A competent and self-confident person is incapable of jealousy in anything. Jealousy is invariably a symptom of neurotic insecurity.
Hmm. Wonder if there is such a thing as national or group "neurotic insecurity?"
A competent and self-confident person is incapable of jealousy in anything. Jealousy is invariably a symptom of neurotic insecurity.
The United States Navy is as much an expression of this nation's will and its ideals as it is a superb fighting service, dedicated to the preservation of those ideals. The United States Army members are proud to serve in defense of freedom on the same team with the Navy; custodian of a great tradition, and a dynamic sister service. This week's THE BIG PICTURE proudly salutes The United States Navy, its history, its achievements and its future role in the military establishment.
On average, five Americans die each year from fires caused by deep fryers, according to the National Fire Protection Association.
The most common mistake is overfilling the deep-frying vat, which causes oil to spill over the edge and ignite, engulfing the entire unit in flames that are difficult to extinguish.
And placing a frozen -- or even partially frozen -- turkey into the vat can cause an explosion of hot oil, according to the fire marshal.
In fact, UL, an independent and global safety science company, considers turkey fryers so hazardous that it will not certify them for safe use.
U.S. fire departments respond to about 1,000 home fires each year that are started by deep fryers. In addition to deaths, those fires cause some 60 injuries and $15 million in direct property damage on average per year.
To avoid explosions and fire, follow these tips from the fire marshal:
-- Place the fryer outdoors on a flat surface, and never on a wooden deck or in a garage.
-- Fill a cold fryer with water and place your turkey into the vat to determine the amount of oil needed. Mark the water level well below the rim of the vat, and make sure the fryer dries thoroughly before filling with oil.
-- Oil and water do not mix. Avoid injury, and explosions, by thoroughly thawing and drying the bird before frying it.
|China's Oil Sea Lines of Communication Chokepoint Problem Areas|
Is it viable for the United States to impose a naval blockade against China in a potential conflict? That’s a critical question in the study of China’s maritime and energy strategies.
But China’s reliance on seaborne oil imports isn’t matched by its naval capability. It doesn’t have overseas bases to support regular operations in distant regions. By contrast, the US Navy not only possesses formidable ocean-going capabilities, but also quantitative and technological advantages. That asymmetry between China’s high level of reliance on seaborne oil imports and its low level of naval capability to protect those imports means the US Navy could successfully interdict China’s seaborne oil trade.The ability to sustain a long blockade and the issue of reliability of prospective allies in such an endeavor are critical.
Mahan argued that hardened coastal defenses had the effect of shifting the battleground offshore. Since harbor forts equipped with land-based armaments could fire weapons at longer distances and with greater accuracy than vessel-based cannons, a foreign naval force would find it difficult to directly attack or conduct an effective blockade of a U.S. seaport. However, a nation that invested in a large deepwater navy could overcome coastal defenses by disrupting what Mahan called the “sea-lines of communication” (SLOC) that facilitate "the sea commerce upon (which) the wealth and strength of countries" ultimately lies.Related issues connected to Anti-Access/Area Denial and the "third offset" here.
The US can conceptualize a conventional war with China because China, with a much smaller nuclear force can’t initiate nuclear exchange in a war with the US. China needs to transform its strategic nuclear force from one of minimal sole-purpose deterrence to a more robust multi-purpose deterrence. A robust Chinese nuclear deterrence could contribute to war prevention by replacing the option of “winnable conventional war” with “unwinnable nuclear war.” But, in order to construct a nuclear deterrence sufficiently robust to deter the US from engaging in a conflict with China, Beijing must make two major changes: it must renounce its No-First-Use declaration, and build up a strategic nuclear force more comparable to that of the US.Goodie, can we have another Cold War?
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Saturday outlined a series of reforms designed to tackle what he views as the military’s declining prowess as China, Russia and others field new weapons technologies.CSBA's Robert Martinage laid "third offset strategy" in out in, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability
Mr. Hagel said the Pentagon needed to look outside the traditional defense industry to target emerging technologies that could be developed within budget constraints, a move that some leaders believe could reshape the weapons business over the next decade.
Defense officials have said the priorities include longer-range and hypersonic weapons, enhanced cybersecurity platforms and unmanned systems.
As a matter of urgency, the U.S. military needs to “offset” the investments that adversaries are making in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities—particularly their expanding missile inventories—by leveraging U.S. advantages in unmanned systems and automation, extended-range and low-observable air operations, undersea warfare, and complex system engineering and integration. Doing so would allow the United States to maintain its ability to project power, albeit in novel forms, despite the possession of A2/AD capabilities by hostile forces.Related to this, of course, is the recognition that U.S. naval surface force are being out-ranged and out-gunned by overwhelming numbers of ship threatening cruise and other missiles, which we discussed on Midrats with Bryan Clark here.
