Revisiting the DARPA "Sea Train"

About 3 years ago, I posted the following about a DARPA research project involving the transit of unmanned vessels across long ocean distances. I can envision the use of such vessels in a sustainment role for remote forces, as I will discuss later.

A recent CIMSEC thought piece by CDR Todd Greene has some interesting thoughts along these lines THE NIGHTTRAIN: UNMANNED EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS FOR SUSTAINING PACIFIC OPERATIONS:

Supplying widely distributed EABs of varying size, composition, and organic capability presents two sets of challenges – long-range transits across thousands of miles of contested open oceans, and last-tactical-mile delivery over an unimproved shoreline and into the hands of stand-in forces. Today’s systems mainly focus on one or the other, but there is nothing that can do both well.

Innovation must be directed at designing connectors that can bridge capability between these two distinct challenges. They must be able to transit oceanic spaces that feature hostile environments stemming from the open ocean environment and adversary capability. After traversing these many miles, the same system must somehow get supplies across a beach and into the hands of the stand-in force. Innovative connectors are necessary to provide the vital link between the stand-in forces and seabases or logistics hubs.

I think the good CDR is correct, but I also think the innovation connectors are being worked on today:

(Begin quote from my 2020 post)

[Back in 2000], the DoD's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency announced the concept of a "Sea Train":

The Sea Train vessels independently depart a port under their own power to reach a sortie point notionally 15 [nautical miles, or nmi] from the pier. The four independent vessels then begin the Sea Train mission by assembling in Sea Train configuration and completing a notional 6,500 nmi transit through varied sea state conditions that might require re-routing to optimize travel times or vessel seakeeping. The Sea Train then arrives at a disaggregation point, where the four vessels begin independent yet collaborative operations consisting of transits, loiters, and sprints in varied sea state conditions. The vessels then arrive at a sortie point to begin the aggregation process and conduct a Sea Train sprint from the operational area. The Sea Train then returns to normal transit speed for the remainder of the transit in varied sea state conditions, disaggregates outside of port and the vessels self-navigate to a pier.

There has been research in this area as set out here (pdf) in a paper by Igor Mizine and Gabor Karafiath:

A sea train is an arrangement of multiple hulls connected together to form a longer assembly of vessels. The sea train configuration takes advantage of fundamental hydrodynamic principles to reduce the drag of the assembled train below that of the individual components proceeding separately. In some circumstances the sea train arrangement can also offer operational advantages.

WHAT IF?

What if we develop large numbers of these "sea train" modules, including several loaded with generators, sensors, and "missiles in a box," they can serve as "accompanying assets" to a battle force. Such vessels, arriving in an area of interest could decouple, spread themselves out over a wide area and allow for a very wide distribution of lethality. 

Other "Sea Trains" may be equipped with machine shops, cranes, additive manufacturing equipment, or replenishment munitions or fuel. These units could be held in "safe havens" and brought to the fleet as needed. None of them need be manned which makes them far less expensive to construct. Each could carry sufficient habitability containers to provide comfort for technicians or other personnel needed to operate equipment at their needed destination. 

 The larger the number of sea train modules, the great the the likelihood of needed components reaching the fleets on a timely basis. With enough units, even the expanse of the Pacific can be "shrunk."

As with WWII merchant shipping, some elements of a sea train could contain self-defense detection and weaponry, remotely monitored, but capable of self protection when authorized by a "human in the loop." Such equipment might include ASW-capable drones, or ASuW assets. 

Further, the use of unmanned but armed surface and subsurface could take the place of manned convoying ships.

COMMUNICATIONS

A key issue in discussing using unmanned vessels in the manner described above is communicating with those vessels to direct their positioning and, in the case of combat. controlling their weaponry. 

Obviously, with the towed missile barge such communications could be done through a cable connection piggy-backing on the tow line. 

With vessels within line of sight of the controller ship, the comms may be done through lasers or line of sight radios.  It is also conceivable that light weight fiber optic lines could connect units even several miles distant.

In certain environments, satellite links may be available. If those are blocked, manned or unmanned aircraft may serve as relay platforms. Indeed, the concept of solar powered high-altitude communications air systems placed to create an continuous link along the projected sea routes is not far-fetched. AeroVironment, among others, has been working along these lines for almost four decades. 

Explained in their video concerning their HAPS project - which could obviously be modified for military use, if needed:

The point is that we currently have the technology to distribute lethality at a much lower cost than the cost of new ships. We just need to get moving on experimenting with these technologies to find the right mix to provide the tools needed by our Navy and Marine Corps. 

***

UPDATE: DARPA "Sea Train" concept image:

DARPA offers up contract bid info here:

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Tactical Technology Office (TTO) seeks to enable extended transoceanic transit and long range naval operations by exploiting the efficiencies of a system of connected vessels (Sea Train). The Sea Train will demonstrate long range deployment capabilities for a distributed fleet of tactical Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs).

(End quoted post)

UPDATE 2023: DARPA has continued its Sea Train work. Technology and software is being worked on DARPA’S SEA TRAIN TO MAKE WAVES WITH TEXTRON SYSTEMS AUTONOMY ENGINE AT THE HELM

If these "No Manning Required Ships" are developed, their configuaration is up to the Navy, not DARPA, see DARPA Updates On Its Sea Train And NOMARS USVs:

DARPA: “NOMARS is not a barge; it is a MUSV [medium-sized unmanned surface vessel]. However, to the other part of your question, we are attempting to develop a next-generation MUSV class that has significantly higher reliability and availability, and carry significant payload for its size. Leveraging any existing design would defeat the purpose of the DARPA program.”

