Messages from China - One Clear and One Odd

First the clear signal We Don't Like Your FONOPS and Exercises in the South China Sea so we'll show off our anti-ship ballistic missile and demonstrate we lied when we said we wouldn't militarize those islands we made in the SCS.

China's military conducted a flight test of an anti-ship ballistic missile in the contentious South China Sea last weekend in violation of a pledge four years ago by President Xi Jinping not to militarize the waterway.
***
China also may have conducted the provocative missile test in reaction to the recent U.S.-Japan naval exercises in the South China Sea.

Well, of course. It's a warning shot across the bow.

The odd message? China Raises Security Warning on Ships Plying Malacca Strait
:

China raised the security level for its vessels heading through the

Strait of Malacca, a key Asian trade route and major oil choke point.

The transport ministry advised Chinese-flagged ships to take heightened security steps and increased its security warning to level three, according to a copy of a July 2 notice posted on a website affiliated with the ministry.

Three is the highest security level in Chinese shipping regulations, and one above a warning issued after recent attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, according to people familiar with the situation, who asked not to be identified discussing government notifications. The ministry wasn’t immediately able to comment.

Things have been pretty calm piracy-wise in the Strait of Malacca in recent years, so this is a head shaker.

Lloyds List Maritime Intel headline says China raises attack threat in Malacca Straits to highest level:

Shipping companies are asked by authorities in Beijing to increase the security level on ships transiting the Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest waterways. Cosco Shipping’s tanker unit has warned its staff about possible attacks from some Indonesian gangs.

But suppose you are China and you decide that the chokepoints through which your vital oil supplies flow are potentially threatened by forces that may attempt to enforce an embargo on - say - Iranian crude oil. After all, 78% of your oil passes through chokepoints.

Given that possibility, and looking to the U.S. Carter Doctrine for a historic parallel, might you decide to gin up a "threat" which would -um - require you to provide armed escort vessels for your tankers heading to and through such chokepoints? What better threat than "Indonesian gangs?"

In short, is this a Chinese setup to intrude in the state waters of Indonesia and Malaysia with warships as a preemptive move against such an embargo and to set the precedent that China can and will do what it wants to protect its "vital national interests" in such chokepoints?

By sending escort ships to protect its tankers China would take another one of those minor steps that seems innocuous but which has major ramifications. They don't even have to be PLAN ships, but could be Chinese Coast Guard ships to begin with.

Messages.

Once Again, China and Its Sea Lines of Communication

It's about time to revisit the importance of "sea lines of communication" or, as I referred to them back in 2005, "sea lanes":

I keep posting about sea lanes. What are these things? Sea lanes are trade routes - almost like highways in the sea, where due to geography, ocean going vessels follow certain paths to avoid islands, shallows and other impediments to their travel. They are also generally the most efficient routes to get from Point A to Point B - as close to straight line travel as a ship can accomplish given the number of obstacles in its path.

Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington,D.C. (National Defense University, 1996)
(color and bursts added)

Of particular interest in recent days are the sea lanes China is working to find ways to protect. As you can see from the following (which just reference crude oil shipments) these lanes are heavily travelled. In the first chart, I have marked U.S. allies in blue (yes, Singapore is oversized) and areas that China is making claims or working to establish relations as red bursts. Note that the red bursts sit athwart the sea lanes.

China has a problem, though, in that all the approaches to its ports must first pass through various chokepoints - some of which are very narrow like the Strait of Malacca and some of which are wider.

As set out SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific by Professor Ji Guoxing (2000):

The South China Sea provides shipping routes connecting Northeast Asia with Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The Spratly Islands are located in the southeast quadrant of the sea, an area known to seafarers as 'dangerous ground' due to the shallowness of the waters surrounding the islands and numerous submerged reefs around. Thus most merchant ships steer clear of the Spratlys, and major routes pass well west of the Spratlys. ''Through the South China Sea pass more than 41,000 ships a year, more than double the number that pass through the Suez Canal and nearly treble the total for the Panama Canal.''[2]

There are several straits of strategic importance in the region, such as the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar in Southeast Asia, and the Straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, Osumi, and Soya (La Perouse) in Northeast Asia. Major shipping routes in the Asia Pacific are through these key straits. Due to their potential for closure, these straits are known as chokepoints.

The Strait of Malacca, 600 miles long, is relatively shallow (only 21.8 meters) at some points. The maximum draught recommended by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for passing ships is 19.8 meters. The navigable channel at its narrowest point in the Singapore Strait at its eastern end is only 1.5 miles wide. This creates a natural bottleneck, with the potential for collision, grounding, or oil spill.

The Strait of Malacca, being the main corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, has as many as 220 ship movements in both directions per day at present, and would have 275 ship movements by the year 2000. ''About 26 tankers, including three fully loaded supertankers heading for Asian ports, pass through the strait daily.''[3] Tankers using the waterway by 2010 will be two to three times more numerous than today. ''If the strait were closed, nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity.''[4]

The Lombok Strait is wider and deeper than the Strait of Malacca, and passing through it is only 150 miles longer. As its depths are greater than 150 meters, it is not draught-limited, and its minimum passage width is 11.5 miles. It is thus used by largest ships over 100,000 DWT (dead weight tonnage). Most ships transiting the Lombok Strait also pass through the Makassar Strait, which has an available width of 11 miles and a length of 600 miles. Its depth is 930-3392 meters, mostly suitable for submarines and large ships.

