Revisiting A Less Expensive Path to Growing the Navy: Great Things Come in Small Packages

Orignally posted 17 Dec 2015, but still relevant today as we discuss growing the U. S. Navy:

The U.S. Navy's newly designated "frigate" (nee "Littoral Combat Ship") is not a dead program, but it ain't all that healthy, either, as set out in Pentagon Cuts LCS to 40 Ships. This has set off some "I was right and you were wrong -ism".

Really, the FF/LCS is not the first Navy ship design that proved to be - uh - less than optimal.

It probably won't be the last.

Let's suppose we ask the question that underlies the size of our fleet: What do we plan to do with it?

If the answer is long-range standoff missions, then it would seem aircraft carriers and their assigned air wings are one part of the answer.

If the answer is killing submarines that might threaten our country or those aircraft carriers, it should be clear that ASW attack submarines are a large part of the answer, along with long-range maritime patrol aircraft and real honest to goodness ASW destroyers.

If the answer is support of forces ashore, then perhaps the new Zumwalt-class destroyers are part of the answer.

USS Pegasus (PHM-1)

If the answer is local sea control in contested waters in narrow straits, inshore, then the answer probably is a force deigned to go into harm's way in those waters. As set out in this 2001 Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe describing a 2000 war game:

The U.S. is at war with China, and U.S. Navy commanders are using a new breed of ship called Streetfighter to sail perilously close to the Chinese coast.

There, the small, fast, inexpensive warships -- designed to go into harm's way and, if necessary, be lost -- hunt down Chinese subs and missile launchers hidden among fishing boats and cargo ships. Some Streetfighters are sunk by enemy fire, and casualties are high, but they help the U.S. win earlier than the military pros had projected.
***
The Streetfighters existed only on paper. But their performance in that mock battle was enough to convince the war college's director, Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, that a fleet of Streetfighters could give any foe fits -- provided the Navy is willing to endure casualties.

"Streetfighter is alive, well and an inevitability," he crowed.

Even then, there were "cautious" voices, like a now former CJCS,

Some top Navy commanders have grave doubts. "I look at the Streetfighter concept and worry that we are saying, 'It's OK to lose ships,' " says Vice Adm. Michael Mullen, commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, Va. Others question whether sailors in an all-volunteer force would sign up to serve on the ships, or whether Congress would approve the money to build them.

Yeah, well, the FF/LCS is a lot of things, but it does not appear to be so robust that if confronted by a threat it wouldn't be "expendable." More from Cebrowski:

The 58-year-old admiral immediately homed in on one of the most vexing weaknesses in the current fleet. In the past 10 years, the proliferation of cruise missiles and cheap diesel subs has made it easier for enemies to strike U.S. vessels. A recent General Accounting Office report concluded that the Navy's ability to deal with the threat posed by cruise missiles and diesel subs in coastal regions was "marginal" and that nothing the Navy is currently buying will "provide adequate protection against improved versions of these weapons."

To protect its precious ships and crews, the military leadership is pushing them farther and farther out to sea, where they are safer but not nearly as effective. "We've become risk-averse," Adm. Cebrowski says.

Re-read Adm Mullen's comment again to see what Adm. Cebrowski was speaking about.

The idea of building a new class of small ships had been kicking around at the Naval War College and the Naval Post Graduate School, where retired Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, one of Adm. Cebrowski's former commanding officers, had been playing with some concepts. Adm. Cebrowski had been thinking about the need for a new class of small ship as well. So he and Capt. Hughes put the concept on paper.

Because Streetfighters would be cheap -- one design would cost only about $70 million a ship, compared with as much as $1 billion for a new destroyer -- the Navy would be able to buy hundreds for the price of one 10-ship carrier battle group. The ships would operate along crowded coastal waters, hiding in coves and springing out to destroy enemy subs, hunt down mines and disrupt enemy missiles that could more easily target larger, slower ships.

After a few days or weeks of heavy fighting, the bigger ships would move in and take over the fight. Some Streetfighters would be lost, and some sailors would die. "Streetfighters must be designed to lose," Capt. Hughes wrote at the time. "If the ships become too costly or too heavily manned, commanders will be unwilling to put them at risk."

I am not sure in this age of near real time satellite imaging that "hiding in coves" might still work, but there is that "quantity has a quality all of its own" thing.

The fun one can have imagining a fleet with a combination of large capable ships and small, fast "sea-going fire ants" boiling out of hiddie holes is immense. Capt Wayne Hughes' The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet suggests:

The “New Navy Fighting Machine” promotes a wider mix of ships, in a more numerous fleet, with better-focused capabilities, to meet a range of scenarios in green and blue water environments. The new fighting machine does this within an affordable SCN (Ship Construction Navy) budget ceiling, because the U.S. defense budget already dominates defense spending in the rest of the world.

The fleet’s new component is a green water force of small vessels to fulfill the three sea service chiefs’ maritime strategy of collaboration and support of theater security operations now manifested in Navy global fleet stations. The green water force also includes coastal combat forces, and additional reconnaissance for the land and sea side of a littoral. These capabilities are achieved with 10% of the SCN budget.

