Somali Pirates: Exploiting Cracks in International Relations

Another piece in the NY Times about how the Somali "Pirates Outmaneuver Warships Off Somalia", which is only partially true.

The pirates have an advantage of not revealing themselves until they strike and are able to hide among the normal fishing and other traffic. The few warships assigned to cover a massive amount of ocean are easily spotted by pirates, and, I assume, there movements are reported by spotters to pirates who have radios and GPS systems.

The pirates further have an advantage in that international law no longer allows them, once captured, to be strung up from a yardarm as a lesson to other pirates. Instead, as is the case with the 23 pirates being held on an Indian warship, they are a burden on the warship and its crew as they try to determine what to do with the Somalis. See here:

With no instructions from the Indian government, naval officers on board the ship INS Mysore are confused about what to do with the 23 pirates and their dhow apprehended in the Gulf of Aden while repulsing an attack on an Ethiopian merchant vessel.

"Since Saturday afternoon, the 12 Somali and 11 Yemeni pirates are in custody on board INS Mysore and they are being fed with rations meant for sailors," Navy officials said here on Monday.

"We have not received any instructions yet from the defence ministry or the external affairs ministry on what needs to be done with the pirates," they said

The piquant situation that INS Mysore finds itself in has been compounded as the Rules of Engagement issued to the warship before it set sail to Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy patrol duties is unclear on the course of action if it did seize a pirate vessel and sea brigands, officials said.

However, officials claimed that frantic efforts were in progress in both ministries to get a foreign port to accept the bandits for trial in their courts and were optimistic of finding a solution by Tuesday.

The only other option available to INS Mysore is to abandon its anti-piracy patrols and return to an Indian port to hand over the pirates to local authorities for trying them.

The fact that Somalia has no real government merely adds to the confusion - and frustration.

By the way - surprised to find Yemenis listed among the pirates? Get over it. Piracy is making enough money that it is drawing area thugs like flies drawn to a honey pot.

And don't be shocked that the pirates are adopting new tactics, including swarming attacks by multiple boats, as they figure out how to counter the limited defenses mounted on merchant ships. With a 20 or 30 boat swarm of RPG and automatic weapon laden pirates, an armed security team would have to be pretty large to avoid being overwhelmed. Neither should pirate expansion to areas outside the Gulf of Aden be a surprise. They are inside the NATO/EU OODA loop.

Safety lies in a old fashioned pirate fighting techniques, such as a good escort/accompaniment system.
NATO/EU and French ships (Update: and the Russians) have set up such a plan, but many shipping companies don't want to be delayed waiting for a convoy to form and rely, instead, on the knowledge that the pirates are only grabbing a small percentage of all the ships that flow through the risk areas and further seem to be moving up the shipping scale from the small freighters and fishing boats they used to nab to bigger, more high profile ships like tankers and cruise ships. The pirates, to borrow a phrase attributed to the bank robber Willie Sutton, know "that's where the money is." To some ship owners, the risks are relatively low and they have overhead to meet. You might note that the crews of the captured ships are rarely natives of European countries - the ship owners have gone for low cost labor from the Philippines, India and Pakistan to crew their ships. Their real investment is in the hull and the time value of the use of the ship.

The pirate business model is pretty simple. They maintain a low overhead operation. Weapons and people come cheap in Somalia and Yemen. They use inexpensive fishing boats that blend in with the local fishermen. They reportedly use captured vessels as "mother ships." GPS equipment and some phones, even sat phones are not expensive. If your lose a boatload of pirates, a boat or even a mother ship, everything can cheaply and easily be replaced. Unlike the old time pirates like Blackbeard, the pirate leaders are not out on the small boats risking their lives and investments with the pirate crews. Update: A look at the way they maintain initiative in ransom negotiations here:

"All the initiative has been held by pirates during the negotiations. The pirates have a system for bargaining, and we've been moving accordingly. They released a few ships before Eid al-Adha; however, they later hijacked a few other ships. That's to say, they don't want to empty a pool in which they have around 30 or 40 ships," Marangoz was quoted as saying by Anatolia.

"We know that there were examples in which pirates didn't release the ships after receiving money from companies as advanced payment. That's why we conduct bargaining while taking these possibilities into consideration. Experience also shows that bargaining with pirates takes approximately one-and-a-half or two months. We've been approaching the end of this process. Our sole goal is rescuing our crew safe and sound," Marangoz added.

Operating out of a state with no local law enforcement, and where palms are easily greased if there were, means low risk on the shore side to both the boat crews and their masters, many of whom seem to live outside Somalia anyway. Cash payments of ransom keep the leaders off the international financial radar and reporting system. Somalia's reputation as a hornet's nest is keeping foreign powers offshore and away from the pirates, recent rumblings about seeking authority to go ashore with military force aside.

Is any nation standing up and volunteering to lead the charge? Does any nation, other than the U.S., have the capacity to put a major military force ashore in Somalia and sustain it through a nation building process? Does the U.S. have a vital national interest at stake in Somalia? I have a round of "Nopes" for you. Feel free to disagree.

Now is the time to start thinking about other weak or failing states with sea access where the U.S.'s national interests might be affected. Nigeria, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico come to mind.

What steps should we be taking?

UPDATE: Time magazine suggests fixing Somalia. A "Marshall Plan for Somalia?"

Good luck with that.

Monday Reading

Start off youir maritime week with Maritime Monday 140 wherein Fred Fry captures the sea-doings of the past week and also has pictures of the ships of the Dutch line Flinter.

Somali Pirates: Shore fight needs more intel

Ignore the stupid headline - Gates says U.S. lacks intelligence to fight Somalia pirates - and concentrate on the message:

The United States lacks the intelligence needed to pursue the fight against pirates on Somali soil, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Saturday.

His comments came days after the U.S. delegation at the United Nations circulated a draft resolution that would give countries the right to pursue pirates on land as well as at sea.

Analysts say that pursuing pirates on land is crucial to any military response to attacks that have targeted dozens of ships in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean in recent months.

"With the level of information we have at the moment, we're not in a position to do that kind of land-based operation," Gates told a regional security conference in Bahrain. "Our first need is intelligence, (to know) who is behind it."

Referring to media reports that "two to three clans or extended families" were behind the pirate attacks on ships off the Somali coast, Gates said: "If we can identify who those clans are then we can operate on land under the auspices of the United Nations and seek out ways to minimize collateral damage."

Somali Pirates: Tough to spot

The captain of a English warship provides a look at the work of pirate hunting here

Speaking from the Kenyan port of Mombassa, Cdr Simpson said: "They are like a needle in a haystack. They don't identify themselves.

"They tend to be in small skiffs with outboard motors on the back and they'll wait for the right sort of ship to go by.

"The weather has been quite windy recently and it has been kicking up white horses on the top of waves, which makes them even more difficult to see.

"Then you have got the entire Yemeni fishing fleet, who also work out of small skiffs. So not only have you got to identify the pirates, you have got to try and sort them out from everything else as well. It is a difficult task.

"It is a big sea and these are small ships, so we have to be in the right place at the right time.

"A bigger force of warships in the area can only be a good thing because it provides the opportunity for warships to be in the right area when an act of piracy takes place. The ideal solution is find them before that happens."

Many people seem to think the pirates are alone on the sea flying the "Jolly Roger" while the commercial ships flow politely in traffic lanes. It's a lot more chaotic than that out there.

UPDATE: Corrected to reflect proper nationality of ship as per comment 2.

Sunday Ship History: Naval Ammunition Depots

Forty years ago, driving across the relative flat lands in the center of Nebraska, it might have struck some drivers as odd to run across a large Navy facility near Hastings - the Naval

Ammunition Depot (NAD), Hastings. In fact out in the midlands the Navy built its largest ammunition depot, where ammunition for Navy ships was both manufactured and stored while awaiting shipment to either coast.

Before World War II, the U.S. Navy had an uncomplicated ammunition storage system, as set out here:

Under the Navy's peacetime practice, each combat unit of the fleet was provided at the time of its commissioning with enough ammunition to fill its magazines, and,in addition, a reserve supply was stored ashore. Periodically, much of this ammunition had to be overhauled, an operation involving the removal of all explosive material and the refilling with new, and the checking of all mechanical parts. The nature of the overhaul operation was such that it was feasible of accomplishment only at a well-equipped shore station. As safety considerations demanded that a combat ship have its magazines emptied before coming into a navy yard, convenience suggested that the ammunition depots, equipped to store the reserve supply and the magazine ammunition and to conduct the overhaul operations, be located in close proximity to the yards.

On the East Coast, the naval ammunition depot at Hingham, Mass., was only 12 miles away from the Boston Navy Yard, across Boston Harbor. The New York area had two depots, one at Iona Island, N.Y., 45 miles up the Hudson River,devoted primarily to industrial activities, and one at Lake Denmark, N.J., 50 miles northwest of the yard by rail, serving principally as a storage depot. For Philadelphia, there was the Fort Mifflin depot, across the Schuylkill River from the navy Yard The St. Juliens Creek depot, 3 miles up the Elizabeth River from the Norfolk Navy Yard, was part of the important Hampton Roads operating area. In addition,at Yorktown, Va., there was a large mine depot, which will be discussed in this chapter as roughly equivalent to an ammunition depot.

East of the Sierra Nevada, 375 miles by rail from the San Francisco Bay area, was the newest ammunition depot, at Hawthorne, Nev., well located to support the depots at Mare Island and Puget Sound. It was the only depot within the United States that was up to date in design, for its very existence could be attributed to a disastrous explosion at one of the older depots which had brought in its train a revolutionary change in ammunition stowage practices.

That the handling of explosives was dangerous should not be a surprise. The explosion referred to above involved the Lake Denmark site destroyed virtually the entire Naval Depot and also did a great deal of damage to an adjacent Army ammunition facility. A fuller description of incident is set out here. An interesting presentation on current issues resulting from the New Jersey blast can be viewed here.

As noted, the main lesson learned from the event was that ammunition bunkers needed to be spread further apart to avoid the sort of chain reaction that destroyed the New Jersey facility. It also looks like it dawned on the engineering command that it might be a good idea to place future depots in less densely populated than New Jersey or Massachusetts - thus, Nevada and Nebraska were logical choices.

In the days that immediately preceded the U.S. entry int WWII the Navy began to make improvements to its existing facilities and development of additional magazines in Charleston, SC and Puget Sound, Washington. Further, a large facility was established in southwestern Indiana as Crane Naval Ammunition Depot. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, an ammunition shipping facility was authorized for the San Francisco area, in the East Bay (actually Suisun Bay off the Sacramento River at Port Chicago. Some of you will recall the later Port Chicago explosion and mutiny. See also here.

Despite these steps and many others, it became apparent that even more was needed:

Even while the depots at Hawthorne and Crane were being expanded so prodigiously in the early summer of 1942, it became apparent that the need for inland production and storage of naval ammunition would still not be met. Enlargements under way would,when completed, tax the capacities of their rail connections, however, and further expansion, it was decided, would have to take place at new points.Plans were laid, therefore, for the building of two additional inland depots, on transcontinental railroads, and the choice of location fell on Hastings, Nebr., and McAlester, Okla. On the first of July, letters of intent were forwarded to contracting firms authorizing them to begin construction.

The two new stations were designed as twins, as nearly identical as the sites permitted; the contract for each depot called for the construction of 707b magazines, 70 storage buildings, 2 large-caliber loading plants, 2 medium-caliber loading plants, and a two-line bomb and mine filling plant.

Operation of an ammunition depot requires a large organization. Until the summer of 1942, all depot labor had been civilian,but,under the circumstances that had come about, it became impossible to maintain operations on that basis. The new depots had been deliberately located in thinly populated areas, areas incapable of supplying the wartime labor force for the huge operations necessary. To relive the condition of inadequate forces, civilian housing projects had been developed near several of the depots, but it was finally decided that civilian labor would have to be supplemented by enlisted personnel, a decision resulting in the formation of Ordnance Battalions.

The Nebraska and Oklahoma facilities each were over 70 square miles in size. Storage bunker design was practical:

High explosive magazines for bulk explosives and high-explosive loaded in thin containers, fuses and detonators, were reinforced-concrete earth-covered arch structures, 256 feet wide and 20,50, or 80 feet long. For less hazardous but still highly inflammable materials, like smokeless powder, fixed and semi-fixed ammunition, small arms ammunition and loaded projectiles, magazines were of two general types: above-ground and earth-covered. Magazines of the above-ground type, illustrating earlier practice, were built with masonry walls, either of reinforced concrete or brick, with light steel roof trusses supporting a pitched roof of corrugated cement-asbestos. The light roofs were designed to be blown off in the event of an explosion. The earth-covered magazines were built either as three-span multiple arches or as vertical-walled, flat-roofed, reinforced-concrete structures. A large number of experimental triple-beehive magazines was built at McAlester, but not repeated elsewhere. Irrespective of structural type, these magazines provided about 5,000 square feet of useful storage space.

Storehouses for inert materials and buildings to house industrial operations were of masonry when permanent construction was called for; otherwise, of timber frame and composition-board siding. All building design was dictated by the function to be served.

Based on the disaster at Lake Denmark, great care was taken to provide protection against lightning:

Lighting protection was an important feature of construction at all stations. All metal, including concrete reinforcing, had to be thoroughly grounded in buildings were explosive or inflammable materials were to be stored or handled. Buildings not earth-covered were provided with a primary lightning protection system composed of a number of grounded steel masts interconnected under ground by a heavy wire girdle. The line of masts, typically surrounded the structure to be protected, a few feet outside the building lines, providing an "umbrella of protection."

The effect of the building of a large ammunition depot on the town of Hastings, Nebraska, is well set out here (good short video here):

The construction of a $45 million ammunition depot (the largest in the nation) brought both growth and stress to Hastings Nebraska. The development helped the Hastings community emerge from the Depression, but it also brought a great influx of immigrants and created new social pressures. At its peak, the depot employed approximately 2,000 military personnel and 6,692 civilian production workers. There were also 2,000 civilians still involved in construction of the plant. All together, over 10,000 workers.

In addition to the regular problems of rapid growth, there was a substantial issue with racial prejudice - both during the construction as many construction workers were Native Americans and with about 20% of the plant workers, who were black Americans:

Racial prejudice became even more apparent when the Navy announced that black sailors and civilians would serve at the Hastings ammunition depot. Immediately there was concern among the white residents about where the newcomers would be housed.
***
The federal government also provided housing for black civilian workers in the Spencer Park addition located in southeastern Hastings. When Spencer Park was completed in 1944, black families lived in 260 buildings in the southeastern section farthest away from Hastings. The Hastings community had limited experience with race relations, but it now had segregated housing. Not surprising, the segregated Navy provided segregated on-base housing as well.
***
There was a need for recreation as well as housing, and once again, the solution was a separate facility. There wasn't much for African Americans to do in Hastings when they weren't working. Every Friday afternoon Hastings NAD officials provided "cattle trucks" with benches on the sides, to transport black workers to Omaha where there was a sizable African-American community. In essence, blacks were forced to travel for hours in converted cattle trucks in search of entertainment because the white community of Hastings assumed separate facilities for African-Americans was a necessity.

Eventually, with the aid of a federal grant, Hastings opened a separate USO club for black servicemen at 624 West First Street. Regularly scheduled activities and dances were held.

The work being performed was dangerous:

At least four major explosions occurred, killing 21 people. The first accident left a crater 550 feet long, 220 feet wide, and 50 feet deep. The blast caved in the roof on the Harvard, Nebraska, High School, 15 miles away. The blast was felt as far away as Omaha, almost 150 miles away.

In addition to the black workers and sailors, many of the plant workers were women:

A large percentage of NAD workers were women, partly because of the absence of men and partly because of the economic opportunities this job provided for females.

How much economic opportunity?Almost three times what they could earn in town as clerks:

The pay for civilian workers was 74 cents per hour and the workweek was 60 hours - about $45 per week.

The facility operated 24 hours a day during WWII and operated under reduced staff afterward, with a slight increase during the Korean War. It was closed in 1966 and various acreage has been converted to other uses.

So, if you happen to be driving through Hastings on U.S. Highway 6, off to one side you will see the remnants of the Hastings NAD. Give it a little salute as you drive by, to honor the men and women who served there country and the Navy there during a time of war.



Many of the photographs are from the Adams County, Nebraska Historical Society website.

Somali Pirates: Greek Chemical Tanker Freed, 3 crew feared dead

Reported here:

Somali pirates have released a Greek chemical tanker seized in October but three crew members are feared dead, a Kenyan maritime official said Saturday.

"The MT Action was released by pirates," Andrew Mwangura, who heads the Kenyan chapter of the East African Seafarers Assistance Programme, said in a statement.

"She is currently limping to safe waters. It is feared that three crew members lost their lives under questionable circumstances," he added.

Somali Pirates: Indian Naval Ship Takes on Pirates

Reported as Indian Navy repulses attack, arrests 23 pirates:

In another successful anti-piracy operation, Navy warship on Saturday repulsed an attack on a merchant vessel in the Gulf of Aden and nabbed 23 Somali and Yemeni sea brigands, in a show of resolve to weed out the menace that affected maritime trade in the region.

The pirates on two speed boats had surrounded the merchant vessel flying the Ethiopian flag around noon, when INS Mysore warship intervened and warded off the attack, Navy spokesperson said.

The pirates had fired at the merchant vessel with their small arms, when it sent out a rescue call and the Indian warship, which was sailing nearby moved its Marine Commandos on a helicopter to help the distressed cargo vessel, he said.

The attack took place about 150 nautical miles off Aden and INS Mysore was about 13 nautical miles away from the merchant vessel when it picked up the SOS call.

The Navy flew its Marine Commandos on helicopters to the scene of the pirate attack and rescued the ship. MV Gibe was later escorted to safety, he added.

Somalia: The Pirates' Life

As reported here:

“We are not warlords, but people who have become jobless,” said one man, who identified himself as Abdenasser, speaking from the city of Bossaso. “Fishermen cannot get their fish, and no one is thinking to build a central government for Somalia. I recruited many young guys to be pirates, and I was paid for that.”

It may be difficult to muster much sympathy for pirates armed with AK-47s and rocket-grenade launchers who disrupt the international shipping trade and have even been known to seize food shipments destined for the starving people of their own country.

But it is easy to understand how a destitute people could be attracted to lottery-like wealth and the prospects of a better life.

“In a region where legitimate business is difficult, where drought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming, and instability and violence make death a very real prospect, the dangers of engaging in piracy must be weighed against the potentially massive returns,” the British think tank Chatham House said in a recent report.

Must Read from the Coast Guard

Admiral Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, recognized a CG Chief had the right ideas on leadership and getting the job done when you don't have to lead when he posted this from Chief Mario Vittone:

The only way to create a truly great place to work is to ensure that each of the team members under you (read: next to you) are raging evangelists for the cause or...whatever your cause is. In my little corner of the Coast Guard, the "cause" is maintaining the survival gear for ourselves, our teammates, and the boating public; and also providing qualified and prepared duty standing helicopter rescue swimmers to help save lives. Yours is something else; but we all (E-5 through O-9 anyway) are responsible for causes. We call them missions or area's of responsibility, but what they truly are, are causes that are either believed in...or not.

Read the whole thing.

Somali Pirates: Legal "Black Hole"

U.S. Navy Commander of NavCent says, "US navy would go after pirates if they could be tried":

The US Navy would go after pirates off Somalia if the international community came up with a process for holding and trying them as criminals, the commander of the US Fifth Fleet said on Friday.

"We would follow the same manner we use down in the Gulf of Mexico in our counter-drug efforts. It's a matter of surveillance, focused surveillance and rapid action," said Vice Admiral Bill Gortney.

But without an internationally recognised legal process for trying pirates, navies have had little choice but to release those captured, Gortney told reporters in Bahrain, which hosts the US Navy's Fifth Fleet.
***
US and other navies have appeared helpless in the face of a wave of seizures of ships and hostages on the high seas by Somali pirates who have then ransomed them off.

It has not been for lack of authority to act, Gortney acknowledged, noting that the UN Security Council has extended a resolution allowing navies to take action against piracy off Somalia.

"I don't need any authorities for offensive actions against the pirates. I have all I need," he said.

"If I see a piracy event, I can engage, I can pursue, as long as I maintain positive identification on the vessel that is doing the piracy, and I can engage with lethal fire," he said.

"The problem is once I take them, and they are alive, I don't have any place to take them and hold them accountable for their action."
***
Gortney rejected direct attacks on pirate camps in Somalia as a solution because of the risk of killing innocent civilians or causing other collateral damage.

"I see people trying to look for an easy military solution to a problem that demands a non-kinetic solution," he said.

"If you are going to do kinetic strikes into the pirate camps the positive ID and the collateral damage cannot be overestimated. It's very difficult. They are irregulars, they don't wear uniforms," he said.

Gortney said he sees "some movement" internationally on tackling the adjudication issue internationally, and more countries are sending ships to patrol the sea lanes off Somalia.

UPDATE: Some thoughts from a retired Marine general on "How to Kick Pirate Booty".

It's all about the will. But he has some interesting observations:

Foreign Policy: During the Millennium Challenge war game of 2002, while playing the “Red” team opposing U.S. forces, you used unconventional tactics to communicate and strike by surprise, eventually “sinking” a U.S. flotilla. Drawing from this experience, as well as conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, why is it that these guerrilla strategies can catch allied forces so off guard?

Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper: What we’re really talking about is what kind of methods folks might use that are unconventional. You struggle with words because to the person doing it, it’s not unorthodox, irregular, any of those things; it’s very normal. If you think in history, the Japanese didn’t think that kamikaze pilots were unconventional, but the U.S. did and the British did. The insurgents don’t think that IEDs [improvised explosive devices] are irregular or asymmetrical. It’s in the eye of the beholder. I think [the tactics] you’re seeing with many of these pirates—it’s not something they’ve done deliberately with relation to more modern nations—it’s what they do normally.

FP: What is it like to be fighting enemies—like these pirates—who are thinking differently than you? How do you have to think differently about your own strategy?

PVR: What we tend to do is look toward the enemy. We’re only looking one way: from us to them. But the good commanders take two other views. They mentally move forward and look back to themselves. They look from the enemy back to the friendly, and they try to imagine how the enemy might attack them. The third [way] is to get a bird’s-eye view, a top-down view, where you take the whole scene in. The amateur looks one way; the professional looks at least three different ways.

FP: Let’s imagine that there is a command structure in place mandated by the United Nations. How would that force figure out the weakness of nontraditional combatants like the pirates? Where would be the best place to strike them?

PVR: You have to understand what their methods of operation are, so you’d obviously begin with whatever kinds of intelligence you can gather. There are going to be a lot of ways to do that. Probably to a limited degree, it would be radio intercepts or communications—because they use varying means of communications. Then, having some sort of broad area surveillance for extended periods of times, you begin to see patterns. You’ve got to develop some sort of a picture of what is normal and what is not normal.

Some of those same techniques have been used for hunting the folks who put in IEDs. You watch an area long enough and you begin to see what’s not normal in the daily routine. You have to understand their method of operation and what the clues are if something is amiss. Any military unit that goes into a new area doesn’t see the subtle clues until they have been there awhile and unless they set up their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in order to pick those things up.

You’re talking weeks and probably months [to get a sense of the patterns], because things don’t happen every day. It’s like weather: You watch one day; it doesn’t mean anything. A week means a little bit [more]. But obviously, a month or months [of observation] means a lot. In Vietnam on the ground, we would have to be in areas for several weeks before we would begin to perceive what was normal and what was abnormal. And the longer they left [troops] in the same place, generally, the more effective they became.

Lex offers up an alternative solution:

With appropriate deference to the UN, I humbly offer a counter-proposal:

1. Build a wall around the place.
2. Come back after 50 years and build a door.
3. Wait another 50 years and open the door. Carefully.
4. Re-assess.

There is certain elegance in its simplicity.

Somali Pirates: Another cruise ship line flies passengers around Gulf of Aden pirate threat

Another cruise ship line flies passengers around Gulf of Aden pirate threat, as set out her:

Passengers have left an Italian-flagged cruise ship, the Vistamar, while it sails through the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden with a reduced crew, the German owners said Friday. The Vistamar is the second ship after the Bahamas-registered Columbus, owned by the Hapag-Lloyd company of Germany, to offload tour passengers in Yemen while it runs the pirate gauntlet.

Vistamar's owner, Plantours & Partner of Bremen, said about 200 passengers would spend three days making a land visit to Yemen.

The German government has rejected calls from the cruise industry for convoy protection through the Gulf, arguing that the boats do not fly the German flag. Plantours requested protection because it flies a European Union flag and carries German passengers.

Latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 11 Dec 08)

The latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 11 Dec 08) can be found
here (text). Highlights:

1. GULF OF ADEN: The following guidance from EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is intended to provide guidance to the maritime community about the military measures in place to reduce the risk of piracy: EUNAVFOR ATALANTA will use the military forces at our disposal, cooperating with other states operating in the region to provide protection to all merchant vessels (MVs) in the Gulf of Aden (GOA). This will be achieved through close co-ordination of surface units, maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters, in the UKMTO Transit Corridor (UTC) and other areas of the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin which suffer from a high risk of piracy. To assist, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA will identify vessels that are especially vulnerable to successful pirate attack so that they can, where possible, be accorded additional protection. To do this, we need you to give us as much information as possible about your vessel and your transit intentions via the secure section of the MSC-HOA website. The use of non-lethal Self Protection Measures (SPMs) when under pirate attack is strongly encouraged for all ships. These can significantly reduce the risk of a successful hijacking and, importantly, provide time for military forces in the area to respond. For full details see the “Advice to Masters” section on www.mschoa.org. COMEUNAVFOR strongly recommends that merchant vessels conduct their passage within the UTC. Westbound vessels should bias themselves to the northern portion of the corridor, and eastbound vessels to the southern portion. We encourage vessels to conduct their passage through the UTC in groups based on passage speed. In order to achieve this, we will promulgate via the website, position, time, and speed for vessels to pass through a waypoint at the eastern and western limits of the UTC. This process will be known as “GOA Group Transits” (GOA GT). GOA GT timings will be at various intervals through each 24hr period. Each GOA GT will follow a recommended navigation track (NAVTRACK) through the UTC at a published speed that will avoid high profile piracy danger periods and allow maximum coordination of military assets in support. The majority of GOA GTs will be at 12 knots. Transits will also be arranged for faster and slower vessels. During your transit you should not expect to be permanently in company with a warship. But all warships in the GOA, whether part of EUNAVFOR or coordinating with us, will be aware of the GOA GTs and have the full details of vulnerable shipping (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, 9 Dec 08).
***
2. GULF OF ADEN: Vessel fired upon 2 Dec 08 at 0400 UTC while underway in position 13:57N – 049:35E. A suspicious craft was spotted on the port side at about 2 miles. Approximately 15 minutes later they were able to see 7 persons onboard in military uniforms armed with guns and RPGs. They approached the vessel about 10 meters away and fired at the vessel many times. The security team onboard the vessel responded and fired parachute rockets. The port side lifeboat was hit with one bullet hole. The gunmen aborted their attempt and all crew including security team is in good condition (Operator, UKMTO).
.
3. GULF OF ADEN: Chemical tanker fired upon 3 Dec 08 at 0419 UTC while underway in position 12:59N – 047:41E. Men armed with automatic rifles in a speedboat fired upon the tanker. The speedboat was white in color with a blue band along the top and appeared to be of metal construction. However, as the boat got closer, it became clear that the hull was made of wood. The boat also had a short bow, similar to a whaling vessel. They tried boarding the tanker twice using a portable ladder, but were unsuccessful due to the evasive maneuvers taken
by the tanker that nearly caused the speedboat to capsize. The pirates aborted the attempted attack after two hours. A coalition helicopter came to investigate (IMB).
.
4. GULF OF ADEN: Two Yemeni fishing vessels, (FALLUJAH) and (KANA), reportedly
hijacked 10 Dec 08 while underway from the Mait area near the port of Aden. According to Yemeni Coastguard, 22 men from both vessels were seized by the pirates. Seven men managed to escape from the (FALLUJAH) on a small boat and report the attack to Yemeni authorities, but 12 other crewmembers were seized, as well as the 10 men aboard the (KANA). There has been no further information provided at this time (AFP, IANS, Reuters).
.
5. GULF OF ADEN: Passenger ship reported being fired upon on 30 Nov 08 at 0528 UTC while underway in position 14:02.7N-049:43.7E. Two speedboats with three pirates in each boat attempted to intercept the ship. The master reported seeing a gun on one of the boats and that the pirates fired upon the ship. The master increased speed. The speedboats were unable to follow the ship and aborted the attempt (IMB).
***
8. GULF OF ADEN: Cargo vessel reported suspicious approach 25 Nov 08 while underway in position 13:38N – 049:06E. An apparent single craft adrift off the starboard side was observed by the bridge watch and independently by the master at approximately 2 miles. As the vessel proceeded in a westerly course at a speed of 16 kts, the small craft increased speed and approached the vessel’s starboard bow. The suspicious craft had a white hull, approximately 25 meters, with white canvass tarp across the bow. Persons were observed on this craft watching the vessel. They approached to pass along the vessel’s starboard side at approximately 70 meters
or less. The master then noticed a smaller craft under tow alongside the suspicious craft. Once on the starboard quarter, the smaller craft was observed as a blue hull, 10 meters in length with four persons equally spaced. This craft broke free, engaged propulsion and deployed from the larger craft. The master reacted by sounding the alarm and alerting the armed security team aboard. Word was passed by ship’s radio of a security emergency. The security team deployed with weapons to the ship’s stern. The crew responded to the alarm as trained. Engines were
ordered to increase speed. The suspicious craft increased speed and approached the stern of the vessel at high speed in the ship’s wake. At this time, the vessel called by VHF radio Ch. 08 to any coalition warship in the area. A warship responded, taking a verbal report from the bridge watch. The master noticed that persons were standing on the approaching craft and raising something at shoulder level. This object was not identified as a firearm but it was taken as a
threatening position. The craft approached to within 100 meters of the stern. The security team were deployed on the main deck aft. They were highly visible and prepared with firearms. Close to the vessel’s stern, the approaching craft suddenly aborted approach with a sharp change and reversal of course. Both crafts rejoined and were observed proceeding slowly in a southerly direction. A verbal report continued with the coalition warship. UKMTO was verbally notified by the master (Operator, UKMTO).
***
1. INDIA: Indian fishing trawler (KUBER) hijacked on 23 Nov 08 probably near Jakhau. The hijackers were militants involved in the 23 Nov 08 attacks in Mumbai, India. The militants killed four crewmembers and threw their bodies overboard. The captain was kept alive until reaching Mumbai's shores likely in order to aid in navigation but was killed upon arrival. Mumbai Coast Guard recovered the body of the captain from the boat and the boat is in their possession. The Coast Guard officials had confirmed on Friday that the boat found by Mumbai Coast Guard was from Porbandar (LM: news.indiainfo.com).
.
2. MALAYSIA: Tug robbed on 1 Dec 08 at 2100 local time while underway in position 02:51N – 104:19E, approximately 7 NM off Teluk Juara. Ten armed men boarded the tug, threatening the master and crew with knives. They tied up the crew with rope and locked them in a compartment. They escaped with cash, documents, and personal belongings. On 2 Dec at 0215 local time, the 2nd officer reported the incident to owners and were instructed to sail the tug to Thailand. The incident was reported to the local police (IMB)

The web address in the EU information is a link to the EU Maritime Security Centre website for the Horn of Africa.

Somali Pirates: Was there really an attack on the cruise ship Athena?

Let me preface the following by a couple of cautions.

First, I have been at sea in an area where there were lots of fishing boats. Sometimes as you proceed along, the fishing boats move closer to your ship as they try to lower the nets they have strung in between them so your hull doesn't catch the nets. In such instances it looks like you have either snagged their nets and have started to tow the fishing vessels or as if the boats are closing on you with some other intent. I have had this happen off Vietnam, Japan and Taiwan, normally in littoral waters as we were approaching or departing a port. Second, I was not on the cruise ship Athena and all reports I have seen are second hand at best. Keep that in mind as you read the following.

The first is a newspaper report about the incident, in which the owners of the vessel discount an attempted attack. See Questions over whether MV Athena cruise ship to Fremantle was attacked by pirates:

The operator of a luxury liner carrying 437 passengers has hosed down reports that pirates tried to board the ship off the coast of Somalia.

Reports said more than 29 pirate boats surrounded the MV Athena, which is carrying 200 Australian women and 187 men, as it passed through the Gulf of Aden on Tuesday night local time.

A couple on board the Athena, which is due to dock in Fremantle on December 20, were reported saying they saw 29 small boats with up to six pirates on each boat approach the liner.

They said crew members had used water cannons to stop the pirates from boarding the ship.

But Grant Hunter, Australian managing director of Classic International Cruises, which operates the ship, today told ABC radio that no pirates had tried to board.

Mr Hunter acknowledged that as the Athena pulled up to the southern end of the Gulf of Aden, several tuna fishing skiffs loomed "some half a kilometre to three kilometres away" as the ship queued to enter a secure port area.
***
"Under normal international security regulations, all the ships in that particular grouping put their fire hoses on board (and) activated those," Mr Hunter said.

"The crew were spraying water off the side of the ship but at no stage did any of the skiffs attempt to get near the vessel, board the vessel.

"They weren't aggressive to the vessel."

Mr Hunter said that as part of routine security, the captain did ask passengers to remain in their cabins for about 90 minutes until the ship cleared the queue.

He said that it was difficult to understand how the reports emanated, because passengers had been eyeing the tuna boats from afar with binoculars - and vice versa.

"I don't think that indicates they were boarding," Mr Hunter said.

Now, from an email I received from a source who wishes no attribution except a statement to the effect it is from source at a private security firm "with core strength in maritime security," and offers another, different view:

The on-again/off-again, it happened/it didn't happen, attack on the Australian cruise ship ATHENA did, in fact, happen, and we should no longer doubt the extraordinarily large number of pirate skiffs involved, originally reported by eyewitnesses as about 30 to ATHENA's port side and 12 to starboard. When the press heard eyewitness accounts from passengers onboard, the cruise line acknowledged the attack initially, only to deny it 24 hours later, referring instead to passengers who were mistaken about the "very friendly" fishermen whose boats surrounded the ship (but nonetheless prompted the crew to deploy fire hoses). Companies have their reasons for saying things, and the cruise line wishes its passengers aboard ATHENA a "memorable cruising experience." It is not the company's fault that pirates tampered with the memories of her Gulf of Aden passage December 2nd.

The latest version of the corporate story has compelled Portuguese Captain Antonio Morais to explain to passengers that the "very friendly" fishermen his cruise line first described in version 2.0 were, version 3.0, pirates on a recce/training mission. Doubtless, Classic International Cruises should award the captain a medal for saving his ship and her souls (not to mention a judge's spot on "Dancing With The Stars" for the deft corporate waltz he was compelled to perform).

Nevertheless, the facts remain: after two and possibly three boarding attempts, pirates mounted a full-on effort to capture his ship. Fortunately, Portuguese mariners rock, and speed kills, sometimes thankfully: Captain Morais and ATHENA outran their attackers.

And the number of boats makes sense. Two to four boats (nominally as many as 24 combatants) capture tankers and freighters with crew of 20 or so. Some 40 boats with 200 combatants, pirates figure, can take and hold a defenseless cruise ship with hundreds of passengers and crew.

Despite the cruise line's denials, this attack was evaluated by our people, and others with a stake in the game, as totally authentic, and it involved the approximate number of boats initially reported by ATHENA passengers. I also believe it figured solidly behind a German cruise line's decision to pull passengers and much of the crew from the cruise ship COLUMBUS December 8th, fly them to Dubai and put them up in a five-star hotel to await that ship's arrival, all at considerable expense.

I also believe SECSTATE Rice and/or our people at the UN referred to ATHENA to build support for the U.S. initiative circulated at the UN to go ashore, if need be, to pursue pirates (full Security Council vote slated for December 16th). If and when we go ashore in Somalia, it is very much game-off for pirates and a most serious game-on for President-elect Obama, our Navy, Marines and special forces, and the international forces fully committed in the region. It also represents a unique challenge to General William E. Ward, U.S. Army, first Commander of U.S. Africa Command.

Perhaps it's a sign, too, that pirates made a grave error by targeting a ship named after the Goddess of Wisdom.

As is my custom, I have highlighted quoted material in blue, with my own comments in black.

The point of my opening comment is to point out that it is possible for the actions of fishing boats to be misunderstood. On the other hand, given a report by a warship of a previously observed event as a "swarm attack" (see here ) and the clear report of an attempt to attack another cruise ship, things may be as my anonymous source states.

And it would be a coup and a potential financial windfall for the pirates if they got a boatload of tourists . . . and a major escalation in this on-going conflict.

NATO Somali Piracy Update of 11 Dec 08

NATO Somali Piracy Update of 11 Dec 08 from the NATO SHipping Centre can be found here, Highlights:

2 December - a cluster of possibly co-ordinated approaches made to 5 merchant vessels in Gulf of Aden, successfully repelled by Italian destroyer, Luigi Durand de la Penne
MV CENTAURI was released 27 November (ransom payment amount not known)
MV MAERSK REGENSBURG was attacked approximately 450n miles east of Dar es Salaam (350nm west of Seychelles). Two pirate skiffs made two attempts to board the vessel and used small arms and 3x RPGs in the attack causing small fire on board. This is the most southerly incidence of piracy yet reported.
The last successful hijack was of MV BISCAGLIA 28 Nov
MV CAPTAIN STEFANOS was released 7 December; tbe vessel is now on route to Suez (ransom payment amount not known).
13 vessels remain hijacked comprising 11 merchant ships 1 fishing vessel and tug boat Yenegoa Ocean
***
In short, the trends in latest piracy incidents are as follows:

* Targeting larger cargo / oil / gas / chemical tankers
* Approaches / attacks conducted from 2-3 small speedboats with 3-5 armed persons each. The number of boats involved in each incident seems to be increasing.

Clicking on the map increases its size.

Somali Pirates: Convoys work

I don't know why David Axe limited his "convoy" reference to World War II, since convoys were a feature of anti-pirate operations going back over 500 years to the earliest days of ships carrying cargo from one point to another , but nonetheless, he writes New Anti-Pirate Tactic: World War II-Style Convoys :

This weekend the first E.U.-escorted convoy will sail from Mombasa, with a French or British frigate providing the heavy firepower. "With escorts, we're getting more food in," Smerdon said. But don't expect the same tactic to work for commercial ships plying the Gulf of Aden. According to Wahutu, most commercial ships sail on strict schedules. "If you have to wait for a convoy to form up, you lose time." And time means money.

So while the world's biggest food campaign piggybacks on World War II-style convoys, for-profit shipping is still going it alone, despite the risks.

Convoys do work, and you can lessen the time of waiting by having enough escorts available. See my earlier post calling for convoys.

UPDATE: A little Wikipedia history:

Naval convoys have been used for hundreds of years, and examples of merchant ships traveling under naval protection have been traced back to the 12th Century.[1] The use of organised naval convoys dates from when ships began to be separated into specialist classes and national navies were established.[2]

By the French Revolutionary Wars of the late 18th century, effective naval convoy tactics had been developed to ward off pirates and privateers. Some convoy contained several hundred merchant ships. The most enduring system of convoys were the Spanish treasure fleets, that sailed from the 1520s until 1790.

When merchant ships sailed independently, a privateer could cruise a shipping lane and capture ships as they passed. Ships sailing in convoy presented a much smaller target: a convoy was no more likely to be found than a single ship. Even if the privateer found a convoy and the wind was favourable for an attack, it could hope to capture only a handful of ships before the rest managed to escape, and a small escort of warships could easily thwart it. As a result of the convoy system's effectiveness, wartime insurance premiums were consistently lower for ships which sailed in convoys.[2]

NATO has an organization of personnel trained in setting up convoy operation under the name of Naval Coordination and Guidance to Shipping (NCAGS)(see here for some background and here).

The U.S. has several reserve units devoted to worrying about such matters (and in which I toiled for many years), folded into the U.S. Fleet Forces Command (pdf). More on the U.S. NCAGS program here (pdf):

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) defined
• NCAGS is a program that bridges the gap between operational forces and merchant shipping by providing a framework for communicating directions, advisories, concerns and information within a maritime region.
• The mission is to assist operational commanders in managing risk by providing situational awareness and near real-time information on the commercial shipping picture to help ensure the safe passage of merchant shipping and the safety of naval vessels. This is accomplished through the use of technology and cooperation between partner nations and commercial industry.
NCAGS is a component of the Maritime Strategy and helps build Maritime Domain Awareness
• NCAGS is an important part of the Maritime Strategy and provides a framework toward building Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), an effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States.
NCAGS Capabilities – Global Force Provider
• Organized under USFF, NCAGS units in the United States are located in Bronx, N.Y., Chicago, IL; Tacoma, Wash.; and Miami, Fla. Each unit is led by a Navy captain and includes 48 personnel from the Navy Reserve force. Many assigned personnel have extensive shipping industry experience or merchant marine qualifications.
• Liaison Officers (LNOs) -- Provide advice on NCAGS measures; senior liaison with civil maritime industry and fleet commanders.
• Shipping Coordination Team (SCT) -- Provides capability for a 24-hour watch at sea or ashore; flexible configuration adjusting to Combatant Commander needs.
• Shipping Coordination Center (SCC) -- Provides analysis capability supporting forward deployed LNOs and SCTs. SCCs are located in Dam Neck, Va., Key West, Fla., and Alameda, Calif., increasing MDA and facilitating the movement of goods and people into U.S. ports.

The NATO Shipping Centre is largely an NCAGS operation.

UPDATE2: Speaking of earlier pirate wars, how about Pompey vs. The Pirates circa 67 BC?

The pirates were at this time masters of the Mediterranean, and had not only plundered many cities on the coasts of Greece and Asia, but had even made descents upon Italy itself. As soon as Pompey received the command, he began to make his preparations for the war, and completed them by the end of the winter. His plans were crowned with complete success. Pompey divided the Mediterranean into thirteen separate areas, each under the command of one of his legates. In forty days he cleared the Western Sea of pirates, and restored communication between Hispania, Africa, and Italy. He then followed the main body of the pirates to their strongholds on the coast of Cilicia; after defeating their fleet, he induced a great part of them, by promises of pardon, to surrender to him.

Cilicia is an old name for the Mediterranean coast of Turkey.

The Athenians used convoys way back when (4th Century BC, see pages 111-112):

. . . The grain did nobody in Athens any good until it arrived . . . and there were unscrupulous competitors. . .and pirates loose all over the seas. One of the reasons Piraeus was so important a center for the grain trade was that Athens had a navy large enough to supply escorts to convoy fleets of freighters . . .

Can't beat those classic ideas.

UPDATE: Technically, unless the merchant ships are placed under military control, the proper word is not "convoy" but "accompaniment." See ATP2(B):

(1) Accompaniment. A voluntary arrangement in which merchant ships may be organised for passage through a specific area of increased risk in company with military assets. Details will be promulgated via navigational warning (NAVWARN).Accompaniment does not imply direct protection by military assets; however, the presence of military assets may act as a deterrent to any unlawful interference to merchant ships.

As compared to:

(4) Convoy. NCAGS can recommend and facilitate convoy operations for merchant shipping. The purpose of convoy operations is to escort and to protect merchant ships by means of military assets through a specific area with higher risk due to unlawful interference. The safe passage of a convoy depends on the organisation before sailing, the management and control at sea and the skilful handling of each ship while in convoy. Ships in convoy sail under military command. Merchant ships under naval supervision have to follow the orders of the Convoy Commodore, other merchant ships cannot be forced to take part in a convoy organisation, but they can be integrated on a voluntary basis. Masters are at all times responsible for the crew, safe navigation and handling of their ship. Details will be promulgated via NAVWARN.

A fine distinction, but . . . such is International Law.

Somali Pirates: U.S. wants UN approval to go after pirates ashore in Somalia

This is important news in the fight against Somali pirates, as U.S. Asking UN to Back Pursuit of Pirates on Somali Territory :

The U.S. is asking the United Nations Security Council to authorize the pursuit of pirates operating off the coast of Somalia onto land, with permission from the nation’s provisional government, diplomats said.

A draft resolution has been given to some member governments on the panel, and a vote may be sought as early as next week, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is scheduled to be at UN headquarters in New York, according to Chinese, French and Indonesia envoys.
***
The draft will face concerns among council members such as Indonesia over concerns that pursuit of pirates onto land might violate provisions of the Law of the Sea. French Deputy Ambassador Jean-Pierre Lacroix said some countries might be “really very nervous” about authorizing landings and military engagements against pirates.

“We want to be sure we are not creating new international law,” Indonesian Ambassador Marty Natalegawa said.

Hmmm. Why would they be concerned about that? Seems like it's a throwback to the old days, when Marines went ashore in Tripoli and the French took out a Barbary pirate fortress...or even the U.S. Navy going after the Malay pirates.

If you are hosting "enemies of all mankind" I would argue that your sovereign rights (such right being suspect in the case of a failed state like Somalia anyway) are waived until the pirates, terrorists or whatever are cleaned up and if you are given the chance to do it yourself and fail, the UN members can offer to "help."

Does the UN community have the right to police a state that cannot police itself? What are the long-term ramifications of such an action?

ICC CCS Weekly Piracy Report (to 8 Dec 08)

The ICC Commercial Crime Services Weekly Piracy Report to 8 Dec 08 can bew found here. Highlights:

16.11.2008: 0945 LT: Posn: 05:34.53N – 005:22.39E, Warri river, Nigeria. Several speedboats with heavily armed men approached a general cargo ship under pilotage. They fired warning shots into the air, ordered the pilot to stop the ship and demanded the gangway ladder to be lowered. The pirates boarded the ship and sailed it to a their rebel base where they anchored it. The 19 crew were taken ashore. The crew and ship was later released. No harm to crew.

06.12.2008: 1142 UTC: Posn: 06:42S – 046:58E, off southern Somalia (450 nm east of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania / 350 nm west of Seychelles islands). Two pirate skiffs were seen approaching a container ship underway. The 2nd mate increased speed, raised alarm, activated fire hoses and mustered crew on bridge. The pirates fired upon the ship with guns and RPG. Master activated SSAS, DSC distress and increased speed to maximum. After some time, the pirates stop firing and the distance increased. The pirates reloaded their weapons and start firing again. For some reason, one of the skiffs slowed down and the other boat was just trailing without firing. Finally, the two skiffs stopped and aborted the attempted attack. No injuries to crew. A fire broke out on board the vessel due to the gunfire and RPG. A white hulled fishing boat-like vessel was sighted 10 nm away, which could be the pirate mother vessel.
***
01.12.2008: 2100 LT: Posn: 02:51.00N - 104:19.00E,7.3nm off Teluk Juara, east of Pulau Tioman, Malaysia. Ten armed pirates boarded a tug underway. They threatened the master and crew with knives. Pirates tied up the crew with ropes and locked them in a compartment. They escaped with tug's and crew cash, documents and personal belongings. On 02.12.2008 at 0215 LT, the 2nd officer reported the incident to owners and owners instructed the master to sail the tug to Thailand. Incident reported to local police.

No "War on Piracy?"

Learn to live with a certain level of piracy says Rand's Peter Chalk here. Too hard a problem to eliminate totally and, in light of the economics involved, too expensive. Besides, the cure to Somali piracy is on the beach:

As with other piracy experts, Chalk said the lawlessness off Somalia’s coast was a symptom of its anarchy on land. The absence of authorities gives pirates the ability to hijack ships and take them to ports where no police will try to free them. Also, pirate payoffs give locals a stake in helping the attacks continue. Short of invading the coastal towns that serve as pirate havens, experts have said, there is no way to strike at more than the symptoms of piracy.

Chalk also echoed other experts with his view that the U.S. and European naval patrols off Somalia could never stop all the attacks over hundreds of square miles, nor even serve as a deterrent for pirates who have proven to be wily, inventive operators. As such, the European Union’s new anti-piracy patrol, with four ships, won’t have much of an effect, Chalk said.
***
He also cautioned that pirates’ recent successes could presage new maritime terrorist attacks. There’s almost no hard evidence linking Somali pirates with Islamic terrorists, Chalk said, but terror groups could use the lessons from pirate attacks for future operations. Terrorists could also become regular third-party buyers of weapons and other goods seized by pirates.

Cruise ships and civilian ferries —“the softest of the soft targets” — are at particular risk for small-boat suicide attacks, Chalk said. Most governments treat ferries more as mass transit than as commercial vessels, he said, and the way such ships are built makes them especially susceptible to catastrophic attacks.

Containment is sometimes the best you can hope...

UPDATE: Rand press release here:

A more broad-based approach might start with a boost to the coastal monitoring and interdiction capabilities of states in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Enhanced surveillance assets, training and technical support for local navies, coast guards or other agencies would be particularly helpful.

Second, public-private partnerships could expand the use of communication and defensive technologies like the satellite tracking devices recommended by the International Maritime Bureau and non-lethal electrical perimeter fences designed to discourage unauthorized boarding.

Third, financial incentives such as lower insurance premiums should be made to encourage the international maritime industry to adhere to basic security protocols -- avoiding dangerous routes, maintaining constant anti-piracy watches, keeping in close contact with nearby vessels.

Finally, and admittedly most vexing, greater effort should be devoted to Somalia itself. Piracy off the Horn of Africa is essentially an extension of the land-based violence, corruption and lawlessness that have plagued this war-torn country since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

Until this void in regional governance is filled, armed maritime crime will continue to proliferate around the Horn of Africa, threatening shipping and commerce in a key maritime corridor connecting Europe and Asia.

Somali Pirates: International Gang

Two AP reporters conclude "Somali piracy backed by international network":

Somalia is a failed state with no banks, only a cash-based, informal transfer network called hawala. A hawala operator takes in money on one end, then instructs a relative, friend or another agent in another country to hand a like amount to someone else. The paperless system, based on trust and oral agreements, is commonly used in the Middle East, parts of Asia and Africa.

There is some concern that the system is used for overseas payments to and from the pirates — especially now that they are getting their ransoms in cash, sometimes dropped in burlap sacks from a buzzing helicopter.

The pirates acknowledge using foreign help.

"All I can tell you is we have people in Nairobi, Djibouti, we have people in Dubai and many other countries," said Gamase Hassan Said, a pirate in Eyl speaking by telephone.

It's currently a small system dealing with relatively small sums in international crime network terms, but from tiny acorns...

Operation Christmas Drop - the 56th year

On Guam, things are getting set for Operation Christmas Drop . Not familiar with this long running "humanitarian airlift?" See here for some background.

The basic idea is to parachute in useful items to remote islands in the Pacific that have no runways:

. . .The air drops are scheduled to begin Dec. 17 and run through Dec. 21.

Operation Christmas Drop is a non-profit organization powered by volunteers from Andersen AFB and the 36th Airlift Squadron from Yokota Air Base, Japan. Every year as part of a training exercise, the two join forces to drop supplies over the Micronesian Islands.

More than 800,000 pounds of humanitarian supplies donated by local businesses, citizens and servicemembers have been dropped throughout the Micronesian Islands.

Photo caption:

Tech. Sgts. Luiz Hernadez and John Kortes fill boxes with clothes at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Dec. 7 during Operation Christmas Drop's box build. Every year in December, Airmen from Andersen AFB and the 36th Airlift Squadron from Yokota Air Base, Japan, drop humanitarian supplies donated by the Guam community over the Micronesian Islands as part of a training exercise. Sergeants Hernadez and Kortes are medics assigned to the 36th Contingency Response Group. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Nichelle Griffiths)

Some "training missions" are better than others...Well done there, AF!

Red arrow points to Guam on map (which should enlarge if you click on it).

I would love someone involved with the operation to send me a map of the route the drop takes.

Official Operation Christmas Drop website here. They take donations via PayPal.