China's Outlaw Government

I keep thinking that these words could be forced to work with that awful "Pina Colada Song"

"If you like brutal dictators
And getting sent off to camps
If you're not into freedom
If you like being controlled
If you like being
In the ruins of fate
Then the CCP is what you've looked for
And it's too late to escape"

Or, as someone else put it:

America’s relations with China should proceed from the recognition that the Chinese government is lawless. China flouts the rule of law, not occasionally or incidentally but characteristically, because the government understands itself as the source of law and unconstrained by it. The problem of China reminds us of the deeper laws that all nations must respect and that determine whether or not our positive laws are legally just.

The list of CCP outrages grows daily. Let me put a few down just to get started:

1. All its claims to anything based on "historical use" are complete and utter garbage, especially those involving the South China Sea;
2. Its claims that their "man-made islands" in the South China Sea extending China's territorial lists in completely bogus;
3. Its treatment of its own minorities, especially but not limited to the Uighurs, is unconscionable;
4. Its treatment of Hong Kong and those there brave to seek freedom is purely tyrannical;
5. Its bullying concerning the ships, fishing fleets, and territories of the other nations abutting the South China Sea, including the use of its para-maritime forces, military grade "coast guard," and other assets borders on warring on those neighbors and often includes intrusion for unlawful purposes into the internationally recognized sovereign waters of those states;
6. Its persistent efforts to corrupt the governments of other nations through bribery, threats, and outright infiltration of research facilities to steal research;
7. China's government lies about everything all the time and then punishes those who would tell the truth;
8. Its Orwellian "social credit system" is an offense to freedom

More to follow and links will be provided.

Excellent Read: "China and Asian Maritime Security" Testimony of Heritage's Dean Cheng Before the HouseSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs

You ought to read this testimony on China and Asian Maritime Security, which combines Chinese history and current strategy. Some good excerpts:

The rise of Chinese maritime capabilities makes it the first new maritime power to take to the seas since the end of the 19th century. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union, both of which fielded substantial navies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) actually relies upon the oceans for much of its economic activity. This dependence upon the sea also constitutes a radical break from that country’s millennia of history; the imperial treasure fleets of Admiral Zheng He were not nearly as central to Chinese power and livelihood. Thus, the transformation of the PRC from a land power to a maritime one constitutes one of the more fundamental changes in the international scene, certainly since the end of the Cold War, and arguably over the past century.
***
This growing dependence on the sea to operate various parts of its economy and maintain its society makes China unique. China is arguably the first continental power that is truly dependent upon the sea. Unlike Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, or the Soviet Union, China cannot look upon the sea as an optional area of operation, but as a vital area of national interest.
***
By contrast, since the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and the diversification of China’s manufacturing base, China’s economic center of gravity has shifted toward the the coast. This has allowed such economic centers as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Pudong to more easily access global trade routes for both imports of raw materials and exports of products. This has meant, however, that China’s recent economic development is also more vulnerable to potential attack from the sea.
***
An essential part of political warfare is legal warfare. From the Chinese perspective, legal warfare is not the “misuse” of the law, but rather, the exploitation of the law in support of broader political ends.
***
Such efforts also exploit not only the law, but also law enforcement agencies. For example, the use of the China Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce Chinese claims over the Senkakus, the Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal not only serves to limit the potential for escalation, but also is a political statement. China is using law enforcement vessels to enforce its laws over its territories, reinforcing its claim to these various features.
***
As important, China’s conception of naval operations has steadily expanded. From “near-shore operations,” which roughly equate with coastal and brown-water duties, it has shifted emphasis to “near-sea” and now “far-sea” operations, roughly comparable to green water and blue water activities, respectively. These operations are not necessarily power projection–oriented, however.

The shift of China’s economic center of gravity to its coast, as noted earlier, means that Beijing is at least as interested in keeping foreign air and naval forces away from China’s shores. Indeed, Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) activities should be seen at least partly in this light. Given the range of modern precision-guided munition weapons, however, keeping an adversary away from China’s shores means being able to undertake A2/AD activities at ranges of a thousand miles or more.

To this end, China is likely to employ not only traditional naval forces, but civilian and commercial assets, in unorthodox ways that embody “hybrid” approaches to warfare. China’s fishing fleets, for example, include a substantial number of naval militia assets, essentially civilian vessels that respond to government (including military) assignments as necessary. Such forces could be exploited to provide everything from intelligence gathering to early warning for China’s navy.[16] CCG vessels, some of which were cascaded from the PLAN, can do the same. More disturbingly, China has reportedly installed radars typically found on patrol vessels on some of the oil rigs in the East China Sea.[17] This further blurs the line between military and civilian assets, and suggests a new means by which oil rigs can serve as “mobile national territory,” while further expanding China’s maritime situational awareness envelope.
***
The physical space of the South China Sea region itself is an invaluable resource, as it provides a strategic buffer. This is especially important as the PRC has built up the island of Hainan in the northwest corner of the South China Sea. Chinese military engineers have constructed a dock to handle its aircraft carriers, dedicated port facilities, including tunnels, for submarines, and a number of military airfields.[20] (The American EP-3 that collided with a Chinese fighter in 2001 crash-landed at one of these airfields.) In addition, China’s newest spaceport is located on Hainan Island, where it will be lofting future manned Chinese space missions. It is clearly not in the Chinese interest to allow foreign, and especially American, naval capability to make close approaches to Hainan.