How many "green water ships? Hughes suggests 240 (+400 inshore patrol craft). Hughes rightly compares the need for a new command to drive developing this green water component of naval power to that that developed Naval Aviation in its infancy. Hughes:

We also show, in rough outline, that the new fighting machine is better suited than the present projection-heavy 313-ship1 Navy to support regional conflicts and, if it should become necessary, to constrain Russian ambitions.

Submarines in greater numbers are central to the maritime strategy, but within a constrained budget the larger force cannot be exclusively nuclear powered. We find that diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion not only allow twice as many submarines, but they also nicely complement the SSNs in the critical scenario.

Because the United States has not conducted an opposed amphibious landing in nearly 60 years, the new fighting machine emphasizes amphibious lift rather than amphibious assault. We stress the unparalleled success of national sealift in timely delivery of ground forces where needed, when needed, and for as long as needed. It is a national treasure that has received too little attention. We assiduously maintain this strong sealift component in the new fighting machine.

The study does not eliminate high-end warships, the individual capabilities of which are unmatched by any other nation in the world. To do so would end America’s maritime superiority. On the other hand, a Navy of only large, multibillion dollar warships will result in a smaller and smaller force that cannot fulfill its roles around the world. Some of those roles, maritime interdiction operations and coastal patrol for example, can be handled by smaller ships in greater numbers.

That 313 number above has now shrunk to 272.

Some are going to debate the building of new frigates or corvettes to boost ship numbers. I suggest instead building the "green water" force using technology that already exists. Further, I suggest building up a corps young officers to drive these new toys hard with some LCDR and CDR supervision.

If you don't think there are some young people who like this idea, see this from 2012 New Navy Fighting Machine in the South China Sea by a couple of then Lieutenants, Dylan Ross and Jimmy Harmon:

This thesis advocates fleet growth as articulated in Hughes' New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) study. Comparisons of the NNFM, the U.S. fleet, and the PRC fleet demonstrate both the disparity facing the American surface forces, and the near parity obtained in the NNFM. CT through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and naval obscurants provide American surface forces increased staying power and tactical advantage. Scouting and communications networking through a theater wide constellation of airships provide the American fleet with persistentsituationalawareness of the battle space, tactical communications with subsurface forces, and improved emissions control (EMCON) measures for surface forces. The distributive properties of the NNFM, combined with this study's CT [counter-targeting] and scouting findings, offer American surface combatants success over the PRC Navy in the SCS scenario.

And who wouldn't like to drive one of these:


or be the a squadron CO of 8 or 10 of these:


We could do worse than building a few of these.

In fact, we have done worse. Too bad the PHMs like Pegasus were killed. We could have had 38 years of experience with small fast, heavily armed war ships by now. "Coulda, shoulda."

Friday Film: Harbor Security - British Maunsell Forts During World War II

Homeland defense, British style, with artificial island fortresses:




Background here

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 12 February - 14 March 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 8 - 14 March 2018

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 12 February - 14 March 2... by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: Now Hear This "USS Philadelphia" (1951)

On Midrats 18 March 2018: Episode 428: Battleflags, Korean Battles, and the Joys of Unexpected Archeology

Please join us at 5pm EDT on 18 March 2018 for Episode 428: Battleflags, Korean Battles, and the Joys of Unexpected Archeology:

Put yourself in the shoes of a museum curator. You have the funds to conduct some much needed preservation on battleflags captured by the US Navy from the War of 1812. To do

USNI News Photo

that, you have to remove them from their home for almost a century.

What happens when you all of a sudden find they are not alone? They are covering something else?

No, this isn't another "National Treasure" sequel, but things that actually unfolded last year at the US Naval Academy. For naval history buffs, this was an exciting time and an opportunity to explore some relatively unknown chapters from our history.

For almost all Americans, when you mention American forces coming ashore to do battle on the Korean peninsula, they think of Inchon and 1950.

Well, we came ashore earlier and fought another battle, in 1871.

When you hear about the American navy vs. pirates, you think about the waters off the Horn of Africa in this century. What about off China in the 1850s?

Join us Sunday to discuss the history and the battleflags of pirates and forgotten kingdoms with returning guests, BJ Armstrong, CDR USN and Claude Berube, LCDR USNR.

BJ Armstrong, PhD is an Assistant Professor of War Studies and Naval History with the History Department of the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds a PhD in War Studies from King's College, London.

Claude Berube is the director of the Naval Academy Museum and recently completed his doctoral dissertation through the University of Leeds on Andrew Jackson’s Navy.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can also pick the show up later by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Friday Film: "Navy Our First Line of Defense" (1935)

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 5 February - 7 March 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 1 - 7 March 2018

Of particular note this week from the WTS:

(U) MEXICO: On 1 March, the U.S. embassy in Mexico issued a travel alert for a popular tourist destination in southeast Mexico. This came a little more than a week after an explosion on a ferry in Playa del Carmen injured more than 20 people, some of them U.S. citizens. The alert was issued the same day as another explosive device was found on another ferry owned by the same company in Cozumel, another tourist hub in the area. According to the alert, which advised U.S. travelers to exercise caution, purchase travel and medical-evacuation insurance, and contact the nearest embassy or consulate for assistance. (www.businessinsider.com; www.cbsnews.com/news)

Though it seems to defy logic, the Mexican government is denying that this is a "terrorist" act as set out in Mexico: Crude bomb caused ferry blast; terrorism ruled out:

Prosecutors said they believe there is no motivation for a terrorist group to have carried out the attack and also think criminal gangs would not have done it, knowing it would draw unwanted attention and increased security.

