China's Naval Militia

Very interesting read from Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy for the U.S. Naval War College's Chinese Maritime Studies Institute on China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA (pdf):

Photo source: Tankler News

Amid growing awareness that China’s Maritime Militia acts as a Third Sea Force which has been involved in international sea incidents, it is necessary for decision-makers who may face such contingencies to understand the Maritime Militia’s role in China’s armed forces. Chinese-language open sources reveal a tremendous amount about Maritime Militia activities, both in coordination with and independent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Using well-documented evidence from the authors’ extensive open source research, this report seeks to clarify the Maritime Militia’s exact identity, organization, and connection to the PLA as a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA.
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Like a tetherball, the PAFMM may be sent in many different directions when contacted by different players in the Chinese security space, but is often directed by the PLA and always remains tied to the PLA.

Read it, download it and think about it.

China is a power using asymmetric tools in a world they want to change to be more China-centric.

More good stuff from James Kraska on The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia:

China operates a vast network of fishing vessels that form a maritime militia equipped and trained to conduct intelligence, communications, and targeting support for the People's Liberation Army Navy. Fishing vessels normally are exempt from capture or attack in the law of naval warfare unless they are integrated into the naval forces, but distinguishing between legitimate fishing vessels and maritime militia during naval warfare is virtually impossible.

You can download a copy at the link, but the key is that China continually is walking that narrow lawfare line.

Excellent Read: "China and Asian Maritime Security" Testimony of Heritage's Dean Cheng Before the HouseSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs

You ought to read this testimony on China and Asian Maritime Security, which combines Chinese history and current strategy. Some good excerpts:

The rise of Chinese maritime capabilities makes it the first new maritime power to take to the seas since the end of the 19th century. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union, both of which fielded substantial navies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) actually relies upon the oceans for much of its economic activity. This dependence upon the sea also constitutes a radical break from that country’s millennia of history; the imperial treasure fleets of Admiral Zheng He were not nearly as central to Chinese power and livelihood. Thus, the transformation of the PRC from a land power to a maritime one constitutes one of the more fundamental changes in the international scene, certainly since the end of the Cold War, and arguably over the past century.
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This growing dependence on the sea to operate various parts of its economy and maintain its society makes China unique. China is arguably the first continental power that is truly dependent upon the sea. Unlike Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, or the Soviet Union, China cannot look upon the sea as an optional area of operation, but as a vital area of national interest.
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By contrast, since the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and the diversification of China’s manufacturing base, China’s economic center of gravity has shifted toward the the coast. This has allowed such economic centers as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Pudong to more easily access global trade routes for both imports of raw materials and exports of products. This has meant, however, that China’s recent economic development is also more vulnerable to potential attack from the sea.
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An essential part of political warfare is legal warfare. From the Chinese perspective, legal warfare is not the “misuse” of the law, but rather, the exploitation of the law in support of broader political ends.
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Such efforts also exploit not only the law, but also law enforcement agencies. For example, the use of the China Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce Chinese claims over the Senkakus, the Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal not only serves to limit the potential for escalation, but also is a political statement. China is using law enforcement vessels to enforce its laws over its territories, reinforcing its claim to these various features.
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As important, China’s conception of naval operations has steadily expanded. From “near-shore operations,” which roughly equate with coastal and brown-water duties, it has shifted emphasis to “near-sea” and now “far-sea” operations, roughly comparable to green water and blue water activities, respectively. These operations are not necessarily power projection–oriented, however.

The shift of China’s economic center of gravity to its coast, as noted earlier, means that Beijing is at least as interested in keeping foreign air and naval forces away from China’s shores. Indeed, Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) activities should be seen at least partly in this light. Given the range of modern precision-guided munition weapons, however, keeping an adversary away from China’s shores means being able to undertake A2/AD activities at ranges of a thousand miles or more.

