"We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and display stamina in purpose." - President Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address
My good friend CDR Salamander weighs in on the aircraft carrier debate on his home blog With Carriers: Go Smaller to get Bigger? which visits the ongoing discussions of Jerry Hendrix and Bryan McGrath about the future of the Navy force, especially aircraft carriers
Both of these gentlemen are stout in their views and their views are well worth discussing. You may find Jerry Hendrix's latest salvo in National Review The Aircraft Carrier We Need and Bryan McGrath's counter-fire on Twitter here. Big deck, small deck, proper air wing configuration, number of hulls, etc. CDR S tends to side with numbers, his view is that too big, too expensive means too much to risk and too easy to lose too much capacity with one lucky torpedo, missile, or accident.
It's a good debate and it's fun to ponder such things. However, I think it's the wrong debate.
I agree with Sal that we have perfected a myopic view of fleet equipment which holds that economies of scale dominate. "Bigger is better because on a per ship basis, it's cheaper to have one great big asset instead of smaller, 'less efficient' sized ships." You see this when you go to the grocery store - the large economy size bottle provides lower cost per ounce and may be the better buy.
The debate assumes that the aircraft carrier remains the premier weapon platform of our Navy. For almost 80 years that has been the aviator's mantra. They justify this view by noting that for almost 80 years the first question in a crisis has been, "Where are our carriers?"
What if that assumption is incorrect? What if, as submariners and others have been saying, the carrier is no longer the "king of the sea?"
What if our potential adversaries have taken a look at our reliance on carriers and designed their own counter forces to stop us from using our carriers and we might wish to?
Oh, wait - they have done just that. Part of the carrier debate is that our current carrier aircraft lack the range to penetrate the "anti-access/area denial (A2AD)" areas covered by "ship killer" ballistic missiles and other land-based weapons that are specially designed to keep our carriers at bay and actively kill them. Naval literature, both in fiction and in professional journals is full of discussion of this
I have argued before for making the effort to "spread lethality" by using many smaller ships all armed to the teeth, and for the creative use of things like missile barges Let's Have "Missile Barges" (and More) Now.
We must stop tying ourselves to large, easily targetable units and move to a force that is dispersed, hard to detect, including semi-submersible missile barges or fully submersible missile toting large autonomous vessels, or something else that mad scientists can create . . .
I support some form of the carrier Navy, but I simply don't think it's wise to suggest that creating a number of smaller carriers while hoping to increase the range of their main weapon system - the aircraft they carry - does much more than kick the problem down the road. If ship killer missiles can range to 2000 miles, why not to 3000? 4000? 5000? What kind of range will future carrier aircraft need to avoid the threat?
The effort to suggest that this "fix" or that other "fix" for carriers and their air wings will restore things to the point they were 20 years ago seems as wrong headed as the South Sea Island "cargo cults" that grew up after WWII. The thinking seems to be that if exactly the right words are spoken and the rituals observed, the magic will happen and the carrier will be "king" again.
It's time to be more innovative than that. If we are going to redesign the fleet to meet the modern threats, we need to be bold.
“Our adversaries in the 21st century are now continually disrupting us,” Blank said. “We have multiple adversaries moving at a speed faster than we are. Tools and tech that DoD used to own, drones and crypto was stuff we used to own, that’s not the case anymore.” “China is now Apple. Not us.”