Ultimately what payload the US Navy would have future generations of USVs carry is part of their decision space, but there is nothing unique to the NOMARS philosophy that makes it more compatible with warfighting payloads vs. logistics payloads.”

As set out in Expeditionary Autonomous Transports, the Navy is experimenting with developoing an automous Expeditionary Fast Transport. Though the EFT is not "Sea Train," the technology is not all that different.

There is no reason not to develop "sea trains" composed of various sized units which can contain feature that would meet the two challenges CDR Greene discusses above - including an asset to cover the proverbial "last mile"delivery. If the need is there, a tool can be found to make it work.

Friday Films "Replenishment at Sea" (1965) and "Seaplane Tenders"

Important Strategic Input: "U.S. Navy Carriers: Strike Range Expansion Is Critical"

If you are going to influence shore based powers, you need to be able to reach out touch them if need be.

This is addressed by Jerry Hendrix in this National Review piece, U.S. Navy Carriers: Strike Range Expansion Is Critical

The United States Navy needs to make some hard choices if it wishes to remain relevant in the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) security environment that lies ahead of it. It must begin to adjust its strategy as well as its accompanying shipbuilding and aircraft-procurement plans to enable it to fight and win within the emerging great-power competition. This new environment, at last recognized in President Trump’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy, requires the Navy to strike enemy capitals and other vital centers of gravity from range, but the Navy’s decision to bypass a carrier-based strike asset, and now even to push off its acquisition of an unmanned mission tanker, suggest that it is not taking A2AD great-power competition seriously. Its decisions place the future relevance of the entire maritime service, at least as it is presently composed, at risk.

We also discussed this on Midrats on 11 March 2018 - and Dr. Hendrix joined us - the discussion rolls through the show, but especially beginning around the 44 minute mark:

On Midrats 28 January 2018 - Episode 421: Sealift, Logistics, & MSC with Salvatore Mercogliano

Please join us at 5pm EST on 28 January 2018 for Midrats Episode 421: Sealift, Logistics, & MSC with Salvatore Mercogliano:

It feeds, fuels, and makes everything a fleet does possible - we're talking logistics for the full hour with returning guest, Salvatore Mercogliano.

Sal sailed with MSC from 1989 to 1992, and worked MSC HQ as Operations Officer for the Afloat Prepositioning Force 1992-1996.

He has a BS Marine Transportation from SUNY Maritime College, a MA Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology from East Carolina University, and received his Ph.D. in Military and Naval History from University of Alabama.

Moving to academia, he's taught at East Carolina University, Methodist University, UNC-Chapel Hill, & the U.S. Military Academy.

Currently an adjunct professor at the US Merchant Marine Academy teaching a graduate course on Maritime Industry Policy and an Associate Professor of History at Campbell University in Buies Creek, NC teaching courses in World Maritime History, Maritime Security, and American Military Experience.

Recently published “We Built Her to Bring Them Over There: The Cruiser and Transport Force in the Great War,” in the Winter 2017-18 issue of Sea History; author of Fourth Arm of Defense: Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War, published by the Naval History and Heritage Command in 2017, and 2nd Prize winner in the 2015 US Naval Institute Naval History Contest with Semper Sealift: The U.S. Marine Corps, Merchant Marine, and Maritime Prepositioning.

He also serves as a Captain on the Northwest Harnett Volunteer Fire Department and currently working on a history of military sealift during the First World War.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can also pick the show up later by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

U.S. Navy photos. Upper by U.S. Navy photo by MC3 James Vazquez, lower by MCSN Morgan K. Nall.

Not Sexy But Important: "IG launches review of Military Sealift Command readiness problems"

Logistics, logistics, logistics. The ability to sustain a fleet at sea and to deliver and sustain forces in the field is a vital need of any navy, but especially for the U.S. Navy. Recent reports indicate that that "not sexy but important role" has some glitches as reported by the Navy Times J.D. Simkins in IG launches review of Military Sealift Command readiness problems

The Defense Department’s Inspector General will be taking a close look at the glaring readiness shortcomings at Military Sealift Command that were the subject of another government report last summer.

citing this GAO report:

GAO Report on Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleets by lawofsea on Scribd

No surprises really, given that maintaining the combatant fleet has also suffered from insufficient funding for years that the "unsexy" logistics force would also suffer. However, not being surprised is not the same as being prepared . . .

Higfhlights:

The capability to rearm, refuel, and re-provision Navy ships at sea is critical to the

USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)