... another “easy button” solution: the promise that we’ll fix declining capabilities by deploying new technology.It is worth reading these arguments and pondering where we should be headed.
The Secretary offered no details that would suggest he considers technology to be a serious strategy for overcoming our deteriorating defenses. Basically all he said in his speech was that his Pentagon would spend the next two years planning to have a plan. That is not a plan.
Second, basing a strategy on technological innovation that is not in hand is nothing more than wishful thinking. It would be like Taft’s Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, planning to fight World War I with nuclear weapons. Game-changing technology happens when it happens—not on-demand, like cable. Indeed, betting on technology that’s not mature often leads to deploying technology before it’s ready, which in turn leads to the kinds of massive cost overruns and delays a cash-strapped Defense Department can ill afford. Of course, the United States should always be seeking out technologies that offer decisive competitive advantages, but that is not the basis for a sound strategy.
Third, it’s a mistake to build a strategy around a single point of strength, because that often becomes a single point of failure.
The effectiveness of America’s other tools for global influence, such as diplomacy and economic engagement, are critically intertwined with and dependent upon the perceived strength, presence and commitment of U.S. armed forces. Yet the capabilities and capacities rightly called for in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, hereafter referred to as the QDR, clearly exceed the budget resources made available to the Department. This gap is disturbing if not dangerous in light of the fact that global threats and challenges are rising, including a troubling pattern of territorial assertiveness and regional intimidation on China’s part, the recent aggression of Russia in Ukraine, nuclear proliferation on the part of North Korea and Iran, a serious insurgency in Iraq that both reflects and fuels the broader sectarian conflicts in the region, the civil war in Syria, and civil strife in the larger Middle East and throughout Africa.At least everyone at this level of the argument acknowledges there are a growing threats that "sweet talk" will not abate.
Flying far is more important than flying fast, Japanese fighter technologists have found in studies aimed at defining their country’s next combat aircraft. Looking for ways for their air force to fight outnumbered, researchers are also emphasizing that Japan’s next fighter should share targeting data, carry a big internal load of large, high-performance missiles and be able to guide them while retreating.While the aircraft design is interesting, the analysis of that concludes that "flying far is more important than flying fast" is worth thinking about.
Whether Japan will build the aircraft at all is another question. On the one hand, the country feels its security is increasingly imperiled by rising and bellicose China. On the other hand, developing a heavy stealth fighter would have to cost tens of billions of dollars.
They moved the engines inboard and left a broad space for side-by-side stowage of six medium-range missiles under the ducts, which twisted upward and inward. The additional missiles, even at the expense of greater size and cost, make good sense for a country that must contemplate fighting against far more numerous enemy forces, Barrie says.
How do we build the future surface fleet to ensure our forces maintain the ability to access to all regions of the world's oceans that our vital to our national interests?Join us live on Sunday or pick the show up later by clicking here. You can also find this show after the live feed on iTunes here, along with its 254 predecessors.
Our guest to discuss this and the broader issues related to our surface forces will be Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
A basis for our conversation will be his recent study for CSBA, Commanding the Seas: A Plan to reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare, where he articulates the operational concept of “offensive sea control” as the new central idea to guide evolution of the U.S. surface force. This idea would refocus large and small surface combatant configuration, payloads and employment on sustaining the surface force’s ability to take and hold areas of ocean by destroying threats to access such as aircraft, ships and submarines rather than simply defending against their missiles and torpedoes.
Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Bryan Clark was Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of his Commander’s Action Group.
He served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. His areas of emphasis were modeling and simulation, strategic planning and institutional reform and governance. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2007, he was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore including tours as Chief Engineer and Operations Officer at the Navy’s nuclear power training unit.
Mr. Clark holds a Master of Science in National Security Studies from the National War College and a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry and Philosophy from the University of Idaho.
Officers of tomorrow's navy trained, new radar-controlled glider bomb shown for first time, air-dropped sonar buoy with sub animation, transmitted to destroyer for depth charges (partial newsreel).
If only a nation as powerful and vulnerable as the United States had the option of defining exactly which types of wars it wages. Reality, alas, seldom cooperates. Over the centuries, U.S. presidents of all political persuasions have found it necessary to send troops to fight adversaries ranging from the Barbary pirates to Filipino insurrectos to Haitian cacos to Vietnamese communists to Somali warlords to Serbian death squads to Taliban guerrillas to al Qaeda terrorists. Unlike traditional armies, these enemies seldom met U.S. forces in the open, which meant that they could not be defeated quickly. To beat such shadowy foes, American troops had to undertake the time-intensive, difficult work of what’s now known as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nation building.
