A War with China? Fleet Size and Other Options

Sam Tangredi, writing in USNI Proceedings January 2023 issue sends a warning shot across the bow of some current naval thinking by looking at history Bigger Fleet Win:

Using technological advantage as an indicator of quality, historical research on 28 naval wars (or wars with significant and protracted naval combat) indicates that 25 were won by the side with the larger fleet. When fleet size was roughly equal, superior strategy and substantially better trained and motivated crews carried the day. Only three could be said to have been won by a smaller fleet with superior technology. (footnotes omitted)

As set out at CNN,

Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy at King’s College in London, praised Tangredi’s work.

“His research is a very good way to push back on the silly assumption that mass doesn’t matter in war at sea,” Patalano said.

He stressed two key points.

A larger size means more leaders looking to gain the edge in their commands.

“A larger fleet tend to be more competitive, in training personnel development, and operational capacity,” Patalano said.

And he said a large industrial base is essential, especially in being able to build new units after incurring casualties in battle.

“In naval war, attrition is a real thing, so the ability to replace is vital,” Patalano said.

But wait, there's more - concern over the ability of U.S. Defense industry to gear up to produce the quantity of ships (and weapons) needed:

“Most analysts doubt that the US defense industry — which has consolidated and shrunk since the end of the Cold War — could expand quickly enough to meet wartime demand,” Tangredi wrote.

***

Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of US Fleet Forces Command, last week called on the nation’s defense industries to step up their game, saying “you’re not delivering the ordnance we need.”

“It’s so essential to winning. And I can’t do that without the ordnance,” Caudle said at a symposium in Washington, adding that the US is “going against a competitor here, and a potential adversary, that is like nothing we’ve ever seen.”

In an online forum last week, Caudle’s boss, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday, also noted the numbers problem the US faces in a potential Pacific conflict.

“The United States Navy is not going to be able to match the PLAN missile for missile,” Gilday said.

And if the US Navy can’t match China’s missile for missile, or ship for ship, Tangredi wonders where it can find an edge.

“US leaders must ask themselves to what extent they are willing to bet on technological — without numerical — superiority in that fight,” he wrote.

The CNN reporting, though surprising good, leaves out some key parts of Tangredi's USNI article, referring to Wayne Hughes and Robert P. Girrier:

Inspired by Professor Hughes’ work, my decades of research have brought me to this conclusion: In a naval struggle between near-peers, mass (numbers), and the ability to replace losses bests technological advantage. As the mass of one opponent grows, the chance of its defeat reduces. At a certain point of imbalance in mass, the larger naval force cannot be defeated, even when the opponent attacks effectively first in any one engagement.

***

One might assume that superior ship capabilities rather than mass can provide this effectiveness. But that is not what operations research indicates. As Naval Warfare Publication 3: Fleet Warfare notes: “Hughes’ salvo equations indicate that twice as many shooters beats half as many equivalent shooters firing twice as fast.”

***

If the United States wants to retain global influence, maintain deterrence in multiple regions, and conduct combat operations against a near peer that is expanding its global military footprint, it needs a large number of naval platforms. Today, the peacetime demand of the regional combatant commanders overwhelms the availability of deployable Navy ships.

In addition, a reserve of naval platforms is necessary to replace losses. In World War II, the reserve was the ability to build ships at speed. Today, most analysts doubt that the U.S. defense industry—which has consolidated and shrunk since the end of the Cold War—could expand quickly enough to meet wartime demand. To replace losses in a protracted conflict, the United States would need numbers of ships already in commission.

***

The United States can fund a significant fleet that matches the growth of the PLA Navy—or not. Whether the fleet is 250 or 500 ships is for elected officials and the Navy to decide, but those leaders must identify, acknowledge, and own that risk. There is risk in all choices. But there is particularly higher risk in making choices based on unproven assumptions.

***

A naval war against China in the western Pacific in this decade would pit a smaller U.S. naval force against a larger PLAN, on China’s home turf, within range of the PLA’s air and rocket forces. U.S. leaders must ask themselves to what extent they are willing to bet on technological—without numerical—superiority in that fight.