To this end, China is likely to employ not only traditional naval forces, but civilian and commercial assets, in unorthodox ways that embody “hybrid” approaches to warfare. China’s fishing fleets, for example, include a substantial number of naval militia assets, essentially civilian vessels that respond to government (including military) assignments as necessary. Such forces could be exploited to provide everything from intelligence gathering to early warning for China’s navy.[16] CCG vessels, some of which were cascaded from the PLAN, can do the same. More disturbingly, China has reportedly installed radars typically found on patrol vessels on some of the oil rigs in the East China Sea.[17] This further blurs the line between military and civilian assets, and suggests a new means by which oil rigs can serve as “mobile national territory,” while further expanding China’s maritime situational awareness envelope.
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The physical space of the South China Sea region itself is an invaluable resource, as it provides a strategic buffer. This is especially important as the PRC has built up the island of Hainan in the northwest corner of the South China Sea. Chinese military engineers have constructed a dock to handle its aircraft carriers, dedicated port facilities, including tunnels, for submarines, and a number of military airfields.[20] (The American EP-3 that collided with a Chinese fighter in 2001 crash-landed at one of these airfields.) In addition, China’s newest spaceport is located on Hainan Island, where it will be lofting future manned Chinese space missions. It is clearly not in the Chinese interest to allow foreign, and especially American, naval capability to make close approaches to Hainan.

Instead, it is in China’s interest to make the South China Sea as forbidding as possible, especially for American submarines, which remain qualitatively superior to their Chinese counterparts. It is therefore not surprising that there appears to be an effort to create a massive sonar surveillance network that would cover the region.[21] Indeed, military bases on the artificial islands China has built in the Spratlys, as well as in the Paracels and perhaps at Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank in the future, could provide convenient sites for processing data, and also for basing anti-submarine warfare aircraft and helicopters. Such deployments would make the deployment of American submarines into those waters far riskier.

Really, read it all.


Hat tip to James Kraska

Must Read: Holmes on China

Important reading from Peter Navarro's interview with Professor James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College at Real Clear Defense's Crouching Tiger: James Holmes on China:

Holmes: The Chinese have been very forthcoming with us about what their aims are. I'm not sure that there's a lack of transparency at all. They've told us face to face, including in meetings here in Newport [at the Naval War College] that they want to set the terms of access to the waters and the skies they claim as their own. That's very straightforward and it conforms pretty much ideally to what they have actually done over the past five years since they seemed to have cast off their soft power offensive – their charm offensive towards the region.

On President Obama’s “pivot” to Asia, Holmes pulls no punches:

Holmes: The metric that President Obama and his advisors have put out is that the United States is going to a 60-40 split [of ships] between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. But if you look at what ten percent of the United States Navy is going to the Pacific, a lot of it is a lighter combat and literal [sic] combat ships. These are not high-end combat assets. So it's a little bit misleading -- and also the pivot is happening very slowly as well. So as diplomatic signals go, as deterrence signals go, this is a pretty Bush{sic] league thing.
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Holmes: The Chinese have been very adept and I've actually been rather impressed with their ability to have a truly maritime strategy. A truly maritime strategy incorporates not just navies but also shore-based hardware – aircraft, missiles, and so forth. It also incorporates law enforcement assets; and for the Chinese, it also includes the fishing fleet. These things that we would think of as commercial vessels – they act as an unofficial arm of Chinese sea power at times.

I think the asymmetry between white hulls and gray hulls is very important. The Chinese are very deft at using these coastguard cutters to essentially stake their claims. These are police assets. The other coastguards reigning in the South China Sea are not nearly big enough or strong enough to stand up to even the China Coastguard.

So if you think about the dilemma that it would put the Philippines or Vietnam or any of these other nations in to counteract these China Coastguard patrols, they would have to use naval force and if it came to shooting, who's going to look like the bad guy? So that's a serious asymmetry that we are still coming to terms with and trying to figure out how, how do you counter such a strategy.

In the face of China’s white-hulled strategy, one of Holmes big concerns is the lack of pushback by a US hamstrung by a shrinking navy. Here, Holmes sees China strategy of expanding its authority as an attempt to establish its own Monroe Doctrine for Asia...

I encourage you to read the whole piece and watch the video at the above link.

As I have noted before, China has the "neighborhood bully" syndrome writ large and hopes to present the world with a fait accompli of "ownership" of the Souh China Sea. The weakness demonstrated by the U.S. in the face of China's actions serves only to assure China's leaders that they are punching a paper dragon.