Instead, it is in China’s interest to make the South China Sea as forbidding as possible, especially for American submarines, which remain qualitatively superior to their Chinese counterparts. It is therefore not surprising that there appears to be an effort to create a massive sonar surveillance network that would cover the region.[21] Indeed, military bases on the artificial islands China has built in the Spratlys, as well as in the Paracels and perhaps at Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank in the future, could provide convenient sites for processing data, and also for basing anti-submarine warfare aircraft and helicopters. Such deployments would make the deployment of American submarines into those waters far riskier.

Really, read it all.


Hat tip to James Kraska

South China Sea: Vietnam Moves to Protect Its Interests

If you are shocked by this, you haven't been paying attention.

Reuters reports Exclusive: Vietnam moves new rocket launchers into disputed South China Sea

Vietnam has discreetly fortified several of its islands in the disputed South China Sea with new mobile rocket launchers capable of striking China's runways and military installations across the vital trade route, according to Western officials.

Diplomats and military officers told Reuters that intelligence shows Hanoi has shipped the launchers from the Vietnamese mainland into position on five bases in the Spratly islands in recent months, a move likely to raise tensions with Beijing.

Nature and threatened states will move to fill a vacuum. I guess Vietnam lacks confidence that the recent arbitration ruling concerning the SCS has any kind of enforcement mechanism.

I expect China will counter with its own equipment escalation.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

South China Sea: China Loses "9-Dash Line", "Island Claims" and "Historical Use" Claims in Court, Denies It

China denies that "Western" justice is just as Philippines wins South China Sea case against China

China has lost a key international legal case over strategic reefs and atolls that it claims would give it control over disputed waters of the South China Sea.

The judgment by an international tribunal in The Hague is overwhelmingly in favour of claims by the Philippines and will increase global diplomatic pressure on Beijing to scale back military expansion in the sensitive area. By depriving certain outcrops of territorial-generating status, the ruling effectively punches holes in China’s all-encompassing “nine-dash” line that stretches deep into the South China Sea.

China reacted angrily to the verdict, which declares large areas of the sea to be neutral international waters or the exclusive economic zones of other countries. Xinhua, the country’s official news agency, hit out at what it described as an “ill-founded” ruling that was “naturally null and void”.

More here:

On Tuesday morning, a tribunal of five judges at Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a highly anticipated and unanimous award in Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, a case filed in 2013 by Manila concerning maritime entitlements and the status of features in the South China Sea, among other issues.

The Tribunal’s award is highly favorable to the Philippines, ruling that China’s nine-dash line claim and accompanying claims to historic rights have no validity under international law; that no feature in the Spratly Islands, including Taiwan-occupied Itu Aba (or Taiping Island), is an island under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); and that the behavior of Chinese ships physically obstructing Philippine vessels is unlawful.

Perhaps the most significant finding–and the one most likely to disturb China–is the Tribunal’s award that China’s nine-dash line and claim to historic rights in the South China Sea are both invalid under international law.

The Diplomat website posted the decision here in a 500-page pdf.

UPDATE: Of course, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has no navy to enforce its ruling. For that matter, neither has the Philippines to any real extent.

UPDATE2: Excellent analysis by CSIS here. Enforcement to be "moral suasion?"

UPDATE3: Last part of the decision. "COnvention" refers to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

In relation to the merits of the Parties’ disputes, the Tribunal:

(1) DECLARES that, as between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines
the scope of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend
beyond the limits imposed therein;
(2) DECLARES that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas
of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are
contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed
the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the
Convention; and further DECLARES that the Convention superseded any historic
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed
therein;
(3) FINDS, with respect to the status of features in the South China Sea:
a. that it has sufficient information concerning tidal conditions in the South
China Sea such that the practical considerations concerning the selection of
the vertical datum and tidal model referenced in paragraphs 401 and 403 of
the Tribunal’s Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015
do not pose an impediment to the identification of the status of features;
b. that Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson
Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef include, or in their natural
condition did include, naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by water,
which are above water at high tide, within the meaning of Article 121(1) of
the Convention;
c. that Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and
Second Thomas Shoal, are low-tide elevations, within the meaning of
Article 13 of the Convention;
d. that Subi Reef lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide feature of Sandy
Cay on the reefs to the west of Thitu;
e. that Gaven Reef (South) lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide
features of Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island; and
f. that Hughes Reef lies within 12 nautical miles of the high-tide features of
McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe Island;
(4) DECLARES that, as low-tide elevations, Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal
do not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or
continental shelf and are not features that are capable of appropriation;
(5) DECLARES that, as low-tide elevations, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), and
Hughes Reef do not generate entitlements to a territorial sea, exclusive economic
zone, or continental shelf and are not features that are capable of appropriation, but
may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of
high-tide features situated at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial
sea;
(6) DECLARES that Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef,
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, in their natural condition, are
rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, within
the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention and accordingly that Scarborough
Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and
Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf;
(7) FINDS with respect to the status of other features in the South China Sea:
a. that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands, in their natural
condition, are capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of
their own within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention;
b. that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands generate
entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf; and
c. that therefore there is no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf generated by any feature claimed by China that would
overlap the entitlements of the Philippines in the area of Mischief Reef and
Second Thomas Shoal; and
DECLARES that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are within the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines;
(8) DECLARES that China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance
vessels in relation to M/V Veritas Voyager on 1 and 2 March 2011 breached its
obligations under Article 77 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’
sovereign rights over the non-living resources of its continental shelf in the area of
Reed Bank;
(9) DECLARES that China has, by promulgating its 2012 moratorium on fishing in the
South China Sea, without exception for areas of the South China Sea falling within
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and without limiting the
moratorium to Chinese flagged vessels, breached its obligations under Article 56 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the living
resources of its exclusive economic zone;
(10) FINDS, with respect to fishing by Chinese vessels at Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal:
a. that, in May 2013, fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels engaged in
fishing within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone at Mischief Reef
and Second Thomas Shoal; and
b. that China, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels, was
aware of, tolerated, and failed to exercise due diligence to prevent such
fishing by Chinese flagged vessels; and
c. that therefore China has failed to exhibit due regard for the Philippines’
sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in its exclusive economic zone; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Article 58(3) of the
Convention;
(11) FINDS that Scarborough Shoal has been a traditional fishing ground for fishermen
of many nationalities and DECLARES that China has, through the operation of its
official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012 onwards, unlawfully
prevented fishermen from the Philippines from engaging in traditional fishing at
Scarborough Shoal;
(12) FINDS, with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment
in the South China Sea:
a. that fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged in the harvesting
of endangered species on a significant scale;
b. that fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels have engaged in the harvesting
of giant clams in a manner that is severely destructive of the coral reef
ecosystem; and
c. that China was aware of, tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent the aforementioned
harmful activities; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Articles 192 and 194(5)
of the Convention;
(13) FINDS further, with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine
environment in the South China Sea:
a. that China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands,
installations, and structures at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef
(North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef has
caused severe, irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem;
b. that China has not cooperated or coordinated with the other States bordering
the South China Sea concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment concerning such activities; and
c. that China has failed to communicate an assessment of the potential effects
of such activities on the marine environment, within the meaning of
Article 206 of the Convention; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Articles 123, 192,
194(1), 194(5), 197, and 206 of the Convention;
(14) With respect to China’s construction of artificial islands, installations, and
structures at Mischief Reef:
a. FINDS that China has engaged in the construction of artificial islands,
installations, and structures at Mischief Reef without the authorisation of the
Philippines;
b. RECALLS (i) its finding that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation, (ii) its
declaration that low-tide elevations are not capable of appropriation, and
(iii) its declaration that Mischief Reef is within the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines; and
c. DECLARES that China has breached Articles 60 and 80 of the Convention
with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf;
(15) FINDS, with respect to the operation of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the
vicinity of Scarborough Shoal:
a. that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels on 28 April 2012 and
26 May 2012 created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships
and personnel; and
b. that China’s operation of its law enforcement vessels on 28 April 2012 and
26 May 2012 violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations under Article 94 of the
Convention; and
(16) FINDS that, during the time in which these dispute resolution proceedings were
ongoing, China:
a. has built a large artificial island on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation
located in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
b. has caused—through its land reclamation and construction of artificial
islands, installations, and structures—severe, irreparable harm to the coral
reef ecosystem at Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef; and
c. has permanently destroyed—through its land reclamation and construction
of artificial islands, installations, and structures—evidence of the natural
condition of Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef
(North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef; and
FINDS further that China:
d. has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning their respective rights and
entitlements in the area of Mischief Reef;
e. has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment at Mischief Reef;
f. has extended the scope of the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment to Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef,
Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef; and
g. has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the status of maritime
features in the Spratly Islands and their capacity to generate entitlements to
maritime zones; and
DECLARES that China has breached its obligations pursuant to Articles 279, 296,
and 300 of the Convention, as well as pursuant to general international law, to
abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the
execution of the decisions to be given and in general, not to allow any step of any
kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute during such time as
dispute resolution proceedings were ongoing.

Chinese Artificial Islands: Ecological Disaster

Odd we aren't seeing more outcry against China's total disregard for environmental matter as in VOA's report from January 2016 Marine Biologists: Artificial Islands Devastating South China Sea Ecosystems

Between 2012 and 2015, Chinese fishermen have used large, extended propellers affixed to utility boats to chop the reefs and prepare for the construction of artificial islands.

Fishermen scour the ocean floor for giant clam shells, which are prized as jewelry and luxury items that sell for up to $150,000.

According to Dr. John McManus, a University of Miami marine biologist, while building on the reefs is not new, China’s large-scale construction of a military base and runways is resulting in unprecedented environmental damage.

“Suddenly we have this massive situation where large areas of coral reef are being buried," he said. "In the end it was almost 13 square kilometers — 13 million square meters — that was destroyed, just in terms of being buried under these islands, and this was a huge, huge shock.”

China’s Foreign Ministry has said the artificial islands are to be used for civilian purposes, search and rescue missions, as well as defense.

Well, I guess that makes it all right, then.

Not.

Ah, "U.S. Bases" on the South China Sea - Okay, in the Philippines on the SCS

The Washington Post sneers, "These are the new U.S. military bases near the South China Sea. China isn’t impressed"

Antonio Bautista Air Base on Palawan

Antonio Bautista Air BaseThe disputed South China Sea will soon see increased U.S. military activity from five Philippine bases, following the signing of a deal between Manila and Washington that will allow the Pentagon to deploy conventional forces to the Philippines for the first time in decades.

The deal — called an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement — was reached Friday between State Department officials and the government of the Philippines, and will allow the Pentagon to use parts of five military installations: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base. It comes at a time when the United States and its allies in the region have expressed concern about China increasingly deploying military assets to man-made islands in the South China Sea.