Though I believe that any war with China will be very much one that is won or lost on the sea, it seems that there is at least some analysis of the effect of shore-based anti-ship missiles controlled by the U.S and its allies that needs to be added into the equation - for as Wayne Hughes and Robert P. Girrier suggest in Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations(3rd ed), battles in the open ocean are rare, but battles inshore are not, and with the current state of land based anti-ship missiles, naval forces do not just have to contend with opposing fleets but with "forts"

Today a "fort" can be an airfield or the launch site for a a missile battery. Either of these can be repaired or rebuilt quickly, but a warship cannot.(p26)

China has the potential home field advantage in that respect, but the U.S. can place more "shooters" ashore and create their own "forts" that create a threat to the PLAN - which is exactly what the U.S. Marine Corps is proposing to do with its Force Design 2030:

NMESIS

 

We will equip our Marines with mobile, low-signature sensors and weapons that can provide a landward complement to Navy capabilities for surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air and missile defense, and airborne early warning. And in partnership with the Navy, our unit will possess littoral maneuver capabilities to include high-speed, long-range, low-signature craft capable of maneuvering Marines for a variety of missions.

The key to this is "Stand-in Forces."

Stand-in Forces Defined

SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary. Depending on the situation, stand-in forces are composed of elements from the Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, special operations forces, interagency, and allies and partners.

Theory of Success

In day-to-day activity, SIF deter potential adversaries by establishing the forward edge of a partnered maritime defense-in-depth that denies the adversary freedom of action.12 The impact of working with allies and partners cannot be overstated; it is key to undermining the adversary’s plans and is a primary reason stand-in forces’ presence must be persistent. SIF also deter by integrating activities with the other elements of national power (particularly diplomatic and informational) to impose costs on rivals who want to use ways and means below the violence threshold to achieve their goals.

Stand-in forces’ enduring function is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition continuum. Stand-in forces do this by gaining and maintaining contact (establishing target custody and identifying the potential adversary’s sensors) below the threshold of violence. This allows SIF to assist in identifying and countering malign behavior, and if armed conflict does erupt, the joint force can attack effectively first and prevent the enemy from doing so.

When directed, SIF conduct sea denial operations in support of fleet operations, especially near maritime chokepoints. SIF can perform sea denial through the use of organic sensors and weapon systems to complete kill webs, but also by integrating organic capabilities with naval and joint all-domain capabilities. SIF also possess sufficient organic maneuver and offensive capability to gain a position of advantage by securing, seizing, and controlling contested key maritime terrain in support of sea denial operations.

By doing the above, SIF become an operational problem an enemy must address to achieve its goals. SIF impose costs on the enemy by presenting operationally relevant capabilities that cannot be ignored, even as their low signature, high mobility, dispersion, and use of deception make them difficult for an enemy to find and target. Their small footprint and focus on partnership make SIF less burdensome on the host nation than larger U.S. formations.

I fully support the Marines in this concept. We could quibble some aspects, but the main thing is get them what they need - now - to make it a reality because it has the potential to change the equations of "fleet size." Add in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Coast Guard and there may be way out of China's spider web. Heck, I can see the Army setting up "forts" too. The more the merrier.

Battle of Midway Begins - 80 Years Ago - One of the Greatest Sea Battles

Yes, the sound quality is a little rough, but the images in this version are the clearest I have seen.

Update - less clear, but smoother:

Not So Subtle -- "Let's Send a Message in the Strait of Hormuz"

Prepared to counter potential small boat swarms when transiting near a minor annoyance:

STRAIT OF HORMUZ (Aug. 12, 2019) An AH-1Z Viper helicopter attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 163 (Reinforced), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) takes off during a strait transit aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4). The Boxer Amphibious Ready Group and the 11th MEU are deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dalton S. Swanbeck/Released)STRAIT OF HORMUZ (Aug. 12, 2019) 

You might note that "manned mobile gun platform" on the elevator behind the helicopters.

On Midrats 5 Feb 2017 - Episode 370: The SECNAV's In Basket With James Holmes

Please join us at 5pm EST on 5 Feb 2017 for Midrats Episode 370: The SECNAV's In Basket With James Holmes:

There will be no rest for the next Secretary of the Navy. He will need to lead his Navy and Marine Corps as they continue to engage in the Long War against expansionist Islamic extremism, while at the same time come up with the best way to respond to the new direction and guidance coming from President Trump and Secretary of Defense Mattis.

