"Assuming" - a major error in international relations

Interesting reading on how assumptions, even with close allies, can be troublesome - here in the case of Australia and the problems China raises, from the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney:  The problem with American assumptions about Australia. First, a very nice description of what China is possibly doing to the international rule of law:

China's rise is not a threat in and of itself. But if Chinese leaders believe that they are not bound by international laws and norms, or that they can intimidate China's smaller neighbors into waiving their sovereign rights — as recent actions in the South China Sea would suggest — then China's rise could undermine the system that has served to foster an extraordinary run of peace and prosperity in this region for the last 25 years, with devastating consequences for the region, including Australia and the US.

But, the article goes on, it is a mistake for the U.S. to "assume" that this means all Aussies see the same threat level as some Americans do:

American officials frequently err, however, in assuming that the Australian defence community's views reflect a broader consensus in Australian society, or even the backbenches of parliament. As Rory Medcalf and James Brown noted in their Lowy Institute analysis in 2013, very few parliamentarians expressed much interest in defence policy. To the extent more do today, much of it seems to be motivated by rent-seeking in acquisitions. The Lowy Institute Poll last year showed that 77% of Australians see China as 'more of an economic partner to Australia' than 'a military threat.' Despite increased Chinese assertiveness over the previous few months, only 39% of Australians said they saw China as likely to be a military threat to Australia in 20 years, 9% fewer than the year before.

These views are particularly noticeable among elites in Australia's financial centres. The Wall Street Journal's editorial page seemed surprised to find former Prime Minister John Howard, 'sitting high above Sydney's sparkling harbor... [to be] cool when asked about China's maritime aggression in recent years.' But Howard reflects the sanguine view from executives in the office towers of Sydney and Melbourne, and among commercial elites in Australia's other capital cities.

In several corner suites, moreover, there is a concern, not that the Chinese leadership might be undermining the rules-based order, but that the US is recklessly raising tensions with China in a contest for regional primacy. This view holds that Australia's closeness to the US could pull it into a conflict that is not in Australia's interests. Such arguments overrate the risk of conflict between the US and China, and underrate the importance of the rules–based order to Australian prosperity. Some in the Australian defence community discourage their American counterparts from taking these arguments seriously, breezily declaring their proponents to be soft on China. But the Australians making them are not uninfluential.

Recommended reading.

Asking the Right Questions: "A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade?"

China's Oil Sea Lines of Communication Chokepoint Problem Areas

From The National Interest A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade? by Xunchao Zhang:

Is it viable for the United States to impose a naval blockade against China in a potential conflict? That’s a critical question in the study of China’s maritime and energy strategies.
***

But China’s reliance on seaborne oil imports isn’t matched by its naval capability. It doesn’t have overseas bases to support regular operations in distant regions. By contrast, the US Navy not only possesses formidable ocean-going capabilities, but also quantitative and technological advantages. That asymmetry between China’s high level of reliance on seaborne oil imports and its low level of naval capability to protect those imports means the US Navy could successfully interdict China’s seaborne oil trade.

The ability to sustain a long blockade and the issue of reliability of prospective allies in such an endeavor are critical.

An earlier post on Cbina's Sea Lanes. It's all about Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), isn't it? Mahan speaks to the Chinese and the U.S. navies.

Interesting analysis by Dr. Stephen E. Flynn here (pdf):

Mahan argued that hardened coastal defenses had the effect of shifting the battleground offshore. Since harbor forts equipped with land-based armaments could fire weapons at longer distances and with greater accuracy than vessel-based cannons, a foreign naval force would find it difficult to directly attack or conduct an effective blockade of a U.S. seaport. However, a nation that invested in a large deepwater navy could overcome coastal defenses by disrupting what Mahan called the “sea-lines of communication” (SLOC) that facilitate "the sea commerce upon (which) the wealth and strength of countries" ultimately lies.

Related issues connected to Anti-Access/Area Denial and the "third offset" here.

Note the nearby map of China's claims to most of the South China Sea as it attempts to secure its nearby SLOCs, especially those near the Spratly Islands. Oh look, Vietnam is important. As are the Philippines.


More worrisome is the author's proposed Chinese solution:

The US can conceptualize a conventional war with China because China, with a much smaller nuclear force can’t initiate nuclear exchange in a war with the US. China needs to transform its strategic nuclear force from one of minimal sole-purpose deterrence to a more robust multi-purpose deterrence. A robust Chinese nuclear deterrence could contribute to war prevention by replacing the option of “winnable conventional war” with “unwinnable nuclear war.” But, in order to construct a nuclear deterrence sufficiently robust to deter the US from engaging in a conflict with China, Beijing must make two major changes: it must renounce its No-First-Use declaration, and build up a strategic nuclear force more comparable to that of the US.

Goodie, can we have another Cold War?

While you think about that delightful idea, remember what the Japanese were up to in 1941 as they tried to secure their supply areas and the SLOCs  they needed to get oil and other things to their island homeland. China, of course, does not have Malaya, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Korea and Japan under their control as did the Japanese after December 1941.