Well, I'm impressed.

Of course, I suggested something like this back a few month ago (Nov 2015) in A Random Thought on the South China Sea Artificial Islands:

Well, it occurs to me that there are several ways to play this game. One opening move would be to assist the Republic of Philippines (RP) to build up its airfields on the South China Sea - on Palawan (Antonio Bautista Air Base (9000 foot runway - looks like it could be expanded), the current dirt field on Busuanga (yellow pin) and, of course, Clark International Airport (formerly Clark AFB).

The difference is mere details.

The real point is, as noted in my previous post,

"In any event, if we are going to sit down to play, we better be prepared to go all the way."

I hope we're serious.

Info on Fort Ramon Magsaysay:

Fort Magsaysay is also the only Philippine Army base that boast its own runway, apron, aircraft maintenance, and air control facilities. The Philippine Army operates Cessna CE172 Skyhawk and CE421 from Fort Magsaysay.

The runway is 1600 feet long.

Info on Lumbia Airbase in addition to its 8000 foot runway:

Lumbia Airport took its name from its location in Barangay Lumbia. It now serves as a minor air base of the Philippine Air Force, with service equipment of OV-10 Bronco aircraft as well as UH-1 Huey and MD-520MG Defender helicopters.

Info on Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in addition to its 10800 foot runway:

This air base is responsible for the Transport Wing, and provides for PAF operations in the Visayas area.

Stationed at the base in 2009 were the 208th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, 205th Tactical Operations Wing and the 220th Airlift Wing, along with the 5052nd Search and Rescue Squadron of the 505th Search and Rescue Group and the 1304th Dental Dispensary. The Headquarters Administrative Squadron from the 205th Tactical Operations Wing and the 560th Air Base Wing handle logistics.

Info on Antonio Bautista Air Base in addition to its 9000 foot runway:

It is one of the nine air bases eyed for the priority development programs of the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The PAF planned to construct Two additional hangars at Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa to store relief supplies and accommodate additional air assets, including long-range patrol aircraft to be stationed there in the future.

I think those upgrades will be happening sooner rather than later.
Info on Basa Air Base in addition to its 10000 foot runway:

Since the Basa Air Base has few aircraft today, it serves as a venue of sports and other outdoor tourism activities. It is planned to be converted into a tourism spot instead of a military base because of the low budget allotment of the government. Aside from housing active soldiers, there are also facilities for tourism.

I expect most tourism will be outside the gate soon.

UPDATE: Nice set of additional info from the USNI News Blog at Analysis: New U.S.-Philippine Basing Deal Heavy on Air Power, Light on Naval Support by Armando J. Heredia.

Freedom to Navigate - "Freedom of Navigation Operations" as challenges to "excessive claims to water and airspace"

Interesting read at Foreign Affairs "All in Good FON: Why Freedom of Navigation Is Business as Usual in the South China Sea" by Mira Rapp-Hooper (a reprint of an Oct 2105 article):

Rumors first emerged in May 2015 that the Pentagon was contemplating military operations around China’s new artificial islands among the Spratly Islands. Through such exercises, the United States would aim to demonstrate that it does not recognize spurious Chinese claims to water and airspace around the islands.
***
As the history of the Freedom of Navigation Program and its relationship to international law make clear, however, such operations would complement U.S. diplomacy and, although they would contest China’s claims to water and airspace under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they would not contest its claims to territory.
***
In a recent Senate hearing, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) argued that Washington’s failure to transit within 12 nautical miles of China’s claims “grants de facto recognition” of them. A report soon followed with the headline “McCain: U.S. Should Ignore China’s Claims in South China Sea.” This was likely not the message the Senator intended to convey, but reporting has consistently suggested that FONOPS would be used to push back against China’s claims to territory. The United States, however, has a long-standing policy that it does not take a position on other countries’ sovereignty disputes. FONOPS are meant to challenge excessive claims to water and airspace; they do not challenge territorial claims.

In other words, the FONOPS reality is both considerably more nuanced and far less escalatory than the popular narrative suggests. (emphasis added)

Yes, very nuanced. But:

. . . [P]recisely because the South China Sea territories are disputed, and because Washington does not take a position on such sovereignty disputes, it need not recognize territorial seas or airspace around any of China’s artificial features—or those of any other countries. In short, territorial seas are a function of recognized state sovereignty, and where that sovereignty is disputed, vessels and aircraft may pass freely.

... even if China’s Spratly holdings were uncontested, the fact remains that Beijing’s seven island features are artificial. Under UNCLOS, man-made islands do not confer territorial seas or airspace. Rather, they are granted only a 500-meter safety zone. In China’s case, before its building spree, at least three of its seven artificial islands were low-tide elevations or reefs, rather than rocks or islands. Under international law, these features are not even subject to sovereignty claims—by China, or by anyone else. By this logic, even without persistent sovereignty disputes, Mischief Reef, Gaven Reef, and Subi Reef would not be entitled to water or airspace of their own, and therefore may be especially appropriate features around which to transit.

Since the Chinese aren't being all that subtle - in that they are making very territorial-like claims, nuance may be wasted.

Who is willing to go to war to keep the South China Sea open to free navigation?

Or for that matter, who is willing to fight to close the South China Sea to the free passage of ships under international law?