From China, to Russia, to Europe, the Islamic world to South America and India on one side of the house, to Congress, academia, and industry - what are those subjects tha the needs to tackle first, which need to be put on a slow boil, and which ones need to be thrown over the transom?

We have for the full hour to discuss this and more, returning guest James Holmes, PhD.

Dr. Holmes is a professor of strategy and former visiting professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College. A former U.S. Navy surface-warfare officer and combat veteran of the first Gulf War, he served as a weapons and engineering officer in the battleship Wisconsin, engineering and firefighting instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and military professor of strategy at the Naval War College. He was the last gunnery officer to fire a battleship’s big guns in anger.

Jim is a Phi Beta Kappa received his BA from Vanderbilt University and completed graduate work at Salve Regina University , Providence College, and received his PhD at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

His most recent books (with long-time coauthor Toshi Yoshihara) are Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age and Red Star over the Pacific.

Jim has published over 25 book chapters and 200 scholarly essays, along with hundreds of opinion columns, think-tank analyses, and other works.

Join us live (for a pre-Great Big Professional Championship Game treat) if you can by clicking here. Or you can pick the show up later by clicking that link or by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Not so much tweaking China? "Philippines, U.S. begin military exercises near disputed seas" - for the 31st time

"Philippines, U.S. begin military exercises near disputed seas":

Thousands of Philippine and American soldiers began annual war games on Monday near disputed waters in the South China Sea, testing the readiness of the two oldest security allies in the southeast Asian region to respond to any emergency.

More here:

Armed Forces of the Philippines and U.S. service members gathered for the opening ceremony of Amphibious Landing Exercise 2015 Sept. 29 at the Armed Forces of the Philippines Naval Forces West Headquarters, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines.

PHIBLEX is an annual, bilateral training exercise conducted by U.S. Marine and Navy forces alongside members of the AFP focused on strengthening the partnership and relationships between the two nations, across a range of military operations, including disaster relief and complex expeditionary operations.

“This year marks the 31st iteration of this exercise,” said U.S. Marine Brig. Gen. Paul J. Kennedy, commanding general of 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, III Marine Expeditionary Force. “On the surface, it showcases our combined capabilities and complex maritime operations. But in reality, it highlights a much deeper union.”

The exercise and training events will strengthen the bond between the two nations, and ensure they are able to work together in an even more efficient and effective way during future real-world operations, according to Kennedy.

"We will hone our military skills together during multiple combined field training events,” said Kennedy. “Additionally, we will focus on improving the tactics, techniques, and procedures in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, crisis response, and preservation of peace.”

While the main focus of PHIBLEX is strengthening interoperability, and ensuring the exchange of best practices and tactics between the two forces, the secondary purpose is to ensure there is a bilateral force standing ready to respond to potential HADR efforts, according to AFP Rear Adm. Alexander S. Lopez, commander of Western Command, AFP.

“The Philippines is host to 20-22 typhoons a year…our country is well versed for varying degrees of natural disaster,” said Lopez. “PHIBLEX has been intentionally scheduled yearly in the Philippines during the region’s typhoon season. Together we form an organized bilateral force with the capacity and ability to conduct more rapidly and affect more humanitarian assistance and disaster response (missions).”

PHIBLEX 15 will take place in areas around the Philippines, including Palawan and Subic Bay, and reinforce the structure in those places to ensure a stronger Philippine nation overall.

“A significant amount of the exercise will take place here in the province of Palawan,” said AFP Brig. Gen. Armando V. Banez, commander of the 3rd Marine Brigade, AFP. “We are sending out a strong message of commitment to the people in Palawan, and our country as a whole, as we support nation building and developmental efforts throughout our country.”

(\U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. William Holdaway

During his closing remarks, Lopez took time to emphasize the importance of PHIBLEX as not just another exercise and training opportunity, but as a chance to build upon already present friendships and strengthen bonds.

“To me, the most significant aspect of the exercise is its social relevance and sustainability,” said Lopez. “Let us not waste a great opportunity to meet new friends and develop a friendship between our ranks – military or civilian alike.”

Friday Fun Film: The Amphibious Marines (1952)

Amphibious with their Navy teammates, that is.