A flat spot on a deck and an ampphibious ship becomes a missile platform capable of supporting operations ashore, as set in this PACOM and Expiditionary Group 3 press release
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was fired from the flight deck of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23) during Dawn Blitz 2017, Oct. 22. The HIMARS is a weapons system made up of the M142, five-ton chassis vehicle and can carry either a launcher pod of six rockets or one MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). It enables Marines to engage targets within minutes after firing and features an advanced targeting system that strikes with an extremely high accuracy rate. The system also features a greater range than traditional artillery, allowing smaller units to cover a larger area. The demonstration on Anchorage consisted of HIMARS engaging a land-based target with a Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary (GMLRS-U). “We had two training objectives for today’s shoot,” said Army Maj. Adam Ropelewski, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), lead planner for sea-based expeditionary fires. "The first training objective was demonstrating this capability, and second, we wanted to have good effects on the target. We achieved both objectives. We destroyed the target at 70 kilometers while at sea." Developing sea-based fires alternatives such as the HIMARS afloat and proving them to be effective provides an opportunity for our Navy and Marine Corps team to evaluate, refine, and improve processes to be ready for the future fight. “In an environment where we are operating in contested waters, we are finding a way to be able to support the land force with deeper strike capabilities,” said Capt. AJ Kowaleuski, an artillery officer with I MEF. This ability provides flexibility while the Navy and Marine Corps are supporting each other in combined operations. This portion of Dawn Blitz validated the commander’s ability to integrate HIMARS with ships to conduct a sea-based strike. “What we demonstrated not only was its capability, but we further demonstrated capabilities from the blue-green team and Amphibious Force Three,” said Ropelewski. “They performed very well, and were able to come together and work hard to make the mission successful.” ***
While offered up in a slightly different context, this post from 9 years ago is relevant about getting creative in doing what our Navy is supposed to do or so it seems to me. I've edited it slightly:
Ain't no need for a Navy if it can't do the job. If you don't have the resources, send a couple of fleet lieutenants and some crusty old
chiefs on a mission to "kludge" the pirates. (insert "build a strong enough presence force") Don't send a "clean hands" Lieutenant - send that guy who hates the bureaucracy and his buddy.
The kind of LT who uses cans of coffee to smooth shipyard wheels- if you get my drift. (Here's another hint - if he offers to do a Power Point presentation- he's the wrong guy...) Send a supply guy along with a check book and a willingness to stretch a few rules. Don't ask too many questions, just tell them to "stop the d*mn pirates!" (insert "payloads, not plaforms") They''ll find a way. If they ask, tell the Washington crowd that operational conditions mandate "thinking outside the box." Or, perhaps, tell them you are :
Leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model.
To steal a phrase. Deterring lightly armed pirates in small boat (insert "bullies") is not that tough. But you have to quit thinking like a cruiser skipper and start thinking like a pirate. If I were a pirate (insert "bully") I would hate to see lots of armed fast support vessels escorting ships (insert "hanging around/training local forces"). Of course, I reckon duty on "pirate patrol" in the escort (insert "the micro") fleet I envision probably won't punch the important SWO tickets. It would just get the job done, unlike tying up a half dozen expensive gray hulls watching a captured ship from a safe distance. And it would help the Navy do its mission of keeping those sea lanes open. You know that mission from the new Maritime Strategy that Charlie Dragonette quoted:
"The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy."
So, how to get a whole lotta fire power in to a single ship? About 20 years ago there were proposals for the minimally crewed, missile laden Arsenal Ship, designed to deliver a flexible package of ordnance downrange for support of, say, amphibious operations or something:
The Arsenal Ship was developed initially as a demonstration program to provide a large increase in the amount of ordnance available to ground- and sea-based forces in a conflict, particularly during the early days. The Navy envisioned that the ship would have a large capacity of different missiles, including Tomahawk and Standard, and space for future extended range gun systems. The ship could also have a sea-based version of the Army Tactical Missile System. This ship could greatly increase capabilities in littoral operations to conduct long-range strike missions, provide fire support for ground forces, defend against theater ballistic missiles, and maintain air superiority. The Arsenal Ship has the potential to provide substantial fire support to a variety of missions in regional conflicts without the logistics burden of transporting both delivery systems and ammunition to the shore and forward areas. The Arsenal Ship is expected to carry a large number of VLS cells but without the sophisticated command and control and radar equipment found on Aegis-equipped ships.
The number of VLS cells being bandied about was 500 per ship, with 4 or 5 ships contemplated.
The SSGN Program Office refueled and converted four SSBNs into SSGNs in a little more than five years at a significantly lower cost and less time than building a new platform. USS Ohio (SSGN 726) entered the shipyard on Nov. 15, 2002, completed conversion in December 2005 and deployed for the first time in October 2007. USS Florida (SSGN 728) commenced its refueling and conversion in August 2003 and returned to the fleet in April 2006. USS Michigan (SSGN 727) started its shipyard availability in October 2004 and delivered in November 2006. USS Georgia (SSGN 729) completed conversion in December 2007.
***
Combined, the four SSGNs represent more than half of the Submarine Force's vertical launch payload capacity with each SSGN capable of carrying up to 154 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles. The missiles are loaded in seven-shot Multiple-All-Up-Round Canisters (MACs) in up to 22 missile tubes. These missile tubes can also accommodate additional stowage canisters for SOF equipment, food, and other consumables to extend the submarines' ability to remain forward deployed in support of combatant commanders' tasking. The missile tubes are also able to accommodate future payloads such as new types of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned undersea vehicles.
