Revisiting an Important Topic: Midrats Episode 358: Seapower as a National Imperative, with Bryan McGrath

Listen to "Episode 358: Seapower as a National Imperative, with Bryan McGrath" on Spreaker.

Sea Power Logistics: Fourth Arm of Defense:Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War by Salvatore R. Mercogliano

Free pdf download of a short book by Salvatore R. Mercogliano at Naval History and Heritage Command Fourth Arm of Defense

Fourth Arm of Defense describes the role of America’s Navy and the U.S. Merchant Marine in the logistics support of the conflict in Southeast Asia. The Fourth Arm of Defense details the deployment of Army and allied troops to the combat theater by the Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service (later Military Sealift Command); development of port facilities and cargo-handling procedures in South Vietnam; the dangerous and sometimes deadly effort to deliver ammunition, fuel, and other supplies to Saigon and other ports far upriver; maintenance of the 5,000-mile logistics pipeline across the vast Pacific Ocean; employment of revolutionary cargo container and roll on/roll off ships; and the maritime evacuations from South Vietnam and Cambodia. The work describes the service and sacrifice of American sailors and the men of the U.S. Merchant Marine and many other countries who braved tempestuous seas and ports and rivers subject to attack by mine-laden Viet Cong ambushes. The work is amply illustrated with more than 80 photographs, maps, and a list of suggested readings. This publication will be of interest and value to those scholars, veterans, and students of the Vietnam War and the role of the Navy and the U.S. merchant marine in that conflict.

This is a valuable update to the list set out in If You Grow the Fleet, Who Is "Optimizing the US Navy's combat logistics force?"

Our 2014 interview with Professor Mercogliano on Midrats:


You might also find "Logistics Week" from 2016 interesting - at theses posts:

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak Begins with a Plan;

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Naval Logistics Defined and Implemented;

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: Prepositioned Ships;


Friday Films: USNS Jack Lummus Offloading Marine Gear and "Land the Landing Force" (1967);

Logistics Week at EagleSpeak: "Sealift Program".

Getting Out of the Gulf? Letting the Arabian Gulf Countries Fend for Themselves in Letting Oil Flow

Behind the pay wall at Foreign Affairs is this think piece by Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic Getting Out of the Gulf: Oil and U.S. Military Strategy which is really not about military strategy, but about national strategy for the Persian Gulf. This means tracing our involvement back to President Jimmy Carter:

In January 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter used his State of the Union address to announce that in order to protect “the free movement of Middle East oil,” the United States would repel “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf.” Carter and his successors made good on that pledge, ramping up U.S. military capabilities in the region and even fighting the Gulf War to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from dominating the region’s oil supplies. Although Washington has had a number of interests in the Persian Gulf over the years, including preventing nuclear proliferation, fighting terrorism, and spreading democracy, the main rationale for its involvement has always been to keep the oil flowing.

The authors point out that the world has changed since 1980 and pose a multi-billion dollar question:

Is Persian Gulf oil still worth defending with American military might?

I should note that back in 2004, I posited the need to plan a curtailment of Middle East oil in Contingency Planning 101: Preparing for an world oil shortage:

[A]n oil shortage may impel more rapid adoption of alternative fuel sources, including natural gas, hydrogen, nuclear power. Coal, of which the U.S. has a lot, can be "gasified".

Gasification, in fact, may be one of the best ways to produce clean-burning hydrogen for tomorrow's automobiles and power-generating fuel cells. Hydrogen and other coal gases can also be used to fuel power-generating turbines or as the chemical "building blocks" for a wide range of commercial products.

The authors of the Foreign Affairs article suggest:

First, if the United States ended its commitment, how much likelier would a major disruption of Gulf oil be? Second, how much damage would such a disruption inflict on the U.S. economy? Third, how much does the United States currently spend on defending the flow of Gulf oil with its military? Finally, what nonmilitary alternatives exist to safeguard against a disruption, and at what price? Answering these questions reveals that the costs of preventing a major disruption of Gulf oil are, at the very least, coming close to exceeding the expected benefits of the policy. So it’s time for the United States to give itself the option of ending its military commitment to protecting Gulf oil, by increasing its investment in measures that would further cushion the U.S. economy from major oil disruptions. And in a decade or so, unless the region becomes far more dangerous, the United States should be in a position to actually end its commitment.

They suggest some sort of economic disruption:

Assessments of the U.S. economy’s sensitivity to oil prices also vary widely, but a reasonable estimate is that a doubling of the price of oil would shrink U.S. GDP by three percent—or approximately $550 billion. Of course, smaller disruptions would result in smaller economic losses, and the most catastrophic disruption—a long, complete closing of the Strait of Hormuz—would cause larger ones.