It doesn't help that  our senior leadership has an very ivory tower, law professor-ish view of the world that seems to  believe that the rule of international law can be enforced through "understandings," vague "agreements" and quasi-treaties, instead of by the willingness and ability to apply proportionate (and perhaps more than proportionate) force to deter bad actors.

 In short, to borrow a phrase from Chairman Mao, ""Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." - a concept well understood by the Chinese leaders.

 Which thinking applies, surprise, surprise to international politics, too. Or, perhaps, especially to international politics. See Clausewitz, "War is the continuation of politics by other means."

Mushy Return Fire: China's "Nine Dashed Line" Fantasy Get Pelted by Marshmallows by the U.S. Department of State

Scott Cheney-Peters guests at USNI News and writes about The Expanding Assault on China's South China Sea Claims, citing what, in my opinion, is a typically mushy U.S. State Department document:

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If you want to cut to the chase, skip all the early stuff and head directly for the conclusion, which notes:

China has not clarified its maritime claims associated with the dashed-line maps in a manner consistent with international law. China’s laws, declarations, official acts, and official statements present conflicting evidence regarding the nature and scope of China’s claims. The available evidence suggests at least three different interpretations that China might intend, including that the dashes are (1) lines within which China claims sovereignty over the islands, along with the maritime zones those islands would generate under the LOS Convention; (2) national boundary lines; or (3) the limits of so-called historic maritime claims of varying types.

How nice of the State Department to suggest China's possible intent, instead of just noting that China lack of clarification is good cover for its attempted "land and sea grab."

Then there is this powerful concluding paragraph:

For these reasons, unless China clarifies that the dashed-line claim reflects only a claim to islands within that line and any maritime zones that are generated from those land features in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the LOS Convention, its dashed-line claim does not accord with the international law of the sea.

You have got to be kidding.

China's "grab" is not, as China well knows, covered by the law of the sea. It is, however, in  "accord" with the law of the "biggest dog" taking what it wants. The acts of a bully pushing around its weaker neighbors while attempting to provide cover for its actions with a fig leaf of "legal right" ("we once sailed through these waters, therefore they are ours" or some such baloney).

State should have written: "China's claims are unmitigated B.S. and serve only as a cover for its attempts to take over the bulk of the South China Sea with flimsiest of excuses, to the detriment both of its neighbors and the freedom of the seas."

Sorry, State, the clarification that is needed here is one that says, "If you try to take the territory and maritime rights of our allies, we will not stand idly by."

I don't think pelting aggressors with marshmallows has ever deterred anything. How many more disasters will it take for State to figure out that weakness in the face of such action just invites more aggression?

China: Attempted Island Grab in the South China Sea

The Chinese apparently have now decided to test Malaysia with a naval exercise on an island offshore Malaysia in the southern South China Sea:

The exercises included the landing of amphibious craft just off the James Shoal, 80 kilometres off the Malaysian coast.

The James Shoal is China's most southerly territorial claim.

It is among several disputed parts of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, that the People's Republic says belong to Beijing.

More here.

Map is the famous "Nine-Dashed Line" or "Cow's Tongue" showing the extent of Chinese South China Sea territorial claims.

I placed the yellow oval to show James Shoal area.

Southeast Asia: India, China and Sea Power

Interesting piece at the Foreign Policy website, "India's Ocean" by Dhruva Jaishankar, posing one of those fundamental questions, "What is the role of the Indian Navy as China asserts dominance to India's east?":

For its part, China needs to appreciate that its aggressive pursuit of maritime territory compels India to cooperate more closely with Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing's issuing of passports this November featuring a map showing the fullest extent of its territorial claims was a remarkably clumsy gesture, provoking simultaneous outrage in India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China may have only itself to blame if these states find greater common cause with one another, and with other regional maritime powers.

The map above indicates key Chinese sea lines of communication. You might take note of India's position relative to them.

You also might take a look at the Thomas X. Hammes piece, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict (pdf), which suggests a "distant blockade" (or "Offshore Control") of China as a possible strategy:

The strategy of Offshore Control works with willing Asia-Pacific nations to ensure that the United States can interdict China’s energy and raw material imports and industrial exports, while protecting our partners.