Yemen’s control over one of the most important naval straits in the world, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, underscores this geostrategic importance. Commercial liners and oil tankers pass through the strait on their way to and from the Suez Canal. International stakeholders are concerned that al-Qaeda will take advantage of the current transitional conditions in Yemen to threaten shipping and international trade, contributing to the maritime piracy that is already blighting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
The engagement with Yemen was initiated with a clear understanding that Yemen was a sanctuary for terrorists.Note that cuts in naval logistics forces placed the Cole in Aden:
Reductions in force structure have left the Navy with signifcantly dimished assets. The reduction in the number of oilers, combatants, and weapons available may have led to operational decisions that contributed to the U.S.S. Cole’s vulnerability.
To take out al Shabab, one need look no further than charcoal. The United Nations has repeatedly called for countries in the region to disrupt the group’s trade in this environmentally destructive product, but, as the most recent Somalia UN Monitoring Group report revealed, such efforts have been lackluster. And so, with its patience wearing thin, the UN has now taken matters into its own hands by approving a naval intervention.The "legislative history" of UN Resolution 2182 here:
According to the latest UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia, published in mid-October, the charcoal trade continues at a rate consistent with prior years. Until Barawe was lost in October, al Shabab still loaded and exported charcoal from the port. And even today, traders and brokers continue to facilitate “systemic violations” of the UN-mandated ban, and Somali charcoal continues to show up in Gulf Cooperation Council markets. All in all, the report noted, al Shabab’s continued survival is secured by its trade operations, the cornerstone of which remains the charcoal trade.
Roopa Gogineni/Al Jazeera
Days after the report was issued, the Security Council passed Resolution 2182, authorizing the use of naval force to disrupt the trade. If trade hubs in the Gulf region will not stop the trade, it seems, the warships of the Combined Maritime Forces, a 30-nation naval partnership that patrols the region to deter piracy will have to do the work for them. It is too soon to tell if the new mission is tightening the screws on al Shabab. If it works, though, it will signal a new era in the war against the terrorist group.
As regards the charcoal ban, in place since 2012, the Council authorized States, for a 12-month period, to inspect vessels in territorial waters and on the high seas which they had “reasonable grounds” to believe were carrying charcoal from Somalia, in violation of that ban, or weapons or military equipment, in violation of the arms embargo. States were authorized to seize and dispose of any prohibited items. Such authorizations applied only with respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council said, deciding to review those measures after six months.I figure that each ship involved should be able to paint a "bag" of charcoal on the bridge wing for every successful interdiction. Just slap a Kingsford bag image up there. 5 bags makes the ship a "charcoal" ace.
Maritime interdiction of charcoal and armsI have no idea what an "environmentally responsible manner" method of getting rid of charcoal is. Unless using it to grill hamburgers is okay.
“11. Reaffirms the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) (“the charcoal ban”), and reiterates that the Somali authorities shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia and reiterates its requests in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013),that AMISOM support and assist the Somali authorities in doing so, as part of AMISOM’s implementation of its mandate set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093,
“12. Condemns the ongoing export of charcoal from Somalia, in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia reaffirmed above;
Potential charcoal interdiction force
“13. Urges all Member States, including those contributing AMISOM police and troop contingents, to respect and implement their obligations to prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not such charcoal originated in Somalia, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2002), and affirms this includes taking the necessary measures to prevent the use of their flag vessels for such importing;
“14. Condemns the flow of weapons and military equipment to Al Shabaab and other armed groups which are not part of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and expresses serious concern at the destabilizing impact of such weapons;
“15. Authorizes for a period of 12 months from the date of this resolution Member States, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, such as ‘Combined Maritime Forces’, in cooperation with the FGS and which the FGS has notified to the Secretary-General and which the Secretary-General has subsequently notified to all Member States, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo on Somalia and the charcoal ban, to inspect, without undue delay, in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia extending to and including the Arabian sea and Persian Gulf, vessels bound to or from Somalia which they have reasonable grounds to believe are:
(i) Carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the charcoal ban;
(ii) carrying weapons or military equipment to Somalia, directly or indirectly, in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia;
(iii) carrying weapons or military equipment to individuals or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009);
“16. Calls upon all Flag States of such vessels to cooperate with such inspections, requests Member States to make good-faith efforts to first seek the consent of the vessel’s Flag State prior to any inspections pursuant to paragraph 15, authorizes Member States conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 15 to use all necessary measures commensurate with the circumstances to carry out such inspections and in full compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as may be applicable, and urges Member States conducting such inspections to do so without causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise of the right of innocent passage or freedom of navigation;
