U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report, 26 February - 26 March 2025

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Enhanced U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report, 1 - 29 November 2023

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Issued before the events of this past weekend, set out in Houthi missiles strike commercial ships in Red Sea, while U.S. warship downs drones and detailed in CENTCOM tweet 3 Dec 2023:

Today, there were four attacks against three separate commercial vessels operating in international waters in the southern Red Sea. These three vessels are connected to 14 separate nations. The Arleigh-Burke Class destroyer USS CARNEY responded to the distress calls from the ships and provided assistance.

At approximately 9:15 a.m. Sanaa time, the CARNEY detected an anti-ship ballistic missile attack fired from Houthi controlled areas of Yemen toward the M/V UNITY EXPLORER, impacting in the vicinity of the vessel. UNITY EXPLORER is a Bahamas flagged, U.K. owned and operated, bulk cargo ship crewed by sailors from two nations. The CARNEY was conducting a patrol in the Red Sea and detected the attack on the UNITY EXPLORER.

At approximately 12 p.m., and while in international waters, CARNEY engaged and shot down a UAV launched from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen. The drone was headed toward CARNEY although its specific target is not clear. We cannot assess at this time whether the Carney was a target of the UAVs. There was no damage to the U.S. vessel or injuries to personnel.

In a separate attack at approximately 12:35 p.m., UNITY EXPLORER reported they were struck by a missile fired from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen. CARNEY responded to the distress call. While assisting with the damage assessment, CARNEY detected another inbound UAV, destroying the drone with no damage or injuries on the CARNEY or UNITY EXPLORER. UNITY EXPLORER reports minor damage from the missile strike.

At approximately 3:30 p.m. the M/V NUMBER 9 was struck by a missile fired from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen while operating international shipping lanes in the Red Sea. The Panamanian flagged, Bermuda and U.K. owned and operated, bulk carrier reported damage and no casualties.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., the M/V SOPHIE II, sent a distress call stating they were struck by a missile. CARNEY again responded to the distress call and reported no significant damage. While en route to render support, CARNEY shot down a UAV headed in its direction. SOPHIE II is a Panamanian flagged bulk carrier, crewed by sailors from eight countries.

These attacks represent a direct threat to international commerce and maritime security. They have jeopardized the lives of international crews representing multiple countries around the world. We also have every reason to believe that these attacks, while launched by the Houthis in Yemen, are fully enabled by Iran. The United States will consider all appropriate responses in full coordination with its international allies and partners.

Referenced in ONI report MARAD Warning:

2023-011-Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels

Description This advisory replaces U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-003

1. References: U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-005, U.S. Maritime Alerts, 2023-001A and 2023-002A.

2. Issue: Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas. The U.S. government is continually assessing the maritime security situation in the region to safeguard freedom of navigation; ensure the free flow of commerce; and protect U.S. vessels, personnel, and interests. Additionally, the international community, including the U.S., continues maritime security operations within this region. While some past incidents may have targeted specific commercial vessels due to their association with certain countries, individuals, or companies, not all did, and the potential remains for miscalculation or misidentification that could lead to aggressive actions against non-associated commercial vessels. Heightened regional tensions in the listed areas, caused by an array of geopolitical issues, could result in an increased threat level to commercial vessels, as noted in Maritime Alert 2023-001A. The following are currently deemed to be the most pressing threats to U.S. flagged commercial vessels in these areas, in no particular order:

a) Illegal Boarding/Detention/Seizure: Commercial vessels transiting through the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman continue to be illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Recent incidents include the April 2023 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman, and the May 2023 Iranian seizure of a Panama-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian forces attempted to seize one Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and one Bahamas-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman during July 2023, but were prevented by the U.S. Navy. Iranian forces have utilized small boats and/or helicopters during boarding operations and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial waters.

- If hailed by Iranian forces, U.S. flagged commercial vessels should provide vessel name, flag state, and affirm that they are proceeding in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The master should immediately inform the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch of such queries.

- If Iranian forces seek to board a U.S. flagged commercial vessel navigating these waters, the ship’s Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, and immediately inform the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch.

- If Iranian forces board a U.S. flagged commercial vessel, the vessel should immediately notify the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch. The crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

- The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) is currently recommending that vessels in the Persian Gulf remain as distant as possible from Iran’s territorial sea without impacting navigational safety. When transiting eastbound in the Strait of Hormuz, it is recommended that vessels transit close to Oman’s territorial sea.

b) UAVs: Explosive unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on commercial vessels in the listed areas, other than the Somali Basin, remain a threat. The most recent UAV attack in this region was a probable Iranian one-way UAV attack on the Liberian flagged M/V CAMPO SQUARE on February 11th, 2023.