A Random Thought on the South China Sea Artificial Islands

Sure, U.S. Navy Freedom of Navigation jaunts are fun and exciting - see the pre-first FONOP message from Admiral Swift, PACFLT, in this Navy Times piece by David Larter, "Navy will challenge Chinese territorial claims in South China Sea":

"It's my sense that some nations view freedom of the seas as up for grabs, as something that can be taken down and redefined by domestic law or by reinterpreting international law," Swift said, according to a report by Reuters. "Some nations continue to impose superfluous warnings and restrictions on freedom of the seas in their exclusive economic zones and claim territorial water rights that are inconsistent with (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). This trend is particularly egregious in contested waters."

The U.S. Navy says it will be back, US navy warns it will repeat South China Sea operations

The US will continue to conduct “routine” operations in the South China Sea, the head of the US Pacific Command told a Chinese audience on Tuesday, even as he called for closer ties between the American and Chinese militaries.

Admiral Harry Harris said US naval operations near territory claimed by China were not “a threat to any nation” but were designed to defend freedom of navigation in international waters.

So,

Well, it occurs to me that there are several ways to play this game. One opening move would be to assist the Republic of Philippines (RP) to build up its airfields on the South China Sea - on Palawan (Antonio Bautista Air Base (9000 foot runway - looks like it could be expanded), the current dirt field on Busuanga (yellow pin) and, of course, Clark International Airport (formerly Clark AFB).

Might be nice for the RP to get some old P-3s and some new aircraft, including some that might be nice workhorse types like the Air Tractor 802u:

Air Tractor Photo

The Air Tractor® AT-802U is an economical single engine turboprop aircraft designed for surveillance, precision strike, and rugged dirt strip utility missions. The AT-802U combines an 8,000-lb. (3,629 kg) payload and 10-hour ISR mission capability with the flexibility and responsiveness of a manned weapon system – for a fraction of the cost of unmanned aerial vehicle systems.

» Real-time eye in the sky for ground troop support
» Integrated fire control system
» Training-focused force support
» Small logistics footprint

Hmmm. Dirt strips. Hmmm. Perhaps some support aircraft that are short field capable. Hmmm.

Of course, all these upgrades will help with humanitarian issues, like typhoon recovery ops and maritime patrols to assist with search and rescue ops in the South China Sea. You know, just like the Chinese assert their artificial islands serve such a purpose. See here:

As The Diplomat reported earlier this month, China has cited a variety of reasons to undertake its “maintenance and construction work” on these island facilities. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign minister, noted in early April that the activities (in the Spratlys at least) had the following goals:

[O]ptimizing their functions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China’s international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other areas.

Of course, the RP already has islands along the South China Sea, so building new ones is not really necessary. On the other hand, perhaps they could use some AID money to help "fix up" some the islands in their territorial waters. Maybe add a nice helicopter base...

In any event, if we are going to sit down to play, we better be prepared to go all the way. As in the "Chicago Way,"

Malone: You said you wanted to get Capone. Do you really wanna get him? You see what I'm saying is, what are you prepared to do?

Ness: Anything within the law.

Malone: And *then* what are you prepared to do? If you open the can on these worms you must be prepared to go all the way. Because they're not gonna give up the fight, until one of you is dead.

Ness: I want to get Capone! I don't know how to do it.

Malone: You wanna know how to get Capone? They pull a knife, you pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. *That's* the *Chicago* way! And that's how you get Capone. Now do you want to do that? Are you ready to do that? I'm offering you a deal. Do you want this deal?

First you have to admit you are in a long game against a very patient player.

On Midrats 25 Oct 2015 - Episode 303: China, the Pivot, and the WESTPAC Challenge - With James Kraska

Please join us at 5pm Eastern on 25 Oct 2105 for Midrats Episode 303: China, the Pivot, and the WESTPAC Challenge - With James Kraska

As 2015 starts its final act, where is China heading?

From her Great Wall of Sand in the South China Sea, to economic stress, and her increasingly nervous neighbors, where does the USA and her allies need to adjust to China’s expanding footprint globally, and where do they need to stand firm?

Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be James Kraska.

Dr. James Kraska is Professor in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, where he previously served as Howard S. Levie Chair in International Law from 2008-13. During 2013-14, he was a Mary Derrickson McCurdy Visiting Scholar at Duke University, where he taught international law of the sea. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia School of Law, Guest Investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and a Senior Associate at the Naval War College's Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups.

He developed the first course on maritime security law at the Naval War College, which he also taught at The Hague Academy of International Law and University of Maine School of Law. Commander Kraska served as legal adviser to joint and naval task force commanders in the Asia-Pacific, two tours in Japan and in four Pentagon major staff assignments, including as oceans law and policy adviser as well as chief of international treaty negotiations, both on the Joint Staff.

Kraska earned a J.D. from Indiana University, Bloomington, Maurer School of Law and J.S.D. and LL.M. from University of Virginia School of Law; he also completed a master’s degree at the School of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate School. In 2010, Kraska was selected for the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement by the Navy League of the United States.

Join us live if you can, or pick the show up later by clicking here. You can also find the show later on our iTunes page here

Interesting Addition to the Office of Naval Intelligence's Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report: China

From the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence's Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report of 30 July 2015 (pdf):

SOUTH CHINA SEA: On 21 July, two Vietnam-flagged fishing boats re
ported being chased and rammed by a Chinese ship in an area approximately 15 nm west of the western section of the Spratly Islands.

and

4.(U) SOUTH CHINA SEA: On 21 July, two Vietnam-flagged fishing boats reported being chased and rammed by a Chinese ship in an area approximately 15 nm west of the western section of the Spratly Islands. Both fishing boat captains reported that navigation lightsand other parts of their boats were damaged as a result of the repeated ramming. Reportedly, the Chinese ship had the number 994 on the hull. (www.vietnambreakingnews.com)

Spratly Islands are in the oval in the nearby map.