"Responsibility by terrorist organizations or organized crime has been ruled out," Deputy Attorney General Arturo Elias Beltran said at a news conference.
***
He added that the bomb "had a very limited capacity" and "was not intended to do major damage."

The Feb. 21 explosion ripped through the upper section of the ferry as it was moored to the dock at Playa del Carmen, leaving a gaping hole in the side of the vessel.
***
As a result of the investigations, it can be concluded that the remnants of the explosive artifact (in the Feb. 21 incident) show similarity to the one discovered days earlier, and it is clear that it was a rudimentary or homemade artifact," the office said.

On March 2, another object said to be a possible bomb was found attached to the underside of a ferry belonging to the same company whose boat was bombed earlier. That vessel was anchored about 500 yards (meters) off Cozumel. There were no passengers aboard at the time, and authorities said it had been out of service for over 10 months.

Investigators are pursuing multiple lines of inquiry but have not made any arrests or advanced a definitive theory about a motive for the explosion.

I guess it could be some sort of labor dispute, but the definition of terrorism is not stretched by calling the planting of even "rudimentary or homemade" devices to influence actions by some party. As even Wikipedia has it,

Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to create terror, or fear, to achieve a financial, political, religious or ideological aim.

I suppose, though, that using that word might shake up the local tourism industry a tad.

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 5 February - 7 March 2018... by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Important Strategic Input: "U.S. Navy Carriers: Strike Range Expansion Is Critical"

If you are going to influence shore based powers, you need to be able to reach out touch them if need be.

This is addressed by Jerry Hendrix in this National Review piece, U.S. Navy Carriers: Strike Range Expansion Is Critical

The United States Navy needs to make some hard choices if it wishes to remain relevant in the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) security environment that lies ahead of it. It must begin to adjust its strategy as well as its accompanying shipbuilding and aircraft-procurement plans to enable it to fight and win within the emerging great-power competition. This new environment, at last recognized in President Trump’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy, requires the Navy to strike enemy capitals and other vital centers of gravity from range, but the Navy’s decision to bypass a carrier-based strike asset, and now even to push off its acquisition of an unmanned mission tanker, suggest that it is not taking A2AD great-power competition seriously. Its decisions place the future relevance of the entire maritime service, at least as it is presently composed, at risk.

We also discussed this on Midrats on 11 March 2018 - and Dr. Hendrix joined us - the discussion rolls through the show, but especially beginning around the 44 minute mark:

On Midrats 11 March 2018: Episode 427: Midrats March Madness ... well, mostly Navy talk

Please join us at 5pm EDT on 11 March 2018 for Episode 427: Midrats March Madness ... well, mostly Navy talk:

Now that we're near the end of 2QFY18, it's time for another Midrats Free-For-All!

Just Sal from the blog CDR Salamander and Eagle1 of EagleSpeak covering the latest developments on the maritime and national security front.

If you have topics you would like us to address, send them to us on twitter at @cdrsalamder or @lawofsea, join the chatroom while the show is live ... or even call in.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can also pick the show up later by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: Dimension X "The Martian Chronicles" (1950)

Yes, Bradbury.

Friday Film: Deep Submergence Rescue System (DSRV) (1972)

National Energy Security: Self Inflicted Energy Wounds That Hurt Taxpayers But Benefit Speculators

Here's a little known tale of how the "environmental" crowd dips into the pocketbook of ordinary Americans while doing little or nothing to improve the environment. You may never have hear of RINS, but here's a lttle background from the EPA to set the table for what follows:

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program was created under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), which amended the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) further amended the CAA by expanding the RFS program. EPA implements the program in consultation with U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Energy.

The RFS program is a national policy that requires a certain volume of renewable fuel to replace or reduce the quantity of petroleum-based transportation fuel, heating oil or jet fuel. The four renewable fuel categories under the RFS are:

- Biomass-based diesel
- Cellulosic biofuel
- Advanced biofuel
- Total renewable fuel

The 2007 enactment of EISA significantly increased the size of the program and included key changes, including:

- Boosting the long-term goals to 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel
- Extending yearly volume requirements out to 2022
- Adding explicit definitions for renewable fuels to qualify (e.g., renewable biomass, GHG emissions)
- Creating grandfathering allowances for volumes from certain existing facilities
- Including specific types of waiver authorities

The Clean Air Act provides EPA authority to adjust cellulosic, advanced and total volumes set by Congress as part of the annual rule process.

The statute also contains a general waiver authority that allows the Administrator to waive the RFS volumes, in whole or in part, based on a determination that implementation of the program is causing severe economic or environmental harm, or based on inadequate domestic supply.

Here's a handy chart that shows what Congress thinks is a good idea for the total volume of "renewable fuels" in our future:

The Congressional Budget Office prepared a 2017 report on "Issues for the Renewable Fuel Standard"

Issues for the Renewable Fuel Standard from Congressional Budget Office

What may you take from that report?