The Sunda Strait is 50 miles long and is another alternative to the Malacca Strait. Its northeastern entrance is 15 miles wide. But because its northern part is relatively shallow with dangerous currents, it is not heavily used, and deep-draught ships of over 100,000 DWT do not transit the Strait.

The Strait of Tsushima, being part of the Korea Strait, is the major link between the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. It is 137.9 miles long. Its narrowest point is 25 miles wide, and its deepest point is 129 meters. It is heavily used by vessels traveling to and from the east coast of South Korea, western Japan, and Vladivostok of Russia.

The Strait of Tsugaru, located between Japan's Hokkaido and Honshu Islands, connects the Sea of Japan with the North Pacific Ocean. It is 71.5 miles long. Its narrowest point is 10.1 miles wide, and the deepest point of the navigable channel is 521 meters.

The Osumi Strait is a major connection from the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea to the Pacific.

The Strait of Soya (La Perouse) connects the Sea of Japan with the Sea of Okhotsk. Its narrowest point is 20 miles wide, and its depth is 30-60 meters.

For straits used for international navigation, some regional countries have modified the width of their territorial sea. In spite of their declaration of 12 nautical miles (nm) territorial seas, both Japan and South Korea have modified their territorial seas to 3 nm in the Korea Strait, thus providing a high seas ''corridor'', through which ships may transit without entering the territorial seas of Japan and South Korea. Japan has also declared territorial seas of 3 nm wide in the Tsugaru, Osumi, and Soya (La Perouse) straits.
***
The Asian Pacific countries rely heavily on intra-regional and inter-regional trade for their economic development, and seaborne trade is the most efficient and economical means of transporting large volume and heavy weight cargoes. Shipping routes are thus described as the arteries of the regional economy.

Through these chokepoints must flow the petroleum and other resources China needs to continue its growth.

However, none of these chokepoints are under Chinese control. Yet.

With the development of it artificial islands in the South China Sea, China is taking steps to be able to control access to that sea. There is an excellent piece by Thomas Shugart at War on the Rocks, China's Artificial Islands Are Bigger (And a Bigger Deal) Than You Think:

But the potential combination of China’s premier anti-ship and anti-air capabilities — along with the sheer, breathtaking scale of China’s island-building — call for serious consideration of the faux islands’ potential impact to U.S. diplomacy and contingency planning, as well as the need to take all possible measures to prevent their full militarization.

Ah, you ask, Why?" The best answer is this graphic from the Shugart article:

 "Range arcs depicting potential coverage of HQ-9 SAMs, YJ-62 ASCMs, and DF-21 ballistic missiles from China’s larger South China Sea island bases."

Should China have malice in their plans, you can seen that bases in the South China Sea give them some degree of control of access to not only the SCS but also threaten access to neighboring countries and limit the sea routes available in the region.

There are currently alternatives:

From "Maritime Economic Interests & the Sea Lines of Communication Through the South. China Sea: The Value of Trade in Southeast Asia," Noer and Gregory (1996)

The cost or re-routing shipping, of course, is time and money. The other cost is the ability of China to force the nations within the range of its weapons to capitulate to China's demands or be cut off from the rest of the world. That might be a little uncomfortable for an old foe like Vietnam. Or for major cities that sit on the ocean:

UN GRID-Arendal graphic

China continues to insist these developments are not martial in nature. It is clear, however, that China is taking steps to protect its sea lines of communication, so China's assertions ought to invoke a "Oh, come on" response from the rest of the world.

Spread the Word: China's Stealth Navy - Its "Maritime Militia"

China has two major blue water forces - its navy (PLAN) and its coast guard. It also has a huge merchant fleet. But there is another force it doesn't want you to notice - an asymmetric force trying to fly under the radar. A force as our guest on Midrats, Andrew Ericson, points out that has not been officially recognized by the U.S. government, though it has been engaged in all sorts of adventures - including the disruption of the operations of USNS Impeccable and much more. It is the Chinese "maritime militia" - designed to be a plausibly deniable force multiplier.

There are many issues that arise from the existence of such a militia, some of which Dr. Ericson discusses during our show:




Other issues are discussed in James Kraska's and Michael Monti's The Law of Naval Warfare and China's Maritime Militia (pdf):

The militia is positioned to conduct a “people’s war at sea” in any future conflict. This strategy exploits a seam in the law of naval warfare,
which protects coastal fishing vessels from capture or attack unless they are integrated into the enemy’s naval force. The maritime militia forms an irregular naval force that provides the PLAN with an inexpensive force multiplier,raising operational, legal and political challenges for any opponent.