“17. Authorizes Member States to seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) any items identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 15, the delivery, import or export of which is prohibited by the arms embargo on Somalia or the charcoal ban, authorizes Member States to collect evidence directly related to the carriage of such items in the course of such inspections, and decides that charcoal seized in accordance with this paragraph may be disposed of through resale which shall be monitored by the SEMG;
“18. Emphasizes the importance of all Member States, including Somalia, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of Somalia, or of any person or entity in Somalia, or of persons or entities designated for measures set out in resolutions 1844 (2008), 2002 (2011), or 2093 (2013), or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;
“19. Requests Member States to dispose of any charcoal, weapons or military equipment seized pursuant to paragraph 17, in an environmentally responsible manner, taking into account the United Nations Environment Programme’s 4 September 2013 letter to the Chair of the Committee, and the Committee’s 7 May 2014 “Implementation Assistance Notice”, calls upon all Member States in the region to cooperate in the disposal of such charcoal, weapons or military equipment, affirms that the authorization provided for in paragraph 15 includes the authority to divert vessels and their crews, to a suitable port to facilitate such disposal, with the consent of the port State, affirms that the authorization in paragraph 15 includes the authority to use all necessary measures to seize items pursuant to paragraph 17 in the course of inspections and decides that any Member State cooperating in the disposal of items identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 15, the delivery, import or export of which is prohibited by the arms embargo on Somalia or the charcoal ban, shall provide a written report to the Committee no later than 30 days after such items enter its territory on the steps taken to dispose or destroy them;
“20. Decides that any Member State that undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 15, shall promptly notify the Committee and submit a report on the inspection containing all relevant details, including an explanation of the grounds for and the results of the inspection and where possible including the flag of the vessel, the name of the vessel, the name and identifying information of the master of the vessel, the owner of the vessel, and the original seller of the cargo, and efforts made to seek the consent of the vessel’s Flag State, requests the Committee to notify the Flag State of the inspected vessel that an inspection has been undertaken, notes the prerogative of any Member State to write to the Committee concerning the implementation of any aspect of this resolution, and further encourages the SEMG to share relevant information with Member States operating under the authorization set out in this resolution;
“21. Affirms that the authorizations provided in this resolution apply only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, including the general principle of exclusive jurisdiction of a Flag State over its vessels on the high seas, with respect to any other situation, underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law, and notes further that such authorizations have been provided only following the receipt of the 8 October 2014 letter conveying the request of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia;
“22. Decides to review after six months from the date of this resolution, the provisions set out in paragraphs 11 to 21 above;
Rescuers on Wednesday pulled a family from a sport utility vehicle that had been buried in a snowdrift on a rural highway in the southwestern state of New Mexico for nearly two days.First: Before you travel, check out your car "winter emergency kit" and make sure you are covered for the dreaded "worst case scenario." Here are some suggestions from New Jersey:
State police said rescuers had to dig through 4 feet of ice and snow to free the Higgins family, whose red GMC Yukon got stuck on the highway when a blizzard moved through the area Monday.
Rescuers found David and Yvonne Higgins and their 5-year-old daughter Hannah clinging to each other and lethargic early Wednesday morning. The family is recovering at Miners Colfax Medical Center in Raton.
Keep these items in your car:Another list from Ready.gov includes some other things:
Flashlights with extra batteries
First aid kit with pocket knife
Extra newspapers for insulation
Plastic bags (for sanitation)
Extra set of mittens, socks, and a wool cap
Rain gear and extra clothes
Small sack of sand for generating traction under
Small tools (pliers, wrench, screwdriver)
Set of tire chains or traction mats
Cards, games, and puzzles
Brightly colored cloth to use as a flag
Canned fruit and nuts
Nonelectric can opener
First Aid Kit: remember any necessary medications, baby formula and diapers if you have a small childThen, if you have space, don't forget the kids, the luggage and the presents for Granny. Really, NJ? "Several blankets" and "sleeping bags?" Oh, yeah, worst case ... which means I'd cut down on the real blankets and go with space blankets and/or sleeping bags.
Food: non-perishable food such as canned food, and protein rich foods like nuts and energy bars
Radio: battery or hand cranked
Charged Cell Phone: and car charger
If you already have an emergency kit, well done. Essentials such as first-aid supplies, jumper cables, gloves, a flashlight, duct tape, a tow strap, and some simple tools should already be in your trunk—if not for daily driving, then at least when you set out on a road trip. Here are some winter-specific items to include for times when the roads are covered in slush."snow socks" or even emergency tire chains can be had for under $100 if you check Amazon for "snow socks." Hand warmer thingies? You might get a box of these or their equivalent at Wal-Mart. There are body warmers, too. Just put a few in the kit, they don't take up a lot of space. My wife, who seems to get colder faster than I do, loves those things. Small folding shovel? Always a good idea, year round. I like the Gerber because it's not a one trick pony and is a good camping shovel, too.