Update:"Cavalry of the air" - - AirCav Marines? In 1952?

Join the Marines for the Holidays

Please make a monetary donation or give new toys before December 18.

More info at Toys for Tots.

No better friends . . .

"With the Marines at Tarawa"

70 years ago, the U.S. Marines were in action on Tarawa.



My wife's uncle was there:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant William H. Sanders, II (MCSN: 0-15606), United States Marine Corps Reserve, for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service while serving as a Reconnaissance Officer of Company D, First Battalion, Second Marines, SECOND Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces at Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands, on 21 November 1943. When intense fire from enemy shore emplacements inflicted heavy casualties on our forces as they waded toward the beach, First Lieutenant Sanders voluntarily prepared to attack the hostile positions with the aid of a Sergeant of his company. Bringing a 75-mm. pack howitzer into use and neutralizing the devastating fire of the first pillbox, he courageously rushed the position despite heavy fire from another emplacement and destroyed the pillbox with hand grenades, moving inside immediately thereafter to kill any remaining defenders. Under the accurate covering fire of the Sergeant, he then crawled twenty-five yards to the first of a group of four connecting emplacements and, completely destroying the position with TNT, unhesitatingly advanced on the second emplacement and annihilated the defenders with hand grenades. After throwing several grenades into the third pillbox, he entered the position and succeeded in killing one of the Japanese before he, himself, was seriously wounded. By his splendid initiative, First Lieutenant Sanders put out of action three enemy .25 caliber and two 13-mm. machine guns and one 20-mm. anti-boat gun. His indomitable fighting spirit and self-sacrificing devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
General Orders: SPOT AWARD, Commander in Chief Pacific Forces: Serial 0647

Mr. Sanders survived his wounds and went on to further service in the Pacific. After the war, he became a successful attorney in West Virginia.

Semper Fi!

Battle of Midway: Marines, The Army Air Corps and Their Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier

This is the day in history is which we note that U.S. forces dealt the Imperial Japanese Navy a stunning

loss - sinking four aircraft carriers and, as the saying goes, "altering the course of the war."

It became the "Miracle at Midway."

On the other hand, calling it a miracle tends to make it sound like the Americans caught a lucky break when the wind shifted or something - it tends to neglect the preparations made to defend Midway and the sound battle plan that Admiral Nimitz and his staff developed - a pretty good description of which you can find here:

Nimitz’s strategy was direct and to the point; the Japanese’ involved operations that were to divert American strength from the main battle. Nimitz’s knowledge of the Japanese intentions and deployment of forces, however, meant that he had no need to employ diversions to keep the enemy guessing. Nimitz knew where the enemy was to be and employed what forces he had to be there to meet him; he had faith in his commanders: Fletcher, victor of Coral Sea, enjoyed his confidence, and Spruance had come highly recommended by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., his commander during the early eastern Pacific raids. When Lt.Col. Harold F. Shannon,. USMC, commanding the USMC garrison at Midway, declared he would hold Midway, Nimitz sent him what reinforcements he could, and provided them to Comdr. Cyril T. Simard, who commanded the overall defense forces at Midway. Popular legend has made much of the Japanese having four carriers and the U.S. Navy three. Midway itself proved to be the equalizer, serving as base for long-ranged aircraft that could not be taken to sea – four-engined heavy bombers (B-17) and flying boats in sufficient quantity for reconnaissance and attack. Nimitz gave Midway “all the strengthening it could take,” exigencies of war dictating the numbers and types of planes employed.
***
Nimitz clearly possessed tremendous faith in his subordinates, who were nevertheless guided by very clear instructions. His principle of calculated risk is, perhaps, his most brilliant contribution to the battle, in that it precisely and economically conveyed his intentions to his task force commanders. There was no doubt about what they were supposed to do, how they were supposed to do it, and what level of risk was acceptable. Nimitz’s operations plan for the defense of Midway is a model for effective macro-management, spelling out essential tasks in general terms, with a minimum of detail-specific requirements. Nimitz’s plan for the Battle of Midway avoided long-range micro-management and allowed the commanders on the battlefield to make key operational and tactical decisions.
***
Although Naval War College analysts believed that plans needed to be formed in light of enemy capabilities and not intentions, something for which they castigated Yamamoto, Admiral Nimitz’s battle planning benefited enormously from having a very good notion of enemy intentions derived from excellent radio-intelligence. Such precise and economic employment of forces could not have occurred unless he possessed the ability to gather strategic intelligence on the enemy. Indeed, one can argue that the battle would never have taken place at all had Japanese intentions been cloaked in mystery.

