Navy Ship Manning: "{M}an the fleet to the requirements or reduce the requirements"

Excellent discussion of the U.S. Navy's shipboard manning issues by a former Fleet Master Chief of Fleet Forces Command at the USNI Blog Manning Still Matters: A Fleet Perspective:

To those leaders making these decisions, or who are unaware of them but could influence them, I would ask, “Would you feel safe boarding a civilian airline whose maintenance department was routinely and chronically undermanned this way?” and “Would you feel comfortable letting your family?” Even though leaders and budgeters save costs in the MPN account, there are personal costs that result from reductions in their sailor’s sleep, fitness, personal time, or cognitive performance. Manning shortfalls contribute to crew fatigue and reduced crew endurance, increasing the chance of mistakes and increasing their risk tolerance to a point of ethical dilemma and decisions to cut corners with maintenance and other administrative requirements to self-manage the workload.

This is a "read the whole thing piece." Master Chief Kingsbury points out the issues caused by the efforts to save personnel dollars -

• Overwork on some ratings at sea
• Impact on morale and retention
• Impact of fatigue 
• Poor effects of "fill vice fit" manning - i.e. there's a reason the manning document calls for a certain number of quartermasters, for example. 
• Stress Dangers of cross decking as short term fills for shortages in certain rates

Giving the fleet billets is one thing, but in a highly technical environment requiring specialized people, giving them the right billets with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet the job requirement is another. And, the sailor working 80 hours suffers the same effects regardless of where their unit is in the OFRP. Once any ship falls to a certain level of fit, they could be displayed as yellow or red to more accurately reflect the level of risk, so force manning managers could decide where to accept risk. To this end, leverage the new type commander human factors engineers, fleet safety officers, and naval safety center to analyze and articulate the risk to mission and force. Then, communicate to OPNAV N1 in terms of operational risk and challenge them to take actions to mitigate it, such as increasing recruiting goals, retention incentives, or adjusting distribution policies.

From the Navy's Core Values Charter

“COMMITMENT” The day-to-day duty of every man and woman in the Department of the Navy is to join together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people and ourselves. I will:

• Foster respect up and down the chain of command. 
• Care for the personal and spiritual well-being of my people. 
• Show respect toward all people without regard to race, religion or gender. 
• Always strive for positive change and personal improvement. 
• Exhibit the highest degree of moral character, professional excellence, quality, and competence in all that I do. (emphasis added)

The "well-being" of our people ought to be the driving factor in ship manning. This has to include that the right people are put in the right positions with the right training and tools to do their jobs so that any ship - all ships- go to sea with the confidence that the men and women who serve therein are ready to take on the heavy burdens going to sea and, potentially, into harm's way involve.

Admiral Nimitz said, "Leadership consists of picking good men and helping them do their best." When we put our men and women into a fleet where they are hamstrung by manning shortfalls, we are not exercising good leadership.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Sarah Mead

The Great Navy Talent Hunt

There's a really interesting guest blog post over at Ask the Skipper concerning the Navy's never-ending talent hunt. This one, written by LCDR Jindrich, "Talent Flight: Real, or Just a Myth?" hits on a topic addressed on Midrats a couple of time (Episode 221: Officer Retention with VADM Bill Moran & CDR Guy Snodgrass and )Episode 277: Manpower, Modernization, and Motivation – an Hour with VADM Moran) - that topic being "how the Navy retain the best officers to meet its needs in the future?"

For those of you unfamiliar with the Navy promotion process, it is driven heavily by the "fitness report" or "fitrep" process by which officers are ranked against their peers. With going into great detail the theory is that the #1 Lieutenant assigned to a unit will be so ranked against all Lieutenants assigned to that unit. Being #1 is vital to future success as it drives subsequent assignments, including to command. Such decisions are made by various selection boards who screen the records of all officers coming before them for promotion or department head selection or command - and it's easier screening #1's into jobs that trying to decide if a solid #2 performer is good enough.

Obviously, even with the various games commanding officers can play with rankings (and there are games that can be played), someone will end up #1 when it counts.

But - does past performance really mean that they are the officers we need for the future? Are we really get the best?

LCDR Jindrich asks a really vital question in his post

. . . I believe talent goes deeper than a FITREP ranking. The Navy needs to take a hard look at what it says it values, what it truly values, and how that is reflected through promotions. A robust public discourse on this topic would be a good start.

Then what is needed is an analysis of all officers, from the CNO on down, and see which part of the talent sandwich we’re truly promoting from. There are many ways to go about this. Idea’s range from focusing on a specific cohort of officers, such as an already established promotion zone, and look back to see who promoted, who left voluntarily, and what their performance was. If possible, this should include an analysis of their performance in civilian jobs for those that left the service.

Other options include focusing on historical board results, both statutory and administrative, to see if we are promoting and keeping our talent. But again the main focus must be emphasized not just on those who stayed, but on those who opted out of service – a group often left out of this conversation. Much of this should be easy if given the requisite time and access. There is an entire library of records in Millington, TN.

I urge the Chief of Naval Personnel to seriously consider a study of this nature (read: not a survey). In order to create solutions to problems, we need to first get a grip on what exactly we mean by talent and then challenge the initial question– which is: Is the Navy in fact truly losing it’s best and brightest? . . .

The Chief of Naval Personnel has opened the door, I believe, to really looking into that question.

Why does it matter? Well, if you are a tax payer, you should want the Navy to keep the officers it needs to fulfill its mission in the most efficient and cost effective manner. Which usually means having the right person in the right job at the right time.

That may mean that we will need to stop promoting people out of jobs that they do really well into jobs that ill suit them.

Food for thought and discussion.