Put them on the drive tires!
Snow Socks: When you unexpectedly need extra traction, snow socks are a space-saving, temporary alternative to snow chains. These fabric doughnuts fit easily over the drive tires and can increase grip enough to extricate a stuck car or get it up a slippery hill.
Spare Phone Charger: The cellphone is your primary means of rescue in today's interconnected world. But to reach help you need juice: A charging cord is a good idea, but a hand-crank charger that works away from the car or when the car battery is dead is an even better one.
Hand Warmers and Wool Blanket: Your car provides shelter, but you don't want to run the engine—you have a limited amount of fuel and deadly exhaust may find its way into the cabin. To keep warm, use a blanket, supplemented by hand warmers when it gets really cold.
LED Flashers/Flares: Battery-powered lights work for hours and are great for alerting other drivers if your car is on the side of the road. Flares may seem antiquated, but the heat they put out prevents them from being obscured and buried by driving snow. Plus, in an extreme emergency they can be used to start a warming or signaling fire. Flares are usually sold in packs; make sure you have at least three sticks.
Food and Drink: It's exceptionally rare for anyone to be stranded during a winter blizzard for more than a day. Long-term rations aren't really necessary, but keeping a few energy bars and a plastic bottle or two of sugary energy drink wouldn't hurt. Why the latter? The electrolytes and sugars significantly lower the concoction's freezing point, ensuring you'll still have liquid when you need it.
Shovel: While it might not look like much, a compact folding shovel is plenty big enough to use when digging your car out of the snow.
Windshield De-Icer: An extra bottle of this could mean the difference between seeing the road and seeing yourself parked in a snow bank. Plus, in emergencies you can use the stuff to melt ice on the road or any frozen car parts.
He was able to keep the car running for a couple of hours, but when he went to get out to clear the exhaust pipe, his door was blocked.See, if he only had a shovel in the car. Costs a lot less than skis or a DVD player, too.
Some parts of the country experience extreme winter weather including blizzards. If a blizzard traps you in your car, do you know how to survive?Gotta love the New Jersey advice:
Taking the following steps can help you stay safe until you are found:
- Don’t walk around in the snow to look for help. You might lose your way or become exhausted;
- Remember to occasionally check your tailpipe to make sure it’s free of snow. Clean the pipe to avoid carbon monoxide poisoning when the engine is running.
- Keep yourself moving! A car offers very little room, but exercise is essential; and
- Make the car visible for a rescue! Hang bright colored cloth or plastic from the windows. If the snow has stopped falling, open the hood of the car as a signal of distress.
If you have a cell phone call 911 to ask for help. Do not hang up until you know whom you have spoken with and what will happen next. You can also sign up for wireless emergency alerts before you travel to receive life-saving alerts wherever you are.
If you are stranded in a remote area you may need to leave the car on foot after the blizzard passes.Huh? Well, one or the other. Perhaps they mean: "Stay in the car during the blizzard so you won't get confused and lost in the storm and when the storm is over and you can see more than a short distance, you might have to trek out to find some help."
Stay in the car.
"Even if a single supertanker… were to be attacked in one of the chokepoints or hijacked and scuttled in one of these narrow sea lanes, the consequences would be phenomenal…"Why, yes, Mr. Hamza Khalid, the author of this fantasy, it would be "phenomenal" though not like you might be thinking.
How America captured the “al Qaeda admiral” and stopped his fifteen-ship fleet from being used as floating bombs.Back in 2005, there appeared a series of "terrorists to close sea lanes" pieces which I addressed here and republish, in part, below:
A Foreign Affairs article from November/December  "Terrorism Goes to Sea" sets out some interesting information:Well, a AQ again threatened to close the "chokepoints" as I set out in 2008 Al Qaeda Calling for Chokepoint Terrorism. See also 2007's "Al Qaeda's Maritime Threat" an essay by Akiva Lorenz of the Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
Since many shipping companies do not report incidents of piracy, for fear of raising their insurance premiums and prompting protracted, time-consuming investigations, the precise extent of piracy is unknown. But statistics from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a piracy watchdog, suggest that both the frequency and the violence of acts of piracy have increased in recent years. In 2003, ship owners reported 445 attacks, in which 92 seafarers were killed or reported missing and 359 were assaulted and taken hostage. (Ships were hijacked in 19 of these cases and boarded in 311.) From 2002 to 2003, the number of those killed and taken hostage in attacks nearly doubled. Pirates have also increased their tactical sophistication, often surrounding a target ship with several boats and firing machine guns and antitank missiles to force it to stop. As Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan recently warned, "piracy is entering a new phase; recent attacks have been conducted with almost military precision. The perpetrators are well-trained, have well laid out plans." The total damage caused by piracy-due to losses of ships and cargo and to rising insurance costs-now amounts to $16 billion per year.and
Whereas land targets are relatively well protected, the super-extended energy umbilical cord that extends by sea to connect the West and the Asian economies with the Middle East is more vulnerable than ever. Sixty percent of the world's oil is shipped by approximately 4,000 slow and cumbersome tankers. These vessels have little protection, and when attacked, they have nowhere to hide. (Except on Russian and Israeli ships, the only weapons crewmembers have today to ward off attackers are high-powered fire hoses and spotlights.)
