When Does China's "Water Cannon" Weapon Use Become an Act of Armed Conflict?

China's bullying of the Philippines may trigger a defense agreement with the U.S. as set out in China’s Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact

Six days after China Coast Guard cutters blasted out the windows of a Philippine resupply ship with a water cannon, Manila is weighing whether a 70-year-old mutual defense pact could compel the U.S. military to defend Filipino forces in the South China Sea as a result.

***

The attack, the ninth and most aggressive since Chinese cutters restarted a campaign blocking the monthly resupply runs to the World War II-era Sierra Madre, is prompting politicians, analysts and lawyers across the Pacific to weigh the U.S. obligation to come to Manila’s aid under a 1951 mutual defense pact.

Both the U.S. State and Defense departments issued statements this week pledging commitment to the treaty.

“The United States reaffirms that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea,” reads the statement from Foggy Bottom.

While the worst-case scenario under the defense treaty could lead to open war with China, the agreement has options for the U.S. to support Manila diplomatically short of armed conflict. However, the 1951 treaty’s application in the 21st century raises questions about whether the Chinese use of water cannons constitutes an armed attack or if the resupply missions are categorized as civilian or military, opening up several legal interpretations.

Read the whole article.

The question of whether such use of water cannons by China constitutes an "armed" attack sufficient to trigger the defense pact has been frequently raised on our Midrats podcast. China's assertion of entitlement to vast areas of the South China Sea and its aggressive efforts to enforce those claims despite a lack of legal justification are an interesting test case in how close to a line it can walk before triggering similar counter activities or more. However, it is vital that the U.S. support, in every way possible, our allies and treaty partners in the region.

China As Bully: New Maritime "Law" Threatens War With Neighbors (and the U.S.)

China's new maritime "law" is another example of China attempts to cow its neighbors into submission to its rules that counter the existing international rule. And the neigbors are aware of this, as set up in the The Japan Times report Japan braces for moves in East China Sea after China Coast Guard law:

Japan is has expressed alarm over China’s new law that allows the China Coast Guard to use force against foreign parties for what Beijing views as violations of its sovereignty and jurisdiction.

The new law, which entered into force Monday, “could shake the order based on international law,” a Defense Ministry executive warns.

Tokyo is braced for possible Chinese military actions in the East China Sea, where tensions are running high over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, claimed by Beijing.

Some in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party say that the Self-Defense Forces should play a bigger role in dealing with the situation.

U.S. Defense Department report last year described the China Goast Guard, often called the country’s second navy, as “by far the largest coast guard force in the world.”

Beijing put the coast guard under the command of the Communist Party of China’s Central Military Commission, the top leadership body for the country’s military, in 2018.

The new law allows the coast guard to take all necessary measures, including the use of weapons, against foreign organizations or individuals that violate Chinese sovereignty or jurisdiction.

By contrast, the Japan Coast Guard is bound by strict restrictions on the use of weapons under the law, which clearly bans it from military activities.

Coast guard ships from China have repeatedly intruded into Japanese waters around the Senkaku Islands.

Last year, Japan spotted Chinese coast guard and other government vessels inside the contiguous zone surrounding the territorial waters around the islets on 333 seperate days, a record number.

Usually, Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels deal with such ships from China. But if Chinese ships become aggressive, SDF vessels may be dispatched to conduct security operations.

At an LDP meeting last week, lawmakers attacked the new Chinese law. One warned, “China is taking aim at the Senkaku Islands,” while another said, “China’s move is nothing less than a threat.”

Yes, this is how wars get started - overreaching by a neighborhood bully who feels slighted by what happened in the past. China's "100 years of humiliation" ended some time ago, but apparently it allows the CCP dictatorship all the excuse it needs to attle sabers.

Couple this with the latest aggresson in the air in Taiwan airspace, China is feeling out the new U.S. leadership. I hope they find that it has a spine.

UPDATE: And in the Philippines:

The Philippines has protested a new Chinese law that authorizes its coast guard to fire on foreign vessels and destroy other countries’ structures on islands it claims, Manila’s top diplomat said Wednesday.

Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. said in a tweet that the new Chinese law “is a verbal threat of war to any country that defies” it. Failure to challenge the law “is submission to it,” he said.

“While enacting law is a sovereign prerogative, this one — given the area involved, or for that matter the open South China Sea — is a verbal threat of war to any country that defies the law,” Locsin said.

Oil and Gas in the South China Sea - Bones of Contention

This might be behind the paywall at the Oil & Gas Journal, but it's an interesting problem surfacing soon in the South China Sea Plan for Philippines bid round escalates drama with China:

Territorial conflict intensifies in the South China Sea.

The Philippines government plans to resume oil, gas, and coal licensing of acreage that includes offshore areas over which China asserts control.
A year ago, in a case brought by the Philippines, the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected Chinese claims to waters the island nation says lie within its exclusive economic zone.
China’s determination to ignore the ruling will be tested by a bidding round in December.
On July 13, Ismael Ocampo, director of the Department of Energy’s Resource Development Bureau, told reporters in Manila that the offering will include blocks on Rector Bank, the Philippines designation of Reed Bank.
China says history shows Reed Bank is Chinese. The arbitration court

disagreed.
The Philippines suspended exploration in the disputed area late in 2014 but craves domestically produced energy, now far below its expanding requirements.
***
... Vietnam’s largely unchallenged exploration in disputed waters might have emboldened Duterte to test Beijing’s resolve with the bidding round.
Or maybe Duterte felt obliged, for political reasons, to address his allegations of bullying.
In May, Duterte said that at a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations, Chinese President Xi Jingping warned him not to implement the arbitration ruling, saying doing so would provoke war ...
Xi, according to Duterte, insisted China would explore for oil and gas where the Philippines government now says it will sanction drilling.
At this stage in an escalating drama, there’s no clear script plotting a tidy finale.