Navy’s ability to project warfighting power from the sea. MSC’s combat logistics force consists of 29 auxiliary ships that provide logistics resupply to Navy combatant ships—aircraft carriers, destroyers, and amphibious ships, among others—at sea during underway replenishments. Doing so enables Navy combatant ships to stay at sea as long as needed during both peacetime and wartime, rather than requiring the ship to pull into port to refuel and resupply. The combat logistics force provides virtually everything that Navy ships need, including fuel, food, ordnance, dry cargo, spare parts, mail, and other supplies. According to MSC, in 2015, combat logistics force ships transferred more than 8.2 million barrels of petroleum products and over 90,000 pallets of dry cargo and ordnance during underway replenishments.
***
The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended downward since 2012. We found that mission-limiting equipment casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have increased over the past five years, and maintenance periods are running longer than planned, indicating declining materiel readiness across both fleets.
***
We found that the readiness of the combat logistics force, like that of the surge sealift fleet, has trended downward in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Specifically,
• Operational availability has declined: Operational availability measures the amount of time that a ship can get underway and execute a mission as required. MSC’s goal is for each combat logistics ship to be available for missions 270 days a year, devoting the rest of its time largely to maintenance and training. However, the fast combat support ship (T-AOE) and the fleet replenishment oiler (TAO) ship classes are not meeting this target and have seen declines in annual operational availability from 289 to 267 days (8 percent) and from 253 to 212 days (16 percent), respectively, over the past 5 years.32 These declines were due primarily to increases in unscheduled maintenance, according to MSC officials.
***
The Navy has not assessed the effect that implementing widely distributed operations will have on the number and type of combat logistics ships required to support the fleet. As early as January 2015, senior Navy leaders outlined a new warfighting concept calling for widely distributed operations, referred to by the Navy as “distributed lethality.” In January 2017, the Navy released its new surface strategy, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, which includes concepts for more widely distributed operations through distributed lethality. According to the strategy, the security interests of the United States are increasingly challenged by near-peer competitors, among others, and the Navy must adjust to this changing security environment. Implementing the distributed lethality concept is critical to maintaining the Navy’s maritime superiority and requires employing its fleet in dispersed formations across a wider expanse of territory to increase both the offensive and defensive capabilities of surface forces. According to the Navy, these concepts complicate enemy targeting by dispersing larger numbers of platforms capable of offensive action over a wide geographic area. According to Navy and MSC officials, a greater reliance on distributed operations and the lethality provided by a widely distributed fleet will require resupplying ships that are

USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)

farther apart and generally increase the demand on the combat logistics force. This stands in contrast to the Navy’s traditional concept of operations, in which Navy combatant ships operate in task group formations—such as carrier strike groups or amphibious ready groups—and, to support these formations, combat logistics force ships transit with them and replenish them with supplies as needed.  In June 2016, the Center for Naval Analyses’ modeling found that spreading combatant ships, such as carrier strike groups, out over larger regions would put more stress on the combat logistics force, because additional ships would be needed as the groups spread out and also because distributing supplies to the individual ships would take longer.  Additionally, combat logistics force ships might need to operate independently in small groups—or even alone—which could put them at risk in contested environments, according to Navy officials. Another effect of widely distributed operations is that ships operating further from ports might require more underway replenishments (see fig. 6), which could affect the number and types of combat logistics force ships required to support the Navy fleet. Under current concepts, Navy carrier strike groups and other ships can typically stay at sea as long as needed, because they have the ability to be replenished either in port or while underway with fuel, ammunition, and stores transported by the combat logistics force. Under distributed operations, geographicallyseparated ships may not be able to be replenished in port during peacetime, or it may be too far or too dangerous in wartime for them to go into port, according to Navy officials. (footnotes omitted)

Really, you should read the report and consider the impact of a weak or too small logistics train on Navy operations, especially in contested water.

Unmentioned in the report but also vital is an adquate escort force for the logistics train. More on that topic later, along with look at the effect of the size of the U.S. flagged merchant shipping fleet on the U.S. role in the maritime world.

Sea Power Logistics: Fourth Arm of Defense:Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War by Salvatore R. Mercogliano

Free pdf download of a short book by Salvatore R. Mercogliano at Naval History and Heritage Command Fourth Arm of Defense

Fourth Arm of Defense describes the role of America’s Navy and the U.S. Merchant Marine in the logistics support of the conflict in Southeast Asia. The Fourth Arm of Defense details the deployment of Army and allied troops to the combat theater by the Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service (later Military Sealift Command); development of port facilities and cargo-handling procedures in South Vietnam; the dangerous and sometimes deadly effort to deliver ammunition, fuel, and other supplies to Saigon and other ports far upriver; maintenance of the 5,000-mile logistics pipeline across the vast Pacific Ocean; employment of revolutionary cargo container and roll on/roll off ships; and the maritime evacuations from South Vietnam and Cambodia. The work describes the service and sacrifice of American sailors and the men of the U.S. Merchant Marine and many other countries who braved tempestuous seas and ports and rivers subject to attack by mine-laden Viet Cong ambushes. The work is amply illustrated with more than 80 photographs, maps, and a list of suggested readings. This publication will be of interest and value to those scholars, veterans, and students of the Vietnam War and the role of the Navy and the U.S. merchant marine in that conflict.

This is a valuable update to the list set out in If You Grow the Fleet, Who Is "Optimizing the US Navy's combat logistics force?"

Our 2014 interview with Professor Mercogliano on Midrats:


You might also find "Logistics Week" from 2016 interesting - at theses posts:

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak Begins with a Plan;

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Naval Logistics Defined and Implemented;

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Prepositioned Ships;


Friday Films: USNS Jack Lummus Offloading Marine Gear and "Land the Landing Force" (1967);

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: "Sealift Program".

"Last of the 8-inch Cruiser Guns"

Nice little article from USNI's Naval History by CDR Tyrone G. Martin, USN (ret) about heavy cruiser guns, especially the
Last of the 8-inch Cruiser Guns

Heavy cruisers were a part of the U.S. Navy for about 50 years, until the late 1970s.

Almost all of them were armed with nine 8-inch/55-caliber guns of several different types whose projectiles were fired using bagged powder charges. With the outbreak of World War II in Europe, four cruisers of the Baltimore (CA-68) class were immediately ordered. A total of 24 ultimately would be ordered, with 14 entering service. Combat experience resulted in modifications, which were reflected in the Oregon City (CA-122) class, whose superstructure was more concentrated to widen the antiaircraft batteries’ arcs of fire. Three of the ten cruisers ordered were completed and commissioned.