1. Transportation fuel costs will increase'
2. Minimal effect on greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (absent some "technology development")
3. While the goals of the Energy Security and Independence Act is to reduce "dependence on foreign oil and reducing GHG emissions" no part of the Act refers to the impact of technology such as fracking that could allow the U. S. to cease needing "foreign oil"
4. The EPA issues, for qualifying fuels (defined in slide 6), a "renewable identification number (RIN) attached to each gallon. These RINs are required to be submitted by fuel suppliers "on the basis of their use of petroleum-based fuels"
5. "RINs can be traded and banked"
6. The guesstimates made by the planners in putting together this program did not anticipate that technology might make vehicles more fuel efficient thus creating issues. See slides 9 and 11.
7. EPA decision makers can affect the price of food and transportation fuesl. (slide17) Note that on slide 19 that "Ethanol accounts for 40% of the corn produced in the U.S. 
8. Slide 23: "for each 100 gallons of gasoline or diesel they sell, suppliers are required to submit  - 1.6 biomass-based diesel RINs                                                                                                    - - 3.4 additional advanced biofuels RINs                                                                                        - - 8.3 additional renewable fuel RINs (met with corn ethanol) 
9.  CBO's renewable RIN price estimate for 2017  was $1.55 to $2.10                                                                                                                                                                        

Yeah, exciting stuff. But here's what happens in the real world, the trading of RINS is putting American refineries and refinery workers at risk - which has a potentially serious effect on national security - because without refineries and their workers, where will we get fuel for our aircraft, ships and military vehicles? Senator Cruz of Texas (of course) has taken up this issue as reported by the Oil & Gas Journal in
Time has come to overhaul RINs, Cruz tells Philadelphia refinery workers

US Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) called for a cap on the price of renewable identification numbers (RIN) to halt speculation and preserve jobs at refineries. "We're here because the jobs, and the men and women whose livelihoods and families depend on those jobs, are at risk from a broken government regulation system that isn't working, and that we have to fix," he said a Feb. 21 rally at Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES).

PES cited dramatically higher prices for the renewable fuel credits the Environmental Protection Agency administers when the refiner declared bankruptcy nearly a month earlier (OGJ Online, Jan. 23, 2018). "In the year 2012, this refinery-the largest refinery on the East Coast-paid about $10 million for RINs. Then the RINs market broke. The price skyrocketed from 1-2¢ each to as high as $1.40 each," Cruz said.

"This means that last year, in 2017, this refinery spent $218 million buying RINs. That is more than double the payroll of the men and women sitting here," Cruz said. "Now, how many think the refinery should be wasting money on government licenses that don't pay a damned thing rather than paying your salaries? It doesn't make any sense. It is nuts."
***
"Here's the crazy thing: Of the $218 million [PES] paid for RINs, do you know how much ended up in the pockets of Iowa corn farmers? None. The money doesn't go to the corn farmers, and it doesn't go to the ethanol producers. Instead, billions [of dollars] are being made by Wall Street speculators and giant integrated companies that are earning a windfall on this broken regulatory system," Cruz said.

It's been a problem for a while. Here's a NYTimes report from 2016, High-Price Ethanol Credits Add to Refiners’ Woes:

Stiff competition, heavy regulation and high operating costs make for some of the lowest profit margins in the petroleum industry. And in the last year, profits have been even harder to come by because of the global fuel glut that has translated into bargain-basement prices for the gasoline and diesel that refiners produce.

But lately, the game has been tougher still for people like Jack Lipinski, chief executive of CVR Energy, an independent operator of two refineries in Oklahoma and Kansas. The problem involves a soaring cost that is outside of his control.

This year, on top of everything else, CVR Energy will have to spend as much as $235 million on credits for renewable fuels. That is nearly double what the company spent last year on the credits, and it exceeds the company’s total labor, maintenance and energy costs.

Mr. Lipinski blames the federal program that requires CVR to buy the credits, but he also suspects a role by unknown market speculators who may be driving up the costs of the credits.

Finally, it is worth noting who ultimately pays the price for cost increases to refiners - it's the American public, to whom the costs are passed on with higher gas and diesel prices at the pump.

By the way current retail gas price hikes are related to the refineries performing maintenance and shift over to producing different blends of gas for the warmer season to come.

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 29 January - 28 February 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 22 - 28 February 2018

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 29 January - 28 February... by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: THe FBI in Peace and War "Ladies in Lace" (1957)

On Midrats 4 March 2018: Episode 426: An Eye on the Fleet with Chris Cavas

Please join us at 5pm EST on 4 March 2018 for Midrats Episode 426: An Eye on the Fleet with Chris Cavas:

With a new administration well over a year in and a clearer view of the direction our Navy is headed, now is a great opportunity to check in with one of the most knowledgeable observers on the maritime scene, Chris Cavas.

Join us this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern for an hour-long broad-ranged discussion of national and international naval issues.