Nimitz’s active preparations for the Battle of Midway indeed provided a momentous reception for the enemy, and once he had issued his operations orders, he entrusted the fighting of the battle to subordinates. Knowing your enemy is coming is one thing, but meeting him on the battlefield and defeating him, is altogether another. In the actions of 4-6 June 1942, those subordinates, from flag officer to fighter pilot, more than justified his faith in them. They had written, Nimitz declared afterward, “a glorious page in our history.”

When hoisting glass to the heroes of Midway, give a thought to the American's "fourth carrier" - the one with the mostly obsolete flying force - the Midway Atoll itself. A good description of the efforts of the Midway defenders is set out in USMC Operations in World War II: Decision at Midway:

The VMF fliers under Major Floyd B. Parks sighted the Zero-escorted Val dive bombers at 0616 about 30 miles out from Midway, and Captain John F. Carey, leading one of Parks' divisions in an F4F-3, launched the attack from 17,000 feet. The Marine fliers were hopelessly outnumbered, and they found that the Zero fighters could "fly rings around

them." they had time for only one pass at the bombers, and then had to turn their attention to the swarm of Zeros, from one to five of which got on the tail of each Marine fighter. Only three of the original 12 Marine pilots survived this brawl, and although the damage they inflicted on the enemy has never been assessed, it is believed that they splashed a number of the bombers and some of the Zeros. Other Zeros were led into the Midway antiaircraft fire.

Meanwhile another group of 13 Midway fighters under Captain Kirk Armistead came in for an attack against the enemy air formation. Again the damage inflicted upon the enemy was undetermined, but fewer Marine pilots were lost. For better or for worse, however, the fighter defense of Midway had been expended, and the problem now passed to the antiaircraft guns on the atoll.

The first Japanese formation attacked at about 0630 from 14,000 feet. Antiaircraft fire knocked down two of these horizontal bombers before they could unload, but 22 came on through to drop their bombs. And just as these initial explosions rocked the two islands, 18 planes of the enemy's second wave came over for their strike. Since each of these Japanese formations had left the carriers with 36 planes, it is possible that the Marine fliers scored some kills.
***
Nagumo's mistake was a natural one for a commander who believed himself to be unopposed on a "field" of battle of his own choice. Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, the flight officer who had commanded the first attack wave against Midway, radioed during his return fight that "There is need for a second attack wave." Meanwhile, with Nagumo still ignorant of the U.S. fleet's presence in the vicinity, six American TBFs and four B-26s from Midway came in to attack his ships. This convinced the Japanese admiral that Tomonaga was right, and he sent below to hangar spaces the 93 planes he had kept spotted for strikes against possible surface opposition. These planes were to be re-armed with bombs for the second strike. Then Nagumo called in the returning planes to arm them for the new attack on the atoll. While his men were involved in this work on the flight deck and in hangar spaces, Nagumo got the belated word from a Tone search plane that U.S. ships, including at least one carrier, were in the area. This caused another change of mind, and the admiral ordered the planes' ordnance changed again, from bombs back to torpedoes with which to attack the surface ships. But this decision was just tardy enough to allow Spruance to catch him with his planes down, and with torpedoes and bombs strewn in great confusion about the hangar deck.38

Meanwhile, as Nagumo vacillated, Admiral Nimitz's orders for Captain Simard to "go all out for the carriers," while Marine antiaircraft batteries worried about Midway, were under execution. VMSB-241, like the fighter squadron, had divided into two striking units, the first composed of 16 SBD-2s led by Major Lofton Henderson, and the second of 11 SB2U-3s commanded by Major Benjamin W. Norris. Hendersons' group climbed to 9,000 feet to locate the enemy carriers, which were then undergoing the attack from the TBFs and the B-26s. Fliers of this group sighted the Japanese ships at 0744, but as the SBDs spiralled down they were set upon by swarms of Nakajima 97s and Zeros flying air cover, which were soon reinforced by more fighters from the carriers below. Henderson and several other were shot down (only eight of these planes got back to Midway) and the strike scored no hits although some were claimed.
Next came an attack by 15 B-17s led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, USA, but again claims of hits were optimistic. And as these Flying Fortresses pulled away, Major Norris came in with his 11 Vindicators which had taken off with Henderson. Beset by the Zeros, Norris turned to the nearest target at hand, and the Marines crowded their ancient planes into a standard glide run almost on top of the Japanese battleship Haruna--previously claimed as an Army B-17's victim off Luzon. Some of the fliers also went after the Kirishima, which was nearby, but neither attack managed any hits. Three Marines were shot down, and the group was credited with splashing two enemy fighters, plus two probables.40