Well, heck, there has been discussion of using the LPD 17 hull to develop a "Ballistic Missile Defense Ship" with up to 288 VLS cells:
Atop the superstructure is a massive S-band phased array radar, over 21 feet on each side. Compare that to the 12.5 ft. diameter of the SPY-1 radars aboard Ticonderoga Class Cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers. For radars, larger size means greater range and better resolution and these arrays have three times the area of those which equip current BMD vessels.
Starting behind the superstructure and continuing along the periphery to the stern is a vertical launch system (VLS) with 288 cells to carry surface to air missiles (SAMs), Tomahawk cruise missiles or Vertical-launch Anti-submarine rockets (VLAs). For comparison, Ticos have 122; later Burkes 96 and earlier Burkes 90. So, that’s triple the average missile load to start, with plenty of room to install more. Plus, the ship is taller than the surface combatants, which means it can hold future missiles of greater length and range.
Before describing the specifics of an arsenal ship, it is important to describe what it is not—or rather, what it should not be. It is not a multipurpose ship; therefore, it is not a replacement for any other ship, especially not aircraft carriers. It is not a destroyer or cruiser capable of conducting missions in multiple domains (that is, antiair, antisurface, antisubmarine, and anti–ballistic-missile warfare). Its weapons are for strike from the sea, not for war at sea . It is not a ship for all reasons. It is a gap filler that will give us the anti-anti-access capability that we need but do not have in the necessary quantity. A modern arsenal ship should not be designed to make port visits, provide humanitarian assistance, provide C2, host any sort of staff, or do anything else other than fulfill the third capability required to defeat anti-access strategies: provide maximum volume of precise fire onto enemy targets. The C2 of its ordnance should come from other warships. Its long-range and mid-range defenses would be provided by the rest of the Fleet or other joint assets. It should not be expected to operate independently, although a low maximum speed and unique sea-keeping characteristics might require independent transits and tactical rendezvous with deception techniques minimizing the risks. Perhaps we should call it a self-propelled arsenal barge.
SNAFU has this image of a towed missile barge, the source of which is hard to track, but the caption on the picture indicates this is Russian design using a Sovremennyy-class destroyer as a towing ship
There is this U.S. Navy image of what appears to be a JHSV pulling what appears to be a high speed missile barge:
:
Even Lego modelers seem to be on the arsenal ship band wagon with a fantasy build:
If you've got any info on the Russian design or the JSHV barge, please let me know.
Andrew F. Krepinevich, director of the U.S. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), alluded to this trend 10 years ago. “Just as bombers are becoming relatively less important than the ordnance they carry,” he said, “so too might surface warships, which could evolve to become “barges” (with some perhaps operating below the surface) for advanced conventional munitions that can strike pre-designated targets at extended ranges.” This concept makes the case that barges would be ideal as strike platforms of the future. The reference to the barges “operating below the surface” is the first precursor toward the idea of larger systems operating underwater. *** One of Krepinevich’s associates at CSBA put it this way: “This type of basic anti-navy architecture could be made more effective by incorporating increasingly sophisticated mines, active and passive sea-based sensor networks and quiet-attack submarines. Such architectures would have far lower barriers to entry (cost and learning) than carrier battle group operations, potentially enabling those competitors to leapfrog the carrier era and become major maritime competitors, at least in littoral waters. Absent a revolutionary breakthrough in ASW[anti-submarine warfare], naval power-projection operations could be driven sub surface.” *** This reference brings the point home in stark fashion: Technologies meant to find and destroy objects will become inexpensive and plentiful. The world’s strongest navy should not build anything but ships that employ the best covering tactics available. The CSBA suggested that the capital ship of the fleet in 2020 might be an arsenal ship — a missile-firing submersible armed with cruise and conventional ballistic missiles — and that such ships might be armed with a few hundred to a thousand missiles. A distributed power projection navy might include several classes of arsenal ships and other submersible power projection forces in the fleet.
Of course, here's the 12 year old kicker:
The Navy must become bold in decision-making before it is relegated to playing catch-up in a world fast becoming shaped by quick-striking revolutions in military affairs.