Chris was the naval warfare correspondent for Defense News from 2004 to 2017 and is a former managing editor of Navy Times . He has reported on Navy issues across the globe, including aboard USSPonce in the Fifth Fleet and aboard National Security Cutters.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can also pick the show up later by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Friday Film: "Sea Dragon, Unde the Ice"

Fleet Size Matters - A Blast From the Past : "A Repeated Note on a Call for Small, Numerous Ships"

What follows is From December 2013 and going back even further.

Bottom line - the U.S. Navy needs to think small(er) in terms of warship sizes and think bigger in terms of numbers of ships.

As has been repeatedly said by others, while a single large ship may be more capable in some ways, the loss of that single large ship in a fleet composed of fewer all large ships may be ruinous to sea control (something we see when we lose a couple of DDGs due to accidents). The loss of one of many smaller ships in a larger fleet may not hurt so much.

The old post begins under the red asterisks:


****

Way back in 2008 we were discussing the shaping of the U.S. Navy fleet at The Time is Right for Revolution and the links therein. Part of that discussion follows:

CDR Salamander's Maritime Strategy Monday: the Revolt of the Commanders ought to stir up discussion - though I am not sure how many "flag bound" O-6s are reading blogs critical of the group think that has put us where we are. I do know that when on exercises it was common to acknowledge that some issues were "too hard" or "too time consuming" to let them dominate the exercise, though in real life one will not be able to "assume away" such problems.

In my view, during my last days being involved with such matters, we were not training senior officers in how to fight and how hard that fighting is against a determined enemy who has had time to build forces designed to exploit your well-known weaknesses.

So when CDR S calls for a "commander's revolt" I understand his frustration. And note that John Boyd paid for his revolution heavily while lesser men gained from his insight. The would-be revolutionaries need to understand the risks.

These commanders need some political help from someone who understands that we shouldn't have billion dollar ships doing missions poorly that could be done better by having many more mission-designed ships. To use a famous Navy phrase, "any ship can be a mine sweeper once." Real minesweepers can be reused after they have swept a channel- multibillion dollar "capital ships" cannot.

Given the promise of "network centric warfare," merely connecting a few huge platforms under-utilizes the potential for linking many small ships for greater tactical flexibility. Or, as Captain Wayne Hughes writes in Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (p.286):

We have seen that the number of ships is the most valuable attribute that a fleet can have. We also saw that many small ships offer more tactical flexibility... The U.S. Navy is composed of large, highly capable ships, many of which have area defense capability. It was for defense more than for offense that the American navy sacrificed numbers for quality.*

The asterisk is to his footnote:

Another reason is because of the economies of scale. A large ship with three times the displacement of a small one will have three or more times the payload and probably only cost twice as much. Sometimes the ship must be big to carry and operate its payload, modern carrier aircraft illustrate. A large ship is also more comfortable for long cruises in many kinds of weather.

Hughes needs to be listened to. Sometimes the economies of scale and crew comfort need to be weighed against other factors, like winning wars and not being afraid to send your expensive ships into harm's way.

Where are we five years on? We are still having the same discussion - albeit the number of Littoral Combat Ships (more properly, "Littoral Drone Carriers" or LDCs) is growing. Exactly where the vast drone force is right now is unclear, though drones ought to be cheaper and easier to build in most ways - just turn the job over to robots as GM has done to most of its automobile manufacturing.

Smaller, faster, cheaper and dispersed in the theater where that matters (Southeast Asia) ought to be the U.S. Navy mantra for the next few months and years.

Not to the exclusion of the big gray hulls - as an adjunct force, not a replacement.

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 22 January - 21 February 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 15 - 21 February 2018

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 22 January - 21 February... by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: Fred Allen "Charlie McCarthy Sues Fred for Slander" (1945)

About Fred Allen

Friday Film: "Proceed and Report" (1943)

Testing Officers of the Deck: The U. S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy Approaches

U. S. Navy approach:

From Navy Times Officers of the deck to undergo competency tests

The Navy has begun randomly testing surface fleet officers on their officer of the deck skills in order to better understand where the community’s strengths and weaknesses lie.

It is part of the surface community’s efforts to assess and revamp training in the wake of fatal collisions involving the warships Fitzgerald and John S. McCain last summer that killed 17 sailors.

***
Forty OOD-qualified first tour division officers were recently selected at random from 10 San Diego ships to undergo the 35-minute assessment, which involves a survey, written test and a simulator scenario, according to a recent Navy blog post by Capt. Scott Robertson, head of the Surface Warfare Officers School, or SWOS.

The tests will take place in the coming months at other fleet concentration points, with the goal of assessing about 200 officers, or a tenth of the fleet’s OOD inventory.

Such a data set will enable the Navy to gauge mariner skills and watch-standing capabilities of its OODs, Robertson said in the post.

Aussie approach:

I once witnessed a Canadian Navy ship turn the wrong way during a exercise. Later found out that the OOD was dismissed from their Navy as a result . . . Nothing focuses the mind like that ...

The past few weeks I've been comtemplating what traits make some naval surface ship drivers officers (Officers of the Deck or Junior OODs) better than others. As part of that process I also thought about whether some of those traits can be taught or whether some of them are organic within individuals.