By 1100 all surviving Marine aircraft had made their way back to he atoll where all hands grimly assessed the battle's damage and prepared for subsequent action. Of the VMF-221 fighters which had gone in against the attacking Japanese planes, only 10 returned, and of this number only two were in shape to leave the ground again. Thirteen F2A-3s and two F4Fs were missing, along with the eight craft lost from the Henderson group and the three shot away from the Norris force. Slick black smoke from oil fires billowed up from the islands, and ruptured fuel lines left more than two-thirds of the aviation fuel temporarily unavailable. Gasoline had to be sent to the field from Sand Island, and hand-pumped from drums. The Marine ground defense force had sustained 24 casualties, and four ordnance-men of VMF-221 had been lost to a direct bomb hit.

At 1700 a burning enemy carrier was reported 200 miles northwest of Midway, and Major Norris prepared VMSB-241's six operational SBD-2s and five SB2U-3s for a night attack. The planes took off at 1900, but could not find the carrier. Major Norris failed to return from this mission, although the other pilots managed to home by the light of oil fires and the antiaircraft searchlights which were turned up as beacons.41 Meanwhile, the Battle of Midway had been decided at sea in a fight of carrier aircraft.

The Marines and Army Air Corps on Midway did their share - flying from their "unsinkable" aircraft carrier.

A salute to all the brave men we should honor today.

Happy 237th Marines!

Marine Corps’ 237th Birthday.

Marines.

Don't leave home without them.


For 237 years, we haven't.

Drug War: U.S. Marines involved in international counter-drug operation

Staff Sgt. Travis A Jakovcic, a UH-1N Huey crewmember with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467 looks back at another crew and aircraft during takeoff. Four UH-1N Huey helicopter crews and aircraft from HMLA-467 are part of Detachment Martillo of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South and are participating in Operation Martillo. The detachment conducted a Mission Rehearsal Exercise prior to operations beginning in Guatemala. Detachment Martillo, under operational control of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, is comprised of a number of units from II Marine Expeditionary Force. Operation Martillo is an operation led by Joint-Interagency Task Force-South, of the U.S. Southern Command, and is designed to help stem the flow of narcotics through Central America and its Pacific and Caribbean coasts by denying transnational criminal organizations littorals used for illicit trafficking. (Official U.S. Marine Corps photo//Released)

HuffPo reports as "Guatemala Drug War: 200 U.S. Marines Join Anti-Drug Effort":

The Marines are deployed as part of Operation Martillo, a broader effort started last Jan. 15 to stop drug trafficking along the Central American coast. Focused exclusively on drug dealers in airplanes or boats, the U.S.-led operation involves troops or law enforcement agents from Belize, Britain, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama and Spain.

More at Danger Room:

The Marines’ share of the operation involves chasing drug traffickers with UH-1N Huey helicopters. The Marine contingent has four of the choppers, and the Marines are carrying weapons. “It’s not every day that you have 200-some Marines going to a country in Central and South America aside from conducting training exercises,” Staff Sgt. Earnest Barnes, the public affairs chief for Marine Corps Forces South, tells Danger Room. Prior to the Marines’ deployment, there were only a “handful” of Marines in the country, Barnes says.

However, the Marines can’t technically use their guns except in self-defense, and Barnes wouldn’t say whether they’re authorized to pursue drug traffickers on the ground. The description of what they’re doing, however, suggests that they probably can’t. Instead, they’ll be looking out for suspicious boats — including crude narco-submarines — and then radio the Guatemalans, who do the work seizing their drugs and arresting cartel members. That could be on rivers, or along Guatemala’s two coastlines, reports the Marine Corps Times.