For some time I have been an advocate* for "basic" aircraft for close air support of our forces in the field - and now there's an interesting piece discussing that topic in the latest U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings by Captain Andy Walton, USN, "Bronco 12 Cleared Hot"
Fighting a low-end war with high-end supersonic aircraft has put a heavy burden on the Department of Defense’s fourth-generation fighter and attack fleet. Sustainment of aging fourth-generation and acquisition of fifth-generation aircraft have left the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps with little interest in adding low-end light-attack airframes to their inventories and quieted the debate over light attack for U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF). From as early as 2002, advocates of “low-cost irregular warfare aircraft” such as the AT-6, A-29, AT-802, OV-10, Scorpion, and others argued the overall cost savings in fuel, maintenance, and manpower were worth exploring. They proposed that even small numbers of these forward-deployed expeditionary aircraft could ease the flight-hour and service-life strain on fourth-generation aircraft performing low-threat armed reconnaissance (AR), air interdiction (AI), and close-air-support (CAS) missions, the airborne tankers supporting them, as well as the number of fuel convoys traveling to air bases in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Iraq. The recent OV-10 deployment, named Combat Dragon II (CD II), provides a template for how adaptable, flexible, innovative, forward-thinking people can produce ideas easily applied to the combatant commander’s capability shortfalls. If adopted, it would ease service topline budget pressure and position the DOD to be prepared for the range of missions it may face in the future. The CD II deployment also demonstrated how gaps in our current strategy can be filled with repurposed or off-the-shelf hardware.
It's in the "open to the public" part of the on-line magazine, so please read it.
Ok. So over at CIMSEC they are have fun with Distributed Lethality Week, a topic which by some other names I have been plugging since Pluto was a pup or perhaps since back when Pluto was a planet.
And this resurrection of the 2008 piece with a reference to the CIMSEC post :
. .. in which I suggested that if "payloads" are the key to the future then the "platform" end of some naval force could allow for a different approach to getting drones of various types out to sea and, even more importantly, out to where the action might be. There is a nice follow on Non-Traditional Drone Motherships by NavalDrones.
And, of course a lengthy repeat of the 2008 post (I must have really liked that post).
The underlying goal, of course, was to suggest a way of getting lots more platforms out there - with lots more weapons and capabilities. Cheaper, faster, and, if not better, certainly "good enough." As I wrote somewhere,
If the answer to the Navy’s future is robotics, then Admiral Greenert’s July 2012 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings piece, “Payloads Over Platforms, Charting a New Course” opens up a whole new world of possibilities for using existing small ship platforms as “trucks” to deliver large numbers of modern weapons platforms to areas of interest.
And don't worry that they are expendable. It's a feature, not a flaw.
Lately I've been sent links to a UK site (ThinkDefence with that obstinate Brit spelling of defense) covering the concept of using merchant hulls and turning them into warships of a sort as in A Ship that Still Isn’t a Frigate:
If one wants a Frigate (light or global) ask those nice chaps at BAE to design and build one for you. So, why bother, the simple point, the whole raison d’être for this, is one of cost, trying to squeeze the maximum utility from the smallest pot of cash. A class of ships that fulfils a plethora of roles that are less than high-intensity combat, and might use some notional future budget for an Argus and Diligence replacement, and perhaps with a nod to future mine countermeasures and survey budgets. These ships would be either a conversion of a second-hand civilian vessel, or largely based on a civilian design with minimal modifications during build.
Yeah, exactly.
I think it's a great idea and have been saying so for what - 7 years- that's what.
The ThinkDefence author says, "don’t take it too seriously" but I think we should take this concept very seriously indeed.
We need hulls on the water carrying weapons to distribute all that lethality stuff.
And we really don't need to spend a fortune - we just need to be smart enough to not always think in great big gray hulls.
A naval trawler is a vessel built along the lines of a fishing trawler but fitted out for naval purposes. Naval trawlers were widely used during the First and Second World Wars. Fishing trawlers were particularly suited for many naval requirements because they were robust boats designed to work heavy trawls in all types of weather and had large clear working decks. One could create a mine sweeper simply by replacing the trawl with a mine sweep. Adding depth charge racks on the deck, ASDIC below, and a 3-inch (76 mm) or 4-inch (102 mm) gun in the bow equipped the trawler for anti-submarine duties.
ASW drones, UAVs, USVs - the trawler model works today, too.