Earlier coverage of this issue at The Diplomat by Jeremy Maxey Philippines Faces Post-Arbitration Dilemma Over Reed Bank:

Considering the risks and tradeoffs, Beijing may instead choose to engage in a potentially less destabilizing option—presenting Manila with a choice between China’s unilateral exploration of Reed Bank or joint development on China’s terms. This could prove a compelling proposition for Manila since Reed Bank (Recto Bank), located approximately 80 nautical miles northwest of Palawan within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but claimed by China, is thought to hold one of the highest concentration of undiscovered resources within the SCS—764 million to 2.2 billion barrels of oil and 7.6 Tcf to 22 Tcf of natural gas.

While Reed Bank’s potential resources are modest relative to China’s massive energy consumption, the area is essential to Philippine future

energy security. In particular, the Philippines is looking to develop Reed Bank to replace the Malampaya gas field, also located offshore west of Palawan, that is expected to be depleted by 2024-2030. The Malampaya gas-to-power project, led by Royal Dutch Shell, currently supplies about 30 percent of the electricity demand of Luzon, the largest and most populous island in the Philippines.

Indeed, geography and economics suggest that the most viable option to monetize Reed Bank gas is the Philippine market. This implies that although China may flagrantly engage in unilateral exploration, it is highly unlikely to unilaterally develop the gas without first locking in the Philippine market. This is politically impossible without Philippine participation, which means that joint development may be the only pragmatic way forward. Manila’s only other option is to hold an offshore licensing round with the expectation of developing Reed Bank through a consortium of international oil majors over Chinese objections.

Attacks on Shipping in Southern Philippines Grinds Shipping to a Halt

Report: Piracy halts vital ARMM port

The usually robust port serving as an international gateway to and from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has been immobilized due recent attacks by pirates on international cargo ships.

According to Polloc Port manager Hexan Mabang, maritime trade has come to a standstill after pirates waylaid several cement and cargo vessels along the Sulu Sea.

ARMM Regional Board of Investments (RBOI) chair Ishak Mastura noted that the recent attack on a Vietnamese ship headed to Polloc Port was more like the last straw that forced companies to defer operation.

“We are deeply concerned that the bane of piracy in the Sulu Sea has affected our international trade leading to revenue losses for the ARMM regional government, which owns and operates Polloc Port,” said Mastura.

The bulk carrier Giang Hai was attacked by ASG in the Sulu Sea, about 20 nautical miles north of Pearl Bank in Tawi-Tawi province, which is part of ARMM.

The Philippine government has approached a number of other nations to assist in patrolling the area.

Philippines Piracy: China, U.S. and Japan to Assist Philippines?

Crude Oil Flows in the South China Sea

The Republic of the Philippines sits on major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which makes those nations that use those SLOCs have a vested interest in keeping them open for use for ships to transit them free of action by pirates and/or terrorists who would disrupt the flow of goods and petroleum on these SLOCs.

The Philippines, about as near to a failed state as one can get without actually being Somalia, knows  that it needs help in patrolling its own waters from the scourge of entities like the formerly al Qaeda affiliated - now ISIS pledged Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist groups that seek to peel away the Muslim majority southern Philippine islands from the ROP. So, the Philippines seeks US, China help to fight pirates:

U.S. National Counterterrorism Center map

The Philippines is seeking US and Chinese help to guard a major sea lane as Islamic militants shift attacks to international shipping, officials said on Wednesday.
Manila does not want the Sibutu Passage between Malaysia’s Sabah state and the southern Philippines to turn into a Somalia-style pirate haven, coastguard officials said.
The deep-water channel, used by 13,000 vessels each year, offers the fastest route between Australia and the manufacturing powerhouses China, Japan and South Korea, they added.
In the past year Abu Sayyaf gunmen from the southern Philippines have boarded ships and kidnapped dozens of crewmen for ransom in waters between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, raising regional alarm.

Indonesia has warned the region could become the “next Somalia” and the International Maritime Bureau says waters off the southern Philippines are becoming increasingly dangerous.

In addition to the U.S. and China, the ROP reports that Japan has offered to "assist" in this situation, as set out here:

Japan has offered to send patrol ships to deal with a growing piracy threat in the southern Philippine waters bordering Indonesia and Malaysia, a senior Philippine defense official said on Tuesday.
A surge in piracy off parts of the southern Philippines is forcing ship-owners to divert vessels through other waters, pushing up costs and shipping times. Dozens of sailors have been taken captive by Abu Sayyaf.
Japanese vice minister Ro Manabe offered the assistance at a meeting in Tokyo on Friday and expressed readiness to contribute to efforts by the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia "in addressing piracy and terrorism", said Raymund Quilop, assistant defense minister for assessments and international affairs.
A senior Japanese defense ministry official, however, gave a different account of the Tokyo meeting and said no offer of patrols was made to the Philippines, just "capacity building".
Leaders from the two countries agreed last fall that Japan would give the Philippines high-speed small boats for its counter-terrorism efforts, but it was not clear if that was part of the apparent offer made by Manabe.