The sheer size and scope of the vast network of China’s maritime militia complicates the battlespace, degrades any opponent’s decision-making process and exposes adversaries to political dilemmas that will make them more cautious to act against China during a maritime crisis or naval war. The legal implications are no less profound. This article concludes that the maritime
militia risks erasing the longstanding distinction between warships and civilian ships in the law of naval warfare. Although the law of naval warfare permits warships to engage civilian fishing vessels that assist enemy forces, it may be virtually impossible to distinguish between legitimate fishing vessels and those that are integrated into the PLAN as an auxiliary naval force. Regardless
of whether the maritime militia plays a decisive combat role, its presence in the theater of war confronts opponents with vexing legal and operational dilemmas.

Yes, it's legal brief of sorts, but with the Chinese engaging in some serious lawfare, it is a must read to understand the issues confronting our forces.

China: South China Sea Dominance is Us

China's goals for the South China Sea and dominance of the SCS area laid out excellently in the Sydney Morning Herald's South China Sea: The fight China will take to the brink of war:

Then, last week, in another unmistakeable sign of hardening Chinese determination, Xi made his first public appearance in military uniform and formally claimed the title of commander in chief of China's war-fighting headquarters.

What is Xi doing? What does China hope to achieve? And where is this dispute heading? An eminent Chinese expert, Dr Shi Yinghong, provides answers.

Xi has declared the pursuit of "China's Dream", a national resurgence after centuries of foreign domination. Shi, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, says there are three international implications. First, Xi wants China to be acknowledged as a superpower equal to the US. Second, he wants China to become the co-manager of global affairs with the US, a Group of Two for world governance. Third, "China must be the preponderant power in the Western Pacific and have some advantage over the US", he told me. Shi's definition of Chinese aims supports that of the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry Harris, who says China seeks "hegemony in East Asia".

Shi, who has been an adviser to the State Council, China's cabinet, for the past five years, says this will be "based on an arms build up and the strategic ability to go tit-for-tat with the US and to force the US finally to recognise Chinese preponderance" in China's claimed sphere.

"China," Shi explains, "must be number one in diplomatic influence and economic clout and maybe in [military] force. It wants to prevent the US military's freedom of navigation eventually, and gradually squeeze Vietnam, the Philippines and all the others out of the South China Sea." This is precisely what the region's governments fear.

Read the whole thing.

China and Its Australian Gambit

Very interesting NYTimes piece by Jane Perlez on China's 99 year lease on up by Darwin - a very strategic locale "U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Australian Port Leased by Chinese":

The port in this remote northern Australian outpost is little more than a graying old wharf jutting into crocodile-infested waters. On a recent day, there was stifling heat but not a ship in sight. “Our pissy little port,” as John Robinson, a flamboyant local tycoon, calls it.

The financially hurting government of the Northern Territory was happy to lease it to a Chinese company in October for the bargain price of $361 million, raising money for local infrastructure projects.

“We are the last frontier; you take what you can get,” said Mr. Robinson, who is known as Foxy. “The Northern Territory doesn’t have the money for development. Australia doesn’t have it. We need the major players like China.”

But the decision has catapulted the port of Darwin into a geopolitical tussle pulling in the United States, China and Australia.

This month, the United States said it was concerned that China’s “port access could facilitate intelligence collection on U.S. and Australian military forces stationed nearby.”

Read it all, it'll make you say, "Hmmmm."

Not really a brand new story, back in November, The Australian Financial Review reported US 'stunned' by Port of Darwin sale to Chinese:

Richard Armitage, a former United States Deputy Secretary of State, said he was "stunned" that Australia blindsided the US on a decision to allow a Chinese company with alleged links to the People's Liberation Army to lease the Port of Darwin.

"I couldn't believe the Australian defence ministry went along with this," Mr Armitage told The Australian Financial Review in an interview.

"And I was further stunned to find out that apparently this did not come up in the A-US talks [Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations]."

Mr Armitage's comments come amid growing controversy about the $506 million deal between the Northern Territory Government and the Chinese Company, Landbridge Corporation to lease the Port of Darwin for 99 years. The furore comes ahead of final bids being lodged for the $9 billion purchase of the NSW electricity grid, which also includes the purchase of sensitive optic fibre cables used by the defence establishment.

More hmmmm.

Check out the map above. Darwin is a vital port right on alternative sea lanes to China, Japan, Korea, etc, from the Middle East. It's that little red dot in the yellow box.

Nice strategic purchase you got there, China.

Well, yeah - "China’s New Islands Are Clearly Military, U.S. Pacific Chief Says "

Kevin Baron of DefenseOne reports "China’s New Islands Are Clearly Military, U.S. Pacific Chief Says" :

“I believe those facilities are clearly military in nature,” Harris said at the Aspen Security Forum, an annual gathering in Colorado of dozens of top U.S. national security leaders, convened by the Aspen Institute.

In his notably undiplomatic remarks, Harris called on China to show meaningful diplomacy to resolve the territorial disputes. But the four-star admiral also appeared resigned to seeing further construction and eventual deployment of military aircraft and ships.