However, the article is from the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security whose work I have found on another occasion to be good, "but a little overly dramatic." I make the same minor complaint here. For example, whereas the following is generally true, the potential disaster of a scuttled ship in a narrow strait is a bit overwrought as I'll explain later.
If a single tanker were attacked on the high seas, the impact on the energy market would be marginal. But geography forces the tankers to pass through strategic chokepoints, many of which are located in areas where terrorists with maritime capabilities are active. These channels-major points of vulnerability for the world economy-are so narrow at points that a single burning supertanker and its spreading oil slick could block the route for other vessels. Were terrorist pirates to hijack a large bulk carrier or oil tanker, sail it into one of the chokepoints, and scuttle it to block the sea-lane, the consequences for the global economy would be severe: a spike in oil prices, an increase in the cost of shipping due to the need to use alternate routes, congestion in sea-lanes and ports, more expensive maritime insurance, and probable environmental disaster. Worse yet would be several such attacks happening simultaneously in multiple locations worldwide.
While there are some very narrow major waterways (the Bosphorus, for example - the U.S. Department of Energy produces a handy "chokepoint" list), for the most part, the Strait of Malacca is is 1.5 miles (7000+ feet) wide at its narrowest spot. Even a 1200 foot long ship placed sideways in that channel leaves some room to maneuver around it. The Strait of Hormuz is wider still. As we learned in the "tanker wars" these large tankers are hard to sink completely.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point.
The Exocets and other small missiles generally failed to "kill" large merchant ships. They did, however, significant damage to 11 out of 17 tankers hit in 1984, which displaced over 50,000 tons, and slightly damaged six. The Exocets were more effective against smaller vessels, and against more complex or automated ships (the automated Safina al-Arab had to be written off because her machinery was too sophisticated to repair), and against ships where the hit happened to trigger a fire.(Tanker War and the Lessons of Naval Conflict). Not that it can't happen.
And if it does, as the DOE puts it,
If the strait were closed, nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity. All excess capacity of the world fleet might be absorbed, with the effect strongest for crude oil shipments and dry bulk such as coal. Closure of the Strait of Malacca would immediately raise freight rates worldwide. More than 50,000 vessels per year transit the Strait of Malacca.But any such closure would be relatively short-lived, given the incentives to salvage, raise or raze a ship interfering with the free passage through the Strait. How long would it take to clear such a ship? While the vessel didn't completely sink, in September 2003 the bulk carrier "Sea Liberty" was involved in a collision in the narrowest part of the Singapore Strait and was salvaged.
The vessel Hyundai No.105 (40,000 GRT) sank just outside the Singapore Strait in May 2004. In fact, the Singapore Strait is a busy, dangerous place and warnings have been issued like this one from Tokio Marine Nichido:
The Strait of Singapore in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, being the main seaway between ports in Europe and the Middle East and those in the Far East and South East Asia.These collisions and sinkings do not seem to interfere with other vessels transiting the Malacca Strait and its "subparts" such as the Singapore Strait.
Singapore is the busiest port in the world with an average of 350 ships arriving per day. At any one time there are more than 800 ships in the port-a ship arrives or departs every 3 minutes. It is the focal port for some 366 shipping lines with links to 3,600 ports worldwide.
With congestion in many parts due to a daily traffic of 400 vessels on average, the Strait has become prone to ship collisions, oil spillage, strandings and sinkings. Therefore it is extremely important for ships to navigate safely in the Strait to avoid accidents which would adversely affect the three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and the marine environment.
Obviously, terrorism at sea is a serious threat and one that requires significant preventative measures. In the "worst case" scenerio, it is possible that some interference with international trade is likely. However, the probability of that worst case- a "perfect storm" of sea-going terrorism must be measured against other, more likely results.