Let me start with an example - one I first used about 12 years ago - in their book Keepers of the Sea Fred Maroon and Edward Beach wrote about replenishment at sea:

...[I]n no fleet maneuver is the steering ability of the helmsman, indeed, the exercise of pure seamanship by all hands so demanding. No evolution is so fraught with potential danger as the high-speed maneuvering of huge ships in close quarters, where the knowledge of one's ship, of the action of the wind and the sea, and of the laws of physics is crucial. At replenishment stations, some individuals seem to have an intuitive awareness of what is happening around them. Such men never seem to lose sight of the ponderously certain outcome of the events they have set in motion. They have eyes in the backs of their heads, a feel for the sea in the tips of their fingers, and the born confidence of a professional juggler or racing car driver. It shows in the way they handle their heavy gear and in the way they drive their ships.."

Why is it that "some individuals seem to have an intuitive awareness of what is happening around them?"

Is there something wrong with the others who apparently lack that "intuitive awareness?" Or is it a learned skill? Can it be taught?

These questions led me to looking at the topic of "situational awareness" - which has been defined as

Situational awareness, a familiar term to professional captains and crew, is defined as having a keen sense of the events and conditions around us, and the ability to apply our awareness of those events to our situation. simply put, it’s knowing what is going on around you.

The article from which that definition comes notes that Admrial Moran stated that in the recent incident of USS Fitzgerald,

According to the Navy’s Admiral William F. Moran, vice chief of naval operations, in the case of the USS Fitzgerald, “the sailors who were on watch in the ship’s bridge lost situational awareness, contributing to the collision.”

A discussion of aircraft pilot and situational awareness notes,

Put simply, situational awareness (SA) means appreciating all you need to know about what is going on when the full scope of your task - flying, controlling or maintaining an aircraft - is taken into account. More specifically and in the context of complex operational environments, SA is concerned with the person's knowledge of particular task-related events and phenomena. For example, for a fighter pilot SA means knowing about the threats and intentions of enemy forces as well as the status of his/her own aircraft. For an air traffic controller, SA means (at least partly) knowing about current aircraft positions and flight plans and predicting future states so as to detect possible conflicts. Therefore, in operational terms, SA means having an understanding of the current state and dynamics of a system and being able to anticipate future change and developments.

A general definition of SA is that it is the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.

In the U. S. Navy surface force, we used to use the term "forehandedness" to describe what amounts to SA. As Stavrides and Girrier put in the 15th Edition of the Watch Officer's Guide:

The watch officer should be ready for any situation. For that reason, the most important faculty for the watch officer to cultivate is forehandedness. If there is reason to think that there will be fog during a watch, he or she should check over the fog procedure before taking the deck. If the ship is to take part in fleet exercises, the watch officer should arrange to study the orders, pre-exercise messages (PRE-EXs) , and applicable instructions before going on watch . . . The watch officer must always look ahead - a minute, an hour, and a day - and make it a matter of pride never to be caught unprepared.

The wise watch officer will mentally rehearse the action to take in event of a fire, a man overboard, a steering failure, or other sreious casualty. This habit is not difficult to acquire and is certain to pay large dividents. Forehandedness is the mark of a successful watch officer. Specific evolutions of a technical or complex nature should b e pre-briefed in advance with all the major participants atending. The OOD is usually a central figure in these briefings. Proper preparation for complex evolutions not only results in smooth running operations but also keeps them safe.

I note that with our naval aviators, every mission is pre-briefed. I am not sure how many, if any, oncoming watch teams on our ships get together before the watch to discuss what to expect.

The best skippers and OODs constantly challenge their watch standing teams - not to harass them with trivia - but to teach them what are the essential matters that any member of the watch team needs to know. My first CO was always testing the limits of my knowledge - "How far can you see from the bridge?" (You first have to know that height of the bridge above the water . . .) "If you are the burdened ship in a crossing situation at sea and you are going to manuver to avoid a collision, how big should your turn be?" (Big enough so the guy on the bridge of the other ship can see that you've made the turn) "What's the best thing to do if you've lost situational awareness?" (Usually go "all stop" and buy yourself some time to sort things out).

The OOD that, during a quiet watch, announces that the "bridge has lost steering" to test the watch crew's ability to shift steering to after steering and for after steering to take control is being forehanded, as is the CO who tells the XO to toss Oscar, the man overboard dummy, over the side to check the OOD and crew responses.

We've been standing watches in the U. S. Navy for over 240 years. Tech may have changed, but people haven't. What has happened is that many of us depend too much on technology and forget that tech can and will fail at the worst possible moment. As in "Murphy was an optimist." It behooves us to learn to use tech properly while keeping alive forehandedness as "the most important faculty" for our watch officers.

All of which is to say, it speaks volumes that we need to "test" U.S. officers of deck to set a baseline for training because we don't really know what we have.

It also speaks volumes that the RAN "test" (after completion of training) is to throw their JOs into the fray piloting "a warship in restricted waters at high speed in a warfare environment."

More on situational awareness later.

