for providing a little insight into this important industry.




As you buy you Christmas/Holiday gifts and are amazed at the selection and availability - think about what it took to get them to a store near you.

Aid to Haiti: Port Broken? JLOTS could help

From a June, 2009 post:

All the supplies in the world don't do any good if you can't get them to the people who need them. Even when there no port to work with, the Navy has an improved solution to an old problem: Sailors Use Improved Navy Lighterage System:

Sailors assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB) 2 had the opportunity to test the Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) during the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) exercise June 15-21.

The JLOTS exercise was a test of the military's ability to move equipment and sustainment supplies to specific areas without the benefit of a fixed port facility.

The exercise increased interoperability and improved military readiness by alleviating situational sustainment issues.

INLS played a large role in the JLOTS mission by acting as a floating pier, or causeway system, which is comprised of powered and non-powered floating platforms.

INLS is used to transfer cargo from ship to shore areas where port facilities may be damaged, or nonexistent.

"The INLS is fairly new to ACB 2; we acquired the system only two years ago," said Master Chief Operations Specialist John Fedor, assigned to ACB 2. "It is vastly improved from the old Navy Lighterage (NL) systems; it is a lot safer, more maneuverable, allows the crew to get out of the weather, provides better visibility for the craftmasters and the overall system is a vast improvement of the previous system."

A comprehensive look at the new INLS here:

The INLS is made up of pontoon sections a.k.a. platforms. Different mixes of pontoon sections are used to make up different assemblies. The Causeway Ferry is used as a lighter for vehicles and large cargo from ship to shore, and has a top speed of 12 knots compared to 4.5 knots for its predecessor. There are 12 modules for 4 ferries, in a 4×3 arrangement where each ferry assembly comes with a Power section (with engine and controls), an Intermediate section, and a Beach section (with ramp). It takes less than 2 hours to assemble the causeway ferry at sea.

A different set of INLS sections can be assembled to make up a Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility (RRDF): 1 docking module, up to 7 combination modules that can be fitted together in various ways, and 1 docking module. Warping tugs, also carried on MPF ships, work to push the RRDF the modules into place, and moving the completed discharge facility into position. Once complete, the 240×72 foot assembly becomes a floating transfer dock onto which Maritime Prepositioning Ships and others lower their ramps. It takes 18 – 24 hours to assemble the RRDF discharge facility, depending on waves and wind. The tactical vehicles and other rolling stock can roll down the ships’ ramps onto the RRDF, then onto waiting lighterage such as barge ferries or LCU landing craft.

RRDF also has obvious potential uses under the Navy’s proposed Seabasing doctrine, which would allow offloading, housing, and transfer of supplies for operations on land from floating platforms that could act as mobile bases. Since these sea-bases could be deployed in international waters, or near areas without convenient ports nearby, they would sharply expand the US military’s ability to project power from the sea. The INLS does not yet have a defined seabasing role, but recent exercises have begun to explore this capability.

Top photo caption:

An improved Navy lighterage system operates supporting the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) exercises. INLS, a sea state three-capable causeway system, is a floating pier that comprises powered and non-powered floating platforms assembled from interchangeable modules. JLOTS is a joint operation that consists of loading and unloading of ships without fixed port facilities, in friendly or non-defended territories. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John Stratton/Released)

Middle photo caption:

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (July 3, 2008) Seabees assigned Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB) 1 offload a structural piece of an elevated causeway system onto Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) Causeway Ferry 1 during Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) 2008. Navy and Army engineering units will construct a life support area, conduct force protection operations, execute an in-stream offload of shipping from a sea echelon area, employ an offshore petroleum discharge system, and retrograde and safely redeploy allocated forces. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Brian Morales (Released)

Lowest photo caption:

HSV-2 Swift utilizes the Improved Navy Lighterage System and its own Roll-on/Roll-off capabilities for West Africa Training Cruise 08 in conjunction with Africa Partnership Station.

Photo caption:

100113-N-4774B-935 ATLANTIC OCEAN (Jan. 13, 2010) Bridge watch standers observe SH-60F Sea Hawks assigned to the Red Lions of Helicopter Squadron (HS) 15, land aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Carl Vinson and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 have received orders from U.S. Southern Command to render humanitarian assistance to the Caribbean nation of Haiti, following a 7.0 magnitude earthquake Jan. 12. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker/Released)

Logistics: Testing Navy's Improved Logistics Over the Shore

All the supplies in the world don't do any good if you can't get them to the people who need them. Even when there no port to work with, the Navy has an improved solution to an old problem: Sailors Use Improved Navy Lighterage System:

Sailors assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB) 2 had the opportunity to test the Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) during the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) exercise June 15-21.