Update: It occurs to me that since I have asserted that the seizure and scuttling of a ship in a narrow strait may not result in the shut down of the flow of world oil and other goods, it is incumbent on me to posit about what I would be more concerned. Again, I am concerned with the "seizure and sink" scenario but just not as concerned as I am with some other possible terrorist acts involving ships. These areas of greater concern include the seizure of a major ship and turning it into a weapon - very similar, in fact, to the seizure of commercial airliners and turning them into guided missiles for the accomplishment of an act of war. Note that I am distinguishing between "terrorism" and "war." Al Qaeda has not declared "terrorism" on the United States - it has declared war.
Osama bin Laden has a vision of his objectives in that war:
The principal stated aims of al-Qaeda are to drive Americans and American influence out of all Muslim nations, especially Saudi Arabia; destroy Israel; and topple pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East. Bin Laden has also said that he wishes to unite all Muslims and establish, by force if necessary, an Islamic nation adhering to the rule of the first Caliphcite. His strategy includes the economic crippling of the United States in such a way that it will be unable or unwilling to continue its presence in the Middle East. He seeks to raise the cost of our presence to a level beyond which we are willing to pay in blood and dollars. Part of his plan is to demonstrate the weakness of the U.S. and thus rally new members to the cause. 9/11 was both about hurting the US economy and showing that the "Great Satan" could be attacked. The joyous reaction in many parts of the world to the fall of the World Trade Center did demonstrate the power of the second prong. In my view, Al Qaeda needs another major "victory" against the U.S. As set out in prior posts, one such possible victory would be the attack and damaging of a major symbol of U.S. power - such as an aircraft carrier (the attack on the USS Cole and the failed attack on the USS The Sullivans show how much attacking these power symbols mean to Al Qaeda). In one of my posts, I indicated my major concern
What if the terrorists have or (use their speedboat tactics to) seize a "neutral" freighter or tanker and then use that ship as either a SIED (seaborne improvised explosive device) or as a "ram" to attack to attack our ships (for this purpose, I believe a tanker to be their preferred vessel because of the potential for fire and pollution and the attendant increase in publicity and spectacular television coverage -so for convenience I will use the word "tanker" alone to refer to this threat).So, my concern is less with the damaging of international trade in the Malacca Strait (much of which flows to Japan and China) by blocking the chokepoints than with the use of such restricted areas (with limited maneuver room) as an area to engage in a vigorous attack on a prime U.S. warship in such a manner as to be visible to the world in an effort to rally more people to the Al Qaeda cause.
At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles wide, separated by a two-mile buffer zone.Let's see that 2+2+2= 6 miles of sea you want to close? You better have lots of ships to sink to do that.
Most serious incidents involve illegal fuel syphoning in the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea. Ten small tankers were hit between April and September: Sri Phang Nga, Orapin 4, Budi Mersa Dua, Ai Maru, Moresby 9, Oriental Glory, VL14, Orapin 2, Pentrader and Naniwa Maru. To put this in perspective, since 2011 a total of 18 syphoning attacks have been reported of which 13 were successful.The author of the piece correctly points out:
Most syphoning attacks occur at night, well outside Singapore’s port limits frequently in the less-policed waters north of Indonesia’s Bintan island. Small product tankers under 5,000 tons are boarded by small groups of lightly armed pirates and taken into the South China Sea; their names sometimes re-painted and communications equipment disabled en route to a rendezvous point with a second vessel. Once alongside, the fuel can be offloaded within hours.
Shipments of Marine Gas Oil (MGO) are targeted for several reasons. First, MGO sold illicitly is lucrative, fetching above US$500 per tonne. Illegal bunkering is a perennial problem beyond port limits. In remote areas, the black market may be the easiest way to obtain marine fuel. Second, loaded product tankers present inviting targets, being low, slow and easily trackable. Third, many attacks betray the hallmarks of preplanned, syndicate involvement: syphoning operations are well organised, conducted with apparent foreknowledge of the cargo fuel type and how to dispose of it. Crews are normally unharmed.
Targeted syphoning attacks, with strong indications of insider involvement, do not pose a generalised threat to shipping or the energy trade, although attacks do still occur on vulnerable vessel types elsewhere within the Straits of Malacca Traffic Separation Scheme.In other words, this "cargo jacking" from small tankers is a crime similar to, but different from the "normal" level of piracy in the area discussed. This "normal" level has been steadily decreasing as a result of various regional/international actions and agreement.
Ten small tankers were hit between April and September ... To put this in perspective, since 2011 a total of 18 syphoning attacks have been reported of which 13 were successful.So - of the 18 hijacking since 2011, 10 occurred in those 5 months of 2014.