China's PLA Navy ship with hull number 994 is a 072A class landing ship.

Hmmm.

Well, yeah - "China’s New Islands Are Clearly Military, U.S. Pacific Chief Says "

Kevin Baron of DefenseOne reports "China’s New Islands Are Clearly Military, U.S. Pacific Chief Says" :

“I believe those facilities are clearly military in nature,” Harris said at the Aspen Security Forum, an annual gathering in Colorado of dozens of top U.S. national security leaders, convened by the Aspen Institute.

In his notably undiplomatic remarks, Harris called on China to show meaningful diplomacy to resolve the territorial disputes. But the four-star admiral also appeared resigned to seeing further construction and eventual deployment of military aircraft and ships.

Fiery Cross Reef sits smack in the middle of South China Sea sea lanes

“They are building ports that are deep enough to host warships and they’re building a 10,000-foot runway at Fiery Cross Reef,” Harris said, referring to one of China’s construction activities in the Spratly Islands that Japan has protested. “A 10,000-foot runaway is large enough to take a B-52, almost large enough for the Space Shuttle, and 3,000 feet longer than you need to take off a 747. So, there’s no small airplane that requires a runway of that length. They’re building rebutted aircraft hangers at some of the facilities there that are clearly designed, in my view, to host tactical fighter aircraft.”

Development on Fiery Cross Reef

I think the Admiral probably said "revetted" and not "rebutted" but that's a minor note. The major note is that -

The top U.S. military officer in the Pacific sternly warned China on Friday to immediately cease its “aggressive coercive island building” in the South China Sea, which he argued was intended clearly for China’s military use as forward operating bases in combat against their regional neighbors.

UPDATE: These maps from an older post might be helpful in visualizing sea lanes a/k/a sea lines of commerce:

China Checking

An interesting article from The Economist especially since the U.S. Pacific Command tweeted about it - Small reefs, big problems: Asian coastguards are in the front line of the struggle to check China

China’s neighbours are unnerved by its rapid increase in defence spending, in particular its pursuit of a blue-water navy. They note a Chinese president, Xi Jinping, who is not shy about flexing Chinese muscle. He likes to talk of China’s “peaceful rise” and of a “new type of great-power relationship”—one that appears to leave little space for small countries.

In both Beijing and Washington, strategists have long liked to grapple with whether America and China are destined to fall into a “Thucydides trap”. In the original, the Spartans’ fear of the growing might of Athens made war inevitable. The modern parallel states that an existing power (America) is bound to clash with a rising one (China). In Japan the point is made differently: at sea modern China is behaving with the paranoid aggression of imperial Japan on land before the second world war. “They are making the same mistakes that we did,” says a Japanese official.

Fun with China: South China Sea Options "Accept or Contain?" and Playing the Environmental Harm Card

China and its South China Sea adventures are gathering a lot of interest reflected in big media, blogs and a large variety of articles.

At the risk of this blog becoming "all China all the time" here's an opinion piece by Michael Swaine from Foreign Affairs that suggests "accepting" a new reality The Real Challenge in the Pacific: A Response to “How to 
Deter China”

An understanding that a gradual, peaceful transition to a more equal regional balance of power was under way could make Beijing more likely to persuade Pyongyang to abandon or strongly limit its nuclear weapons program and begin the sort of reforms that would eventually yield a unified peninsula. Both U.S. and Chinese leaders might ultimately convince Taipei of the benefits of new and more stable security arrangements (none of which would require the U.S. abandonment of Taiwan). And as for Japan, a calibrated strengthening of its capabilities, in the context of the creation of 
a buffer-like arrangement and stable balance of power with regard to the first island chain, would almost certainly prove acceptable to Beijing and eventually necessary for Tokyo.

Such realignments will not occur automatically. They will require courageous and farsighted leadership in all the relevant capitals, some significant risk taking, and highly effective diplomacy. In fact, given the daunting obstacles in the way, one might legitimately ask why it is worth even raising the prospect of these changes. The answer is that the alternative—trying to sustain U.S. predominance in the western Pacific and muddle through continual and likely intensifying crises—is even worse, risking the sort of large-scale military conflict that power transitions throughout history have so often generated.

Ultimately, the choice facing decision-makers in the United States, China, and other Asian powers is whether to deal forthrightly and sensibly with the changing regional power distribution or avoid the hard decisions that China’s rise poses until the situation grows ever more polarized and dangerous. Indeed, delay will only make the process of change more difficult. There are no other workable alternatives.

The Swaine response was to Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.'s How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense:

In the U.S. military, at least, the “pivot” to Asia has begun. By 2020, the navy and the air force plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is investing a growing share of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and nuclear-powered submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments.

These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing’s expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as “the first island chain,” encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington’s ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington’s goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force.

Read them both. It's always fun to watch a debate, regardless of how slow-moving.

But wait, there's more:

An environmental campaign to stop China's sand islands? There was this NYTimes article by Floyd Whaley China’s Island-Building Is Ruining Coral Reefs, Philippines Says:

China’s island-building activities have destroyed about 300 acres of coral reefs and are causing “irreversible and widespread damage to the biodiversity and ecological balance” of the South China Sea, a spokesman for the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said on Monday.