Shortly after the Oregon Citys were ordered, a startlingly different 8-inch/55 gun became available, one that used semi-fixed ammunition and could repeat firing cycles without human assistance. This was the Mark 16, which required an expansion of the Oregon City design. Twelve ships were programmed, but with the war’s end, only the three hulls well underway were completed: the Des Moines (CA-134), Salem (CA-139), and Newport News (CA-148). These would be the last 8-inch-gun cruisers built by any navy.

Newport News was around for the last legs of the Vietnam War, arriving, I believe, soon after the North Vietnamese Army rolled south in the 1972 "Easter Invasion."

One of the lessons that seems to have been learned out of that was that semi-fixed ammunition for the

8"/55 guns was somewhat of a logistical issue for the force - there was a scarcity of it in theater - and ammunition ships entering the waters off Vietnam had to take on the remaining 8"/55 load of ammunition ships leaving the area to load out other munitions in Subic Bay. As I recall, there was a requirement to document loads of that ammo by message to keep the fleet higher ups in the know on where Newport News 8" was and in what quantities.

In the larger logistical sense it points out the problem of having to cater to one ship's needs while most of the rest of the NGFS force was using 5"/38 or 5"/54 or even 6"/47 rounds.

Standard ammo types make logistics easier.

Newport News was a beautiful ship, though.

Photos from here - USS Newport News Official Website

Kind of a Big Deal: "CNO Announces the Return of Vertical Launch System At-Sea Reloading"

I want to say "about time" but this is a big deal, reported by Hunter Stires at The National Interest Exclusive: CNO Announces the Return of Vertical Launch System At-Sea Reloading:

The U.S. Navy is looking to restore its ability to reload its ships’ vertical launch systems at sea, which could be a dramatic logistical game changer in the planning and execution of high-intensity contingencies against peer competitors.

This encouraging revelation comes from an exclusive one-on-one conversation with Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson following his remarks at the U.S. Naval War College’s 2017 Current Strategy Forum last month.

After discussing the means by which the Navy seeks to ensure its forward-deployed

U.S. Navy photo

naval forces remain survivable and up-to-date with the latest tactical and technological innovation, Admiral Richardson said in reference to vertical launch system (VLS) underway replenishment, “we’re bringing that back.”
***
However, unlike other Navy striking arms like the carrier air wing, vertical launch systems cannot, at present, be practicably resupplied and reloaded while at sea. Once a VLS-equipped ship or submarine expends its missiles, it must withdraw to an equipped friendly port to replenish. This represents a significant operational liability, especially in high-intensity combat scenarios against peer adversaries. U.S. surface combatants currently in service have 80–122 VLS cells per ship, each cell being capable of accommodating either one large-diameter missile (such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, rocket-assisted antisubmarine torpedoes, and SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 Standard Missiles) or four small-diameter Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles for local air defense out to thirty nautical miles.

U.S. Navy by  John L. Beeman

Yes, reloading vertical launcher at sea can be challenging, but it's darn well worth it to keep ships in the fight. As stated by Bryan McGrath in the article,

“In our analysis, we expect surface combatants to quickly expend their VLS magazines even in a small confrontation and need to leave the conflict area to reload.” Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper at the Ferrybridge Group and the Hudson Institute and a coauthor with Clark on the CSBA fleet-architecture study, added that “Distributed Lethality,” the surface fleet’s new doctrine for a more offensive posture, “succeeds or fails on the strength of the logistics that support it. If a ship has to head back to a selected port to reload, it is out of action for an unacceptable period of time.”

Keeping ships on the line is very important.

Now, build more ammo ships.

If You Grow the Fleet, Who Is "Optimizing the US Navy's combat logistics force?"

Prompted by the celebration One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Replenishment at Sea, it's good to remind ourselves that if you want to have world-wide fleet operations, you need to be able to sustain your fleet wherever it is and for as long

 as necessary.

A good history of refueling at sea can be found in Thomas Wildenberg's Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1995 which features this quote:

USNS Supply

Fuel stands first in importance of the resources of the fleet. Without ammunition, a ship may run away, hoping to fight another day but without fuel she can neither run, nor reach her station, nor remain on it, if remote, nor fight.
ALFRED THAYER MAHAN

A partial history of naval logistics in WWII can be found at Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II by Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter.

And more of the WWII story in Ships, Salvage, and Sinews of War: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in Atlantic and Mediterranean Waters During World War II by Rear Admirals Worrall Reed Carter andElmer Ellsworth Duvall USN (Retired).

For the War in Korea, there is Logistics & Support Activities, 1950-1953 --Overview and Selected Views:

Logistics and support activities were vital to the success of U.S. and United Nations Korean War operations. Without extensive and efficient trans-oceanic shipping, the tens of thousands of service people and the hundreds of thousands of tons of "beans, bullets and black oil" needed every month to prosecute the war would never have reached a war zone that was some five thousand miles from the U.S. west coast and about twice that far from eastern seaboard ports. Without underway replenishment of warships off the Korean coast, the effectiveness of Naval forces there would have been substantially reduced. Without well-equipped and effectively-staffed Japanese bases close to the combat theater, sea and air operations against the Communist aggressors would have been gravely hindered, and, during the crisis periods of summer 1950 and winter 1950-51, probably impossible. Without ports and other facilities in South Korea, the insertion and sustenance of the large ground forces needed to defend that country simply could not have been done, and local naval operations would have been hamstrung.

Like much else about the Korean War, its logistics and support effort depended extensively on the legacy of World War II. Transport ships, long-range aircraft and much of the other equipment used in supporting the war had been made during that great conflict and had been wisely retained against the possibility that it might be needed again. The senior officer and enlisted servicemen and civilian sailors and airmen who resurrected the logistics and support system in response to the Korean crisis, and kept it running thereafter, had largely learned their crafts in the struggle against Japan and Germany.