Update: More on the U.S. Navy data gathering process here

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 15 January - 14 February 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 8 - 14 February 2018

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 15 January - 14 February... by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: FIbber McGee and Molly "War Worker Shortage" (1943)

Friday Film: "Defensive Electronic Countermeasures" (1962)

Part of an Old Debate Between the U.S. and Iran About the Strait of Hormuz: "Ships in Gulf should use Iran-defined routes"

Iran lays out its long-held contention that Iran has the right to control shipping entering the Arabian Gulf as reported by an Iranian "news" source in Ships in Gulf should use Iran-defined routes: official

In comments at a conference of maritime organizations in Tehran on Tuesday, Rear Admiral Fadavi said the Supreme National Security Council has passed a new regulation obliging all foreign ships, including American and British vessels, to take the waterway defined by Iran.

American vessels obey the Iranian rules when it comes to exercising sovereignty in the Persian Gulf, he said.

The general added that foreign vessels in the Persian Gulf do not dare to violate Iran’s instructions on the waterways.

He further explained that Iran Ports and Maritime Organization has the authority to announce the decision on new maritime routes, in accordance with the administrative and international regulations.

General Fadavi also expressed the IRGC’s readiness to detect and document environmental violations in the Persian Gulf through aerial and naval patrolling, as soon as the Ports and Maritime Organization and Iran’s Department of Environment authorize the IRGC forces.

In remarks in June 2016, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei underlined that security of the Persian Gulf region comes within the purview of the regional countries alone, and dismissed the US claim of seeking security in the region.

“The Persian Gulf security relates to the countries of the region which have common interests, and not to the US. So, security of the Persian Gulf region should be provided by the countries of this region itself,” the Leader said.
***

As Professor James Kraska noted in his 2013 article in the Virginia Journal of International Law, "Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz," the issue is complicated by the fact that neither Iran nor the U. S. is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which has a specific section pertaining to straits like the Strait of Malacca or, in this instance, the Hormuz Strait.

The standoff is especially complicated because the United States and Iran are not parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4 Both states have bypassed UNCLOS, the one multilateral treaty positioned to resolve their differences. Their status as holdouts colors every aspect of the bilateral legal relationship in the Strait of Hormuz. Their dispute is also layered and made more complex by both states subscribing to some terms of the treaty, but rejecting others. Without adherence to a common rule set, the rivals embrace incompatible views of the
source and content of the laws that govern passage through the strait.

As we now see in the South China Sea, part of the problem lies with there being two distinct types of passage through "territorial" waters, (1) innocent passage and (2) transit passage, with very different rules in play.

Under UNCLOS, a coastal state may declare an area out to 12 miles as "territorial sea." Under older law, the traditional "limit" of such claims was 3 miles. As Dr. Kraska puts it,

Ships of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.9 On the other hand, coastal States have broad and durable security interests in the territorial sea, and may prescribe and enforce laws that condition or preclude altogether the surface transit of foreign warships.

When overlapping territorial seas connect one area of the high seas or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to another area of the high seas or EEZ, this also constitutes a strait used for international navigation under the terms set forth in UNCLOS.10 States are entitled to exercise the right of transit passage through such straits used for international navigation. The regime of transit passage affords more rights to users of the strait than innocent passage. In most circumstances, innocent passage can be suspended by the coastal State; transit passage cannot be suspended. Transit passage also allows submerged transit and overflight of aircraft through the strait.11 Only surface transits are permitted for ships engaged in innocent passage. In the absence of acceptance of UNCLOS, however, the United States and Iran cannot use these clear rules as a guide and therefore must revert to legacy treaties, such as the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Territorial Sea Convention), 12 as well as customary international law, to determine their respective rights and duties in the strait.

As Iran would have it, unless a country has become a party to UNCLOS, there is no "transit passage" available to it. On the other hand, Iran also asserts it has the right to a 12 mile limit on its territorial waters. Using these two concepts, Iran argues that it has the right, applying rules applicable to "innocent passage" to control the "surface transit of warships."

The counter-argument is that, in order to invoke UNCLOS benefits (the 12-mile limit), you have to accept the totality of UNCLOS without "cherry-picking" those rules that benefit you while ignoring those that don't. Thus, if Iran wants to claim that "transit passage" not applicable in its "territorial sea" it is restricted to a 3 mile limit. Again, Dr. Kraska:

Iran is not a party to UNCLOS, and therefore is under no compunction to recognize legal regimes therein unless they have become customary law and therefore binding on all nations. Since Iran is not a party to UNCLOS, it does not enjoy a twelve nautical mile territorial sea and instead may claim only the historic three nautical miles.

While restricting Iran's territorial seas can be fun, the U. S. has its own issues with UNCLOS and has to fall back on asserting that "transit passage" rights are founded in customary international law which apply even if UNCLOS does not.

Since the United States is not party to UNCLOS, it does not automatically enjoy the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation if the coastal state also is not a party to the treaty. The United States counters that although the regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation is reflected in UNCLOS, it springs from customary international law, rather than being a creation of the terms of the treaty. Although transit passage is codified in article 38 of UNCLOS, it merely reflects long-standing state practice and opinio juris.
***
According to this view, even though the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, therefore, it nonetheless enjoys the right of transit passage through international straits as a matter of historical practice and a history of legal obligation among states. To put a final point on it, the United States rejects Iran’s claim of broad security competence over the territorial sea, since even article 16(4) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention precludes the coastal State from suspending innocent passage.