“China has pursued these activities unilaterally, disregarding people in the surrounding states who have depended on the sea for their livelihood for generations,” the spokesman, Charles Jose, said during a news briefing in Manila.

Followed by Robert Williams's The National Interest item "A Secret Weapon to Stop China's Island Building: The Environment?":

Although the tribunal has yet to decide whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case, the Philippines’ strategy of using international law to press its arguments—rather than through negotiations with China—may offer a blueprint for pushing back against China’s recent land reclamation activities. Here is where the environmental consequences of China’s island buildup are poised to play a central role.

Like all countries that have ratified UNCLOS, China has general legal obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment. UNCLOS specifically requires signatory nations to refrain from causing transboundary environmental harms and to take measures “necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.”

Hmm. Given China's already well-known disregard for the environment in pursuit of its economic goals, one is forced to assume that the Philippines is playing the environmental card to rally all sorts of folks to the cause of stopping China.

Will "it's for the children" come next?

In any event, The National Interest pushed it out again in Anthony Bergin's Is China Destroying the South China Sea? (which headline should have added "Environment" in my view, since seas are tough things to destroy but not to harm):

It’s surprising we haven’t seen environmental groups, mounting the kind of protests in the South China Sea that we saw a few years ago against Arctic oil exploration.

Well, perhaps not too surprising, since such groups seem to have a mostly anti-Western bias. The Age in Australia has allowed the baton to be picked up by David Rosenberg in South China Sea: Why not take up China on its words?:

Beijing has cast a peaceful light on its construction of airfields, ports and radar antennae on 800 hectares of new man-made islands in the South China Sea, claiming they are intended for humanitarian concerns like maritime search and rescue, disaster relief, and navigational security, and to aid environmental protection.
***
Other countries are also building or expanding their facilities in the Spratly Islands. Vietnam maintains the most features in the Spratly Islands: six islands, 16 reefs, and six banks. Taiwan controls the largest land feature in the Spratly Islands, Itu Aba, and is expanding its port there to accommodate frigates and coast guard cutters. It is also making improvements to its 1200-metre runway.

But the total size of all these construction activities in the Spratly Islands activities is quite small, under 10 square kilometres.

By contrast, the Philippines has 35,000 square kilometres or 3.5 million hectares of coral reefs within its undisputed territorial waters. About 70 per cent of them are degraded due to coral mining, dynamite, cyanide and other destructive fishing practices, as well as sedimentation and pollution from land based sources. This is vastly larger than the buried 120 hectares of reef attributed to Chinese building projects in the Spratly Islands. In the short term, the environmental impact of all these building projects in the Spratlys is highly disruptive to local ecosystems due to sand dredging, coral mining, and cement pouring.

The long-term impact is not yet clear. However, the costs could be catastrophic. Coral reefs are the foundation of the maritime food chain. They provide the habitat and spawning grounds for numerous fish species, including many of the world's most valuable and productive stocks of tuna and shrimp.

That's the trouble with raising environmental claims - fingers get pointed at you. Of course, the "clean hands doctrine, may apply in courts of equity, but usually seems inapplicable in international affairs.

May we live in interesting times.

"Should U.S. worry about China's island building?"

James Kraska on CNN: Should U.S. worry about China's island building?

Short answer: Yes!

Meanwhile, over the past six weeks, Philippine and U.S. maritime patrol aircraft have been warned away from the artificial island, as though China is claiming that its work generates a territorial sea and national airspace. U.S. Navy Adm. Harry Harris has dismissed these maritime claims as "preposterous," while Defense Secretary Ash Carter has stated that the United States will "fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows."

The "United States and everyone else in the region has a stake in this" because "it gets to the question of freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, freedom from coercion, abiding by peaceful and lawful processes," Carter told the media on his way to Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference. "[A]nd that is...a longstanding U.S. position, as is freedom of flying, freedom to sail."

International law appears to support U.S. officials' skepticism about China's seeming territorial aspirations.

Under article 121 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), only "naturally formed" islands or rocks that are above water at high tide generate a 12-nautical mile territorial sea -- there is no lawful claim of sovereignty over a submerged reef or artificial island. Despite this, on April 24, China flashed powerful lights at Philippine aircraft near Subi reef and reportedly warned it to leave Chinese "territory."

Read the whole thing.

Nice power play, you've got there China. But a little ham-handed.

Fun with China - South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operations

Nice piece at Defence One discussing U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the context of the artificial islands China is creating in the South China Sea:

The point of these operations is to publicly challenge any country which seems to be asserting unjustified legal rights under UNCLOS. China has a longstanding disagreement with this US interpretation of the law of the sea. So they always make protests, and China has sometimes sent its fighter jets out to harass or challenge US spy aircraft.

But the bottom line: freedom of navigation operations are not challenges to “territorial claims” or “sovereignty”; US Navy operations already assume that the other nation has “sovereignty” over the relevant coastline or island. So the US Navy operations near China’s artificial islands can assume that China has sovereignty but still demand the standard transit rights.

Of course, it is worth noting that the US could soon escalate the dispute with China.