For the Vietnam War, there's Mobility, support, endurance : a story of naval operational logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965-1968 by Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper (Retired):

Over the years a number of general officers and a few flag officers in

USNS Bighorn

positions of responsibility have written their own accounts of what went on during a major war. Quite understandably these have tended to focus mainly on the purely combat features of the war and on overall strategy. The result has often been an unbalanced picture of the total military effort.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to place in proper perspective the logistic support actions upon which the combatant forces and the effectiveness of these forces were totally dependent. It is the coupling of combat strength and logistic support that makes victory possible, whether it be action by a small unit, a major battle, a campaign, a war, or the wide variety of peacetime operations to support the national interest. Thus, along with knowledge of combat activities, one must gain an appreciation of logistics, of its relationship to operations, and the nature of operational logistic actions for a full understanding of a war. Hopefully, this recording of the activities of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, will advance that appreciation, and contribute to a more complete picture of the Vietnam Conflict.

What about going forward? Here's a OR look at the issues as they existed in 2008.

Optimizing the US Navy's combat logistics force by lawofsea on Scribd

If you are wondering about the current Navy combat logistics force, it is now in the Military Sealift Command and the inventory of ships can be found here.

Is sea-going logistics a concern? See this 2014 article by James Holmes, US Surrenders Naval Logistics Supremacy: Without underway replenishment ships, America’s ability to project power in wartime will shrivel.:

If the United States wants to escape the danger zone in its strategic competition with China — disproving Beijing’s fancy that it can rule the Western Pacific — decommissioning the U.S. Navy’s fastest, most capacious combat logistics ships is no way to do it. Just the opposite. It telegraphs that America is no longer serious about fighting far from North America for long spans of time. Competitors will take note.

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: "Sealift Program"

U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command's Sealift Program:

Our Sealift Program provides high-quality, efficient and cost-effective ocean transportation for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies during peacetime and war. More than 90 percent of U.S. war fighters' equipment and supplies travels by sea. The program manages a mix of government-owned and long-term-chartered dry cargo ships and tankers, as well as additional short-term or voyage-chartered ships. By DOD policy, MSC must first look to the U.S - flagged market to meet its sealift requirements. Government-owned ships are used only when suitable U.S.-flagged commercial ships are unavailable.

One high-speed transport vessels recently acquired by our Navy also belong to MSC. USNS Guam (HST 1), formerly MV Huakai, will replace the high-speed vessel Westpac Express, whose mission is to transport military personnel and cargo for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force between Okinawa and other U.S. Pacific Command training sites. The specific mission of USNS Puerto Rico (HST 2) is still being evaluated.

U.S.-flagged commercial tankers, under long-term charter to MSC, transport refined petroleum products for DOD, primarily between commercial refineries and storage and distribution facilities worldwide. Our tankers also perform unique missions such as refueling the National Science Foundation's McMurdo Station in Antarctica and the U.S. Air Force early warning station at Thule Air Base, Greenland.

During wartime or other contingencies, our Navy charters dry cargo ships under contract to MSC to move cargo as needed. These ships carry items that are too large to fit in containers, such as engineering and construction equipment, military vehicles, aircraft and ammunition.

With a shrinking U.S. merchant fleet, the importance of ready and available surge vessels increases each year. The Ready Reserve Force, owned and maintained by the Maritime Administration, provides a resource to offset the shortage of militarily useful U.S.-flagged ships. The RRF consists of fast sealift ships, roll-on/roll-off ships, lighter aboard ships, heavy lift ships, crane ships and government-owned tankers. Maintained in four-, five-, 10- or 20-day readiness status, these ships are activated when needed, fully crewed and placed under the operational control of MSC in support of U.S. wartime, humanitarian and disaster-relief operations. RRF ships are also used for some military exercises.

The MSC Sealift program list of ships:

Sealift Program Ships
Containers and RO/RO
USNS 1st LT Harry L. Martin
USNS LCPL Roy M. Wheat
USNS MAJ Stephen W. Pless
USNS PFC Eugene A. Obregon
USNS SGT Matej Kocak
Dry Cargo
T/B Sea Eagle
High-Speed Transport (HST)
USNS Guam
High-Speed Vessel (HSV)
MV Westpac Express
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off
USNS Benavidez
USNS Bob Hope
USNS Brittin
USNS Fisher
USNS Gilliland
USNS Gordon
USNS Mendonca
USNS Shughart
USNS Watson
USNS Yano
Long-term Chartered Tankers
MT Empire State
MT Evergreen State
MT SLNC Goodwill
MT SLNC Pax
Petroleum Tanker (T5)
USNS Lawrence H. Gianella

With these Sealift ships, the MSC graphic fills in:

The Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Fleet:

The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) program was initiated in 1976 as a subset of the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) to support the rapid worldwide deployment of U.S. military forces. As a key element of Department of Defense (DOD) strategic sealift, the RRF primarily supports transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the critical surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled. The RRF provides nearly one-half of the government-owned surge sealift capability. Management of the RRF program is defined by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DOD and Department of Transportation (DOT).

The MARAD graphic:

With the exception of any ships contracted on an "as needed" to carry U.S. military cargoes, the posts in this series have set out the sea-going logistics force.