I don't think any of the nations that are mentioned have any desire to see the ROP actually fall into full failure mode and they surely want to have this affected SLOCs clear for normal merchant transits.

It should also be noted that Australia has made long-term commitments to aid the ROP. See here:

Total Australian Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Philippines will be an estimated $81.9 million in 2016-17. Our economic partnership with the Philippines will focus all elements of our trade, investment and aid initiatives working together to promote growth.

Australia delivers targeted advice and technical assistance that aims to have a catalytic effect both on reform efforts and capacity development of the Philippine Government. Given the Philippines’ current positive economic position we will shift focus from basic service delivery, such as classroom construction, towards supporting the Philippine Government to better manage its own resources.

The strategic direction of Australian aid to the Philippines is informed by the Australian Government’s development policy Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability; Australia’s national interests; by our ability to add value; and our previous development results. Australia’s aid will align with the priorities of the Philippines Government which is seeking to put the country on the path of accelerated and inclusive development. The Philippine Government has had an ambitious reform agenda in recent years to tackle poverty, improve governance and address corruption, while pushing through important social sector reforms, including education, and promoting peace in the Southern Philippines.

UPDATE: Fixed a portion that was somehow turned into gibberish when first posted.

Philippines as Failing State: President Duterte Asks China to Patrol Philippine Waters

The Republic of the Philippines President invites the nose of the Chinese camel into the Philippines Philippines' Duterte asks China to patrol piracy-plagued waters

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on Tuesday said he had asked China to help in the fight against Islamic State-linked militants by sending ships to patrol southern waters plagued by raids on commercial vessels.

Speaking to newly promoted army generals, Duterte said he had sought China's help in dangerous waters in the south to check the activities of Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim rebel group sustained by piracy and kidnap-for-ransom activities.

A surge in piracy off parts of the Philippines is forcing ship-owners to divert vessels through other waters, pushing up costs and shipping times.

Duterte said piracy in the Sulu Sea between eastern Malaysia and the southern Philippines would escalate to levels seen in Somalia, and raise insurance costs for firms and increase prices of consumer goods and services.

"We would be glad if they have their presence there ... just to patrol," Duterte said, adding that China could send coastguard vessels, not necessarily "gray" warships.

The Philippines has a loose cannon.

I have a Horace E. Scudder fable:

ONE cold night, as an Arab sat in his tent, a Camel thrust the flap of the tent aside, and looked in.
"I pray thee, master," he said, "let me put my head within the tent, for it is cold without."
"By all means, and welcome," said the Arab; and the Camel stretched his head into the tent.
"If I might but warm my neck, also," he said, presently.
"Put your neck inside," said the Arab. Soon the Camel, who had been turning his head from side to side, said again:—
"It will take but little more room if I put my fore legs within the tent. It is difficult standing without."
"You may also put your fore legs within," said the Arab, moving a little to make room, for the tent was very small.
"May I not stand wholly within?" asked the Camel, finally. "I keep the tent open by standing as I do."
"Yes, yes," said the Arab. "I will have pity on you as well as on myself. Come wholly inside."
So the Camel came forward and crowded into the tent. But the tent was too small for both.
"I think," said the Camel, "that there is not room for both of us here. It will be best for you to stand outside, as you are the smaller; there will then be room enough for me."
And with that he pushed the Arab a little, who made haste to get outside the tent.
It is a wise rule to resist the beginnings of evil.

Emphasis added.

Friday Film: Speaking of the Philippines "The Battle of Leyte Gulf"

"U.S. has lost" - Philippines Chooses the Strong Horse says its President

Leadership is an odd thing, since so much of it depends on perception - and the current president of the Philippines has perceived that China is the big dog in his region, as Reuters reports in "Duterte says U.S. has lost, aligns Philippines with China":

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced his "separation" from the United States on Thursday, declaring that it had "lost" and he had realigned with China as the two agreed to resolve their South China Sea dispute through talks.

Duterte made his comments in China, where he is visiting with at least 200 business people to pave the way for what he calls a new commercial alliance as relations with longtime ally the United States deteriorate.

His trade secretary, Ramon Lopez, said $13.5 billion in deals would be signed

Duterte's efforts to engage China, months after a tribunal ruling in the Hague over South China Sea disputes in favor of the Philippines, marks a reversal in foreign policy since the 71-year-old former mayor took office on June 30.

"America has lost now," Duterte told Chinese and Philippine business people at a forum in the Great Hall of the People, attended by Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli.

"I've realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to (President Vladimir) Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world - China, Philippines and Russia. It's the only way," he added.

Lord Palmerston had it right:

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

President Duterte may not be everyone's cup of tea, but he does seem to have a strong view of where the interests of the Republic of the Philippines lie. He's decided that China is the stronger horse, or as that now dead chap Osama bin Laden said:

“When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse”

While thinking about protecting U.S. interests in the Pacific, it might be time to look hard at those islands that are U.S. territory out there in the Pacific, like Wake, Midway, etc, and building up our attack submarine force.