The US might take the view, for example, that China is building artificial islands on top of reefs or submerged features which do not entitle China to any legal rights at all (See UNCLOS, Art.60(8): “Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”)

If so, then the US would fly within 12 nm miles or even directly over the artificial islands. Such operations would effectively be a direct challenge to China’s territorial claims, but they haven’t happened yet. 
(Hat tip to James Kraska)

China is pushing hard to assert that it has some historical claim to a large chunk of the South China Sea that renders the provisions of UNCLOS inapplicable. See Why US analysis of China’s nine-dash line is flawed:

The State Department study is at its most questionable in its blunt dismissal of the dashed line’s most compelling legal basis: as a geographic limit of China’s historically formed and accepted traditional fishing rights in the semi-enclosed waters of the South China Sea, which are exercised today on a non-exclusive basis. The study argues that China, in acceding to UNCLOS’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime and its exclusivity-based prerogatives, effectively conceded all prior usage-based claims that it may have held in foreign EEZs, even in semi-enclosed seas. Limited rights pertaining to historical uses are confined to the territorial sea of the coastal state. It quotes the International Court of Justice’s Gulf of Maine judgment of 1984 to press its point.

The study’s argument is conceptually and legally flawed. It fails to fully admit that such long-usage (traditional fishing) rights in semi-enclosed seas that pre-date UNCLOS can be exercised non-exclusively, and has been accepted by regional peers by way of practice. Further, such usage rights do not raise sovereignty or title-based claims but only give rise to the right to continue using the waters for these traditional purposes.

Read the source completely.

See also Maintaining Peace and Tranquility in the South China Sea:

International law has not prohibited the reclamation of land or islands from the sea. For instance, Shanghai has expanded greatly since the Song Dynasty by reclaiming land from the sea. Songjiang, now a part of internal land here, used to be coastal many centuries ago. Such reclamation has been continuing all the time – Japan has built Kansai International Airport through reclamation, Hong Kong has done similarly for its current airport, and Dubai has engineered its famous World Islands projects for leisure purposes. Certainly they have expanded their territory and gained associate benefits. Contemporary international maritime law doesn’t disallow such activities.

Maritime reclamation has been a part of our life. For a long time, Japan has been fortifying the Okinotori Islands and demanded an exclusive economic zone derived from its fortified structure. However, America has been silent on this. For a similarly long time, Vietnam has reclaimed and expanded some of the islands of the Spratly under its occupation, earlier than China is doing. Again, America has made no objection.

It shall be noted that China and Vietnam have disputes over some of these islands in South China Sea. China has claimed that it owns all islands/islets on its side of the U-shaped line and it thought that decades ago Vietnam had agreed with China’s claim, made at the time when Hanoi needed China’s support to its independence and unification fight with France and the US. Last year China submitted to the UN its evidence of Vietnam’s past admission of China’s sovereignty over the entire Spratly and Paracel islands. China has difficulty with Vietnam’s negating its past commitment and present occupation oj some of them and subsequent reclamation.

Despite this, China has joined the Declaration on the Code of Conduct (DoC) on the South China Sea with all ASEAN members, committing to using peaceful means only to settle disputes. Lately Beijing has embarked on a process of preparing for negotiating the Code of Conduct (CoC) on the South China Sea, to eventually conclude a multilateral institutional legally bound framework of resolving disputes peacefully in the region. Clearly, China’s handling of the disputes has shown its intent to maintain peace and tranquility collaboratively in South China Sea. It is notable that per the UN Charter, any countries have self-defense right to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity, with or without specific UN authorization. By working around DoC and CoC parameters on the South China Sea, China is willing to abide by higher standard so as to resolve international disputes through cooperation.

I guess that only works if you assume China has any rights at all to do what it is doing.

China Weaponizes Built Up Islands in South China Sea

Yes, I know, shocking. Australia's The Age reports, China moves weapons on to artificial islands in South China Sea:

China has moved weaponry onto artificial islands that it is building in contested areas of the South China Sea, adding to the risks of a confrontation with the United States and its regional security partners including Australia.

Australian officials are concerned that China could also introduce long-range radar, anti-aircraft guns and regular surveillance flights that will enable it to project military power across a maritime expanse which include some of Australia's busiest trading lanes.

Well, it's not like we didn't know this was coming.

I suspect the reaction will be more hand-wringing, strong memos and some increase in overflights while China consolidates its positions. Why? As stated here:

When a land power wants to set up locations for bases to control the air and sea in areas of interest to them ...

China is thinking like a land power, setting up fixed bases for expansion of its alleged rights in the South China Sea.

It will keep doing this until it has a reason to stop. The threat of "international law" is a joke to China, which knows that international law means little unless there is some means - and the will to use that means - to enforce it.

Are the U.S and/or any of its allies willing to go to war to stop China's island campaign? Will we send in the Marines to dig the Chinese off these sand spits?

China, acting in its own interest as it sees it, understands the "paper tiger" nature of threats rendered impotent by politics, thus they will keep going at this until they have their own South China lake.

Can you imagine the protests about "our kids" going off to war over man-made islands in the middle of nowhere?"

In their defense against U.S. protests they will point to the Monroe Doctrine, the events that lead to the Panama Canal and centuries of European imperialism. Given their history, they probably won't use "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" as the title of their empire building effort - but whatever they call it, it follows a similar thought process.

Here's an interesting WWII OSS (CIA predecessor) analysis of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere:

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

You might note the mention of the Monroe Doctrine:

In 1962, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked symbolically when the Soviet Union began to build missile-launching sites in Cuba. With the support of the Organization of American States, President John F. Kennedy threw a naval and air quarantine around the island.

I don't know what the Chinese equivalent of "goose/gander" is, but I suspect we'll hear it at some point.