Col. Hammes's thoughts are also set out in December 2012 U.S. Naval Institute article, "Offshore Control is the Answer":

Offshore control would deny China the use of the sea inside the first island chain, at the same time defend those islands, and dominate the air and sea outside that theater. It envisions a stand-off military campaign focusing on a war of economic strangulation rather than on penetrating Chinese airspace to physically destroy its infrastructure. It seeks to force China to fight in ways that maximize U.S. strengths while minimizing China’s. In essence, OC provides a strategic context for an operational approach that goes beyond Air-Sea Battle to use the U.S. geographical advantage to maximize the effectiveness of a campaign using our air, sea, and land assets.

Oh, and if you were wondering about the value of a strong U.S. Navy - this discussion is right on point. Being able to project power even when it needs to be done without local help - that's a big chunk of the Navy's job description.

Keep in mind that it is the job of the military strategist to work through "unlikely" scenarios just in case. Next time some idiot media hack reports on secret U.S. plans to re-take Midway Island based upon some outlandish event occurrence, it shouldn't really be a shock to you.

UPDATE: There has been some notice of the fact I used an "oil flow" map to illustrate this post. Here is a more recent map that shows vital sea lanes (click on it to enlarge), followed up by a closer view in the China region:

China: South China Sea Threats and Denials

China is doing one of its usual song and dance routines with respect to its claims to a large chunk of the South China Sea. First, it announces an increase in the authority of its "patrols" in the area as set out in Patrols in Hainan get more clout:

Police in Hainan will be authorized to board and search ships that illegally enter the province's waters in 2013, the latest Chinese effort to protect the South China Sea.

Under a set of regulation revisions the Hainan People's Congress approved on Tuesday, provincial border police are authorized to board or seize foreign ships that illegally enter the province's waters and order them to change course or stop sailing.

The full texts of the regulations, which take effect on Jan 1, will soon be released to the public, said Huang Shunxiang, director of the congress's press office.

Activities such as entering the island province's waters without permission, damaging coastal defense facilities, and engaging in publicity that threatens national security are illegal.

If foreign ships or crew members violate regulations, Hainan police have the right to take over the ships or their communications systems, under the revised regulations. (emphasis added)

Of course, this was followed by other semi-disclaimers, see China values free navigation in S. China Sea for example:

China attaches great importance to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said at a regular press briefing on Friday.

Hong made the remarks in response to a question regarding recent reports that border patrol police in south China's island province of Hainan were given the power to embark on and check ships that illegally enter its waters.

China conducts marine management in accordance with international law and national law and safeguards its territorial sovereignty and rights over the South China Sea, the spokesman said.

"Meanwhile, we insist that all relevant disputes with neighboring countries should be resolved through friendly negotiation and consultation," Hong said.

All countries have freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, he said.

"China highly values free navigation in the South China Sea," Hong said. "At present, there are no problems in this regard."

Or, China seeks no marine hegemony: spokesman:

China's Defense Ministry spokesman on Thursday stressed that the country's move to build itself into a maritime power has nothing to do with seeking hegemony.

China wants to become a maritime power in order to enhance its capacity to exploit marine resources, develop the marine economy, safeguard the country's maritime rights and interests, and ensure a sustainable economic and social development, Geng Yansheng told a regular press conference.

That does not mean that China is aiming at expanding its presence at sea, nor at marine hegemony, Geng said.

Chinese leader Hu Jintao's report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China earlier this month spelt out future efforts to build China into a maritime power.

The spokesman further denied interpretations that this position indicates a more hardline approach by China in its marine sovereignty claims, such as over the Diaoyu Islands.

"China's stance of safeguarding the country's legitimate sovereign rights and interests should not be regarded as a hardline approach," he said.

According to Geng, China will resolutely protect its sovereignty, security and development interests and will never yield to any outside pressure.

Safeguarding the country's marine rights and interests is one of the military's important duties and the army will well perform its duties under the country's deployment, Geng said.

Meanwhile, the spokesman noted, China is always committed to peaceful settlement of international disputes and opposes the wanton use of force or threat to use it.