Strategy in Southeast Asia and Australia: The U.S. Marines Land

An Australian Broadcasting Corporation look at the strategic move of sending in the Marines to the Northern Territory.
A continuation of a 60 year alliance and a message.

ALAN DUPONT, INT. SECURITY STUDIES, UNSW: It's not so much the Marines themselves but it's the symbol - the signal it sends to the region that Australia is - and the United States are working together to meet these common challenges. So I think it's quite an important shift.

UPDATE: Robert Kaplan has a related analysis at Stratfor America's Pacific Logic:

Were the United States not now to turn to the Indo-Pacific, it would risk a multipolar military order arising up alongside an already existent multipolar economic and political order. Multipolar military systems are more unstable than unipolar and bipolar ones because there are more points of interactions and thus more opportunities for miscalculations, as each country seeks to readjust the balance of power in its own favor. U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific is needed not only to manage the peaceful rise of China but also to stabilize a region witnessing the growth of indigenous civil-military post-industrial complexes.

UPDATE2: Related - a port visit of a couple of U.S. Navy ships reported as Louisville Visits Malaysia During Western Pacific Deployment:

U.S. Navy photo by MCS 1st Class David R. Krigbaum

The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Louisville (SSN 724) arrived in Malaysia April 3 for a visit as part of its deployment to the western Pacific.

Louisville moored alongside USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) to receive tended support for [sic- from?] the submarine tender.

"We anticipate performing a variety of submarine support services for Louisville to ensure all systems are fully functioning and operational when she returns to sea," said Lt. Cmdr. James Hicks, Emory S. Land's production maintenance officer.

***

Measuring more than 360 feet long and weighing more than 6,000 tons when submerged, Louisville is one of the most advanced and stealthiest attack submarines in the world. Louisville uses her stealth, mobility, endurance, and firepower to perform missions in undersea warfare, surface warfare, strike warfare, mine warfare, battlespace preparation including intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue.

236th Marine Corps Birthday

236th Marine Corps Birthday

Glad to have them by our side. Happy Birthday, Marines!

The Magellan Star: Pirate Takedown, Force Recon Style by Capt. Alexander Martin | USNI Blog

Go read at The Magellan Star: Pirate Takedown, Force Recon Style by Capt. Alexander Martin | USNI Blog

Somali Pirates Meet the U.S. Marines - Pirates Lose

From the Wall Street Journal U.S. Marines Retake Ship From Pirates

U.S. Marines early Thursday boarded and seized control of a German-owned commercial vessel that had been commandeered by pirates, in what appeared to be the first American-led military boarding of its kind amid a recent surge of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and along the east coast of Africa.

See also this on the Marines from the U.S. Naval Insitute Blog Pirates Beware: Force Recon Really Does Have Your Number:

“We got word that the pirates wanted to stay on and fight — it was funny b/c when we came alongside and they saw us board and rush the superstructure, you could see the look change in their eyes…they didn’t want to play anymore…you’d be proud of the men today, they represented America with honor. It didn’t need to be a bloodless day (for the pirates) but it was…


The guys executed with the highest violence of action, and yet, highest level of restraint, I’ve ever seen.”

For an earlier blog post by the Marine Captain with this unit, Alex Martin, on the nature of piracy, see The Reality of Piracy.

Marines doing what Marines were meant to do, taking the fight to the enemy at sea.

UPDATE: Photo added. Photo info:

Helicopters from USS Dubuque (LPD 8) provide aerial watch as U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Maritime Raid Force, embarked on Dubuque, right, boarded and seized control of Antigua and Barbuda-flagged, German-owned vessel M/V Magellan Star, left, early Sept. 9. Pirates attacked and boarded Magellan Star Sept. 8. Dubuque is part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, the multinational task force established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin. (U.S. Navy photo by Cryptologic Technician 2nd Class William Farmerie)

From NavCent press release:

MANAMA, Bahrain – At approximately 5 a.m. local time, Sept. 9, 24 U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Maritime Raid Force (MRF) aboard USS Dubuque (LPD 8) operating under Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), boarded and seized control of Antigua-Barbuda-flagged, German–owned vessel M/V Magellan Star from pirates who attacked and boarded the vessel early Sept 8.