But the actual costs to the United States would be far smaller, because Washington could draw on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its emergency underground oil stockpile, to relieve the pressure on prices. The roughly 700 million barrels currently stored in the SPR form part of the more than four billion barrels held by members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organization founded in 1974 to coordinate collective responses to major oil disruptions.

What all of this means is that if the world experienced a massive disruption of oil from the Persian Gulf, a coordinated international release of various reserves could initially replace the vast majority of the daily loss. In all but the worst-case scenarios—far more severe than anything seen before—the impact of a severe disruption would be greatly cushioned.

What they do not discuss is the cushioning effect of the U.S.'s increased oil and gas reserves through the use of new drilling techniques and fracking - there is simply no mention in the article that the U.S. is thought by some to be the leader in energy reserves, as set out in in Oil Price.com's "U.S. Has World’s Largest Oil Reserves":

The U.S. holds more oil reserves than anyone else in the world, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela.

That conclusion comes from a new independent estimate from Rystad Energy, a Norwegian consultancy. Rystad estimates that the U.S. holds 264 billion barrels of oil, more than half of which is located in shale. That total exceeds the 256 billion barrels found in Russia, and the 212 billion barrels located in Saudi Arabia.

The findings are surprising, and go against conventional wisdom that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela hold the world’s largest oil reserves. The U.S. Energy Information Administration, for example, pegs Venezuela’s oil reserves at 298 billion barrels, the largest in the world. Rystad Energy says that these are inflated estimates because much of those reserves are not discovered. Instead, Rystad estimates that Venezuela only has about 95 billion barrels, which includes its estimate for undiscovered oil fields.

Some analysis is less aggressive in assessing U.S. reserves, because of a matter of "proven" reserves:

Proven oil reserves are those that have a reasonable certainty of being recoverable under existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology.

Let's parse that a little. The key part of the quote being "existing economic and political conditions," which exactly what we have seen play out with the reserves unleashed by fracking and unconventional technology being applied to the oil patch - as the price of oil from outside the U.S. rose, the ability and affordability of U.S. drillers to develop fields not cost effective under lower prices also rose. Now, as experience in using such techniques has grown, that "price point" has dropped, much to the regret of OPEC, which no longer has real cartel power over oil prices. See Why OPEC can't stop the shale oil industry:

Just as a cartel benefits from cutting output to raise price, it suffers from raising output to lower price. This would not be true if it could permanently eliminate competitors by temporarily lowering prices, but that is not the case here. The shale oil industry is resilient and flexible – just as it can be pushed out of the market by very low prices, it can promptly get back into the market when prices improve. So an extended attempt by OPEC to close down the shale industry is a lose-lose situation, and as such is very unlikely to happen.

Perhaps this is a minor quibble, concerning the article, but the point I am attempting to make is that the economic impact of U.S. withdrawal from the Gulf may not be anything close to what is predicted in the article. In fact, it may further increase U.S. development of its own reserves and in alternatives (hydrogen fuels?) which may not be cost-effective in "existing economic and political conditions, with existing technology" but which may spur new technology and which would certainly increase American jobs for Americans, which, after all, is a pretty important governmental concern.

Now, let's circle back a little.

The U.S. government, in part due to the "Carter Doctrine", has maintained a very expensive presence

in the Arabian Gulf.

The authors of the article pose the right questions - "Is it still in the U.S. interest to expend any effort in guarding those oil sea lines of communication that flow out of the Arabian Gulf? In whose vital national interests is it to keep sending aircraft carriers and other ships to attempt to preserve the status quo in the Arab/Persian Middle East? Is it time for the U.S. to remove itself from the Gulf? Whose interests would be served by our doing so?"

Would Iran establish the regional hegemony it seems to so strongly desire? Would the Chinese rush in to replace the U.S.? Or would the Chinese be concerned that the U.S. might suddenly free up a large portion of its Navy to be deployed to other areas that, 36 years after Mr. Carter's speech, are now of much greater interest to the U.S.?

I would argue that the new administration should take a close look at these issues and at the issues raised by the "You broke it, you fix it" attitudes in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have thrown a lot of time, talent and money into trying to convert those states into something that looks like us. It is time to rethink our goals and leave the inhabitants of the region to sort themselves out? Are we doomed to play Sisyphus and keep trying to push uphill the burden that no one in the area seems ready to take up? Is it time for us to engage in a little "benign neglect" and back off?

Is it time to postulate a policy built more on "punitive expeditions" than on nation building? See Intervention in International Law (1921) (pdf):

When the territorial sovereign is too weak or is unwilling to enforce respect for international law, a state which is wronged may find it necessary to invade the territory and to chastise the individuals who violate its rights and threaten its security.

Had we smashed the Taliban in Afghanistan for their support of al Qaeda and then left with a stern warning that we would come back again should they continue in their evil ways, would we have been better off?