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Prepositioned Ships

The U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command has a number of ships staged around the world in anticipation of need, as set out in Prepositioning:

Our Prepositioning Program is an essential element in the U.S. military's readiness strategy. Afloat prepositioning strategically places military equipment and supplies aboard ships located in key ocean areas to ensure rapid availability during a major theater war, a humanitarian operation or other contingency. MSC's 25 prepositioning ships support the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Defense Logistics Agency.

Prepositioning ships provide quick and efficient movement of military gear between operating areas without reliance on other nations' transportation networks. These ships give U.S. regional combatant commanders the assurance that they will have what they need to quickly respond in a crisis - anywhere, anytime. During a contingency, troops are flown into a theater of operations to rapidly employ the cargo from these ships.

Many of MSC's prepositioning ships are able to discharge liquid, containerized or motorized cargo both pier side or while anchored offshore by using floating hoses and shallow-draft watercraft, called lighterage, that are carried aboard. This allows cargo to be ferried to shore in areas where ports are non-existent or in poor condition and gives the nation's military forces the ability to operate in both developed and undeveloped areas of the world.

Prepositioning ships include a combination of U.S. government-owned ships, chartered U.S. - flagged ships and ships activated from the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force. All prepositioning ships are operated by U.S. civilian mariners who work for ship operating companies under contract to the federal government.

While most active ships in MSC's Prepositioning Program strategically place combat gear at sea, there are other ships, including:

• The Mobile Landing Platform, a new class of ships designed to serve as a mobile sea-base option that provides our Navy fleet with a critical access infrastructure supporting the flexible deployment of forces and supplies

• Two offshore petroleum distribution system ships that can deliver fuel from up to eight miles offshore; and

• Zero aviation logistics support ships that are activated as needed from reduced operating status to provide at-sea maintenance for Marine Corps fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

Ship Types

Maritime Prepositioning Force ships strategically position supplies for the U.S. Marine Corps at sea. These ships are laden with a variety of Marine Corps equipment and supplies, including tanks, ammunition, food, water, cargo, hospital equipment, petroleum products and spare parts - ready for rapid delivery ashore when needed.

MPF ships are organized into two Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadrons, each comprising four to six MPF ships as well as additional prepositioning ships dedicated to other military services. Each MPS squadron carries sufficient equipment and supplies to sustain more than 16,000 Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Navy personnel for up to 30 days.

Army Prepositioned Stock-3 ships strategically place U.S. Army combat equipment at sea to supply and sustain deployed U.S. troops during national crises. Five of the APS-3 ships are government-owned cargo ships, called large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships, or LMSRs. Each ship has a cargo-carrying capacity of more than 300,000 square feet.

LMSRs are ideal for the rapid loading and off-loading of Army wheeled and tracked vehicles, as well as other outsized Army equipment. A series of internal and external ramps makes this possible, and shipboard cranes allow cargo to be lifted without relying on local port infrastructure. In addition to LMSRs, APS-3 ships include two container ships that store ammunition at sea for the Army.

Navy, Defense Logistics Agency and Air Force ships (NDAF) are the most diverse subset of MSC's prepositioning program. These ships operate around the world in support of the Department of Defense services and agencies.

Ship descriptions:

Air Force:

Provide Air Force with prepositioned ammunition stocks.

Army:

Provide 30 days sustainment for an Army Brigade Combat Team.

Dry Cargo/Ammunition:

Ships provide ammunition, food, repair parts, stores and small quantities of fuel for the U.S. Marine Corps.

Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off:

Part of the Prepositioning Program, MSC's largest sealift ships preposition Army stocks and are also available to move common user cargo.

Maritime Prepositioning Force Containers, RO/RO and LMSR:

Combines the enhanced prepositioning capabilities with modifications to provide a multi-mission vessel to the unified commander.

Mobile Landing Platforms:

Provides logistics movement from sea to shore supporting a broad range of military operations.

Offshore Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS):

Transfers fuel from a tanker to depots ashore from up to eight miles off the coast.

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Where We Were, Where We Are

Let's take a stroll back in time to 1971. As the Vietnam war was coming to an end and while the Cod War was still "hot," the U.S. Navy had 752 active ships of various types.  You might note that this was down from 932 ships in 1968. To support the surface combatants and aircraft carriers, the 1971 Navy had 177 "auxiliary" ships, which included ammunition ships (AE), fleet oilers (AO), fast replenishment ships (AOE and AOR), stores ships (AFS), destroyer tenders (AD), and others. In June, 1971, the Navy counted 262 "surface warships."

As you can see from the following chart, in September 2015, the "surface warships" of the Navy numbered 99.

By way of explanation of the numbers of auxiliaries, there is this note:

To clarify the ship numbers included in this table, the year 2000 entries include active commissioned ships, those in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) and ships operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Row entries are self-explanatory, with the auxiliary category including combat logistic ships (such as oilers, ammunition, combat store ships), mobile logistics ships (such as submarine tenders) and support ships (such as command, salvage, tugs and research ships). Command ships have been subsumed into that category and the separate line entry removed. A new row has been added for guided missile submarines (SSGN).

When the Navy offers up The Status of the Navy on its website, you have to understand that that"deployable battle force ships" category includes roughly 2/3 of the fleet that are not "surface warships." Certainly, the submarine force composes a warship category of 72 ships. Due to their unique abilities, these submarines are not dependent on the same sort of logistics train that is required by aircraft carriers and surface combatants.

Operating under U.S. Transportation Command under the Military Sealift Command, the U.S. Navy maintains a fleet of logistics ships:

MSC safely operates, supplies, and maintains the ships that provide logistics support, conduct special missions, move military equipment, supply combat forces, provide humanitarian relief, and strategically position combat cargo around the world.