Fiery Cross Reef sits smack in the middle of South China Sea sea lanes

“They are building ports that are deep enough to host warships and they’re building a 10,000-foot runway at Fiery Cross Reef,” Harris said, referring to one of China’s construction activities in the Spratly Islands that Japan has protested. “A 10,000-foot runaway is large enough to take a B-52, almost large enough for the Space Shuttle, and 3,000 feet longer than you need to take off a 747. So, there’s no small airplane that requires a runway of that length. They’re building rebutted aircraft hangers at some of the facilities there that are clearly designed, in my view, to host tactical fighter aircraft.”

Development on Fiery Cross Reef

I think the Admiral probably said "revetted" and not "rebutted" but that's a minor note. The major note is that -

The top U.S. military officer in the Pacific sternly warned China on Friday to immediately cease its “aggressive coercive island building” in the South China Sea, which he argued was intended clearly for China’s military use as forward operating bases in combat against their regional neighbors.

UPDATE: These maps from an older post might be helpful in visualizing sea lanes a/k/a sea lines of commerce:

China's "Far Sea Operations"

From the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operations in a downloadble pdf format. The contents may prove interesting:

CHAPTER ONE Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security by Dale C. Rielage
CHAPTER TWO Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and Policy
Implications for China by Wu Zhengyu
CHAPTER THREE Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security by Xu Qiyu
CHAPTER FOUR Chinese Cooperation to Protect Sea-Lane Security:
Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden by Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange
CHAPTER FIVE Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and
Escort Missions by Zhang Junshe
CHAPTER SIX Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the
Twenty-First Century by Christopher D. Yung
CHAPTER SEVEN China’s Evolving Overseas Interests and Peaceful
Competition by Cai Penghong
CHAPTER EIGHT Freedom of the “Far Seas”? A Maritime Dilemma for China by Jonathan G. Odom
CHAPTER NINE SLOC Security and International Cooperation by Wang Xiaoxuan
CHAPTER TEN The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic: Catalyst for
Cooperation or Confrontation? by Mark Redden and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

It's the May 2015 edition, edited by Peter Dutton and Ryan Martinson.

I am still reading it, but this introduction to Chapter 6 is intriguing:

In the thirty-five years since inaugurating its “Reform and Opening” policy, China has become increasingly intertwined with the world outside its borders. China is currently the world’s largest trading nation, relying heavily both on foreign supplies of raw
materials for and on foreign consumers of its manufactured products.1 Chinese firms, answering the call of to “Go Out” (走出去), are expanding their overseas investments, and Chinese citizens are traveling the world in ever greater numbers in search of business, education, and pleasure. Though generally positive, these developments have increased the country’s vulnerability to events beyond its control.

Chinese leaders recognize the increasing challenges of safeguarding overseas interests. However, official Chinese policy rejects the type of initiatives that would enable the country to meet these new needs better—namely, overseas basing of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. In recent years, growing numbers of Chinese commentators have expressed views favoring revision of this traditional policy, suggesting that in due time China will have no choice but to take steps to enhance its far-seas support capabilities. This public discussion likely reflects a debate among Chinese policy makers about how best to protect the country’s expanding overseas interests. If China ultimately does
change its long-standing policy eschewing permanent overseas presence, what basing model is it likely to choose?

Dr. Yung lays out the options he sees.

It's interesting reading, as are the previous 12 issues of China Maritime Studies - which are also available for your reading pleasure here.

If you want more "PLA/PLAN cred," there is this Peter Mattis post at War on the Rocks So You Want to Be a PLA Expert? I don't know if you can get a special ribbon for reading all his links.

China Weaponizes Built Up Islands in South China Sea

Yes, I know, shocking. Australia's The Age reports, China moves weapons on to artificial islands in South China Sea:

China has moved weaponry onto artificial islands that it is building in contested areas of the South China Sea, adding to the risks of a confrontation with the United States and its regional security partners including Australia.

Australian officials are concerned that China could also introduce long-range radar, anti-aircraft guns and regular surveillance flights that will enable it to project military power across a maritime expanse which include some of Australia's busiest trading lanes.

Well, it's not like we didn't know this was coming.

I suspect the reaction will be more hand-wringing, strong memos and some increase in overflights while China consolidates its positions. Why? As stated here:

When a land power wants to set up locations for bases to control the air and sea in areas of interest to them ...

China is thinking like a land power, setting up fixed bases for expansion of its alleged rights in the South China Sea.

It will keep doing this until it has a reason to stop. The threat of "international law" is a joke to China, which knows that international law means little unless there is some means - and the will to use that means - to enforce it.

Are the U.S and/or any of its allies willing to go to war to stop China's island campaign? Will we send in the Marines to dig the Chinese off these sand spits?

China, acting in its own interest as it sees it, understands the "paper tiger" nature of threats rendered impotent by politics, thus they will keep going at this until they have their own South China lake.

Can you imagine the protests about "our kids" going off to war over man-made islands in the middle of nowhere?"

In their defense against U.S. protests they will point to the Monroe Doctrine, the events that lead to the Panama Canal and centuries of European imperialism. Given their history, they probably won't use "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" as the title of their empire building effort - but whatever they call it, it follows a similar thought process.