- If U.S. flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV, they should immediately inform the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch. Crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

c) Limpet Mines: Limpet mines have been used to damage commercial vessels on multiple occasions in recent years and are primarily a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Limpet mines, or similar improvised explosive devices, can be attached to vessel hulls, above or below the waterline, via swimmers or small boats, while a vessel is berthed, at anchor, or underway.

- When operating in these waters, U.S. flagged commercial vessels should maintain a close lookout and remain vigilant for suspicious activity to include the approach of swimmers or small boats. Close attention should be given to the vessel’s waterline, especially at slow speeds, at anchor, and when moored.

- If crewmembers believe a mine has been, or was attempted to have been, attached to their vessel, they should immediately inform the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch and the IMSC. Crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

d) Explosive Boats: Explosive boat attacks are a known threat to commercial vessels operating in the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. Vessels in these areas have reported explosions believed to have been caused by explosive boats, both in port and underway.

- When operating in these waters, U.S. flagged commercial vessels should maintain a vigilant lookout at all times for small boats operating in a suspicious manner and additional precautions should be taken to ensure small boats are kept at a safe distance whenever possible.

- If crewmembers believe an attempted explosive boat attack is underway, or was attempted, they should immediately inform the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch. Crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be restricted to a safe location on the vessel until the threat has passed.

e) Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Piracy and armed robbery continue to pose a threat to commercial vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden, Western Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin. Specific case details are available via the Office of Naval Intelligence's weekly "Worldwide Threat to Shipping" product at https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/.

- The Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (BMP5), and Maritime Global Security website at: https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org should be consulted prior to operating in the above listed geographic waters.

- Transit by yachts and privately owned sailing vessels through the region is hazardous and may result in capture. The U.S. Government advises against all operation of yachts and pleasure craft in these areas. American citizens abroad should inform the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate of their plans to transit the area and/or update their information via the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) at: https://step.state.gov/step/. Yachting guidance can be found at: https://on-shore.mschoa.org/reference-documents/advice-for-sailing-vessels.

f) Navigation or Communication Disruptions: Vessels operating in these areas may encounter GPS interference (see Advisory 2023-005), AIS spoofing, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing, and/or other communications jamming. Vessels have also reported bridge-to-bridge communications from unknown entities falsely claiming to be U.S. or coalition warships, or the Yemeni Government.

- In addition to risks to navigation, confusion from such disruptions could be leveraged by bad actors to facilitate physical attacks. Additional precautions should be taken if your vessel experiences, or vessels in your vicinity report experiencing, such disruptions.

- If a U.S. flagged commercial vessel suspects it is being hailed from a source falsely claiming to be a U.S. or coalition naval vessel or is being asked for positions or info on coalition military vessels or aircraft operating in the area, the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch should be immediately informed.

- Maritime GPS disruptions or anomalies should be reported immediately to the USCG Navigation Center (NAVCEN), available 24 hours a day.

g) Yemen Conflict: The conflict in Yemen continues to pose a risk to U.S. flagged commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. The UN-brokered truce in Yemen formally expired on October 2nd, 2022, although the parties continue to uphold most truce conditions. In addition to threats otherwise referenced in this advisory, additional threats include, but are not limited to, missiles, rockets, projectiles, mines, and small arms. These threats pose a direct or collateral risk to U.S. flagged commercial vessels transiting in international shipping lanes, or otherwise operating in these areas.

- U.S. flagged commercial vessels operating in these areas are advised to avoid entering or loitering near Yemen's ports, and exercise increased caution if operating in Yemen’s territorial waters or Saudi territorial waters on the Red Sea. Crewmembers should be especially vigilant if at anchor, operating in restricted maneuvering conditions, or proceeding at slow speeds.

3. Guidance: U.S. flagged commercial vessels operating in these waters are advised to exercise caution, review security measures, ensure AIS is always transmitting (except in extraordinary circumstances) in accordance with provisions of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and monitor VHF Channel 16. To afford best protection in the region, U.S. flagged commercial vessels are also advised to:

- Coordinate vessel voyage planning for transits in the region with the IMSC and follow their recommendations and guidance whenever possible. IMSC stands a 24-hour watch and has the latest information on the current maritime security threats and the operational environment in this region. IMSC organizational information is available at https://www.imscsentinel.com/.