Combat Logistics Force

Combat Logistics Force
Ships Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships
USNS Alan Shepard
USNS Amelia Earhart
USNS Carl Brashear
USNS Cesar Chavez
USNS Charles Drew
USNS Matthew Perry
USNS Medgar Evers
USNS Richard E. Byrd
USNS Robert E. Peary
USNS Wally Schirra
USNS Washington Chambers
USNS William McLean

Fast Combat Support Ships
USNS Arctic
USNS Supply

Fleet Replenishment Oilers
USNS Big Horn
USNS Guadalupe
USNS Henry J. Kaiser
USNS John Ericsson
USNS John Lenthall
USNS Joshua Humphreys
USNS Kanawha
USNS Laramie
USNS Leroy Grumman
USNS Patuxent
USNS Pecos
USNS Rappahannock
USNS Tippecanoe
USNS Walter S. Diehl
USNS Yukon

Prepositioning Ships
Air Force Containers
MV MAJ Bernard F Fisher
MV CAPT David I Lyon
Army Containers
MV SSG Edward A. Carter, Jr.
MV LTC John U. D. Page
Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships
USNS Lewis and Clark
USNS Sacagawea
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off
USNS Charlton
USNS Pomeroy
USNS Red Cloud
USNS Soderman
USNS Watkins
Maritime Prepositioning Force Containers, RO/RO and LMSR
USNS 2ND LT John P. Bobo
USNS SGT William R. Button
USNS Dahl
USNS 1st LT Baldomero Lopez
USNS 1st LT Jack Lummus
USNS Pililaau
USNS Seay
USNS Sisler
USNS GYSGT Fred W. Stockham
USNS PFC Dewayne T. Williams
Mobile Landing Platforms
USNS John Glenn
USNS Montford Point
Offshore Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS)
USNS Fast Tempo
USNS Vadm K. R. Wheeler

The 31 ships in blue are capable of replenishment at sea. As such, they are vital to the "surface warships" and aircraft carriers of the fleet, as they allow those ships to remain at sea while conducting combat operations. The logistics ships provide food, munitions (including for aircraft), and fuel for ships and aircraft.

Dry Cargo/Ammuntion ships:

Deliver supplies to customer ships at sea — ammunition, food, repair

parts, stores and small quantities of fuel. Replace T-AE, T-AFS and T-AOE when operating with T-AO. Two dedicated ships* provide ammunition, food, repair parts, stores and small quantities of fuel for the U.S. Marine Corps.

Those dedicated ships are Sacajawea and Lewis and Clark.

Fast Cargo Support Ships:

Deliver petroleum products, ammunition, food and other cargo to customer ships at sea. MSC's largest combat logistics ships.

Fleet Replenishment Oilers:

Provide underway replenishment of fuel, fleet cargo and stores to customer ships at sea.

The question posed by Bryan McGrath quoted in the first installment of this series is whether this combat logistics force is large enough to support even our limited number of surface warships in a large scale conflict.

One of the concerns is the vast distances that may need to be covered by a "train" of logistics ships if local supplies of food, fuel and munitions are not available. To circle back to those Vietnam days, the U.S. had a very large logistics base in Subic Bay, Philippines. Subic was very short sail from the Vietnam coast, so a replenishment ship could leave the Gulf of Tonkin, go to Subic and be back on line within a week. If those ships had have to transit to Guam, Hawaii or the U.S., the transit times would have been much longer and more ships would have been required to maintain the same level of fleet support that the logistics force provided during that war, which saw extensive use of both ships' guns and bombs from aircraft.

While more recent operations probably have seen fewer bombs used because they are mainly precision guided weapons compared to the mostly "dumb" bombs of the Vietnam war, there has been virtually no used of naval gunfire in recent years. Instead, the Navy has used lots of  missiles. Replacements for expended missiles can be transferred at sea, but reloading the VLS cells at sea has not been a U.S. Navy skill set (see here). One of the advantages of the new rail guns that will someday introduced to the fleet will be that there will be no need for ships so equipped to carry more than the projectiles that the rail guns fire, and the space now needed for powder can be used for additional projectile storage. Propelling ships using nuclear power (carriers, especially) saves the need to refuel them, though their aircraft still need the oilers for their fuel (which is why you see oilers alongside carriers). Food and parts will always be needed.

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Naval Logistics Defined and Implemented

From Administration of the Navy Department in World War II [Chapter 18]

The word "logistics" did not come into common usage in the English language until comparatively recent times, although it was employed in French and German military parlance long before it was used in English. In 1888, Alfred T. Mahan used the term in his address on "The Object of the United States Naval War College" but with a meaning much more limited than its later connotations. He said:

"Between strategy and grand tactics comes logically logistics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics is the art of moving armies; it brings the troops to the point of action and controls questions of supply; grand tactics decides the methods of giving battle. There are obvious differences of condition between armies and fleets that must modify the scope of the word logistics, which it yet may be convention to retain."

The use of the single word "logistics," to denote the very broad field of planning and implementation necessary to give effect to the strategy and tactics of naval warfare, seems first to have been accorded formal recognition by the Naval War College in a lecture by Commander C.T. Vogelgesang, U.S.N. during its 1911 Summer Conference.

In its broadest sense "logistics" signifies the total process by which a nation's resources in men and materials are mobilized and employed to achieve military ends. Logistics ha been officially defined as:

"Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of matériel; induction, classification, training, assignment, separation, movement, evacuation and welfare of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. It comprises both planning (including determination of requirements) and implementation."