Here's an interesting WWII OSS (CIA predecessor) analysis of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere:

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

You might note the mention of the Monroe Doctrine:

In 1962, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked symbolically when the Soviet Union began to build missile-launching sites in Cuba. With the support of the Organization of American States, President John F. Kennedy threw a naval and air quarantine around the island.

I don't know what the Chinese equivalent of "goose/gander" is, but I suspect we'll hear it at some point.

China's Interest is China's Interest

Kick off the Memorial Day Weekend - mindful that many Americans died fighting helping to free China during WWII - by suggesting a couple of reads on China.

First is Jeff Smith's Foreign Affairs piece, Beware China's Grand Strategy

Ask ten China scholars to define Chinese grand strategy and you will get ten answers. In a formal sense, it does not exist. Yet observers can discern coherent strategic priorities that, in aggregate, resemble the elements of a grand strategy. Today, the first priority is arguably driven by the Communist Party’s preoccupation with mitigating key vulnerabilities in pursuit of stability and growth.
***

Ah, those "key vulnerabilities" - which support China's need for economic growth:

Externally, Beijing is keenly sensitive regarding the vulnerability of the energy imports that sustain China’s economy, the bulk of which must traverse thousands of miles of open sea patrolled by the U.S. Navy and through the narrow naval chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca. The naked vulnerability of these imports (particularly in war time) is intolerable to Chinese strategists.

China's Port and Canal Developments

The goals of Chinese grand strategy can therefore be assumed to be attaining diverse and defensible sources of energy and rapid economic growth bolstered by a healthy supply of export markets in an increasingly connected Asia.

The AIIB [Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank] has the virtue of advancing both agendas, but it represents just one finger in a Chinese hand grasping Asia in an ever-tighter embrace. China’s “String of Pearls” investments in port facilities along the Indian Ocean rim represent another. Just this past February, a Chinese state-owned enterprise assumed control of the “crown pearl,” Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. Another finger is the web of new oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar (also called Burma) to Kazakhstan, and new industrial and commercial rail links spanning from Western China to Europe. Last year a Chinese cargo train made the longest continuous train ride in history, a 21-day, 8,000-mile round trip from China’s Zheijang province to Spain and back. Meanwhile, Russia and China are currently negotiating the details of a largest-ever gas pipeline and supply contract worth up to $40 billion. Finally, Beijing is still unveiling the details of a “One Belt, One Road” New Silk Road Initiative, an ambitious vision for an interconnected Asia with each spoke linking back to the hub of the Chinese economy.

As the article notes, China has a nationalist movement that is unhappy with things that happened during China's weak years and that anger leads directly to efforts to "get back" that which this movement feels was "stolen." One symbol of this effort is the infamous 9- or 10-dashed line which China uses to justify its actions in the South China Sea.

As far as strategy goes, China is not straying too far from a Mahanian approach (see Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?).

The other big read is from the Council on Foreign Relations, Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis authors, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China , which is downloadable as a pdf:

"Because the American effort to 'integrate' China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy."

Is China a boogie man or just a major country asserting its will in a world where other major powers have risen and fallen? Does China's ascendance require confrontation? What is "international law" but the will of the strongest glossed over as "proper behavior?" Will the behavior of past "western" empires come back to haunt their descendants?

It also might be a good idea to read Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations (book available here) as well as critics of that work (see e.g. here). Another approach to ponder, John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. There's also, perhaps more directly on point, Henry Kissinger's On China.

China: A South Atlantic Pivot? Base rights in Southwest Africa?

If the U.S. is doing a "Pacific Pivot," is China countering with expansion into the South Atlantic?

Click to enlarge. Namibia Circled.

The Diplomat asks Is China Secretly Building a Navy Base in Africa?

Writing for Real Clear Defense, Robert C. O’Brien explores reports that China is looking to build an overseas naval base in Namibia. O’Brien notes the historical strategic importance of Walvis Bay, Namibia’s sole deep water port, adding that the South Atlantic is generally “below the radar of most policy makers today.” If the PLA Navy does construct a base at Walvis Bay, he writes, “It would have the ability to patrol the critical Cape of Good Hope around Africa and Cape Horn around South America. The approaches to the key North Atlantic sea lanes linking the Americas, Africa and Europe would be nearby.”

Mr. O'Brien's piece is China's Next Move: A Naval Base in the South Atlantic?:

During my visit to Walvis Bay, China's plan to build a naval base was the talk of the town. Several Namibians pointed out that China already has a major satellite tracking installation in-country. China is developing key uranium mines. Chinese immigrants are opening shops in every corner of the land. A Namibian told me he would not be surprised if Namibia soon elects its first Chinese member of parliament. One local, who works at the harbor, said he has heard the PLA Navy will deploy four to six warships to the prospective base. Once that happens, he said, Namibia becomes, in essence, a Chinese colony.