UPDATE: Vietnam announces an "enemy of my enemy is my friend" hedging strategy as set out here:

Vietnam supports US “intervention” in the Asia-Pacific if it helps keep peace and stability, the defence ministry said, in a timely endorsement of a continued U.S. presence amid uncertainty over Washington’s faltering “pivot”.
Vice-defence minister, Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, met on Monday with Cara Abercrombie, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for South and Southeast Asia, and told her Vietnam backed a positive US role.
The general’s words of support, conveyed by a normally reclusive defence ministry, come when the United States most needs them, with its “rebalance” – aimed at boosting its Asian foothold and tempering China’s rise – now under strain in the run-up to a US presidential election.
Vinh “affirmed that Vietnam will support the US and other partners to intervene in the region as long as it brings peace, stability and prosperity”, he said in a statement.
Vietnam will support the US and other partners to intervene in the region as long as it brings peace, stability and prosperity.
At the dialogue, Abercrombie said the United States would not change its rebalance strategy, the statement added.
***
Washington’s traditional defence alliances in Southeast Asia are currently being tested, with ties with Thailand frosty since a 2014 coup and questions about the future of a tight military relationship with the Philippines under volatile new President Rodrigo Duterte, a staunch US critic.

You might note that Vietnam has couched its "support" with a few "ifs."

South China Sea: China Loses "9-Dash Line", "Island Claims" and "Historical Use" Claims in Court, Denies It

China denies that "Western" justice is just as Philippines wins South China Sea case against China

China has lost a key international legal case over strategic reefs and atolls that it claims would give it control over disputed waters of the South China Sea.

The judgment by an international tribunal in The Hague is overwhelmingly in favour of claims by the Philippines and will increase global diplomatic pressure on Beijing to scale back military expansion in the sensitive area. By depriving certain outcrops of territorial-generating status, the ruling effectively punches holes in China’s all-encompassing “nine-dash” line that stretches deep into the South China Sea.

China reacted angrily to the verdict, which declares large areas of the sea to be neutral international waters or the exclusive economic zones of other countries. Xinhua, the country’s official news agency, hit out at what it described as an “ill-founded” ruling that was “naturally null and void”.

More here:

On Tuesday morning, a tribunal of five judges at Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a highly anticipated and unanimous award in Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, a case filed in 2013 by Manila concerning maritime entitlements and the status of features in the South China Sea, among other issues.

The Tribunal’s award is highly favorable to the Philippines, ruling that China’s nine-dash line claim and accompanying claims to historic rights have no validity under international law; that no feature in the Spratly Islands, including Taiwan-occupied Itu Aba (or Taiping Island), is an island under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); and that the behavior of Chinese ships physically obstructing Philippine vessels is unlawful.

Perhaps the most significant finding–and the one most likely to disturb China–is the Tribunal’s award that China’s nine-dash line and claim to historic rights in the South China Sea are both invalid under international law.

The Diplomat website posted the decision here in a 500-page pdf.

UPDATE: Of course, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has no navy to enforce its ruling. For that matter, neither has the Philippines to any real extent.

UPDATE2: Excellent analysis by CSIS here. Enforcement to be "moral suasion?"

UPDATE3: Last part of the decision. "COnvention" refers to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

In relation to the merits of the Parties’ disputes, the Tribunal:

(1) DECLARES that, as between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines
the scope of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend
beyond the limits imposed therein;
(2) DECLARES that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas
of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are
contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed
the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the
Convention; and further DECLARES that the Convention superseded any historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed
therein;
(3) FINDS, with respect to the status of features in the South China Sea:
a. that it has sufficient information concerning tidal conditions in the South
China Sea such that the practical considerations concerning the selection of
the vertical datum and tidal model referenced in paragraphs 401 and 403 of
the Tribunal’s Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015
do not pose an impediment to the identification of the status of features;
b. that Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson
Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef include, or in their natural
condition did include, naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by water,
which are above water at high tide, within the meaning of Article 121(1) of
the Convention;
c. that Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and
Second Thomas Shoal, are low-tide elevations, within the meaning of
Article 13 of the Convention;
d. that Subi Reef lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide feature of Sandy
Cay on the reefs to the west of Thitu;
e. that Gaven Reef (South) lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide
features of Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island; and
f. that Hughes Reef lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide features of
McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe Island;
(4) DECLARES that, as low-tide elevations, Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal
do not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or
continental shelf and are not features that are capable of appropriation;
(5) DECLARES that, as low-tide elevations, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), and
Hughes Reef do not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, exclusive economic
zone, or continental shelf and are not features that are capable of appropriation, but
may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of
high-tide features situated at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial
sea;
(6) DECLARES that Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef,
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, in their natural condition, are
rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, within
the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention and accordingly that Scarborough
Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and
Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf;
(7) FINDS with respect to the status of other features in the South China Sea:
a. that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands, in their natural
condition, are capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of
their own within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention;
b. that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands generate
entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf; and
c. that therefore there is no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf generated by any feature claimed by China that would
overlap the entitlements of the Philippines in the area of Mischief Reef and
Second Thomas Shoal; and
DECLARES that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are within the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines;
(8) DECLARES that China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance
vessels in relation to M/V Veritas Voyager on 1 and 2 March 2011 breached its
obligations under Article 77 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’
sovereign rights over the non-living resources of its continental shelf in the area of
Reed Bank;
(9) DECLARES that China has, by promulgating its 2012 moratorium on fishing in the
South China Sea, without exception for areas of the South China Sea falling within
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and without limiting the
moratorium to Chinese flagged vessels, breached its obligations under Article 56 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the living
resources of its exclusive economic zone;
(10) FINDS, with respect to fishing by Chinese vessels at Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal:
a. that, in May 2013, fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels engaged in
fishing within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone at Mischief Reef
and Second Thomas Shoal; and
b. that China, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels, was
aware of, tolerated, and failed to exercise due diligence to prevent such
fishing by Chinese flagged vessels; and
c. that therefore China has failed to exhibit due regard for the Philippines’
sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in its exclusive economic zone; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Article 58(3) of the
Convention;
(11) FINDS that Scarborough Shoal has been a traditional fishing ground for fishermen
of many nationalities and DECLARES that China has, through the operation of its
official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012 onwards, unlawfully
prevented fishermen from the Philippines from engaging in traditional fishing at
Scarborough Shoal;
(12) FINDS, with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment
in the South China Sea:
a. that fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged in the harvesting
of endangered species on a significant scale;
b. that fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged in the harvesting
of giant clams in a manner that is severely destructive of the coral reef
ecosystem; and
c. that China was aware of, tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent the aforementioned
harmful activities; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Articles 192 and 194(5)
of the Convention;
(13) FINDS further, with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine
environment in the South China Sea:
a. that China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands,
installations, and structures at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef
(North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef has
caused severe, irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem;
b. that China has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States bordering
the South China Sea concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment concerning such activities; and
c. that China has failed to communicate an assessment of the potential effects
of such activities on the marine environment, within the meaning of
Article 206 of the Convention; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Articles 123, 192,
194(1), 194(5), 197, and 206 of the Convention;
(14) With respect to China’s construction of artificial islands, installations, and
structures at Mischief Reef:
a. FINDS that China has engaged in the construction of artificial islands,
installations, and structures at Mischief Reef without the authorisation of the
Philippines;
b. RECALLS (i) its finding that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation, (ii) its
declaration that low-tide elevations are not capable of appropriation, and
(iii) its declaration that Mischief Reef is within the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines; and
c. DECLARES that China has breached Articles 60 and 80 of the Convention
with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf;
(15) FINDS, with respect to the operation of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the
vicinity of Scarborough Shoal:
a. that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels on 28 April 2012 and
26 May 2012 created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships
and personnel; and
b. that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels on 28 April 2012 and
26 May 2012 violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Article 94 of the
Convention; and
(16) FINDS that, during the time in which these dispute resolution proceedings were
ongoing, China:
a. has built a large artificial island on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation
located in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
b. has caused—through its land reclamation and construction of artificial
islands, installations, and structures—severe, irreparable harm to the coral
reef ecosystem at Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef; and
c. has permanently destroyed—through its land reclamation and construction
of artificial islands, installations, and structures—evidence of the natural
condition of Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef
(North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef; and
FINDS further that China:
d. has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning their respective rights and
entitlements in the area of Mischief Reef;
e. has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment at Mischief Reef;
f. has extended the scope of the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment to Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef,
Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef; and
g. has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the status of maritime
features in the Spratly Islands and their capacity to generate entitlements to
maritime zones; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations pursuant to Articles 279, 296,
and 300 of the Convention, as well as pursuant to general international law, to
abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the
execution of the decisions to be given and in general, not to allow any step of any
kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute during such time as
dispute resolution proceedings were ongoing.

Terrorist Threats to Shipping: Philippines ISIS Team Member Abu Sayyaf Nabs Sailors, Seeks Ransom to Fund Operations

Abu Sayyaf kidnaps 7 Indonesian sailors

Jolo Island is in the oval

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on Sunday finally confirmed the Abu Sayyaf Group's (ASG) kidnapping of seven Indonesian sailors in the Sulu Sea, two days after Indonesian authorities announced the incident.
The AFP's Western Mindanao Command (WesMinCom) said that armed men on board two motorized boats intercepted the Indonesian's tugboat while en route to Indonesia in the Sulu Sea around 11 a.m. last June 22.
The WesMinCom's report said that only seven of the 13 crewmen on board the Indonesia tugboat were taken by the bandits.
It said that the seven Indonesians have been turned over by the armed men, later identified as the Muktadil brothers -- Nickson, Brown, Badung and Dadis -- to Abu Sayyaf Group sub-leader Majal Adja alias Apo Mike based in Sulu.
The WesMinCom said among those kidnapped was the boat's captain, who had called his wife in Indonesia to relay that their kidnappers were asking 20 million Malaysian ringgit.

Now, Indonesian hostages of Abu Sayyaf located:

Efforts to release seven Indonesian sailors recently abducted in waters off southern Philippines have progressed, with the defense ministries of the two countries on Monday locating the hostages.
The government had been tight-lipped over its handling of the aftermath of the kidnapping of seven members of the crew of the tugboat Charles 001 on June 20 in waters near Philippines’ Jolo island, where the headquarters of terrorist group Abu Sayyaf is located.
***
Abu Sayyaf has for more than a decade been notorious for its profit-driven activities, such as extortion and kidnap-for-ransom, and has a number of sub-operations under its control.

Of course Abu Sayyaf is now asserting it is affiliated with ISIS:

Southeast Asian militants who claim to be fighting for Islamic State in the Middle East have said they have chosen one of the most wanted men in the Philippines to head a regional faction of the ultraradical group, security officials said on Thursday.

The claim was made in a video that was recently posted on social media, possibly last week, a military intelligence official in the Philippines told Reuters. The video is significant, experts say, because it shows that Islamic State supporters are now being asked to stay home and unify under one umbrella group to launch attacks in Southeast Asia, instead of being drawn to the fight in the Middle East.