At the very least, it is better to say that dispute is not going to be readily resolved, though it is of vital import in a area of potential conflict. Both sides will argue their positions with vigor, but as Professor Kraska concludes in his article:

A coastal State, such as Iran, may not select a twelve nautical mile territorial sea over waters forming a strait used for international navigation, dispense with the navigational regime of transit passage, and instead insist on enforcement of innocent passage any more than the United States could recognize only a three nautical mile territorial sea and then demand to exercise the right of transit passage within it. Ultimately, it is unclear which of the two nations has the superior position to determine this legal landscape. Both the twelve nautical mile territorial sea and the right of transit passage through international straits have either entered, or are on the cusp of, customary international law. The barest tinge of irresolution to the matter means the onus is on Iran either to accept the post-1982 legal status quo or raise it as a challenge before a competent international tribunal.

Also of interest Iran's Maritime Claims.

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 8 January - 7 February 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 1 - 7 February 2018

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 8 January - 7 February 201... by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: Adventures in Research "The King of Ice" and "Yesterday's Secret Weapon" (1943)

Background:

Decades before The History Channel or the Discovery Network there was Adventures in Research. The program was sponsored by Westinghouse, a company which knew the importance of science and research. In fact, the program was written by physicist Phillips Thomas, who was on the staff at the Westinghouse Laboratories. Adventures in Research highlighted technology, inventors and their inventions. Subjects were presented as dramatic plays and ranged from atomic power to cash registers.

The King of Ice

Yesterday's Secret Weapon

On Midrats 11 February 2018 - Episode 423: A long, irregular, and forever war; a discussion with Dan Green

Please join us at 5pm EST on 11 February 2018 for Midrats Episode 423: A long, irregular, and forever war; a discussion with Dan Green:

As we enter our 17th of ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and the global struggle against terrorism, why is this war taking so long? Where are we making progress, where are we stalled, and where are we falling back?

There are no easy answers to these questions, if there were they wouldn’t need to be asked.

We will discuss these and related issues for the full hour with author Dr. Daniel R. Green, a Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy focusing on counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and stability operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.

He is a reserve officer with the U.S. Navy with multiple deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan, along with holding several senior advisory positions dealing with the Middle East, Central Asia, and NATO/Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department.

Dr. Green recently completed his third book, In the Warlords' Shadow: Special Operations Forces, the Afghans, and their Fight with the Taliban that we will use as a stepping off point for our conversation.

Join us live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here. Or you can also pick the show up later by visiting either our iTunes page or our Stitcher page.

Friday Film: "Take Her Down" (1954)

Updated: Crew Recaptures Oil Products Tanker Gone Missing in Gulf of Guinea

Ship with 22 Indian crew missing in Gulf of Guinea since Friday reports Gulf News India:

A ship carrying 22 Indian crew members and 13,500 tonnes of gasoline is still missing in the Gulf of Guinea; contact was lost in Benin on Friday, the company and India's minister of external affairs said on Sunday.
The Gulf of Guinea is increasingly becoming a target for pirates who steal cargo and demand ransoms, even as piracy incidents fall worldwide, experts say.

The Marine Express tanker, managed by Hong Kong-based Anglo-Eastern, was last seen in Benin's waters at 3.30am GMT on Friday after which contact was lost, an Anglo Eastern spokesman told Reuters.

According to MarineTraffic, Panama flagged, 28000 ton ship.

According to Hellenic Shipping News:

Anglo Eastern, managers of the 45,989 dwt oil products tanker “Marine Express”,(IMO 9403322) report that contact has been lost with the vessel which was at the Cotonou Anchorage, Benin.

Nearby map shows area in question in the red oval off Benin in the Bight of Benin, a portion of the Gulf of Guinea.

Update: Crew retakes ship:

The Anglo-Eastern company reports on Facebook that the entire 22-person crew was "safe and well," and that they even managed to keep the entire cargo of 15,120 tons of gasoline intact. The crew and captain regained control of the Marine Express tanker at 4 p.m. Singapore time on Monday, according to the Hong Kong-based company.

"A complete investigation will be carried out into the hijacking and we wish to express our gratitude to the captain and crew of the vessel and their families for their courage and fortitude in dealing with this difficult situation, as well as to all of the authorities and agencies involved," the company wrote on Facebook.
Sushma Swaraj, India's Minister of External Affairs, tweeted that "I am happy to inform that Merchant Ship Marine Express with 22 Indian nationals on board has been released."

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 1 - 31 January 2018 and HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) Report for 25 - 31 January 2018

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 1 - 31 January 2018 by lawofsea on Scribd

U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence HORN OF AFRICA/GULF OF GUINEA/ SOUTHEAST ASIA: Piracy Analysis and... by lawofsea on Scribd

Saturday Is Old Radio Day: Sherlock Holmes "The Case of the Stolen Naval Treaty" (1947)

Featuring John Stanley as Holmes, Alfred Shirley as Watson. These two came to the Holmes' shows after Basil Rathbone/Nigel Bruce and Tom Conway/Nigel Bruce.

The duo might not be everyone's cup of tea, and the acting, well, let the story speak for itself.

Friday Film: Sea Mine Warfare (1968)