David Tweed had this story back in November 2014 at Bloomberg reporting on an article from the Namibian, China Mulls Building Naval Base in Namibia, Namibian Times Says. The Namibian report from Nov 19 2014 is "Chinese naval base for Walvis Bay" by Adam Hartman:

According to reports in the Chinese media, Walvis Bay will be one of 18 naval bases that will be established in various regions: Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Mynanmar in the northern Indian Ocean; Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique in the western Indian Ocean; and Seychelles and Madagascar in the central South Indian Ocean.

“These three strategic lines will further enhance China's effectiveness in taking responsibility for maintaining the safety of international maritime routes thereby maintaining regional and world stability,” the media reports said.

Other naval bases are: Chongjin Port (North Korea), Moresby Port (Papua New Guinea), Sihanoukville Port (Cambodia), Koh Lanta Port (Thailand) Sittwe Port (Myanmar), Dhaka Port (Bangladesh), Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Hambantota Port (Sri Lanka), Maldives, Seychelles, Djibouti Port (Djibouti),

Lagos Port (Nigeria), Mombasa Port (Kenya), Dar es Salaam Port (Tanzania) and Luanda Port (Angola).

As the Tweed piece notes, however,

The Namibian Times report was based on an unofficial Chinese Internet report and was “inaccurate,” “exaggerated” and therefore “groundless,” Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said at a monthly press conference in Beijing today, according to a transcript of his remarks. Geng didn’t say which parts of the report, if any, were accurate.

The game's afoot. And it's a big one.

As seen on the above map, the Chinese, if the reported "naval base" list is correct, would build an interesting string of ports available to them. The listed countries that would host bases are under the red ovals. I added China and I added in the Nicaragua canal that it appears the Chinese may fund/engineer/build.

IN 2013 there was this report, China’s moves in Western Hemisphere have U.S. stepping up its game:

China’s courting of Latin America and the Caribbean – signaled anew this week by a visit by its president – is prodding the United States to step up its outreach to the rapidly emerging economies, which are showing greater global clout.

President Xi Jinping’s weeklong trip to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico starting Friday comes in the wake of President Barack Obama’s recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and follows by just a day Vice President Joe Biden’s three-nation tour of the region. Xi will meet with Obama at the close of his trip, June 7-8 in California.

China has eclipsed the United States as Brazil and Chile’s largest trading partner, purchasing soybeans, iron ore and oil to fuel its rapidly expanding economy. Latin American exports to China accounted for just $5 billion in 2000; by 2012, they topped $104 billion.

May we live in interesting times.

Asking the Right Questions: "A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade?"

China's Oil Sea Lines of Communication Chokepoint Problem Areas

From The National Interest A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade? by Xunchao Zhang:

Is it viable for the United States to impose a naval blockade against China in a potential conflict? That’s a critical question in the study of China’s maritime and energy strategies.
***

But China’s reliance on seaborne oil imports isn’t matched by its naval capability. It doesn’t have overseas bases to support regular operations in distant regions. By contrast, the US Navy not only possesses formidable ocean-going capabilities, but also quantitative and technological advantages. That asymmetry between China’s high level of reliance on seaborne oil imports and its low level of naval capability to protect those imports means the US Navy could successfully interdict China’s seaborne oil trade.

The ability to sustain a long blockade and the issue of reliability of prospective allies in such an endeavor are critical.

An earlier post on Cbina's Sea Lanes. It's all about Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), isn't it? Mahan speaks to the Chinese and the U.S. navies.

Interesting analysis by Dr. Stephen E. Flynn here (pdf):

Mahan argued that hardened coastal defenses had the effect of shifting the battleground offshore. Since harbor forts equipped with land-based armaments could fire weapons at longer distances and with greater accuracy than vessel-based cannons, a foreign naval force would find it difficult to directly attack or conduct an effective blockade of a U.S. seaport. However, a nation that invested in a large deepwater navy could overcome coastal defenses by disrupting what Mahan called the “sea-lines of communication” (SLOC) that facilitate "the sea commerce upon (which) the wealth and strength of countries" ultimately lies.

Related issues connected to Anti-Access/Area Denial and the "third offset" here.

Note the nearby map of China's claims to most of the South China Sea as it attempts to secure its nearby SLOCs, especially those near the Spratly Islands. Oh look, Vietnam is important. As are the Philippines.


More worrisome is the author's proposed Chinese solution:

The US can conceptualize a conventional war with China because China, with a much smaller nuclear force can’t initiate nuclear exchange in a war with the US. China needs to transform its strategic nuclear force from one of minimal sole-purpose deterrence to a more robust multi-purpose deterrence. A robust Chinese nuclear deterrence could contribute to war prevention by replacing the option of “winnable conventional war” with “unwinnable nuclear war.” But, in order to construct a nuclear deterrence sufficiently robust to deter the US from engaging in a conflict with China, Beijing must make two major changes: it must renounce its No-First-Use declaration, and build up a strategic nuclear force more comparable to that of the US.

Goodie, can we have another Cold War?

While you think about that delightful idea, remember what the Japanese were up to in 1941 as they tried to secure their supply areas and the SLOCs  they needed to get oil and other things to their island homeland. China, of course, does not have Malaya, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Korea and Japan under their control as did the Japanese after December 1941.