Authorities in the region have been on heightened alert since Islamic State claimed an attack in the Indonesian capital Jakarta in January in which eight people were killed, including four of the attackers. In the 20-minute video seen by Reuters, young men and some children in military fatigues are shown carrying and training with weapons, and holding Islamic State flags.
***
In the video, a man authorities in Malaysia have identified as Mohd Rafi Udin, a Malaysian militant currently in Syria, says in Malay: "If you cannot go to (Syria), join up and go to the Philippines."

In the video, Udin also urges Muslims to unite under the leadership of Abu Abdullah, a Philippine militant leader who pledged allegiance to Islamic State in January. Abu Abdullah, also known as Isnilon Hapilon, is a leader of the Philippine militant group Abu Sayyaf.

Abu Sayyaf poses some threat to shipping transiting the Sulu and Celebes Seas, especially to tugs,dive boats and other small craft which can be boarded and from which hostages can be removed. They are not yet in the business of hijacking larger ships.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 17 May - 15 June 2016 and a New Maritime Security Approach in Southeast Asia

Office of Naval Intelligence Threats to Shipping:

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 17 May - 15 June 2016

Not mentioned in the report (due to its timing), Three southeast Asian nations to designate shipping corridor to battle piracy:

Celebes and Sulu Seas indicated by ovals

The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia signed the agreement to designate a transit corridor for commercial vessels in order to prevent hijacks by pirates.

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines on Monday agreed to designate a transit corridor for commercial vessels crossing a maritime zone hit by a spate of hijackings by Islamist militants in the southern Philippines.

Nearly 20 Indonesian and Malaysian tugboat crew have been kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf militants this year, with Jakarta airing fears that the problem could reach levels seen off the coast of Somalia.
****
Analysts say $40-billion worth of cargo passes through the Sulu and Celebes seas each year, including supertankers from the Indian Ocean that cannot use the crowded Malacca Strait.

The three countries also agreed to step up air and sea patrols and escorts for commercial ships in the common maritime areas to fend off potential hijacks, kidnaps and robbery.

Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said the leaders agreed to share the best practices evolved by Indonesia and Malaysia during a joint effort to patrol the busy Malacca Strait waterway against pirates, as a model for three-way cooperation with the Philippines.

****

Analysts say $40-billion worth of cargo passes through the Sulu and Celebes seas each year, including supertankers from the Indian Ocean that cannot use the crowded Malacca Strait.

The three countries also agreed to step up air and sea patrols and escorts for commercial ships in the common maritime areas to fend off potential hijacks, kidnaps and robbery.

Philippine Defence Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said the leaders agreed to share the best practices evolved by Indonesia and Malaysia during a joint effort to patrol the busy Malacca Strait waterway against pirates, as a model for three-way cooperation with the Philippines.

***

There was no immediate comment from the Abu Sayyaf rebels.

Piracy near Somalia’s coast has subsided after shipping firms hired private security details and international warships patrolled the waters.

It's a Reuters report. Love the "no immediate comment from the . . . rebels" bit.

Screw FONOPS - Let's Play Hardball in the South China Sea

The South China Sea is not now, nor should it ever become, a Chinese "lake."

Allowing China to have its way in the region is not good for international commerce, surrounding nations and the bodes ill for further Chinese expansionism as it asserts some fabricated "historical usage" right to waters that it sailed in "once upon a time." That "once upon a time" ended hundreds of years ago when China, due to internal reasons, abandoned the high seas and ended its exploration of the world.

Now, however, having read Mahan and studied its position in the world, China has decided that its "manifest destiny" lies in invading both international waters and the domestic waters of its neighbors to force them into a world where their adjacent seas are dominated by Chinese warships (including its large, aggressive "Coast Guard") as well as by a militia force of fishing vessels. Why? To create a 'strategic strait'?

"The logical conclusion drawn from China's adding ... islands in the southern part of the South China Sea with military-sized runways, substantial port facilities, radar platforms and space to accommodate military forces is that China's objective is to dominate the waters of the South China Sea at will," Peter Dutton, professor and director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, said in a February speech at London's Chatham House.

"Building the islands is therefore, in my view, a significant strategic event," he said. "They leave the potential for the South China Sea to become a Chinese strait, rather than an open component of the global maritime commons."

Tuoi Tre News

The proof of this Chinese approach is daily recounted in news reports of the shouldering or ramming non-Chinese fishing vessels, in the aggressive response of Chinese military forces to military aircraft and ships transiting in what the rest of the world recognizes as "international waters" but which the Chinese are intent on grabbing. See Dangerous rocks in the South China Sea from the Washington Post:

Having made a “rebalancing” toward Asia a pillar of his foreign policy, President Obama may face a fateful test from China in his final months in office. President Xi Jinping already broke a promise he made to Mr. Obama not to militarize islets his regime has been building up in two parts of the South China Sea. Now Beijing appears to be contemplating building a base on a contested shoal just 150 miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines. A failure by the administration to prevent this audacious step could unravel much of what it has done to bolster U.S. influence in the region.

Disputed islands per Inhabit.com (red flags with yellow star = Vietnam; red/blue striped flag = Malaysia; other red/white/blue flag = Philippines; red flag with star in upper left = China)

Chinese development of Scarborough Shoal, a collection of rocks and coral reefs it seized from the Philippines four years ago, would escalate its already-belligerent behavior in the South China Sea in a number of ways. Until now, Beijing’s landfill work and construction of airstrips have occurred on islets it already controlled that are considerably closer to the Chinese mainland. Scarborough Shoal lies about 500 miles from China. A base there could allow Chinese radar and missiles to threaten Manila, as well as Philippine bases where U.S. forces are positioned.

Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese venture would concretize Beijing’s refusal to abide by international law in resolving territorial disputes with its neighbors.

The nations surrounding the South China Sea (SCS) are either arming themselves or inviting allies to "come back" and show a level of possible force.

One response of the United States has been to sail naval vessels into the SCS and conduct "Freedom of Navigation Operations" or "FONOPS."

These SCS FONOPS are discussed in a National Interest article by Zack Cooper and Bonnie S. Glaser, How America Picks Its Next Move in the South China Sea which describes the U.S.'s tiptoeing in and around the Chinese island building and aggression in the SCS. This is certainly a nice, nuanced approach to the situation, sending signals that are meant to warn the Chinese but without raising the stakes too high.

It also isn't working.

Fiery Cross Reef

The Chinese have moved from area to area, building military bases on artificial island after artificial island, with the latest efforts in the Spratly Islands.

As noted in several of the links above, China and the Philippines are awaiting a ruling from from an arbitration panel over the Chinese claims to the SCS - a ruling China has already denounced, despite many good reasons why it shouldn't.

As was discussed during one of the Midrats podcasts, Episode 321: The Year of the Monkey in the South China Sea w/Toshi Yoshihara (starting about 16:21), China views international law as not being binding because, it does not reflect Chinese "traditions." but rather "Western legal traditions" because of differing historical perspectives - China wants to start with "history first" as Dr. Yoshihara expressed it.

History may not be "bunk" but certain "historical events" are completely ignored by the Chinese as the make their claims, including World Wars I and II, and the last 70+ years of free access to the seas granted to the Chinese around the world brought to them courtesy of the Western world, especially by the U.S. and its allies.

When China was building up its large merchant shipping force, who was protecting freedom of the seas?

Hint - it wasn't the Chinese navy.

If any country could have made the SCS into a "lake" it would have been the U.S. following WWII - but which, instead, backed out of the area.

 China, not content with a free sea, is trying to fill what it perceives as a void and is not getting much in the way of push-back.

It's time the international community did something stronger than FONOPS, which are weak tea at best.

Sea Launch  Odyssey company photo

My modest proposal is to send a properly modified self-propelled drilling rig into the area and have it anchor itself at or near one of those SCS rock formations that China claims but which are generally not uncovered by the sea. Man the thing with scientists who ought to be screaming their heads off about the changing of the ecological state of the SCS by the Chinese island building campaign. Fly the UN flag. Support it from the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and

Ocean Odyssey before modifications

any other SCS stakeholders.

In short, it is time to quit playing soft games with the Chinese and move to hardball. Time to challenge every encroachment. Time to move to a higher level of activity. Time to increase the signal strength, if signaling is still needed.

Use this "sea base" as the locus of naval exercises involving those stakeholders and Aussies, Japanese, South Koreans and anyone else who chooses to play - except the Chinese.

Oh. and by the way, we need to take a look at Guam's status, too. 51st state. anyone?

Time to re-look at building up Midway? Wake Island?

Hardball.

Ah, "U.S. Bases" on the South China Sea - Okay, in the Philippines on the SCS

The Washington Post sneers, "These are the new U.S. military bases near the South China Sea. China isn’t impressed"

Antonio Bautista Air Base on Palawan

Antonio Bautista Air BaseThe disputed South China Sea will soon see increased U.S. military activity from five Philippine bases, following the signing of a deal between Manila and Washington that will allow the Pentagon to deploy conventional forces to the Philippines for the first time in decades.

The deal — called an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement — was reached Friday between State Department officials and the government of the Philippines, and will allow the Pentagon to use parts of five military installations: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base. It comes at a time when the United States and its allies in the region have expressed concern about China increasingly deploying military assets to man-made islands in the South China Sea.

Well, I'm impressed.

Of course, I suggested something like this back a few month ago (Nov 2015) in A Random Thought on the South China Sea Artificial Islands:

Well, it occurs to me that there are several ways to play this game. One opening move would be to assist the Republic of Philippines (RP) to build up its airfields on the South China Sea - on Palawan (Antonio Bautista Air Base (9000 foot runway - looks like it could be expanded), the current dirt field on Busuanga (yellow pin) and, of course, Clark International Airport (formerly Clark AFB).

The difference is mere details.

The real point is, as noted in my previous post,

"In any event, if we are going to sit down to play, we better be prepared to go all the way."

I hope we're serious.

Info on Fort Ramon Magsaysay:

Fort Magsaysay is also the only Philippine Army base that boast its own runway, apron, aircraft maintenance, and air control facilities. The Philippine Army operates Cessna CE172 Skyhawk and CE421 from Fort Magsaysay.

The runway is 1600 feet long.

Info on Lumbia Airbase in addition to its 8000 foot runway:

Lumbia Airport took its name from its location in Barangay Lumbia. It now serves as a minor air base of the Philippine Air Force, with service equipment of OV-10 Bronco aircraft as well as UH-1 Huey and MD-520MG Defender helicopters.

Info on Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in addition to its 10800 foot runway:

This air base is responsible for the Transport Wing, and provides for PAF operations in the Visayas area.