A simpler and in some respects a more satisfactory definition is the one given by Major Cyrus Thorpe, USMC, in his booklet, Pure Logistics, "Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military operation; logistics provides the means therefor."
***
Elements of Logistics

Logistics tasks, whether concerned with men materials, or services, have certain elements that are common to all. These are the planning and determining of requirements, procurement of matériel, and finally the distribution of men and things to the combat areas and Operating Forces. The elements of requirement, determination and distribution (the what, when, and where of logistics) may be viewed as the consumer segment of logistics; procurement n the other hand as the producer segment, sharp line of demarcation between the two elements cannot, however, be drawn, as they are interdependent, and must be closely integrated if logistic tasks are to be carried out efficiently and economically. Consumer logistics is essentially a command prerogative and responsibility; producer logistics a staff function The latter is concerned principally with the procurement aspects of logistics.

Here's good read on WWII logistics, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II by Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter

Also Ships, Salvage, and Sinews of War and Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps 1940-1946

The key, however, is to remember that no fleet or force can sustain operations without a sound logistics plan and the assets to carry out that logistics plan.

When ships changed from coal to oil fuel, some far-sighted officers developed practical methods to refuel ships while underway. The following document is a joint U.S. Maritime Administration and Historic American Engineering Record effort to document that remarkable achievement - one that Admiral Nimitz called "The Navy's Secret Weapon."

MARAD US Navy Oilers and Tankers HAER Report by lawofsea on Scribd

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak Begins with a Plan

A hallmark of the U.S. Navy is its ability operate for long periods of time away from its own shores. The ability to sustain such operations involves logistics, which, as we all know, is what professionals talk about when amateurs are discussing other things.

How do we plan to sustain our forces? Is the current logistics force large enough to support a far-flung fleet?

Some say it is not - for example, Bryan McGrath in his "You're Gonna Need a Bigger Boat": Principles for Getting the U.S Navy Right wrote:

Logistics, logistics, logistics. Because Navy leadership seems to agree that the Navy needs to grow and be more widely distributed geographically, it is rational to consider the logistics necessary to support such a fleet. Today’s logistics force is pitifully small to support even the peacetime operations of our too small Navy. Should that fleet be called into war, we would quickly realize that our reach exceeds our grasp and that the culprit is insufficient prepositioning, forward-based ship repair and re-arming capacity, and oilers and other logistics ships designed to supply the fleet. Navy leaders must account for both the actual requirement and combat attrition, the latter of which has been (in my experience) consistently hand-waved in previous force structure assessments.

Well, then, we'll spend a week looking at U.S. Navy logistics. A good place to start is with a plan:

U.S. Navy: Naval Logistics Integration 2011-2015 Strategic Plan by lawofsea on Scribd

Well, it's a start.

Other item of interest:
Naval Operations Concept 2010
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Friday Fun Film: "Supply - Lifeblood of Seapower" (1959)

Saved by Periscope Film

Created in 1959, this documentary film profiles the U.S. Navy's Supply Corps. and shows the varied activities of its personnel. Modern punchcard computers are seen in the film (00:09:35:00 and 00:12:00:00) in a segment where a "vital part" is located in the supply point warehouse and sent to the fleet via a long chain of logistics.

The Supply Corps of the United States Navy traces its beginnings to February 23, 1795 when the nation's first Purveyor of Public Supplies, Tench Francis, Jr., was appointed by President George Washington. The Supply Corps is one of the oldest staff corps in the U.S. Navy. Supply Corps officers are concerned with supply, logistics, combat support, readiness, contracting and fiscal issues. The official motto of the Supply Corps is "Ready for Sea" - reflecting the Supply Corps' longstanding role in sustaining warfighting. The motto derives from the traditional report from each Department Head of a ship to the Captain prior to getting underway. The tradtional form is "Good Morning, Captain, The Supply Department is ready for sea in all respects."

Commissioned officers in the Supply Corps are schooled and experienced in a variety of disciplines such as supply management and expeditionary logistics, inventory control, disbursement, financial management, contracting, information systems, operations analysis, material and operational logistics, fuels management, food service and physical distribution.

Supply Corps officers can be members of a ship or shore activity's supply department or can be billeted into supply units/commands - such as the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG), Fleet Logistics Centers (FLCs) or Navy Special Warfare (SPECWAR) Logistics Groups which support the United States Navy SEALs. Supply Corps officers can command supply units. A Supply Corps officer is always the Commanding Officer of a Naval Cargo Handling Battalion - groups charged with stevedoring and logistics whose constituent companies are led by both Supply Corps and Civil Engineer Corps officers. Supply Corps officers also serve in forward deployed land-based units - such as the Seabees - working alongside Civil Engineer Corps officers and with the Marine Corps.

The Hidden Side of the U.S. Navy: Military Sealift Command

On Sunday 20 July 2014, we had a discussion on Midrats with Salvatore R. Mercogliano, Ph.D. about the "Military Sealift Command - Past, Present and Future." Many of you may have heard of MSC, but not know all that much about it. So, if you missed the show, here's a chance to catch up:

Online Military Radio at Blog Talk Radio with Midrats on BlogTalkRadio

Professor Sal also sent along this PowerPoint presentation that helps further the discussion:

MSC Background

Professionals talk logistics.

Because tactics and strategy are driven by it.

Friday Fun Film: "History of Refueling at Sea"

Nice All Hands video:



Logistics, logistics, logistics.

Golden Oldies of Logistics at Sea

A look at the U.S. Navy at war in 1968, focusing on the logistics train:



Except that certain "politically incorrect" items would not now be allowed on ships and that there are now women at sea, the underlying principles haven't changed all that much.