China: The Times They Are A-Changin'?

Interesting thoughts on where China is headed politically from an reporter/author:




Transcript here:

As a motivator, if you think about it, China has grown for 30 years at a rate of about eight percent a year, meaning that the economy has doubled in size every seven or eight years. And that period has come to an end. And so what it's looking for is a new source of domestic legitimacy, growth and unity, and that has forced the government to draw on new impulses, and one of the ways that it's doing that, of course, is by turning to nationalism. And it's cultivating a sense that China should rally around the flag. It's encouraging students in school to study the history of China's victimhood.

Victimhood seems a pretty poor place to start - I think some guy in Germany took that route a few years back.

Not that China doesn't have some historical grievances (as did Germany). The question for the CCP is which path to follow - focusing on the past to seek to pump an aggressive patriotism, or focusing on the future in which the past is overcome by success in the modern world. But the latter path may lead to shrinking power for the CCP . . .

It is interesting to hear the opinion that China has moderating influences to which the CCP is sort of responding.

As noted by the Sam Trangredi, our guest on Midrats yesterday, in his book Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (also available as a Kindle book here), one reason that authoritarian governments make aggressive political/military moves is often an attempt to shore up domestic support when the authorities power is shaken, citing the Argentine actions with respect to the Falklands as one example (and perhaps Putin in the Ukraine):

. . . The obvious question is why the Argentine government decided to use preemptive force in seizing the islands,

The answer lies in Argentina's domestic situation at that time. *** With no appearance of legitimacy, the junta resorted to resolving a standing nationalist grievance, the outcome of which could appeal to Argentine patriotism and popularly justify continuation of junta rule.

There are plenty of other examples of internally threatened regimes who resort to external violence to keep their power.

This portion of the video seems particularly appropriate:

. . . fundamentally, the rule of the Communist Party relies on faith of a certain kind. Faith in the party above all.

The interview appears to have taken place before the current Hong Kong embarrassment to the Chinese power structure.

UPDATE: Cleaned up one split infinitive.

Thinking about "big deck carriers?" . . . James Holmes is

Interesting opinion piece from Professor Jim Homes of the Naval War College at USNI News, Opinion: History’s Costliest Fleet Auxiliary:

Carriers started off as fleet auxiliaries a century ago, scouting and screening for the battle line, before taking their place as the chief repository of U.S. Navy striking power during World War II. The CVN could trace the same trajectory followed by the battleships—from capital ship, to expensive fleet auxiliary, and into eventual obsolescence and retirement.

Why is he thinking this way?

This is a milieu populated not just by adversary cruisers and destroyers, but

Old "Silkworm" Anti-Ship Missiles

by missile-toting subs and fast patrol craft. This is also an age of land-based sea power. Extended-range fire support has come a long way since the days of Corbett and Mahan, when a fort’s guns could clear enemy vessels out of a few miles of offshore waters, and that was it. Tactical aircraft flying from airfields ashore, batteries of antiship cruise missiles, and even an exotic antiship ballistic missile are among the weaponry with which U.S. Navy defenders must now contend. This latter-day, hybrid land/sea flotilla menaces not just CVNs but all surface forces that venture within its range.

Modern Iranian Chinese C-801/2 Dispenser

Actually, it is a return to the old days, when Lord Nelson's adage "A ship's a fool to fight a fort" was the wisdom of the day.

Anti-access weapons and capability have just added to their range, as land-based powers seek to convert their "near seas" into safe, controlled space.

What does it mean if Professor Holmes is right?

I would suggest starting with building up the submarine fleet. A slew of diesel/AIP boats would be good. Or something different - submersible missile hydrofoil ships? Break out the old Tom Swift books.

I should also note that one of the original arguments for something like the Littoral Combat Ship was that it was an inexpensive asset that could be put in harm's way . . . to keep the sea lanes open among other things.

The U.S. Navy needs to be very careful to the avoid the hammer/nail approach to problem solving.