The JLOTS exercise was a test of the military's ability to move equipment and sustainment supplies to specific areas without the benefit of a fixed port facility.

The exercise increased interoperability and improved military readiness by alleviating situational sustainment issues.

INLS played a large role in the JLOTS mission by acting as a floating pier, or causeway system, which is comprised of powered and non-powered floating platforms.

INLS is used to transfer cargo from ship to shore areas where port facilities may be damaged, or nonexistent.

"The INLS is fairly new to ACB 2; we acquired the system only two years ago," said Master Chief Operations Specialist John Fedor, assigned to ACB 2. "It is vastly improved from the old Navy Lighterage (NL) systems; it is a lot safer, more maneuverable, allows the crew to get out of the weather, provides better visibility for the craftmasters and the overall system is a vast improvement of the previous system."

A comprehensive look at the new INLS here:

The INLS is made up of pontoon sections a.k.a. platforms. Different mixes of pontoon sections are used to make up different assemblies. The Causeway Ferry is used as a lighter for vehicles and large cargo from ship to shore, and has a top speed of 12 knots compared to 4.5 knots for its predecessor. There are 12 modules for 4 ferries, in a 4×3 arrangement where each ferry assembly comes with a Power section (with engine and controls), an Intermediate section, and a Beach section (with ramp). It takes less than 2 hours to assemble the causeway ferry at sea.

A different set of INLS sections can be assembled to make up a Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility (RRDF): 1 docking module, up to 7 combination modules that can be fitted together in various ways, and 1 docking module. Warping tugs, also carried on MPF ships, work to push the RRDF the modules into place, and moving the completed discharge facility into position. Once complete, the 240×72 foot assembly becomes a floating transfer dock onto which Maritime Prepositioning Ships and others lower their ramps. It takes 18 – 24 hours to assemble the RRDF discharge facility, depending on waves and wind. The tactical vehicles and other rolling stock can roll down the ships’ ramps onto the RRDF, then onto waiting lighterage such as barge ferries or LCU landing craft.

RRDF also has obvious potential uses under the Navy’s proposed Seabasing doctrine, which would allow offloading, housing, and transfer of supplies for operations on land from floating platforms that could act as mobile bases. Since these sea-bases could be deployed in international waters, or near areas without convenient ports nearby, they would sharply expand the US military’s ability to project power from the sea. The INLS does not yet have a defined seabasing role, but recent exercises have begun to explore this capability.

Top photo caption:

An improved Navy lighterage system operates supporting the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) exercises. INLS, a sea state three-capable causeway system, is a floating pier that comprises powered and non-powered floating platforms assembled from interchangeable modules. JLOTS is a joint operation that consists of loading and unloading of ships without fixed port facilities, in friendly or non-defended territories. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John Stratton/Released)

Middle photo caption:

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (July 3, 2008) Seabees assigned Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB) 1 offload a structural piece of an elevated causeway system onto Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) Causeway Ferry 1 during Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) 2008. Navy and Army engineering units will construct a life support area, conduct force protection operations, execute an in-stream offload of shipping from a sea echelon area, employ an offshore petroleum discharge system, and retrograde and safely redeploy allocated forces. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Brian Morales (Released)

Lowest photo caption:

HSV-2 Swift utilizes the Improved Navy Lighterage System and its own Roll-on/Roll-off capabilities for West Africa Training Cruise 08 in conjunction with Africa Partnership Station.

UPDATE: Jan 15, 2010: And, of course, you can fery stuff ashore using LCAC's:

The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) is a high-speed, over-the-beach fully amphibious landing craft, capable of carrying a 60-75 ton payload. It is used to transport the weapons systems, equipment, cargo and personnel of the assault elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force from ship to shore and across the beach. LCAC can carry heavy payloads, such as an M-1 tank, at high speeds. The LCAC payload capability and speed combine to significantly increase the ability of the Marine Ground Element to reach the shore. Air cushion technology allows this vehicle to reach more than 70 percent of the world's coastline, while only about 15 percent of that coastline is accessible by conventional landing craft.

Or by lots of helicopter trips, but you need secure landing areas in either case. H-60 helicopters, apparently to be supported on the aircrafter carrrier Vinson, can carry a little over 4 tons in a sling under the aircraft.

Barges and ships with cranes can lighter off shore.

One of the key problems is water - and a couple of barges with desalination equipment and a pipeline to shore would be helpful. Or a water carrying variation using tankers...

The bad part is - it all takes time to put together.