Stationed at the base in 2009 were the 208th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, 205th Tactical Operations Wing and the 220th Airlift Wing, along with the 5052nd Search and Rescue Squadron of the 505th Search and Rescue Group and the 1304th Dental Dispensary. The Headquarters Administrative Squadron from the 205th Tactical Operations Wing and the 560th Air Base Wing handle logistics.

Info on Antonio Bautista Air Base in addition to its 9000 foot runway:

It is one of the nine air bases eyed for the priority development programs of the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The PAF planned to construct Two additional hangars at Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa to store relief supplies and accommodate additional air assets, including long-range patrol aircraft to be stationed there in the future.

I think those upgrades will be happening sooner rather than later.
Info on Basa Air Base in addition to its 10000 foot runway:

Since the Basa Air Base has few aircraft today, it serves as a venue of sports and other outdoor tourism activities. It is planned to be converted into a tourism spot instead of a military base because of the low budget allotment of the government. Aside from housing active soldiers, there are also facilities for tourism.

I expect most tourism will be outside the gate soon.

UPDATE: Nice set of additional info from the USNI News Blog at Analysis: New U.S.-Philippine Basing Deal Heavy on Air Power, Light on Naval Support by Armando J. Heredia.

Back to the Philippines?

Philippines to Offer the Use of Eight Bases to US Forces

The Philippines is set to offer the U.S. military use of eight bases, a military spokesman said Wednesday, after the country’s supreme court upheld a security agreement with Washington forged in the face of rising tensions with China.

The facilities include the former U.S. Clark airbase and air and naval facilities on the southwestern island of Palawan, which faces the South China Sea, the focus of territorial disputes with China.

I had some thoughts on bases in the RoP a couple of months ago in A Random Thought on the South China Sea Artificial Islands:

Of course, the RP already has islands along the South China Sea, so building new ones is not really necessary. On the other hand, perhaps they could use some AID money to help "fix up" some the islands in their territorial waters. Maybe add a nice helicopter base...

In any event, if we are going to sit down to play, we better be prepared to go all the way. As in the "Chicago Way,"

A Random Thought on the South China Sea Artificial Islands

Sure, U.S. Navy Freedom of Navigation jaunts are fun and exciting - see the pre-first FONOP message from Admiral Swift, PACFLT, in this Navy Times piece by David Larter, "Navy will challenge Chinese territorial claims in South China Sea":

"It's my sense that some nations view freedom of the seas as up for grabs, as something that can be taken down and redefined by domestic law or by reinterpreting international law," Swift said, according to a report by Reuters. "Some nations continue to impose superfluous warnings and restrictions on freedom of the seas in their exclusive economic zones and claim territorial water rights that are inconsistent with (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). This trend is particularly egregious in contested waters."

The U.S. Navy says it will be back, US navy warns it will repeat South China Sea operations

The US will continue to conduct “routine” operations in the South China Sea, the head of the US Pacific Command told a Chinese audience on Tuesday, even as he called for closer ties between the American and Chinese militaries.

Admiral Harry Harris said US naval operations near territory claimed by China were not “a threat to any nation” but were designed to defend freedom of navigation in international waters.

So,

Well, it occurs to me that there are several ways to play this game. One opening move would be to assist the Republic of Philippines (RP) to build up its airfields on the South China Sea - on Palawan (Antonio Bautista Air Base (9000 foot runway - looks like it could be expanded), the current dirt field on Busuanga (yellow pin) and, of course, Clark International Airport (formerly Clark AFB).

Might be nice for the RP to get some old P-3s and some new aircraft, including some that might be nice workhorse types like the Air Tractor 802u:

Air Tractor Photo

The Air Tractor® AT-802U is an economical single engine turboprop aircraft designed for surveillance, precision strike, and rugged dirt strip utility missions. The AT-802U combines an 8,000-lb. (3,629 kg) payload and 10-hour ISR mission capability with the flexibility and responsiveness of a manned weapon system – for a fraction of the cost of unmanned aerial vehicle systems.

» Real-time eye in the sky for ground troop support
» Integrated fire control system
» Training-focused force support
» Small logistics footprint

Hmmm. Dirt strips. Hmmm. Perhaps some support aircraft that are short field capable. Hmmm.

Of course, all these upgrades will help with humanitarian issues, like typhoon recovery ops and maritime patrols to assist with search and rescue ops in the South China Sea. You know, just like the Chinese assert their artificial islands serve such a purpose. See here:

As The Diplomat reported earlier this month, China has cited a variety of reasons to undertake its “maintenance and construction work” on these island facilities. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign minister, noted in early April that the activities (in the Spratlys at least) had the following goals:

[O]ptimizing their functions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China’s international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other areas.

Of course, the RP already has islands along the South China Sea, so building new ones is not really necessary. On the other hand, perhaps they could use some AID money to help "fix up" some the islands in their territorial waters. Maybe add a nice helicopter base...

In any event, if we are going to sit down to play, we better be prepared to go all the way. As in the "Chicago Way,"

Malone: You said you wanted to get Capone. Do you really wanna get him? You see what I'm saying is, what are you prepared to do?

Ness: Anything within the law.

Malone: And *then* what are you prepared to do? If you open the can on these worms you must be prepared to go all the way. Because they're not gonna give up the fight, until one of you is dead.

Ness: I want to get Capone! I don't know how to do it.

Malone: You wanna know how to get Capone? They pull a knife, you pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. *That's* the *Chicago* way! And that's how you get Capone. Now do you want to do that? Are you ready to do that? I'm offering you a deal. Do you want this deal?

First you have to admit you are in a long game against a very patient player.