China's armed forces advocate and follow the concept of a "harmonious ocean," and comply with the UN Charter as well as other international laws and rules, Geng said, adding that the Chinese military is active in taking part in international dialogue and cooperation in marine security and is willing to join other countries in maintaining security at sea.

Right, just remember that deeds speak louder than words.

Oh, yeah, and what the heck is "engaging in publicity that threatens national security?"

East China Sea: War Drum Beats Faintly in the Background

Wall Street Journal video, "Japan Calls for Greater Defense Against China's Military Aggression in the East China Sea":

China: Using Presence to Build Dominance in the South China Sea

Interesting read at gCaptain, discussing "another" Chinese fleet (meaning not the PLAN) - more specifically, the Chinese Maritime Surveillance force- dubbed there as "China’s Great White Fleet".

Floating under that tag will be a planned 350 or so ships which already are establishing themselves as a "presence" in what are hotly contested sea areas.

One such area is the portion of the South China Sea falling under the "nine dotted line," (see the nearby "Nine Dotted Line" map) sometimes referred to as "China's Cows Tongue" (see also China and the South China Sea: Back to the "Cow's Tongue").

As set out in the gCaptain post:

Worries extend not only over the larger nation’s diplomatic claims over the region – claims in which China argues span centuries of maritime history – but in China’s increasing military strength in the region. At the heart of the problem is the aggressive newbuild strategy of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) agency, a paramilitary maritime law enforcement agency created on 19 October 1998 under the auspices of China’s State Oceanic Administration and responsible for law enforcement within the territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and shores of the People’s Republic Of China.
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Painted white with the English words, “China Marine Surveillance” emblazoned in tall blue letters across the sides of their hulls, the vessels being built for CMS are reminiscent of the great battleships built by the United States at the turn of the last century...
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While the CM ships are relatively small, between 78 and 98 meters in length, and may be only lightly armed, they are certainly enough to intimidate fishing vessels and may prove effective in future actions against larger targets.
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The CMS fleet has the proven audacity and speed to harass vessels of sizes ranging from small fishing boats to the 281 foot (85.78 m) USNS Impeccable, but unarmed fixed structures may be the primary target. Agency vessels are keeping a close eye on offshore oil and gas structures in the region and, in March of this year, CMS issued a press release citing the successful surveillance of “illegal exploration of oil and gas fields” in the South China Sea . . .

The gCaptain post goes on to note a report of a small Indian "convoy" being "welcomed" to the South China Sea by Chinese naval forces which then escorted the Indian vessels for several hours. Such a "welcome" might just be one way to let people know who the dominant power in the area is.

Using the combination of CMA and PLAN ships to "surveill" is damn clever way to assert maritime dominance.

A report on the CMS can be found at China Daily's
"Expansion of fleet to safeguard sea rights":

An SOA [State Oceanic Administration] official, who requested anonymity, told China Daily on Wednesday that the lack of ocean surveillance ships has hindered the country's ability to protect its maritime rights.

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Sea disputes between China and other countries have surged in recent months.

Sino-Japanese relations have been strained since a collision between two Japan Coast Guard patrol boats and a Chinese trawler on Sept 7 in waters off the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.

Beijing suspended all high-level contacts with Tokyo after Japan illegally detained the Chinese captain. China has since sent several fishery administrative ships to monitor the region.

In the South China Sea, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei all have competing claims over some Chinese islands.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in July that sovereignty issues in the South China Sea were a "diplomatic priority" for the US and proposed dealing with them in the international arena.

"The new ships (joining the fleet) can be interpreted as China's response to recent sea disputes," said Wang Hanling, a maritime law specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

One more thing to keep an eye on.

UPDATE: Salamander is on the case with a nice link to Professor Holmes at China’s Monroe Doctrine, which points out the differences in the current situation.

UPDATE2: About that "escort service" provided to the Indians from The Indian Express .
Indian Navy in South China Sea: Beijing’s unwelcome escort:

The PLAN’s challenge to India was presented in a typical and exquisite Chinese style. In ‘welcoming’ and ‘escorting’ the Indian naval unit, the PLAN was showing India its velvet covered fist.

The message is this: “nice to see you here, but you are in our territorial waters and within them there is no right to ‘freedom of navigation’ for military vessels. You are here at our sufferance.”