This successful mission by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) secured the safety of the ship’s crew and returned control of the ship to the civilian mariners. Nine pirates are currently under control of CTF 151, pending further disposition. This ship’s crew has not reported any injuries or casualties. There were no reported injuries from the U.S. Maritime Raid Force.


The CTF-151 flagship, TCG Gökçeada, a Turkish frigate, was the first ship on scene, responding to a distress call received from Magellan Star, Sept. 8. Two additional warships assigned to CTF-151, USS Dubuque (LPD 8) and USS Princeton (CG 59) arrived in the vicinity of the attack to provide support to Gökçeada.


Turkish Navy Rear Adm. Sinan Ertugrul, commander, CTF-151 said, “units from the multi-national maritime force, under Combined Task Force 151, are actively engaged in anti-piracy operations. This regional problem, truly, has global impact and we are completely committed to bringing the disruptive acts of piracy to an end. We have full support of the international community and will continue to do everything possible to bring security to the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin.”


CTF-151 is one of three task forces operated by the 25 nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CTF-151 was established in January 2009 in order to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy, protecting maritime vessels of all nationalities and securing international freedom of navigation.

BZ to everyone involved!

Marines: From Talafar to Marja: Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions

Bing West's From Talafar to Marja: Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions I from The Marine Corps Gazette:

In February of 2009, the top commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, decided to send a Stryker Brigade to Kandahar and a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) to Helmand, where ten of the twelve districts were under Taliban control. The MEB mission was to control the southern and western districts and to seize Marja, the Taliban headquarters and the hub of the drug trade. Helmand accounted for 70% of the world's illegal opium and heroin production, with the Taliban taking between $40 and $100 million per annum. If Kandahar was the symbolic capital of the Taliban, then Helmand was their breadbasket.

We know part of the rest of the story.

This is an interesting read on the meaning of the campaign and possible lessons to be learned from it.

"The Americans are coming"

A reminder:

The Americans are coming

Photo info: COTES DE FER, Haiti (Jan. 21, 2010) A Marine from 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU) hands a bottle of water to a Haitian girl during a relief supply distribution. The 22nd MEU, embarked aboard the ships of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, is deployed supporting Operation Unified Response after a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck near Port-au-Prince on Jan. 12, 2010. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Wayne Campbell/Released)

Yeah, we'll start worrying about what the critics of the USA say when they carry their own weight.

UPDATE: A report from USNS Comfort from Castle Argghhh!

Making Marines

One thing about the Marines - they are not "conflicted" or "role confused" or "morally unclear."

No nihilists need apply. And, probably, very few do.

The new Marine recruiting campaign, "Earning the Title," begins on September 19. Sneak preview:


A suggestion - don't go to war without them.

UPDATE: The new commercial:

Good Answer: "What would you tell the parents...."

The Commandant of the Marines talks about the Future of Marine Corps Operations. Worth watching for that, of course, but the last question and answer were a hoot:

Q: What would tell the parents of an 18-year old who wants to be a Marine?

A. I would look the mother in the eye and say "Don't worry, the safest place in the world is somewhere inside a battalion of Marines."

Marine Landings on Iwo Jima began this date 1945

Today is the 64th anniversary of the U.S. Marines landing on Iwo Jima kicking off a battle that has become legend:

More than 450 ships massed off Iwo as the H-hour bombardment pounded the island. Shortly after 9 a.m., Marines of the 4th and 5th divisions hit beaches Green, Red, Yellow and Blue abreast, initially finding little enemy resistance. Coarse volcanic sand hampered the movement of men and machines as they struggled to move up the beach. As the protective naval gunfire subsided to allow for the Marine advance, the Japanese emerged from their fortified underground positions to begin a heavy barrage of fire against the invading force.

The 4th Marine Division pushed forward against heavy opposition to take the Quarry, a Japanese strong point. The 5th Marine Division's 28th Marines had the mission of isolating Mount Suribachi. Both tasks were accomplished that day.

As part of the prep for the landing, small gunboats, LCI(G)s, took part in the bombardment of the island and paid a price:
Many more dead and wounded would follow. Honor the fallen.

UPDATE: Changed the post title to more accurately reflect the content.