But they sure wish they did.

Fighting ISIS and al Qaeda: Choosing Poor Allies Is Not Helpful

Warfare is never pretty, but it gets downright ugly when you have poor allies who cannot be relied on to fulfill the roles assigned to them. Case in point is this report from the WAPO, which actually has a misleading headline, U.S.-backed Syria rebels routed by fighters linked to al-Qaeda, because, in addition to being "routed," many of them shifted allegiance:

The Obama administration’s Syria strategy suffered a major setback Sunday after fighters linked to al-Qaeda routed U.S.-backed rebels from their main northern strongholds, capturing significant quantities of weaponry, triggering widespread defections and ending hopes that Washington will readily find Syrian partners in its war against the Islamic State.

Moderate rebels who had been armed and trained by the United States either surrendered or defected to the extremists as the Jabhat al-Nusra group, affiliated with al-Qaeda, swept through the towns and villages the moderates controlled in the northern province of Idlib, in what appeared to be a concerted push to vanquish the moderate Free Syrian Army, according to rebel commanders, activists and analysts.
(emphasis added)

Given the long history of rapidly changing alliances in the region this result probably shouldn't be exactly - you know - shocking. However, it does point out - once again - the problem of first world thinking meeting third world tribal and cultural standards head on.

These "allies" are fighting for what, exactly?

It certainly isn't for the glory of Syria or mom and apple pie.

Motivation being what it is and given that Mao's precept that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," applies to tribal and religious struggles in the Middle East as well as to communist insurgencies, these former and current allies basically are fighting for power and profit, while the other side seeks to replace the status quo ante with themselves, asserting that "God is on our side!" as they gather up power, profit and young maidens to debauch or sell into slavery. Seems to be a pretty good recruiting tool when coupled with the chance to fight the "Great Satan" and its minions.

In the long run, our side offers  . . . what exactly again?

Why would any rational player in this "game" choose to align with the force holding the weak hand and with a reputation for abandoning the field when the going gets tough?

If the U.S. and its allies are serious about doing something about Syria and ISIS, AQ and its ally the "Al Nusrah Front," then they had better gear up for the game and quit pussy-footing around trying to bend other people into doing the hard work.

They also better develop a plan that tells putative allies what the mess will look like (as in what's in it for them) when the fighting is over. Without that clear vision to sell, well, you are pushing vapor and pipe dreams of  "kumbaya" singing around the campfire holding hands and sharing flower petals.

Lesson #1 out of our involvement in the Middle East in the last 30+ years ought to be that you have to earn respect and then you have to work hard to keep it. Playing around at the margins probably isn't the path that leads to that result.

Keep up with lots more in the "long war" by reading The Long War Journal.

Oh, yeah, those guys in the video are not Crusaders. In case you were wondering.

Friday Movie From the Why We Fight Series: "The Battle of China" (1944)

Longish movie and tough for modern audiences, but good to watch if you want some historical background on tensions in East Asia.



A horror film of sorts suitable for the date.

Western Pacific Sea Power

An interesting little RAND brief that raises some interesting questions, "The Future of Sea Power in the Western Pacific":

. . . While China has not embraced global sea power, it is moving from coastal defense to extending its naval reach into disputed water in order to protect regional trade routes. Of most concern, the Chinese military is exploiting information technology to greatly improve and extend its targeting of surface ships, especially U.S. aircraft carriers, with missiles, submarines, and cyber weapons.

Defending U.S. ships against extended-range missiles and quiet submarines is difficult, expensive, and probably futile in the face of China’s accelerating, well-funded anti-naval build-up. With known technologies, neither ballistic missile defense nor anti-submarine warfare can keep pace with the offensive enhancements of such a large, capable, and resolute rival.

The U.S. Navy, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, is responding with “Air-Sea Battle” to counter China’s anti-naval and other anti-access capabilities by targeting its “kill chain” of sensors and weapons. While this is a worthwhile option, it could become vulnerable to Chinese cyber attack, might require the United States to strike first or preemptively, and could be escalatory, in that most targets are on Chinese territory. A better approach is to take full advantage of networking technology and shift toward more distributed, numerous, diverse, elusive, small, long-range, and hard-to-find naval strike forces, while also exploiting drones and cyber-war. Yet even more distributed and less visible U.S. forces may become targetable. Moreover, the U.S. Navy is unlikely to shift rapidly to such survivable sea power, given fiscal constraints and institutional-industrial inertia. Meanwhile, the vulnerability of U.S. sea power will increase, and regional stability could suffer.

Okay, here's today's challenge: What are "more distributed, numerous, diverse, elusive, small, long-range, and hard-to-find naval strike forces?"

Submarines, I would think.

Many more submarines.

Lots of smaller ships designed for operations in the straits and islands of WestPac.

More firepower in small packages.

Surface and semi-submersible drones.

Naval mines.

Creative use of "mother ships" to support smaller vessel ops.

Exploiting the U.S. and its Allies' island chains.

And faster.

Sooner is better than too late.