- The Fifth Fleet Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) detachment is in the process of reactivation. Guidance on impacts for U.S. flagged commercial vessels will be forthcoming at a later date.

- Simultaneously register with both the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO) and the IMSC watch 24 hours prior to entering the Indian Ocean Voluntary Reporting Area by sending UKMTO and IMSC, via a single e-mail, the Initial Report from Annex D of (BMP5). Include the estimated times of arrival at the Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb Strait (BAM), and Strait of Hormuz (SoH) in line 10 of the report and add a line 14 for comments as needed (e.g., speed restrictions or other constraints, anticipated time of entering/exiting the SoH Traffic Separation Scheme; an outline of the navigation plan for operating in the SoH and Persian Gulf, etc.). Utilize other reports included in Annex D of BMP5 as necessary.

- Answer all VHF calls from coalition navies. Vessels should be aware that U.S. and other coalition naval forces may conduct maritime awareness calls, queries, and approaches to ensure the safety of vessels transiting these listed waters.

- In the event of any incident or suspicious activity, immediately contact the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch, IMSC, and activate the Ship Security Alert System.

- Vessels operating in this area are advised to establish contact with both UKMTO and the IMSC watch, and to include both on all updates or incident report emails, as detailed above. By including both as addressees on each email, awareness will be enhanced without creating an additional reporting burden.

- Due to the risk of piracy, kidnapping, hijacking, and robbery while operating within U.S. Coast Guard designated High Risk Waters (HRW), U.S. flagged commercial vessels are required to comply with the Guidelines for U.S. Vessels Operating in High-Risk Waters contained in U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (Rev 8) and comply with their Coast Guard approved Vessel Security Plan annex on counter piracy. The U.S. Coast Guard Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance (CG-CVC) announced in the Federal Register in August 2021 the availability of Revision 8 to Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive 104–6. U.S. vessel owners and operators who need to act under previous versions of MARSEC Directive 104–6 should immediately contact their local Coast Guard Captain of the Port or District Commander for a copy of Revision 8.

- Conduct a pre-voyage risk assessment and incorporate appropriate protective measures into their vessel security plans.

- The Maritime Global Security website at https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/ offers industry issued best practices and guidance to mariners by geographic region and provides contact and subscription information for regional maritime security reporting centers, particularly in high risk-areas. The Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies, Masters, and Seafarers, should be reviewed.

- Per 33 CFR 101.305, report all suspicious activities, breaches of security, and transportation security incident events involving U.S. vessels or persons to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center. Additional U.S. Coast Guard port specific requirements may be found in Port Security Advisory 2-20 at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/InternationalPortSecurity/Port%20Security%20Advisory/PortSecurityAdvisoryLIBERIARemoveCOE2-20.pdf?ver=2020-06-10-151708-817.

- U.S. Department of State Travel Advisories discuss safety and security information that should be reviewed by U.S. mariners prior to disembarkation or embarkation in foreign ports. These travel advisories are available at: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories.html/....

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) for 21 July - 18 August 2021

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U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) for 27 August - 23 September 2020

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U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) for 21 August - 25 September 2019 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/SOUTHEAST ASIA Weekly Piracy Update for 19 -25 September 2019

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U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 3 April - 8 May 2019 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 2 - 8 May 2019

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Somali Pirates: Fishing Vessels Attacked Off Somali Coast

Seems that Somali pirates are up to their old tricks, grabbing a dhow to use as a "mother ship" and sending skiffs out to attack. EU NAVFOR reports:

EU NAVFOR photo

On 21 April, fishing vessels FV Adria and FV Txori Argi were attacked by suspected pirates in the Indian Ocean, 280 NM off the coast of Somalia. The piracy attacks were thwarted, and the crew and vessels remained safe, thanks to the application of Best Management Practices (BMP) protection measures by the Masters, the crews and the private security teams embarked on both fishing vessels.
EU NAVFOR Somalia Operation Atalanta confirms these attacks. It is likely that the attacks were facilitated by a mothership, which was reportedly seized by armed men on 19 April off the central Somali Coast.
EU NAVFOR subsequently dispatched its Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts to search the area. In addition, EU NAVFOR flagship ESPS Navarra left the port in Mombasa in order to proceed into the area.
On 23 April, ESPS NAVARA successfully intercepted and boarded the dhow being used as a mothership.
The operation is still ongoing, and more details will be provided upon completion.
EU NAVFOR remains committed to deterring, preventing and suppressing piracy and emphasizes that the Maritime Industry must adhere to BMP measures in order to maximize the safety of the ship and their crews whilst transiting the high-risk area.