But they sure wish they did.

Things to Worry About: China and the Buying of Resources

In the world of free trade, there are some interesting trends as set out in this interview from Mining.com: Jeb Handwerger: China isn't slowing down, it's buying up (resources, that is:

This is really all about natural resources and the ability to control the trade. There's a whole list of 10 to 15 strategic minerals that come from China almost exclusively. Russia, on the other hand, has a major control on palladium, platinum group metals and nickel, as well some of the agricultural fertilizers, such as potash. Russia also has a critical supply of uranium; it produces about 3,000 tons of uranium, close to double United States production of uranium. Not only that, but Russia has strategic ties with Kazakhstan, which produces close to 20,000 tons of uranium—over 36% of global supply.

I've written for years that these metals and these materials are at risk of critical supply shortfall. It's even more the case now as these tensions increase. There is greater risk of China or Russia turning off the natural gas pipelines or cutting exports of the rare earths and graphite.

Their control of these critical metals is going to force the West, the European Union and the U.S. to develop their own strategic, secure supplies of these materials needed for the critical technologies.

We're already beginning to see that take place. Many junior miners have made strategic advancements with some jurisdictions in the rare earth sector.
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China is going to have to go abroad to support its expanding economy with natural resources over the long term.
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While the media dazzles us with a Chinese slowdown, China's buying up North American energy resources and precious metals during this pullback. One of the areas that has benefited the most from this ongoing trend has been Western Canada, most notably Alberta. It may be one of the best economies in the world right now. Hundreds of billions of investment dollars are earmarked for this region to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities and major pipelines to transport petroleum to the growing economies in Asia.

So, if a country is importing natural resources from abroad, it is forced to use the sea to carry the resources on ships and on sea lines of communication.

One of the reasons to build up a navy is to protect those sea lines. Ah, but protect them from whom? Why, of course, anyone that might threaten them to force behavior changes by your government.

If you catch my drift.

Here's an older map of "China's Critical Sea Lines of Communication":

Might want to add something like the non-great circle sea lanes as new critical routes:

Just sayin'

And, so long as China is the topic, you might go to the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies page and download some research papers. The latest covers China's Near Sea Combat Capabilities.

Not a surprise: "Oil and gas will drive future control of the South China Sea"

If you've been reading this blog, this will not come as a surprise to you, but if Robert Kaplan writes and talks about it, perhaps others will get the idea: "Oil and gas will drive future control of the South China Sea". From MarketPlace.org (and NPR):

In his new book “Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and The End of a Stable Pacific”, Robert Kaplan breaks down how a possible dispute over the South China Sea could have a substantial impact.
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Kaplan said the possible dispute over who owns the South China Sea could have a staunching economic impact.

“If the pacific is no longer stable, that will affect investment, growth rates, etc.” said Kaplan. “If you ask me what’s the biggest question in the world today; it’s not ‘Will Iran get its Nukes?’ it’s the direction of the Chinese economy.”

China finds a large natural gas reservoir in Sichuan Province

In what is good news both for the Chinese and the rest of the world's energy users, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation has declared a major natural gas reservoir find:

A major breakthrough was made by CNPC in natural gas exploration in the Sichuan Basin. As certified by the Ministry of Land and Resources, the newly added proven gas in place in the Longwangmiao formation of Cambrian system in the Moxi block of Anyue gas field is 440.385 billion cubic meters, with technically recoverable reserves hitting 308.2 billion cubic meters.

This is the largest monomer marine uncompartmentalized carbonate gas reservoir discovered in China up to now, featured by large reserve scale, broad gas-bearing areas, high formation pressure, high gas flow, and superior gas components. The production test has obtained average per well daily output of 1.1 million cubic meters, and the wells in production yield at 0.6 million cubic meters per day averagely.

The Anyue gas field is located at the paleo uplift of central Sichuan. Since 2011, CNPC has drilled two exploration wells — Gaoshi-1 and Moxi-8, both obtaining high-yield gas flows of one million cubic meters per day from the Simian system and Cambrian system respectively.

It only took CNPC less than two years to find the Longwangmiao gas reservoir, identify its reserves, and make a successful production test with 1 billion cubic meters capacity. The phase-I capacity building project of 4 billion cubic meters is now on full swing, and the phase-II capacity building project of 6 billion cubic meters has already been kicked off. At present, gas production test at Moxi block has cumulatively yielded more than 600 million cubic meters.

That ought to last them a couple of years or so.

Internal Chinese development of its natural resources ought to ease some of their concerns over their sea lines of communication being threatened.

There is much to be said about near energy independence as a calming factor in international relations.

African Trade: China, India and others

Nice report by BBC News "China and India: The scramble for business in Africa":

Throughout Africa - at building sites, on the street, and at ports and airports - the Chinese presence is growing.

Competing for a slice of the wealth along with traditional stakeholders are new ones such as Brazil and South Korea - and India, China's neighbour.
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India's $65bn (£44bn) of trade with Africa is dwarfed by China's $200bn.