Really, the FF/LCS is not the first Navy ship design that proved to be - uh - less than optimal.
It probably won't be the last.
Let's suppose we ask the question that underlies the size of our fleet: What do we plan to do with it?
If the answer is long-range standoff missions, then it would seem aircraft carriers and their assigned air wings are one part of the answer.
If the answer is killing submarines that might threaten our country or those aircraft carriers, it should be clear that ASW attack submarines are a large part of the answer, along with long-range maritime patrol aircraft and real honest to goodness ASW destroyers.
If the answer is support of forces ashore, then perhaps the new Zumwalt-class destroyers are part of the answer.
USS Pegasus (PHM-1)
If the answer is local sea control in contested waters in narrow straits, inshore, then the answer probably is a force deigned to go into harm's way in those waters. As set out in this 2001 Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe describing a 2000 war game:
The U.S. is at war with China, and U.S. Navy commanders are using a new breed of ship called Streetfighter to sail perilously close to the Chinese coast. There, the small, fast, inexpensive warships -- designed to go into harm's way and, if necessary, be lost -- hunt down Chinese subs and missile launchers hidden among fishing boats and cargo ships. Some Streetfighters are sunk by enemy fire, and casualties are high, but they help the U.S. win earlier than the military pros had projected. *** The Streetfighters existed only on paper. But their performance in that mock battle was enough to convince the war college's director, Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, that a fleet of Streetfighters could give any foe fits -- provided the Navy is willing to endure casualties. "Streetfighter is alive, well and an inevitability," he crowed.
Even then, there were "cautious voices, like a now former CJCS,
Some top Navy commanders have grave doubts. "I look at the Streetfighter concept and worry that we are saying, 'It's OK to lose ships,' " says Vice Adm. Michael Mullen, commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, Va. Others question whether sailors in an all-volunteer force would sign up to serve on the ships, or whether Congress would approve the money to build them.
Yeah, well, the FF/LCS is a lot of things, but it does not appear to be so robust that if confronted by a threat it wouldn't be "expendable." More from Cebrowski:
The 58-year-old admiral immediately homed in on one of the most vexing weaknesses in the current fleet. In the past 10 years, the proliferation of cruise missiles and cheap diesel subs has made it easier for enemies to strike U.S. vessels. A recent General Accounting Office report concluded that the Navy's ability to deal with the threat posed by cruise missiles and diesel subs in coastal regions was "marginal" and that nothing the Navy is currently buying will "provide adequate protection against improved versions of these weapons." To protect its precious ships and crews, the military leadership is pushing them farther and farther out to sea, where they are safer but not nearly as effective. "We've become risk-averse," Adm. Cebrowski says.
Re-read Adm Mullen's comment again to see what Adm. Cebrowski was speaking about.
The idea of building a new class of small ships had been kicking around at the Naval War College and the Naval Post Graduate School, where retired Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, one of Adm. Cebrowski's former commanding officers, had been playing with some concepts. Adm. Cebrowski had been thinking about the need for a new class of small ship as well. So he and Capt. Hughes put the concept on paper. Because Streetfighters would be cheap -- one design would cost only about $70 million a ship, compared with as much as $1 billion for a new destroyer -- the Navy would be able to buy hundreds for the price of one 10-ship carrier battle group. The ships would operate along crowded coastal waters, hiding in coves and springing out to destroy enemy subs, hunt down mines and disrupt enemy missiles that could more easily target larger, slower ships. After a few days or weeks of heavy fighting, the bigger ships would move in and take over the fight. Some Streetfighters would be lost, and some sailors would die. "Streetfighters must be designed to lose," Capt. Hughes wrote at the time. "If the ships become too costly or too heavily manned, commanders will be unwilling to put them at risk."
I am not sure in this age of near real time satellite imaging that "hiding in coves" might still work, but there is that "quantity has a quality all of its own" thing.
The “New Navy Fighting Machine” promotes a wider mix of ships, in a more numerous fleet, with better-focused capabilities, to meet a range of scenarios in green and blue water environments. The new fighting machine does this within an affordable SCN (Ship Construction Navy) budget ceiling, because the U.S. defense budget already dominates defense spending in the rest of the world. The fleet’s new component is a green water force of small vessels to fulfill the three sea service chiefs’ maritime strategy of collaboration and support of theater security operations now manifested in Navy global fleet stations. The green water force also includes coastal combat forces, and additional reconnaissance for the land and sea side of a littoral. These capabilities are achieved with 10% of the SCN budget.
How many "green water ships? Hughes suggests 240 (+400 inshore patrol craft). Hughes rightly compares the need for a new command to drive developing this green water component of naval power to that that developed Naval Aviation in its infancy. Hughes:
We also show, in rough outline, that the new fighting machine is better suited than the present projection-heavy 313-ship1 Navy to support regional conflicts and, if it should become necessary, to constrain Russian ambitions. Submarines in greater numbers are central to the maritime strategy, but within a constrained budget the larger force cannot be exclusively nuclear powered. We find that diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion not only allow twice as many submarines, but they also nicely complement the SSNs in the critical scenario. Because the United States has not conducted an opposed amphibious landing in nearly 60 years, the new fighting machine emphasizes amphibious lift rather than amphibious assault. We stress the unparalleled success of national sealift in timely delivery of ground forces where needed, when needed, and for as long as needed. It is a national treasure that has received too little attention. We assiduously maintain this strong sealift component in the new fighting machine. The study does not eliminate high-end warships, the individual capabilities of which are unmatched by any other nation in the world. To do so would end America’s maritime superiority. On the other hand, a Navy of only large, multibillion dollar warships will result in a smaller and smaller force that cannot fulfill its roles around the world. Some of those roles, maritime interdiction operations and coastal patrol for example, can be handled by smaller ships in greater numbers.
That 313 number above has now shrunk to 272.
Some are going to debate the building of new frigates or corvettes to boost ship numbers. I suggest instead building the "green water" force using technology that already exists. Further, I suggest building up a corps young officers to drive these new toys hard with some LCDR and CDR supervision.
If you don't think there are some young people who like this idea, see this from 2012 New Navy Fighting Machine in the South China Sea by a couple of then Lieutenants, Dylan Ross and Jimmy Harmon:
This thesis advocates fleet growth as articulated in Hughes' New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) study. Comparisons of the NNFM, the U.S. fleet, and the PRC fleet demonstrate both the disparity facing the American surface forces, and the near parity obtained in the NNFM. CT through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and naval obscurants provide American surface forces increased staying power and tactical advantage. Scouting and communications networking through a theater wide constellation of airships provide the American fleet with persistentsituationalawareness of the battle space, tactical communications with subsurface forces, and improved emissions control (EMCON) measures for surface forces. The distributive properties of the NNFM, combined with this study's CT [counter-targeting] and scouting findings, offer American surface combatants success over the PRC Navy in the SCS scenario.
ANd who wouldn't like to drive one of these:
or be the a squadron CO of 8 or 10 of these:
We could do worse than building a few of these.
In fact, we have done worse. Too bad the PHMs like Pegasus were killed. We could have had 38 years of experience with small fast, heavily armed war ships by now. "Coulda, shoulda."
Development of revolutionary engines at GE Aviation is setting the stage for the next 50 years in military aircraft propulsion, engineers there believe. *** The engine can adapt in flight to give maximum thrust or long-range cruise, while a third stream of air will cool both the engine and the aircraft’s systems, explains Jean Lydon-Rodgers, vice president and general manager of GE Aviation’s military systems. *** “The sixth-generation fighter engine is a big piece of the future of the business. That’s why we’re investing heavily in it,” says Lydon-Rodgers. That investment also involves materials including ceramic matrix composites and titanium aluminides, and techniques such as additive manufacturing, to make the engines lighter and more robust while running hotter and providing more power. The military engines are benefitting from GE’s huge investment in such materials and manufacturing readiness for its next generation of commercial engines, which helps keep the costs down for the warfighter, she says.
Innovation! More range for fighters? Will this allow aircraft carriers greater stand-off range and improve our maritime security? Sure sounds like it.
What makes it possible for us to move billions of tons of raw materials and manufactured goods from continent to continent? Why are we able to fly almost anywhere on the planet within twenty-four hours? In Prime Movers of Globalization, Vaclav Smil offers a history of two key technical developments that have driven globalization: the high-compression non-sparking internal combustion engines invented by Rudolf Diesel in the 1890s and the gas turbines designed by Frank Whittle and Hans-Joachim Pabst von Ohain in the 1930s. The massive diesel engines that power cargo ships and the gas turbines that propel jet engines, Smil argues, are more important to the global economy than any corporate structure or international trade agreement.
The USS Antietam (CV/CVA/CVS-36) was one of 24 Essex-class aircraft carriers built during World War II, and the first carrier to be fitted with an angled deck. This innovative feature, made possible by the addition of a port sponson, effectively allowed aircraft to take off while others were simultaneously landing. This film was made to acquaint naval aviators and deck crew with this new feature. Also shown in the film is USS Coral Sea (CV/CVB/CVA-43), a Midway-class aircraft carrier which was converted in 1957.
The "angled deck" was not a U.S. innovation, but was developed by the Royal Navy. Excellent background in this U.S. Naval War College pdf The Development of the Angled-Deck Aircraft Carrier. Nice discussion of innovation.
About 9 years ago, I had a post about Wing in Ground aircraft, Going WiGgy which was a look at the fearsome Soviet Wing in Ground planes of the old days.
WingShip photo
Now it appears a South Korean company WingShip Technology Corp. is looking to revive the concept in a big way. According to The Economist, things are moving right along despite the sad history of previous failures in WiG:
But hope springs eternal, and the Wing Ship Technology Corporation, a South Korean company, is trying to revive the idea. The country’s armed forces have already agreed to buy some and the firm says it hopes to announce its first commercial sales (to an oil-and-gas firm and a Mediterranean ferry company) shortly.
Corporate video:
WingShip suggests a number of uses for their design here, including military:
Similar to development and operation of previous WIG crafts for military purpose by Soviet Union, WSH series is considerably attractive in military market. She could be used for special purpose because it’s hard to detect her during operation.
On the purpose of innovation: "I never, ever want to see a Sailor, Marine or Coast Guardsman in a fair fight ever . . ." Rear Admiral Matthew L. Klunder, Chief of Naval Research
From the recent Navy League Sea Air and Space Exposition, an interesting panel discussing "Innovation and Supporting the Warfighter" -
'The World Bank estimates that, as a result, 780 million women and children inhale smoke which is equivalent to smoking 2 packets of cigarettes every day,' the page says. 'Sixty per cent of adult, female lung-cancer victims in developing nations are non-smokers. 'The fumes also cause eye infections and cataracts, but burning kerosene is also more immediately dangerous: 2.5 million people a year, in India alone, suffer severe burns from overturned kerosene lamps. 'Burning Kerosene also comes with a financial burden: kerosene for lighting ALONE can consume 10 to 20% of a household's income. 'This burden traps people in a permanent state of subsistence living, buying cupfuls of fuel for their daily needs, as and when they can.'
The inventors and "improvers" of the LED need to be thanked,too.
Speaking of which, Cree has introduced a new "homeowner" friendly set of "bulbs" to replace the current incandescent bulbsand the mercury load CFL thingies,as announced here:
The innovative bulb is illuminated by Cree LED Filament Tower™ Technology and provides a compact optically balanced light source within a real glass bulb to deliver consumers the warm light they love and want. Boasting a shape that looks like a traditional light bulb, Cree LED bulbs can be placed in most lighting fixtures in the home. The new Cree LED bulb is designed to last 25,000 hours or 25 times longer than typical incandescent light bulbs – reducing the need to replace bulbs for years to come. With a retail price of $9.97 for the warm white 40-watt replacement, $12.97 for the 60-watt warm white replacement and $13.97 for the 60-watt day light, the Cree LED bulbs save 84 percent of the energy compared to traditional incandescents. Cree LED bulbs can pay for themselves quickly and then pay consumers year after year. By replacing the incandescent bulbs with Cree LED bulbs in a home’s five most frequently used light fixtures, consumers can save $61 per year on electric bills.* Cree LED bulbs are the ideal replacement for energy-wasting 60-watt and 40-watt incandescents and compromise-laden CFL lighting. The new LED bulbs turn on instantly and are free of the mercury that is found in CFL bulbs. Unlike many low-priced LED bulbs, Cree LED bulbs are easily dimmable with most standard incandescent dimmers. The Cree LED light bulb (60-watt incandescent replacement) delivers 800 lumens and consumes only 9.5 watts and is available in warm white (2700K) and day light (5000K) color temperatures. The Cree LED light bulb (40-watt incandescent replacement) delivers 450 lumens and consumes only 6 watts and is available in 2700K color temperature.