Hmmm. Looks like Perry-class frigate was useful in the operation, Spanish FFG Navarra. Too bad the US doesn't have something like them.

Hat tip to Lee.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 15 October - 14 November 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 8 - 14 November 2018

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U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and W... by lawofsea on Scribd

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 1 - 31 October 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 25 - 31 October 2018

Highlights:

B. (U) ReCAAP WARNIING 01-10-2018 Date: 30 Oct 2018: The ReCAAP ISC has received information from the
Philippine Focal Point (Philippine Coast Guard) that a group of approximately 10 ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) members armed
with pistol, rifles and grenade launcher is planning to conduct kidnapping activities at any opportune time in undisclosed
areas in Sabah primarily targeting businessmen or ship's crew of foreign vessels passing through the area. They are using
unmarked colored blue and white motorbanca locally known as jungkong. Ship masters and crew are strongly urged to
exercise extra vigilance when transiting the waters off eastern Sabah and Sulu-Celebes Seas.

Issues continue to arise in the Gulf of Guinea, especially off Nigeria, including kidnappings and ship hijackings.

An attempted Somali pirate attack on a merchant ship ended with EU forces seizing and destroying one of the skiffs identified as participating in the attack. See here.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 1 - 31 October 2018 by lawofsea on Scribd

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and W... by lawofsea on Scribd

Somali Pirates: EU Task Force Acts, Destroys Pirate Craft

Pirate whaler seized and destroyed by EU NAVFOR
:

EU NAVFOR photo

In the morning of Sunday 28th October 2018, EU NAVFOR military personnel seized an active Pirate Action Group (PAG) whaler and destroyed it. This followed a sustained period of surveillance after a piracy attack was conducted against the Hong Kong-flagged Bulk Carrier KSL Sydney. EU NAVFOR is committed to disrupting PAG’s wherever and whenever the opportunity arises and Sunday 28th October was one such occasion.
. . . EU NAVFOR Spanish Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) flew over the area to gain as much detailed information on suspected pirate activity as they could. The ability to deploy aircraft and ships immediately to this area proved vital in identifying this latest PAG. The information the MPRA provided made it apparent that PAG whalers were active in the area, which would be used to launch further attacks on maritime shipping transiting the area.

The suspicious whaler identified by the MPRA was later tracked down by the crew of ESPS Castilla to a small bay just off the Somali coast. The Force Commander then ordered it to be seized and towed out to sea where it was safely destroyed.

***

More at EU NAVFOR destruction of pirate vessel: timeline of events
:

16 Oct 18
During the afternoon; a single skiff approached MV KSL SYDNEY in a fast and aggressive manner from the stern and opened fire at the ship’s bridge.
The skiff approached to within five metres of the vessel’s port rear (beam). The suspected pirates had ropes and hooks ready for boarding.
MV KSL Sydney’s armed security team were activated and engaged the suspected pirates in an exchange of small arms fire; this lasted for approximately two minutes.
After the exchange of fire, the skiff disengaged and fled from the scene.
EU NAVFOR resources were deployed to search for the pirate vessel. Continuous surveillance by naval and air assets was maintained in the area.

17 Oct 18
The following morning, a suspicious whaler and a single skiff were sighted by EU NAVFOR surveillance aircraft around 167Nm off the coastline of Somalia, approximately 130Nm from the scene of the attack on MV KSL Sydney.
In a bid to deter surveillance, the suspected pirates used mirrors to flash EU NAVFOR aircraft. Subsequently, they separated and made off at speed in different directions to avoid being tracked.

17-27 Oct 18
During this period, EU NAVFOR maintained ongoing and continuous surveillance in the area using air and naval assets.

27 Oct 18
The search identified the suspect whaler in an area known to have been associated with pirate activity.
The vessel was seized and, after a thorough search, the whaler was confirmed as being the one EU NAVFOR had tracked on 17 Oct 18.
A decision was made by EU NAVFOR to destroy the vessel to prevent it being used for pirate acts.

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 17 September - 17 October 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 11 - 17 October 2018

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U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and W... by lawofsea on Scribd