If we had gone after Saddam Hussein in 1991 and punished him for his violations of international law, would we have had to go back?

With a new administration coming, now is the time to ask such questions, and set national strategy accordingly.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 27 September - 26 October 2016

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 27 September - 26 October... by lawofsea on Scribd

On Midrats 3 April 2016, Episode 326: Undersea Lawfare with RADM Johnson, USN (Ret) and CAPT Palmer, USN

Please join us at 5pm (EDT) on 3 April 2016 for Midrats Episode 326: Undersea Lawfare with RADM Johnson, USN (Ret) and CAPT Palmer, USN

DARPA image

Since its ascendency to the premier maritime power, the US Navy - especially in the area of undersea warfare - has been at the leading edge of using technology to get a military edge.

During the Cold War, significant and steady progress in the first two steps of the kill chain against submarines, location and tracking, made the prospect of engaging superior numbers of Soviet submarine forces manageable.

We continue that tradition today, but to keep ahead of growing challenges, we have test. Build a little, test a little, learn a lot will stop dead in its tracks without testing in the real world. Computer simulation is only so good.

When it comes to submarines especially, you have to get in the water with them.

Knowing our technological track record an operating a generation or two ahead of some potential adversaries - are there ways they can negate our edge - or at least buy time while they catch up?

Are we vulnerable to potential challengers using national and international law against us? Undersea Lawfare?

Our guests for the full hour to discuss will be Rear Admiral J. Michael "Carlos" Johnson, USN (Ret.) and Captain Michael T. Palmer, USN.

As a stepping off point, we will be using their article in the latest Naval War College Review: UNDERSEA LAWFARE - Can the US Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetrical Warfare Threat?

RADM Johnson retired after 33 years of service as a naval aviator that included combat in Vietnam, Libya, the Balkans, and the Persian Gulf. He commanded the John F. Kennedy Battle Group, CVW-8, and VFA-86. Ashore he served on the staffs of the CNO as Director of Aviation Plans and Requirements) and the J3 of EUCOM.

Captain Palmer is an active-duty JAG and an adjunct assistant professor at ODU. Her has served as environmental counsel to the CNO; U.S. Fleet Forces Command; and Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic.

Listen live or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can find the show later on our iTunes page.

Time to Re-Read "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower"

Let's start off 2016 with a brief visit to the basics, as in recalling the March 2015 revision to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, introduced as follows (excuse the caps, they are from the Navy-provided transcript):

MARITIME LEADERS FROM THE U.S. NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND COAST GUARD UNVEILED AN UPDATE TO THE COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEA POWER MARCH 13TH. THIS STRATEGY UPDATE IS DESIGNED TO HELP U.S. FORCES ADAPT TO CURRENT WORLD AND TECHNOLOGICAL SITUATIONS.

"THAT IT REALLY DEFINES WHAT YOU'RE DOING TODAY, WHAT THE PEOPLE THAT I HIGHLY ADMIRE AND RESPECT ARE DOING OUT AND AROUND THE WORLD BEING WHERE IT MATTERS, WHEN IT MATTERS.THIS CODIFIES THE EFFORTS OF OUR SAILORS OUT AND AROUND TODAY."

"THE BIGGEST CHANGE IS THE OTHER DOMAIN IN WHICH WE OPERATE, THAT'S THE CYBER DOMAIN. IT IS EXPLICIT IN EVERY LINE OF OPERATION THAT WE CONDUCT TODAY. ONE FROM A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE CYBER DOMAIN ISN'T COMPROMISED."

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century

By the way, if you want to read A. T. Mahan's Influence of Seapower of History Upon History (1660-1783), you can find it for free here. I also recommend reading B. J. Armstrong's 21st Century Mahan but unless your library carries it, you might have to pay for it (Kindle version is about $13).

Another free book on Maritime Strategy is Sir Julian Stafford Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

You might have heard mention of these books on our Midrats podcasts, including the latest show Episode 313: Fleet Architecture and Strategic Efficiency with Barney Rubel.

Somewhere along the way you might want to consider, that level of war often called "operational":

The operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations. See also campaign.

Campaign

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander's objective, normally within a given time or space. See also operational level of war.

Have fun.

USNS Yukon,  U.S. Navy photo by Jason D. Landon

Oh, and don't forget - logistics, logistics, logistics. It's not enough to field a force if you can't sustain it and its operations.

A nice look back at WWII sea logistics in Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II in the introduction to which Admiral Spruance wrote:

A sound logistic plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

In a war, one operation normally follows another in a theater and each one is dependent upon what has preceded it and what is anticipated. The logistic planning has to fit into and accompany the operational planning. The two must be closely coordinated, and the planners for each must look as far into the future as they can in order to anticipate and prepare for what lies ahead.

Got all that?

Have fun!