Chinese companies are active across the continent with big infrastructure projects, including ports, railways and sports stadiums.

Hmm. No mention of U.S. companies vying for work?

But, to follow on, the BBC is helpful with, a report of $5 billion deal between China and Kenya.

Kenya is on the outs with the U.S. and the EU due to issues with Kenya's president, whose spokespeople suggest nothing but good things from their relations with China:

In a statement, his office said the deals with China were a "massive boost" to his government.

"The rail link, particularly, is important in the context of East Africa's shared goal of ensuring quicker movement of peoples, goods and services," it quoted Mr Kenyatta as saying.

It will link the Kenyan border town of Malaba with the port of Mombasa, one of the busiest in Africa.

Funny, I remember the days when China was attacking the "exploitation" of Africa by western countries. Now, in Wikileaks released message, a U.S. government official brightly notes:

"China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons," he says. "China is in Africa primarily for China."

I would think any person who ever attended a "Great Powers" course might understand that.

I suspect the Africans and the Chinese do.

So, if you find yourselves asking why China might need a blue water navy to protect its sea lanes - you might consider the routes from Africa to China and the chokepoints that they might see as problematic.

You might also speculate about the experience that Chinese fleet is getting operating in the Indian Ocean as part of the anti-Somali pirate forces.

China Issues Threat to the Philippines Over South China Sea

Yes, you could call it a "warning" as Reuters does in China media warns Philippines of 'counterstrike' in South China Sea, but we all know a threat made by a bully when we hear one, don't we? From the Reuters article:

The overseas edition of the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, said in a front-page commentary that the Philippines had committed "seven sins" in the South China Sea.

These include the "illegal occupation" of the Spratly Islands, inviting foreign capital to engage in oil and gas development in the disputed waters and promoting the "internationalization" of the waters, said the commentary.

The Philippines has called on the United States to act as a "patron", while ASEAN has become an "accomplice," said the commentary, which does not amount to official policy but can reflect the government's thinking.

"The Philippines, knowing that it's weak, believes that 'a crying child will have milk to drink'," the People's Daily said, accusing Manila of resorting to many "unscrupulous" tricks in the disputed waters.

Beijing's assertion of sovereignty over a vast stretch of the South China Sea has set it directly against Vietnam and the Philippines, while Brunei, Taiwan and Malaysia also lay claim to other parts of the sea.

Wow, even reads like the words of 12-year old thug picking on a smaller kid.

The U.S. has defense agreements with the Philippines.

"Seven sins" against China -that's pretty good -setting China up as a victim.

 And you have to love the use of the "counterstrike" to justify an act of aggression against a country with a very weak military.

 Perhaps China is afraid that international law won't recognize its claims to the Spratly Islands and the entirety of the South China Sea?

Or perhaps they see the U.S. as too timid to react on behalf of an ally? Everyone else seems to be tweaking our nose lately.

Southeast Asia: India, China and Sea Power

Interesting piece at the Foreign Policy website, "India's Ocean" by Dhruva Jaishankar, posing one of those fundamental questions, "What is the role of the Indian Navy as China asserts dominance to India's east?":

For its part, China needs to appreciate that its aggressive pursuit of maritime territory compels India to cooperate more closely with Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing's issuing of passports this November featuring a map showing the fullest extent of its territorial claims was a remarkably clumsy gesture, provoking simultaneous outrage in India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China may have only itself to blame if these states find greater common cause with one another, and with other regional maritime powers.

The map above indicates key Chinese sea lines of communication. You might take note of India's position relative to them.

You also might take a look at the Thomas X. Hammes piece, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict (pdf), which suggests a "distant blockade" (or "Offshore Control") of China as a possible strategy:

The strategy of Offshore Control works with willing Asia-Pacific nations to ensure that the United States can interdict China’s energy and raw material imports and industrial exports, while protecting our partners.

Col. Hammes's thoughts are also set out in December 2012 U.S. Naval Institute article, "Offshore Control is the Answer":

Offshore control would deny China the use of the sea inside the first island chain, at the same time defend those islands, and dominate the air and sea outside that theater. It envisions a stand-off military campaign focusing on a war of economic strangulation rather than on penetrating Chinese airspace to physically destroy its infrastructure. It seeks to force China to fight in ways that maximize U.S. strengths while minimizing China’s. In essence, OC provides a strategic context for an operational approach that goes beyond Air-Sea Battle to use the U.S. geographical advantage to maximize the effectiveness of a campaign using our air, sea, and land assets.

Oh, and if you were wondering about the value of a strong U.S. Navy - this discussion is right on point. Being able to project power even when it needs to be done without local help - that's a big chunk of the Navy's job description.

Keep in mind that it is the job of the military strategist to work through "unlikely" scenarios just in case. Next time some idiot media hack reports on secret U.S. plans to re-take Midway Island based upon some outlandish event occurrence, it shouldn't really be a shock to you.

UPDATE: There has been some notice of the fact I used an "oil flow" map to illustrate this post. Here is a more recent map that shows vital sea lanes (click on it to enlarge), followed up by a closer view in the China region: