Saturday Is Heinlein Quote Day #51

From The Number of the Beast

I’m not sure what purpose Russian fiction has, but it can’t be entertainment.

By the way, this particular Heinlein book is not very good either.

Friday Fun Film: The Navy Nurse (1952)

A look back at the Navy Nurse Corps from 63 years ago:





From the current Navy Nurse recruiting pages:

Navy Nurses may serve at any one of more than 250 Navy and medical facilities around the globe, from Hawaii to Japan, Germany to Guam, and Washington, D.C., to Washington state.

As a Navy Nurse, you could work at one of the highly acclaimed National Naval Medical Centers in Bethesda, Md.; Portsmouth, Va.; and San Diego, Calif. Or you could provide medical support to deployed troops aboard one of two dedicated hospital ships: the USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy.

Still more opportunities are available stateside and abroad – onboard a surface ship, working closely with a nearby aircraft squadron, or even with the Fleet Marine Force.

Yemen: An Excellent Backgrounder from PBS Frontline

Preview of some excellent reporting by Frontline reporter Safa Al Ahmad

Complete video The Fight for Yemen.

Also this (blurb from Frontline):

The Soufan Group's Ali Soufan, who served in Yemen as an FBI special agent, puts the conflict in Yemen into regional context. The vacuum of power in countries like Yemen, Soufan says, has allowed extremist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS to gain influence in several countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia.

Disaster Prep Wednesday: Disaster Prep Big Time

Most of the time this disaster prep series has been devoted to individual family preparations and those really are key to surviving a disaster. But here's a press conference transcript from 7 April 15 in which Admiral Bill Gortney had some interesting comments.

Admiral Gortney's charge covers Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. NORTHCOM's mission:

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's homeland — protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.

NORAD's mission:

The North American Aerospace Defense Command conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

NORAD is a joint U.S. and Canadian organization.

As you might guess, Admiral Gortney has a lot on his plate. The full extent of how much ground he covers can be gathered from the following transcript.

The transcript can be found here. I've added some highlights in areas I thought were especially interesting:

Department of Defense Press Briefing by Admiral Gortney in the Pentagon Briefing Room
Presenters: Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, Adm. Bill Gortney
April 07, 2015

ADMIRAL BILL GORTNEY: Well, thanks for giving me the opportunity to come talk with you all. I've been in command now about four months, going on four months at NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense) and Northern Command. You know, NORAD's the only bi-national command in the world's existence, 58 years young, between Canada and the United States.

But there's a lot of misconceptions I think. People don't really understand what NORAD and Northern Command do. And so to get my head around it, I break the activity down into what we call lines of operation. And the dominant line of operation is defending the homelands. It's a darn good mission set. But it encompasses the traditional NORAD role of the air defense, as well as the maritime warning. We round that out under a Northern Command hat, the maritime defend and control piece of that.

But it also encompasses Operation Noble Eagle, which has been ongoing since 9/11 to prevent another 9/11 attack. It also encompasses the ballistic missile defense from rogue nations shooting at the homeland. And also, we roll in there our counter-transnational criminal networks piece of that -- someone that might be exploiting the seams that are out there to smuggle something nefarious into the country. And that is the dominant line of operation.

The other one is the defense support for civil authorities. And many people think that DSCA (Defense Support of Civil Authorities) involves Hurricane Katrina or Super Storm Sandy or an earthquake or a flood, but it encompasses much more than that. It's helping our interagency partners, predominantly Homeland Security, doing their particular missions, and the law enforcement -- our law enforcement partners as well.

Which brings me to the third line of operation, which we call our homeland partnerships. It's our center of gravity. Northern Command, much like Southern Command, has a very large interagency and law enforcement presence, very senior government employees from the GS-14 up to the SES level. We have about 60 of them in the headquarters. And it's through them -- with them that we -- it crosses all of our mission sets.

It also encompasses those homeland partnerships, working with the governors, with the DSCA role, as well as the guard, both the Army Guard and the Air National Guard, and our fellow COCOMs, both are functional and our geographic COCOMs, all working together to close those seams that enemies will try and exploit to get after us.

The next one is our international partnerships -- of course, Canada. I'm assigned under the UCP (Unified Command Plan) to work with Canada, which is real easy since it's NORAD. But the other one is -- other two are Bahamas and Mexico. We spend a great deal of time working with Mexico and I look forward to some of your questions on that one, but great partners, as they look north and consider themselves North Americans, as we work on shared problems.

The next one after that is the Arctic; assigned a responsibility as the advocate of the Arctic, which is kind of hard doctrinally. We don't have a term. We don't really understand what "advocate" means. It has no -- I can't mandate anybody to purchase or train to capability, but we are the advocate for DOD for all of the agencies in the services, and we're studying that real hard. And we'll be reporting that out this spring.

And the last two lines of operation underpin all of our lines of operation. The next one is professionalism and excellence. You know, being professional and striving for excellence, it's a full-time job, not just a part-time job. It's not something you choose to do. It's the way you act. It's the way you work.

And the last one is warfighters and our families. You know, we rely on those that wear the cloth of our nation, that defend our nation. It's both an away game and a near game, and we -- and it's our families that are the very stitches that hold the cloth of that nation together.

And with that, I'd forward to your questions.

Q: Sir, within the past hour, there's been power outages in Washington that have affected, among others, the White House and State Department.

Do you have any indication that those power outages are in any way the result of a deliberate act?

ADM. GORTNEY: I just -- I was just notified that just before coming up here from my office. I know that Homeland Security is getting ready to make a statement.

And I think at this point, it's too early to speculate. Knowing what we know is that it happened, and all the backup power systems kicked in, and that's all that I know at this point.

Q: Can I follow up on that?

Even though you may not know a direct cause at the moment, what concerns does something like this raise for you that the power can go out from the White House to the State Department to key facilities in the nation's capital in terms of your responsibility keeping the country safe? I mean, how secure can Washington be if the power can just go out?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, Barbara, I think, you know, what it really goes to is we have a lot of vulnerabilities out there. And if I look at vulnerabilities for me to be able to execute mission is the NORAD and NORTHCOM.

It is our reliance on critical infrastructure that our nations need in order to operate, be it banking, be it power, be it rail, be it the FAA, and if someone, either through a nefarious act or just through a act of nature – they impact on us.

And so I think all of our -- those critical infrastructures are -- are fragile. And when I say fragile, it's just because we really don't know the true vulnerabilities. We try and mitigate them as best we can. But it causes me great concern.

In the cyber realm, my assigned tasks are to defend my own networks at NORAD and Northern Command and to assist the lead federal agency, most likely Homeland Security, in the aftermath in a DSCA-type event.

But to be honest, it -- it could be cyber against these critical infrastructures. Could be a mission kill for NORAD and NORTHCOM. It would make the mission, in effect --

Q: If I can follow up.

Again, understanding you don't know the details yet -- and then I have a question about Iran -- does this power outage today in Washington, even not knowing the reason at this point -- does an event like this -- what concerns does it cause you in terms of keeping the nation's capital safe and the government up and running?

ADM. GORTNEY: Are the backup systems that we put in place, do they work? And at the -- at the moment, what I've been told is that they all kicked in and they're all working. Everybody was back up on backup power, which is why we do it. We build redundancy into our -- into this critical infrastructure.

So as we look forward is to see how well those -- those backup systems did work. Did they perform as advertised? Do we need to strengthen them in some areas? That's what I'll be looking for.

Q: Just how vulnerable do you consider the nation's electric grids?s

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, the -- I'm by no -- no way an expert in -- in the electric system. But I would say all of the critical infrastructure that we have out there that we are reliant upon.

I'll give you an example. If -- if the power grid up in Ottawa fails, then we -- that could take the northeast quadrant of the United States out.

Our interdependencies, not only within our own country but the close linkages between us and Canada, those are all -- and it's not just limited to power. It's also limited to everything else that we rely on for our governments to run and our countries to run.

Q: You mentioned interagency cooperation in your opening statements. Did you -- I know it's early on, but have you found that was the case today? Was there -- did everything work on that level?

ADM. GORTNEY: As I was notified just before I came out here, everything worked. All the backup systems worked for all of the locations that have lost power.

Q: (off mic) backup systems?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, you have backup generators that are in place. So if the power goes down, the backup generators kick in automatically.

(Crosstalk -- off mic)

ADM. GORTNEY: Yes, ma'am. And it did. My understanding is that they all functioned.

Q: Admiral, I want to ask you about something that's come up on your previous -- (inaudible) -- for congressional testimony, which is the flights by Russian long-range bombers into the periphery of the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

I think you've said on the Hill that you believe the Russians are messaging NORTHCOM and the United States.

Can you just kind of give us an overall sense about how much more frequent they are, what the messages could be and how your airmen and sailors and other troops respond when they take place?

ADM. GORTNEY: Sure.

Well, you know, the Russians have developed a far more capable military than the quantitative, very large military that the Soviet Union had.

Also, they published a new doctrine. You're seeing that bear out. You seeing them employ that capability and that doctrine in the Ukraine.

At the same time, they are messaging us. They're a global. They're messaging us that they're a global power -- we do the same sort of thing -- with their long-range aviation as events.

So when there was the airline shootdown in the Ukraine, they were doing some long-range aviation flights up around Canada, Alaska and even down the English Channel.

So, you know, the question I have is, what is their -- what is their intent with that?

The numbers have gone up, but I don't like to give percentages, because one to five is 500 percent, and that may overstate it. But the numbers have gone up, and where they're flying are different.

And so we watch very carefully what they're doing. They are adhering to international standards that -- that are required by all airplanes that are out there. And everybody is flying in a professional manner on their side and our side as we watch very closely.

But really, my question is, what is their intent long-term-wise.

Q: Perhaps one of the longest-running debates in Washington is the effectiveness of national missile defense and what the taxpayers have gotten for the billions of dollars that have put into it.

Some critics still say that it doesn't really work, it will never work.

How would you describe the capability of national missile defenses if a nation like North Korea or Iran were, in the future, to launch a missile against the United States? Could we shoot it down?

ADM. GORTNEY: Yes. As the -- as the person that owns the trigger -- I don't maintain it. The services maintain it. It's designed by Admiral Jim Syring and the Missile Defense Agency, but I own the trigger on this, and I have high confidence that it will work against North Korea.

The -- you know, it was designed to defend against nations that might not be deterred other ways, and that would clearly be North Korea in that regard. We're very concerned about the mobile nature of the KN-08, that we have the -- that we'd would lose our ability to get the indication that something might occur, and then, of course, the particular nature of the -- of the regime that's there.

But I have high confidence in its ability. It didn't -- it's well-documented, the fits and starts that's it's had getting to where it is.

And Admiral Syring, his priorities are absolutely correct, which are to -- first off, we need to improve our sensors, our discrimination sensors so that we have high confidence and be able to detect the objects that are in space.

The next piece is that we need to improve the lethality of the kill vehicles, and then the next one is to take care and upgrade and maintain that which we have to be as best as we possibly can.

And those have to be done concurrently. They're not sequentially -- they all have to be put in place.

And the next step that he needs to go after is, you know, when it comes to ballistic missile defense, we are on the wrong side of the cost curve. We're shooting down not very expensive rockets with very expensive rockets, and we need to look at the entire kill chain of the -- of these ballistic missiles and try and through kinetic or non-kinetic means, and through deterrence, keep them on the rail.

We need to be able to start knocking them down in the boost phase and then -- just after that, and not just rely on the mid-course phase where we are today. Very, very expensive. And so, Admiral Syring has put in the necessary investments where in those -- in some technologies that we think will bear out to make -- to get us to where we need to go.

And those technologies are not just for the ballistic missile defense against the homeland, but it's also the theater ballistic missile defense that we need to do as well. Very, very expensive proposition and -- and I think with the -- with those right investments and those technologies paying off we can get on the correct side of the cost curve.

Q:: If sometime in the future Iran, for instance, were to develop the capability of threatening the United States with a long-range missile, are you confident at that point, where it was, a couple years from now, whatever, the U.S. would have an effective defensive --

ADM. GORTNEY: Yeah, based on our assessment we can -- we are out-pacing the threat, and that's why it's the importance that the, you know, the effects of sequestration will be pretty hard on Missile Defense Agency.

You know, when it comes to sequestration, the services -- it delays new capability any other place and it really impacts the services as it comes out of readiness. It's the only place that you can generate the -- generate the money.

Well, Missile Defense Agency doesn't have a readiness account large enough to cover the sequestration cuts. And so, it will delay those technologies, those key technologies in the improvements of a long range discrimination radar and the advance kill vehicle. It will delay those, and it's going to prevent us from out-pacing the threat.

So, our concern is maintaining the investments to out-pace the threat.

Q: KN-08, I want to go back to that a second. Back in -- in a couple weeks ago you said in your testimony that once it is fielded it's going to complicate out ability to provide warning and defend against an attack.

How is the -- this road mobile nature different than a fixed type No-dong attack -- launch?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, it's a re-locatable target and, you know, as someone thumped targets for most of my life growing up, it's the re-locatable target sect that -- that -- that really impedes our ability to find, fix, and finish the threat.

And so, as the targets move around and are -- if we don't have the persistence there and the persistent ISR, which we do not have over North Korea at this time, that re-locatable nature makes it very difficult for us to be able to counter it.

That said, should one get airborne and come at us, I'm confident that we'll be able to knock it down.

Q: Secretary Carter yesterday previewing his Asia trip, he mentioned, ballistic missile defense and moving assets over to the -- are -- are fielding or deploying two more Aegis missile defense vessels part of you way to mitigate the potential threat from this road mobile missile?

ADM. GORTNEY: Actually, we're setting up the second TPY-2 in Japan, which is actually -- reduces our alliance on Aegis a little bit. But, you know, the ballistic missile defense is a system of systems. It's all of the sensors, whether they're land-based or -- sea-based, it's the space-based architecture as well and then our -- our -- our kill vehicles that are at Vandenberg and up at Fort Greely in Alaska.

It's a system of systems that need to be maintained.

Q: (off mic) as far as you could tell?

ADM. GORTNEY: That I'm going to have to get back to you. We assess it that they can go -- we assess it that it's operational today. We assess that it's operational today.

And so, we practice to go against that.

Yes, ma'am.

Q: I have a question about POWs, because we know Defense Secretary Carter is in Japan. According to Japanese media, a new medical history museum is going to show the evidence of -- (inaudible) -- of U.S. POW during World War II about eight victims that were captured by Japanese soldiers when their B-29 bomber attacked during World War II. So, any comments on that?

ADM. GORTNEY: I'm not familiar with that story, ma'am. I'm sorry.

Q: So, but -- I mean, the Defense Secretary Carter is in Japan except they're talking about defense issues. Are they going to talk about any history issues?

ADM. GORTNEY: On any of those issues, I'm not briefed on what he's going to be -- be talking about.

Q: Yes, a couple months ago -- excuse me -- the commander of first Air Force said he urgently needs new radars on his F-15s for homeland defense. I was wondering if you could -- where do things stand with this, and why is -- are these AESA radars needed right now for the F-15s when the Air Force had put off those upgrades in their CAP program the past couple of years?

ADM. GORTNEY: Yeah, well, I actually submitted that urgent need today meant for AESA active electronically scanned array radars, first for the national capital region. We have -- we have some boxes, we have the airplanes, and we should be able to marry them up.

You know, it goes against the cruise missile threat that's out there. I've been defending against the cruise missiles since threats since I was a Lieutenant J.G. on the USS Nimitz and I've shot over 1,300 cruise missiles. So, I know how effective they are and I know how hard they are to shoot down.

And so, you need a system of systems in order to do that, and when it comes for the airborne piece of that, you need the capabilities that the AESA radar can give you to that. But it's only a single piece.

It's also the JLENS (Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System) that we're testing up in Aberdeen (Proving Grounds, MD), and it's also being able to nest that with our Aegis that are off the coast so that we can track, and share data, and -- and have our best opportunity to -- to shoot down any of the leakers that might be out there. But the best way to defeat the cruise missile threat is to -- is to shoot down the archer, or sink the archer, that's out there. And that's what we need to be able to do is to start, just like in the ballistic missile defense, start knocking down the archers at range, and then your only dealing with fewer missiles as they come at you.

Q: (off mic) authority here in the national capital region just need to put it together. Is there a time line on that?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well -- well, we have the -- we have the first set of the systems in the national capital region IADS. I hold great hope that the JLENS is going to bear out, it's having a little bit of difficulty right now early in its test phase, as we expect in all of our test phases, but it's not something I think that is insurmountable.

And then nesting that with our offshore capability as well as Aegis. It -- again, is a system of systems that you need to defeat that sort of a threat.

Q: Can I ask you about the Cheyenne Mountain complex? Several years back the NORAD and NORTHCOM moved a lot of its command into -- at the Peterson Air Force Base. However, in the last week, there was a $700 million contract let for activities at the mountain. Has there been any change in the status, and do you know what that $700 million's going towards?

ADM. GORTNEY: Yeah, we're -- there's -- because of the very nature of the way that Cheyenne Mountain's built, it's EMP (electro-magnetic pulse )-hardened. And wasn't really designed to be that way, but the way it was constructed makes it that way.

And so, there's a lot of movement to put capability into -- into Cheyenne Mountain and to be able to communicate in there, and that's what that contract's letted for in order to do that.

We have the space for it, we have the cube. My -- my primary concern was do -- are we going to have the space inside the mountain for everybody who wants to move in there, and I'm not at liberty to discuss who's moving in there, but we do have that capability to be there.

Q: (off mic)

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, it goes to the very nature of an EMP threat, I think, that -- that capability that we need to be electro-magnetic pulse be able to sustain those sorts of capabilities, our ability to communicate, things of that nature, and an EMP environment's important.

Q: Are operations still going to go on at Peterson?

ADM. GORTNEY: Oh, absolutely. We'll be in both places. We -- we -- we command where the staff is, and we move between both locations so that we can co-opt, should we need to, both NORAD and NORTHCOM. We're going to maintain both.

Q: Just a follow up on that question. How soon are you looking to move some of those capabilities into that complex or --

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, we're -- it happened long before I got there, the people are moving in there. And so it was, you know, decisions from my predecessor and I support those decisions. And we'll make sure that it all gets in there and it's all secure.

Q: Let's go back to missile defense for a moment. You know, I covered the Pentagon for a long time and then I went away, and then I came back. And when I left --

ADM. GORTNEY: We do that, too.

Q: -- back in 2008, the airborne laser and sea-based X-band radar were being touted as really significant technological advances. Then I come back to the Pentagon and I discover the airborne laser was killed and the X-band radar doesn't seem to be -- have worked out.

I mean, are we wasting a lot of money when we're trying to develop these missile defenses on technology that it turns out doesn't really work?

ADM. GORTNEY: You know, as I understand it, the deficiencies in some of the programs as the system was developed, as we were putting -- we were putting in capability before we had properly tested it. I'd hate to say it, it is what it is. That's not the way we're progressing today.

The necessary improvements and where we're going that Admiral Syring is doing at MDA that we test before we -- test before we, you know, fly before we -- test and fly, do it in the proper order, I think, is absolutely critical.

Now, some of the decisions we're living with that occurred three or four years ago, but that's not the way that Admiral Syring and MDA is moving forward today. Some of those capabilities, you know, airborne laser nowadays -- now as the technology has advanced holds great promise for us, provided we do it in a methodical and a thoughtful manner, and we don't try and put it out there before we know that it's going to work for certain. So we don't make those same mistakes again.

Yes?

Q: (inaudible) -- going back to North Korea, is it your assessment that they've developed the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and put it on a ballistic missiles like the KN-08?

ADM. GORTNEY: Yes. Our assessment is that they have the ability to put it on -- a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland. And that -- that's the way we -- that's the way we think. That's our assessment of the process. We haven't seen them test the KN-08 yet and we're waiting to do that. But it doesn't necessarily mean that they will fly before they test it.

Q: (inaudible). Could not in the future a commander in your position live with the idea of another country, say Iran, that would have the ability to put a nuclear device on top of a missile and threaten the United States?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, actually, our system is designed for North Korea, and if we get out assessment wrong, for Iran. It's able to defend the nation against both those particular threats today. And our investments are to make sure that they outpace the capability should they -- say, in the case of Iran, which we don't think they have the capability of today, but what if we got that intel wrong and they moved that delivery capability to the left, even if they moved it today, we could defend the nation with what we have today.

Q: Is it Admiral, the U.S. assessment that North Korea has succeeded in miniaturizing a warhead to put on the -- an ICBM?

ADM. GORTNEY: We -- we have the -- we assess that they have the ability to do that. Yes, sir.

Now, we have not seen them do that. We haven't seen them test that. But I don't think the American people want us to -- you know there are some things that they want us to make sure we edge on the side of conservatism to make sure we get right.

Q: Is that what it is -- an overabundance of caution as opposed to any evidence that they have the ability to do it?

ADM. GORTNEY: No, I think it's a prudent decision by my assessment of the threat, and the threat to the nation. I think it's a prudent decision.

Q: (inaudible) -- relatively new -- (inaudible)?

ADM. GORTNEY: I'm going to have to get back with you on that as to when that -- when the I.C. made the assessment -- the intel community made the assessment.

Q: When you came in, you came into an I.C. assessment that said that we believe that they -- North Korea has the capability to miniaturize a warhead and put it on the KN-08.

ADM. GORTNEY: That's correct. But when that decision, you know, how -- was that last year or two years ago, that I have to get.

In the back?

Q: The Chinese PLA is now developing a new capability of an SLBM (sub-launched ballistic missile). So to what extent are you concerned about the Chinese PLA capability?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, the -- they have put to sea their sea-launch ballistic missile submarines. I believe they have three in the water right now. And, you know, any time a nation has developed nuclear weapons and delivery platforms that can range the homeland, it's a concern of mine. So, you know, it's not a surprise that China has taken their fixed sites and then road mobile sites and now into a sea-launch ballistic missile. It's necessary, I -- it doesn't surprise me that they're doing it. That's -- we do the same thing. We've done that for years. So it doesn't surprise me that they're -- that they're doing that.

China does have a no-first-use policy, which gives me a little bit of a good news picture there.

Next question?

Q: (inaudible) -- follow that? How close do some of those boats, including attack boats, get to the United States?

ADM. GORTNEY: The -- you know, we watch them very carefully. And, you know, their very long-range capability is a function of how far do they reach. You know, so even from their own waters, they can reach part of our homeland. Hawaii is part of our homeland and they can reach Hawaii. And then the farther east -- farther east they go, they can reach more and more of our nation.

Q: (inaudible) -- into a range where they could strike the west coast of the United States?

ADM. GORTNEY: We haven't seen those patrols just yet, but it doesn't mean that those patrols can't exist in the future.

Q: (inaudible) -- kind of surface ships? Are they getting close to our shores?

ADM. GORTNEY: The -- boy, I'm stepping out of my lane here just a little bit. As I track our foreign warships, we have two Russian warships, but I'm not sure about the Chinese. They had a port visit -- was it last year in San Diego, I believe? But I'm out of my lane here a little bit on that.

Q: Can you talk about those Russian ships? Last question.

ADM. GORTNEY: What's that?

Q: Those two Russian ships you just mentioned?

ADM. GORTNEY: Oh, sure. They're AGI, you know, an intel platform, as well as a logistics ship. And I believe one of them is just coming out of Venezuela -- no. Yeah, I'm going to have to get that for you. But they -- they -- no port call in the United States, but in Cuba and places elsewhere.

Q: Sir in the past couple of months, U.S. officials expressed desire for some sort of new multipurpose sensor in the Canadian Arctic, not just for the ICBMs for maritime vessels, airplanes, that kind of thing. Haven't really gotten much details on that. Can you give us kind of what you're looking for there? And what timeline …

ADM. GORTNEY: Yeah, well the -- the -- the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line -- the air defense radars that we maintain on northern Canada and then the Canada-U.S. border are, you know, in a few years -- I'd say 10 years I think is the number -- you know, they're going to reach a point of obsolescence and we're going to have to reinvest for that capability.

The question is what sort of technology do we want to use to reconstitute that capability? We don't want to put in the same sorts of sensors because they're not effective against the low-altitude, say, cruise missiles. They can't see over the horizon.

So now the question is, what's the technology that's going to work up there? Is it an over-the-horizon radar system that would work, but it has challenges in the Arctic?

So that's -- those are the questions we're asking the community about.

Q: What is the timetable for when you think the answers are going to be?

ADM. GORTNEY: I don't think we have a timetable just yet. We're just now bringing it up through our policy leaders as well as with the Canadian government.

Yes, sir?

Q: Russia said they were going to begin long-range bomber patrols down to the Gulf of Mexico. Have you seen any indication that they are preparing to conduct patrols?

ADM. GORTNEY: Yeah, the one that we expect would be either Blackjack bombers or large jet bombers, not the Bears that we see them flying elsewhere.

But it wouldn't surprise me that they do that. We're prepared for it, you know, to intercept them, should we need to, should we choose to.

Q: At the time, U.S. officials were saying it didn't make any sense to conduct patrols down there, because you would take so long to get there and you would go past the whole United States military to get there. You would have the element of surprise.

But you expect (off mic)?

ADM. GORTNEY: I think -- you know, I think if you have long-range aircraft, you want to exercise them, and in order to exercise them, you need to fly long-range missions.

Q: Would you expect that they're doing this summer -- spring, summer season --

ADM. GORTNEY: It wouldn't surprise me, no. It wouldn't -- it wouldn't surprise me.

You know, again, it goes to the question that was asked before. They're messaging us, showing us that they have a long-range conventional reach or nuclear reach with their -- with their manned bombers.

You know, we do the same sorts of things with our aircraft and with our ships, so it wouldn't surprise me if they did it.

Q: Related on that, in the past couple days, two Air Force B-52s flew round-trip missions up to the North Pole in the North Sea. What message were you trying to send with those --

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, actually, it was our own exercise program with one of the -- for the bombers themselves that do that long-range mission and then for us, with U.S., Canada and our -- and our NATO allies, to do those intercepts along there.

Polar Growl was the name of exercise, and we announced it. It was a very successful exercise. In the back.

Q: Two -- two unrelated questions, same notion.

There's been concern on the Hill about the threat that ISIS fighters might want to infiltrate through the southern border. Is that a legitimate concern, and what can you do to work against that?

And the other question has to do with the East Coast, the idea of the East Coast-based interceptors. Is that a good idea, or is that just a waste of money?

ADM. GORTNEY: Okay.

The first one is, I don't believe that it's ISIL that we have to worry about infiltrating through -- through our southern approaches.

They're using -- they are a threat to us, because they're using a very sophisticated social-media campaign to incite American and Canadian citizens to do harm against American and Canadian citizens. That's how they are trying to attack us in that regard, through that very sophisticated social-media campaign.

However, those same scenes that are out there between the geographic combatant commanders, our interagency partners, the seams between us and our -- and our countries to our south and the seams within their countries, you know, the enemy, if you find your seams, you'll find your enemy, and that enemy will exploit those seams.

And they're going to move -- through those seams will move people, drugs, money, weapons or something even greater. They'll move it -- they're just moving product through there. And that's why we work so hard looking down there and trying to close those seams with our homeland partnerships and with the other geographic combatant commanders.

As far as the East Coast missile site, if I had one more dollar to do ballistic missile defense, I wouldn't put it against the East Coast missile site; I'd put it against those technologies that allow us to get to the correct side of the cost curve in the ballistic missile defense. And again, that's just not only theater ballistic missile defense but the homeland missile defense.

You know, it is -- it is a proliferating threat. It is growing. People -- countries are developing those capabilities. They can threaten their neighbors with power projection with that. And our current approach has us on the wrong side of that cost curve.

So I'd take those dollars and invest it in those necessary technologies to start -- (inaudible) -- those threats at range, not just relying on the endgame and the mid-course.

I can take one more.

Q: (off mic) completely different subject.

ADM. GORTNEY: Okay.

Q: The loss of sea ice in the Arctic, what -- what security issues does that raise as we see that whole area changing up there?

ADM. GORTNEY: Well, that's part of what we're going to be reporting out, the necessary threats.

You know, the reality is, is that it is. The sea ice is melting. The Arctic shelf is getting smaller.

That said, it is still a very inhospitable place, you know. And today, if we wanted to go up there, you know, we don't have the ability to reliably navigate, communicate and sustain ourselves up there.

And so that's huge investments for the services to figure out how to do that, and when do we need to lay those investments in to be able to communicate, navigate and sustain?

And -- and before we can communicate and navigate, we have to -- we have to do the sustainment. We have to supply ourselves. You know, it's three times as expensive and takes three times as long to put anything up there in the Arctic. I mean, it is a very, very harsh place.

We are seeing more intermodal traffic from ships that are going in there, but we're not seeing -- we've worked with the shipping industry and talked with the shipping -- the major shipping companies, and they're not really interested. You know, they need ships that can make them money 350 days out of the year. They can't rely on a particular period of time; they need to move large numbers of containers and a large number of crude or liquid natural gas that happens to be out there.

But the reality is, there's going to be more activity up there, and it's actually more dangerous today than when we had a stable shelf.

So that's what we're -- I'm looking forward to reporting that out here in the spring.

Q: (off mic) conflict with Russia that you have to worry about? Are we in a race with them to --

ADM. GORTNEY: I don't see it as a race, but the strategic importance of the Arctic and the strategic importance of Alaska -- you know, it's all about location. You know, we have airplanes, F-22s in Alaska, and we can deploy them around the world quicker than we can from Langley, just because of the strategic location in Alaska.

So I think as we look forward, it's a reawakening of the strategic importance of the Arctic, and how are we going to operate up there?

So, if you find yourself thinking preparing your home for a disaster is a big task, you might ponder the challenges Admiral Gortney faces.

Fiction, Science Fiction and Military Strategy and Thinking

On very rare occasions I am asked to suggest some sort of reading list for prospective Naval officers. Or even for prospective Marines.

It has been my usual practice to refer the person seeking advice to the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program which contains a very good selection. Most of these are historical or "current events" in nature, such as Joel Holwitt's Execute Against Japan or Robert Kaplan's Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power.

There are some great books on the challenges of war at sea on that list, as well there should be. These include James D. Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno and The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.

On the other hand, sometimes there are recommendations for books in the "speculative" fiction arena - which some might call "science fiction." These would include Robert Heinlein's Starship Troopers about which the keepers of the CNO list wrote:

The rigors of military life, the sacrifices that such a life entails, the raw fear before going into battle, the burdens of leadership—all are captured masterfully. Like most sci-fi that stands the test of time, Starship Troopers is about much more than futuristic hardware and shootouts with space creatures. It is, above all, a novel of ideas, a book that stimulates thought about citizenship, responsibility, duty, and the role of the individual in society.

Another recommendation, retired CPO Jeff Edwards'The Seventh Angel which we are informed "... focuses on the crew of a fictional Arleigh Burke destroyer and the civilian technicians operating an unmanned robot submersible to stop a rouge actor with nuclear weapons."

Yes, there is other fiction on the lists, including Patrick O’Brian's Master and Commander ( don't stop with the one book, the whole series is terrific). I assume that C.S. Forster's Hornblower series lies somewhere on the list. The slightly more risque Dewey Lambdin Alan Lewrie series may or may not be there, but it is quite good, even if a little historical stretching goes with it.

But I digress.

As a young officer serving in a ship you learn that one key thing is to be "forehanded." This is not just a tennis term, but rather another was of saying "looking to the future." It means learning to contemplate what actions you would take "if . . ."

As in "What would I do if the rudder stopped responding?" "What steps would I take if there was a fire in a berthing area?" "What would I do if a fleet of enemy ships suddenly appeared to threaten the jeep carriers which I am escorting?" You can make up your own scenarios. Some you can base, like the last one in my sequence, in a historical context. Others? Well, if you like (and the watch is sufficiently boring), you can get into odd thoughts - "What would I do if a flying saucer suddenly appeared over the ship?"

It isn't too much of a leap from that to appreciating the authors of science fiction - who mostly write about "What if ...?" Better than than, as the introduction to old radio series X-1 announced,

These are stories of the future; adventures in which you'll live in a million could-be years on a thousand may-be worlds.

Which gets me back to the point of this post, if you bear with me a little longer.

Mahan wrote in his "Introductory" to The Influence of Sea Power:

It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of galleys. Both have their points of resemblance to the modern ship; both have also points of essential difference, which make it impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical precedents to be followed. But a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success. War has such principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and weapons change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy.

It is however in these wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a large portion of the globe, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent value, because the conditions remain more permanent. The theatre of war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less pronounced, the contending armies more or less great, the necessary movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale, of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness gives place to civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened, rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the operations of war become easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they must be conformed remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail, the protection of communications, were not altered. So, on the sea, the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the sailing-ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without necessarily changing the principles which should direct them; and the speech of Hermocrates twenty-three hundred years ago, before quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, which is as applicable in its principles now as it was then. Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these history has a great deal to say. ***

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time

so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage,—a lesson in itself of no mean value. (emphasis added)

In science fiction we can find examples of the underlying principles Mahan writes of being applied to "could-be years ... on a thousand may-be worlds."

"What if?" Let's face it, reading Mahan can be a tough slog. But . . . science fiction writer David Weber uses Mahan to set up his novels in the Honor Harrington series (get the first book in this series, On Basilisk Station, free here). These books are quite readable. What does Mr. Weber say of this series?

What I didn't know when I pitched the ideas to Jim was that he had been looking for someone to write an interstellar Horatio Hornblower series for the better part of 20 years. As soon as he read the first sentence of the proposal -- "Honor Harrington is a 6'2" female, Eurasian starship captain in the service of the Star Kingdom of Manticore" -- he basically told Toni Weisskopff "Write him a contract. No, make it two contracts! No! Make it four contracts!" I don't know for certain that he ever read all of the other proposals at all . . . and given the Honorverse's success, I'm not going to complain if he didn't!

As for the reasoning process that led me to create this particular literary universe, I knew that I wanted to do a military novel, that I wanted it to be about a very long running war, that I wanted to have "good guys" on both sides, and that I wanted it to be of a naval character. I actually started out looking at the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage, but I decided that the naval aspects of those wars were too limited. Seapower in those wars was really primarily logistical -- transporting armies and keeping them supplied -- rather than the sort of "command of the sea" warfare in the tradition of Alfred Thayer Mahan that I really wanted to write about. Which, of course, caused me to turn to the wars that Mahan had actually analyzed -- the Napoleonic Wars between the British Empire and Revolutionary and later Imperial France.

Once I'd chosen my historical template, I sat down and constructed the basic universe: political units, available technologies, naval strategic and tactical doctrines, historical evolution, etc... And, I will confess, I deliberately constructed my navel technological toolbox in a way which would create something with clear parallels between three-dimensional space-going warfare and the two-dimensional broadside warfare of the eighteenth century.

So, Mr. Weber took that part Mahan wrote about "conditions changing" and set it in space far in the future. He kept the principles of war - logistics (Mahan calls them "communications"), the tyranny of time and distance, and that part about "the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated" - and placed them into the future. The point being that whether it's the French and English fighting 200 years ago or the Star Kingdom of Maniticore fighting the Republic of Haven 2000 years from now, the underlying principles of war will apply.

Mr. Weber also writes the Safehold series in which a human world has intentionally kept itself from being high tech but into which a change agent is introduced who faces the challenge of pushing progress while evading both in-planet and extra-planetary enemies. A relatively rapid change from oared galleons to steam powered war ships and from spears to gun powder parallels the same process in our history, as it should since Mr. Weber intended that to be the case. Again, the underlying principles of war govern. But under it all, lurks the question "What if . ..?"

And shouldn't that be the fundamental military question for both strategy and tactics? As in "What, given constraints of a limited budget and trained manpower, should our strategic naval posture be?" "What if we had 10% more funding?" "What if we had 10% less?" "What strategic changes does nuclear power for warships bring?" "What about laser weapons?" "Robotic and semi-robotic vessels and aircraft?" "What are the threats to a modern fleet by a modern swarm attack?"

Things to ponder on one of those nights on an independent transit of the Pacific or in other quiet moments.

Reading good science fiction can help stimulate that pondering.

By the way, the Commandant of the Marine Corps reading lists can be found here. Yes, there are scifi books on them. The Coast Guard Commandant's lists can be found here. A list I prepared last year is here.

Holy War: Killing Unbelievers, Apostates and Destroying Relics

We go from one act of horror to another.

Shabaab massacres dozens in attack on Kenyan university:

Shabaab terrorists attacked the Garissa University College in Kenya earlier today. Initial reports say that approximately 10 gunmen were involved in assault, which left at least 147 people dead and dozens more wounded.
***
A spokesman for Shabaab, al Qaeda’s official branch in Somalia, said the gunmen deliberately separated Muslims from non-Muslims during the attack. “We sorted people out and released the Muslims,” Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab told Reuters.

We see the same sort of thing with ISIS, ISIS video appears to show beheadings of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya, Iraq's Christians persecuted by ISIS.

Further, it is not enough, in some cases, to be a Muslim. You have to be the right kind of Muslim - 4 questions ISIS rebels use to tell Sunni from Shia:

Whether a person is a Shia or a Sunni Muslim in Iraq can now be, quite literally, a matter of life and death.

As the militant group the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, has seized vast territories in western and northern Iraq, there have been frequent accounts of fighters' capturing groups of people and releasing the Sunnis while the Shias are singled out for execution.

ISIS believes that the Shias are apostates and must die in order to forge a pure form of Islam.

Ah, the joys of being on the "right" side in a holy war.

Of course, this form of holy war also wants to destroy the past, Priceless Iraqi Artifacts Destroyed by ISIS :

ISIS fighters are destroying symbols of pre-Islamic culture, including artifacts from the Assyrian Empire that are over 2,000 years old.

Should you be surprised by this destruction?

No, you shouldn't. In his book, The Crisis of Islam, Professor Bernard Lewis explained it, non-Islamic history is irrelevant to these holy warriors:

The Muslim peoples, like everyone else in the world, are shaped by their history, but unlike some others, the are keenly aware of it. Their awareness dates however from the advent of Islam, with perhaps some minimal references to pre-Islamic times, necessary to explain historical allusions in the Quar'an and in the early Islamic traditions and chronicles. Islamic history, for Muslims, has an important religious and also legal significance, since it reflects the working our of God's purpose for His community - those that accept the teachings of Islam and obey its law. The history of non-Muslim states and peoples convey no such message and is therefore without value or interest.

What is of no value may be destroyed without qualm.

Obviously, this includes non-believers, believers who are viewed as apostate, and "images" from the past before Islam.

More from Professor Lewis on "Muslim fundamentalists" -

The Muslim fundamentalists, unlike the Protestant groups whose name was transferred to them, do not differ from the mainstream of question of theology and in the interpretation of of scripture. Their critique is, in the broadest sense, societal. The Islamic world, in their view, has taken a wrong turning. ***

Such a perception of straying from the "true path" justifies pretty much anything, since being wrong-headed means you are resisting God's will and that means you are an enemy of "God's army."

"Holy" War. Brought to us by people who prefer a certain black and white clarity to having to deal with shades of gray.

The ultimate "if you aren't with us, you are against us."

Easter

UPDATE: So, I asked my wife, "Do you think 'Amazing Grace' works as an Easter Song?"

"Well," she replied, "Most people would probably go with something more about the resurrection."

OK, then, here you go:

Saturday Is Heinlein Quote Day #50

From The Notebooks of Lazarus Long

You live and learn. Or you don't live long.

Which reminds me of Piet Hein's "Grook,"

THE ROAD TO WISDOM

The road to wisdom?
-- Well, it's plain
and simple to express:
Err
and err
and err again
but less
and less
and less.

Friday Fun Film: Capturing a German Submarine "Now It Can Be Told (1945)"

Capturing the U-505, which now sits in a special exhibit in the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry:



Bravery.

Fun with Iran: Not a deal but maybe "parameters" of a deal?

WAPO reports, "Iran and world powers agree on parameters of Iranian nuclear deal"

He said Iran has agreed to “the most robust and intrusive inspections” ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history. Obama added: “If Iran cheats, the world will know it. If we see something suspicious, we will inspect it. Iran’s past efforts to weaponize its program will be addressed.”

Seeking to head off what he called “inevitable” criticism, he asked whether anyone really thinks that the deal is “a worse option than the risk of another war in the Middle East.”

Warning that “our work is not yet done,” Obama said that “if there is backsliding on the part of the Iranians” and verification standards are not met, “there will be no deal.”

So, we really don't have a "deal" with Iran, but . . . more negotiations.

Reminds of a guy I used to work with who, when asked about a legal brief he was supposed to be drafting, would say, "Just a matter of putting pen to paper."

I feel so much better.

Interesting take at The Economist"Bargaining with the Great Satan" where the view seems to be that any deal is better than no deal. Unless it's not.

Iranian pragmatists like to boast of their country’s growing influence, even as they claim that its belligerence is a response to Western and Arab pressure. Nevertheless, a nuclear deal, says Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat, “will make Iran less aggressive”, and strengthen moderates around President Hassan Rouhani, whose primary concern is to revive the sanctions-crippled economy. Some think Mr Rouhani might even succeed the ailing Ayatollah Khamenei as Supreme Leader. For now, though, Mr Khamenei is adamant that a deal will not lead to a rapprochement with America: “No way!” he told a crowd of students chanting “Death to America” last month.

A nuclear deal might over time help to moderate Iran. But it also might increase the region’s instability. One risk is that Iran will cheat, or that hardliners will test the limits of the commitments. Another is that Mr Obama may be prevented by a sceptical Congress from delivering the relief from sanctions that he has promised, or that his successor will repudiate the deal.

Freed from some sanctions, and perhaps feeling immune from an American (or Israeli) military strike, Iran might be emboldened to extend its reach even further, an option which Mr Khamenei might see as a way to mollify hardliners. Or perhaps America’s allies, feeling estranged, will turn more aggressive. In Israel, there is renewed talk among military officers of bombing Iran’s nuclear sites at the first sign of a violation.

So there.

Feel better?

Disaster Prep Wednesday: "Shock Troops of Disaster" (1939)

In September 1938 a major hurricane hit New England:



More:

The New England Hurricane of 1938 (or Great New England Hurricane, Yankee Clipper, Long Island Express, or simply the Great Hurricane of 1938) was the first major hurricane to strike New England since 1869.

By the way, the 2015 Hurricane Season "officially" starts June 1 and runs through November.

Now is a good time to start preps.

Don't be an April Fool.

Applying Lessons Learned in the Middle East: Letting the Local Powers Fight It Out

Interesting piece from George Friedman at Stratfor, "The Middle Eastern Balance of Power Matures:"

Last week, a coalition of predominantly Sunni Arab countries, primarily from the Arabian Peninsula and organized by Saudi Arabia, launched airstrikes in Yemen that have continued into this week. The airstrikes target Yemeni al-Houthis, a Shiite sect supported by Iran, and their Sunni partners, which include the majority of military forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. What made the strikes particularly interesting was what was lacking: U.S. aircraft. Although the United States provided intelligence and other support, it was a coalition of Arab states that launched the extended air campaign against the al-Houthis.

Three things make this important. First, it shows the United States' new regional strategy in operation. Washington is moving away from the strategy it has followed since the early 2000s — of being the prime military force in regional conflicts — and is shifting the primary burden of fighting to regional powers while playing a secondary role. Second, after years of buying advanced weaponry, the Saudis and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are capable of carrying out a fairly sophisticated campaign, at least in Yemen. The campaign began by suppressing enemy air defenses — the al-Houthis had acquired surface-to-air missiles from the Yemeni military — and moved on to attacking al-Houthi command-and-control systems. This means that while the regional powers have long been happy to shift the burden of combat to the United States, they are also able to assume the burden if the United States refuses to engage.

Most important, the attacks on the al-Houthis shine the spotlight on a growing situation in the region: a war between the Sunnis and Shiites. In Iraq and Syria, a full-scale war is underway. A battle rages in Tikrit with the Sunni Islamic State and its allies on one side, and a complex combination of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi army, Shiite militias, Sunni Arab tribal groups and Sunni Kurdish forces on the other. In Syria, the battle is between the secular government of President Bashar al Assad — nevertheless dominated by Alawites, a Shiite sect — and Sunni groups. However, Sunnis, Druze and Christians have sided with the regime as well. It is not reasonable to refer to the Syrian opposition as a coalition because there is significant internal hostility. Indeed, there is tension not only between the Shiites and Sunnis, but also within the Shiite and Sunni groups. In Yemen, a local power struggle among warring factions has been branded and elevated into a sectarian conflict for the benefit of the regional players. It is much more complex than simply a Shiite-Sunni war. At the same time, it cannot be understood without the Sunni-Shiite component.

Iran's Strategy and the Saudis' Response

One reason this is so important is that it represents a move by Iran to gain a major sphere of influence in the Arab world. This is not a new strategy. Iran has sought greater influence on the Arabian Peninsula since the rule of the Shah. More recently, it has struggled to create a sphere of influence stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea. The survival of the al Assad government in Syria and the success of a pro-Iranian government in Iraq would create that Iranian sphere of influence, given the strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the ability of al Assad's Syria to project its power.

For a while, it appeared that this strategy had been blocked by the near collapse of the al Assad government in 2012 and the creation of an Iraqi government that appeared to be relatively successful and was far from being an Iranian puppet. These developments, coupled with Western sanctions, placed Iran on the defensive, and the idea of an Iranian sphere of influence appeared to have become merely a dream.

However, paradoxically, the rise of the Islamic State has reinvigorated Iranian power in two ways. First, while the propaganda of the Islamic State is horrific and designed to make the group look not only terrifying, but also enormously powerful, the truth is that, although it is not weak, the Islamic State represents merely a fraction of Iraq's Sunni community, and the Sunnis are a minority in Iraq. At the same time, the propaganda has mobilized the Shiite community to resist the Islamic State, allowed Iranian advisers to effectively manage the Shiite militias in Iraq and (to some extent) the Iraqi army, and forced the United States to use its airpower in tandem with Iranian-led ground forces. Given the American strategy of blocking the Islamic State — even if doing so requires cooperation with Iran — while not putting forces on the ground, this means that as the Islamic State's underlying weakness becomes more of a factor, the default winner in Iraq will be Iran.

A somewhat similar situation exists in Syria, though with a different demographic. Iran and Russia have historically supported the al Assad government. The Iranians have been the more important supporters, particularly because they committed their ally, Hezbollah, to the battle. What once appeared to be a lost cause is now far from it. The United States was extremely hostile toward al Assad, but given the current alternatives in Syria, Washington has become at least neutral toward the Syrian government. Al Assad would undoubtedly like to have U.S. neutrality translate into a direct dialogue with Washington. Regardless of the outcome, Iran has the means to maintain its influence in Syria.

When you look at a map and think of the situation in Yemen, you get a sense of why the Saudis and Gulf Cooperation Council countries had to do something. Given what is happing along the northern border of the Arabian Peninsula, the Saudis have to calculate the possibility of an al-Houthi victory establishing a pro-Iranian, Shiite state to its south as well. The Saudis and the Gulf countries would be facing the possibility of a Shiite or Iranian encirclement. These are not the same thing, but they are linked in complex ways. Working in the Saudis' favor is the fact that the al-Houthis are not Shiite proxies like Hezbollah, and Saudi money combined with military operations designed to cut off Iranian supply lines to the al-Houthis could mitigate the threat overall. Either way, the Saudis had to act.

During the Arab Spring, one of the nearly successful attempts to topple a government occurred in Bahrain. The uprising failed primarily because Saudi Arabia intervened and imposed its will on the country. The Saudis showed themselves to be extremely sensitive to the rise of Shiite regimes with close relations with the Iranians on the Arabian Peninsula. The result was unilateral intervention and suppression. Whatever the moral issues, it is clear that the Saudis are frightened by rising Iranian and Shiite power and are willing to use their strength. That is what they have done in Yemen.

In a way, the issue is simple for the Saudis. They represent the center of gravity of the religious Sunni world. As such, they and their allies have embarked on a strategy that is strategically defensive and tactically offensive. Their goal is to block Iranian and Shiite influence, and the means they are implementing is coalition warfare that uses air power to support local forces on the ground. Unless there is a full invasion of Yemen, the Saudis are following the American strategy of the 2000s on a smaller scale.

The U.S. Stance

The American strategy is more complex. As I've written before, the United Sates has undertaken a strategy focused on maintaining the balance of power. This kind of approach is always messy because the goal is not to support any particular power, but to maintain a balance between multiple powers. Therefore, the United States is providing intelligence and mission planning for the Saudi coalition against the al-Houthis and their Iranian allies. In Iraq, the United States is providing support to Shiites — and by extension, their allies — by bombing Islamic State installations. In Syria, U.S. strategy is so complex that it defies clear explanation. That is the nature of refusing large-scale intervention but being committed to a balance of power. The United States can oppose Iran in one theater and support it in another. The more simplistic models of the Cold War are not relevant here.

All of this is happening at the same time that nuclear negotiations appear to be coming to some sort of closure. The United States is not really concerned about Iran's nuclear weapons. As I have said many times, we have heard since the mid-2000s that Iran was a year or two away from nuclear weapons. Each year, the fateful date was pushed back. Building deliverable nuclear weapons is difficult, and the Iranians have not even carried out a nuclear test, an essential step before a deliverable weapon is created. What was a major issue a few years ago is now part of a constellation of issues where U.S.-Iranian relations interact, support and contradict. Deal or no deal, the United States will bomb the Islamic State, which will help Iran, and support the Saudis in Yemen, which will not.

The real issue now is what it was a few years ago: Iran appears to be building a sphere of influence to the Mediterranean Sea, but this time, that sphere of influence potentially includes Yemen. That, in turn, creates a threat to the Arabian Peninsula from two directions. The Iranians are trying to place a vise around it. The Saudis must react, but the question is whether airstrikes are capable of stopping the al-Houthis. They are a relatively low-cost way to wage war, but they fail frequently. The first question is what the Saudis will do then. The second question is what the Americans will do. The current doctrine requires a balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the United States tilting back and forth. Under this doctrine — and in this military reality — the United States cannot afford full-scale engagement on the ground in Iraq.

Turkey's Role

Relatively silent but absolutely vital to this tale is Turkey. It has the largest economy in the region and has the largest army, although just how good its army is can be debated. Turkey is watching chaos along its southern border, rising tension in the Caucasus, and conflict across the Black Sea. Of all these, Syria and Iraq and the potential rise of Iranian power is the most disturbing. Turkey has said little about Iran of late, but last week Ankara suddenly criticized Tehran and accused Iran of trying to dominate the region. Turkey frequently says things without doing anything, but the development is still noteworthy.

It should be remembered that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has hoped to see Turkey as a regional leader and the leader of the Sunni world. With the Saudis taking an active role and the Turks doing little in Syria or Iraq, the moment is passing Turkey by. Such moments come and go, so history is not changed. But Turkey is still the major Sunni power and the third leg of the regional balance involving Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The evolution of Turkey would be the critical step in the emergence of a regional balance of power, in which local powers, not the United Kingdom or the United States, determine the outcome. The American role, like the British role before it, would not be directly waging war in the region but providing aid designed to stabilize the balance of power. That can be seen in Yemen or Iraq. It is extremely complex and not suited for simplistic or ideological analysis. But it is here, it is unfolding and it will represent the next generation of Middle Eastern dynamics. And if the Iranians put aside their theoretical nuclear weapons and focus on this, that will draw in the Turks and round out the balance of power.

"The Middle Eastern Balance of Power Matures is republished with permission of Stratfor."

And a chaser from J.D. Tuccille| at Reason "So Arab Countries Can Clean Up Their Own Messes Without (Crazy) Uncle Sugar! Being the craziest guy in the room can sometimes get results."

It looks like there are two ways to get countries to reduce their dependence on the American military umbrella. One way is the calculated, tough-love approach: point out that to other governments that they're capable of fighting their own fights, set a timetable for them to assume responsibility for defense matters, and stick to it. The other approach is to act so nuts and untrustworthy that allies sense an implosion of crazy and reluctantly take on new responsibilities. This second technique seems to be working miracles in the Middle East as some sort of unified Arab self-help emerges from an anguished watching of whatever the hell it is the United States is up to.

Just proof that being indecisive makes its own strategy.

Perhaps not one that can be contained, though.

Better load up the humanitarian aid train, because before this is over the Middle East looks like it will need it.

Lots of it.

Oh, and I guess it's a good time to point out that, thanks to the oil and gas industry, our reliance on Middle East oil and gas has diminished to the point that we can afford the "crazy uncle" approach, intentional or not.

UPDATE: Another excellent piece by A. Savyon and Y. Carmon at MEMRI "Tehran vs The Awakening Sunni Arab Camp: Significance And Implications:"

In recent years, and especially in the last few months, Tehran has ratcheted up its direct involvement in several Arab countries, thanks to the silence on the part of the U.S.; this silence has been interpreted in the Arab world as support for Iran becoming a hegemonic military and political regional superpower. The Sunni Arab camp has appeared to be in a state of disintegration and division both politically and militarily, after nearly five years of internal erosion following the Arab Spring.

In this situation, official Iranian spokesmen had stepped up their threats against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states,  as well as against the U.S. military. These threats were backed up by maneuvers conducted by naval, ground, and missile forces, and by advanced weaponry development. Several Iranian officials spoke of Iran's control of four Middle East capitals and four seas. A senior advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rohani, Ali Younesi, even declared that the Persian Empire was now revived.

The surprise Sunni Arab move blocked Iran in Yemen, and is a warning sign of Sunni camp intentions to cut Iran back down to size and to let it know that it is no empire, as Younesi said, but rather a mere 10% of the Islamic world – the vast majority of which is Sunni.