Last Hijack Interactive is an award-winning online transmedia experience by Submarine Channel that allows you to explore the hijacking of a ship in Somalia. Showing both the Western and the Somali perspective on piracy through the eyes of a pirate, a captain, the captain’s wife, a lawyer, a journalist and a security expert, Last Hijack Interactive allows you to uncover the complex realities behind piracy in Somalia.You can go look and decide for yourself.
Combining live-action video and animation, the interactive experience gives the user the opportunity to navigate the real stories of these people, building to the hijack itself and the resulting aftermath. What are the causes and consequences of piracy? And what is the impact of piracy in Somalia and in Western countries? Together with an elegant use of data visualization, Last Hijack Interactive provides a unique, informative and eye-opening glimpse into the murky world of hijackings in Somalia.
Last Hijack Interactive can be experienced in English, German and Dutch. We invite you to check it out at lasthijack.com
Directors Femke Wolting and Tommy Pallotta take you through the main features of Last Hijack Interactive in the following vimeo video Last Hijack Interactive - Walkthrough.
In October the project won the Prix Europa for best online production. The international jury praised the journalistic quality, seamless integration of video, animations, and data visualizations and the "extremely user-friendly" interface. And in November at the Tous Ecrans Festival in Geneve Last Hijack Interactive won two prizes: the Best International Transmedia Award (shared with The Doghouse) and the youth jury prize for the best Transmedia Award (shared with Love Hotel Experience).
Last Hijack Interactive is the counterpart to Last Hijack, a feature length film combining animation with documentary storytelling directed by Femke Wolting and Tommy Pallotta. Last Hijack is now available across all leading Video On Demand Platforms in North America - including Amazon Instant Video, Google Play, iTunes, Movies On Demand on Cable, Sony Playstation, Vimeo On Demand, Vudu and XBOX Video.
13 years into the long war, what have we learned, relearned, mastered, forgotten, and retained for future use? What have we learned about ourselves, the nature of our latest enemy, and the role of our nation? What have those who have served learned about their nation, their world, and themselves?Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. You can also pick the show up later at out iTunes page here, where you can also find the archive of all our previous shows.
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Islamic State, and the ever changing global national security ecosystem, where are we now, and where are we going?
Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be returning guest John Nagl, LTC US Army (Ret.) D.Phl, using his most recent book Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice as the starting point for our discussion.
Dr. Nagl is the Ninth Headmaster of The Haverford School. Prior to assuming responsibility for the School in July 2013, he was the inaugural Minerva Research Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He was previously the President of the Center for a New American Security. He graduated from the United States Military Academy Class in 1988 and served as an armor officer for 20 years. Dr. Nagl taught at West Point and Georgetown University, and served as a Military Assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense. He earned his Master of the Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and his doctorate from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar.
Dr. Nagl is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and was on the team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Naval aviation during the Korean War is the subject of this 1954 documentary. Part 1 begins with footage of the armistice signed on 27 July 1953. The film then moves back in time to look at the first half of the war, and the impact of American aircraft carriers operating off the coast of Korea. It features extensive aerial footage of combat operations. Source: Naval History and Heritage Command, Photographic Section, UMO-18.
The Egyptian armed forces destroyed four “hostile” boats containing what the military called “terrorist elements,” and arrested 32 people off the coast of Damietta governorate, the military said in a statement on Wednesday night.
“Hostile vessels” opened fire on an Egypt navy boat while it was on patrol, the military spokesperson’s office said on Wednesday. An exchange of gunfire took place between the “terrorist elements” and the navy, who had called for back-up forces.
According to state-owned media, four of the attackers were killed during the clashes. The military has not yet confirmed.
One navy boat was set on fire, and five navy personnel were injured and taken to a military hospital. The military also stated that eight of its navy personnel are missing and military forces are currently searching for them.
It was not immediately clear what the naval boat was doing so far offshore, and whether it was on a routine patrol anticipated by fighters.And more, including "analysis" at BBC News:
A military source told the AFP news agency the attackers used "fishing boats" and did not appear to have deployed rocket propelled grenades or heavier weapons.
The Mediterranean Sea is used by drug traffickers and illegal migrant smugglers who have been intercepted by the Egyptian navy in the past.
There have been no recorded attacks at sea by the Sinai-based armed fighters who launched an insurgency after the army overthrew President Mohamed Morsi last year.
If this was a militant attack in the Mediterranean, as the Egyptian army has said, then it's the opening of a new front.
The incident happened north of the port of Damietta, where armed people traffickers are known to operate. Did they clash with the navy to protect their lucrative trade?