VertRep

VertRep

Saturday, November 22, 2008

Latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 21 Nov 08)

The latest Latest ONI Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report (to 21 Nov 08) is up. Highlights:
1. ONI SPECIAL ADVISORY: SRI LANKA: Sri Lankan government troops captured the strategic northern town of Pooneryn on 15 Nov 08, the last remaining stronghold of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the island’s north-west coast. The fall of Pooneryn is considered a significant blow to the LTTE, which has held the town and surrounding areas since 1997. This capture by the Sri Lankan government further isolates the rebel forces from their sea supplies and constrains their territory. ONI Comment: When government forces have scored significant gains ashore in the past, LTTE has often counterattacked with terror tactics in ports in the Island's south and east, particularly at Trincomalee. All maritime interests are advised to maintain increased security vigilance in and near Sri Lanka waters (UPI, ONI).

2. SOMALIA/UN: The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on pirates, arms smugglers, and perpetrators of instability in Somalia in a fresh attempt to help end years of lawlessness in the Horn of Africa nation, 20 Nov reporting. The 15-nation council endorsed a British plan for a council panel to recommend people and entities whose financial assets would be frozen and who would face a travel ban. It also reaffirms an arms embargo. Enforcing the sanctions poses steep challenges, however, as those responsible for much of the anarchy plaguing the country are well outside any traditional finance system. The council action was followed by discussion on the deteriorating situation in Somalia - both on land and at sea, which includes some of the world's most important shipping routes. U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Raisuddin Zenenga said the multinational effort being mobilized to fight the pirates off Somalia - involving the European Union, NATO countries, Russia, India and others - should be replicated to mobilize an international force to tackle the security problems in Somalia itself. U.S. deputy ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo called for immediate steps to stabilize the deteriorating security situation, which threatens political progress and an Oct. 26 cease-fire agreement between the Somali government and the insurgents. She stressed that piracy is "a direct result of the lack of rule of law and desperate economic conditions on the ground." DiCarlo urged the international community strengthen the beleaguered 3,450-strong African Union force in Somalia to protect food shipments. The African Union also urged the U.N. to quickly send peacekeepers to Somalia (AP).

3. GULF OF ADEN: An Indian navy frigate battled with, and sank a vessel described as a pirate mother ship in the Gulf of Aden, per 18 Nov reporting. Amid a surge of piracy around the hijacking-plagued Horn of Africa, the Indian navy said in a statement that fire from its (INS TABAR) set the pirate vessel aflame after it failed to stop for investigation. The Indian navy statement said that before the Tuesday night battle, the crew of the renegade vessel could be seen on board with a full complement of modern weapons and tools -- satellite phones, night-vision goggles, AK-47 assault rifles, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The ship was spotted while the (TABAR) was patrolling 285 nautical miles southwest of the coast of Oman on Tuesday evening. The (TABAR) crew demanded that the vessel stop. But the pirate ship responded by threatening to "blow up the naval warship if it closed on her," the navy statement said. The pirates then fired on the (TABAR), and the Indian crew responded. Some of the pirates tried to escape on two speedboats that the larger vessel had in tow. One boat was later found abandoned, while the second escaped (Washington Post Foreign Service).

4. GULF OF ADEN: British Royal Navy commandos gave chase to suspected pirates off the coast of Yemen, killing two of them in an ensuing gunfight, 11 Nov 08. The (HMS CUMBERLAND) was on a routine patrol in the Gulf of Aden when it spotted a Yemeni registered fishing boat, positively identified in a hijacking attempt on a Danish cargo ship, (MV POWERFUL) earlier in the day, according to the UK’s Ministry of Defense. After “non forcible methods” to stop the dhow failed, the Royal Navy launched small assault craft to encircle the vessel. The pirates opened fire and the Navy fired back in self defense, according to the MoD statement. Two foreign nationals, believed to be Somali, were shot and killed. A Yemeni was found injured and later died. It wasn’t clear whether his injuries were due to the gunfight or to a previous incident. After the gunfight, members of the British frigate boarded the dhow, whose crew “subsequently surrendered and a compliant boarding followed,” according to the MoD. The boarding was conducted in accordance with UK rules of engagement. The confrontation took place approximately 50NM south of the Yemeni coast (Bloomberg, Times Online).

***
6. GULF OF ADEN: The European Union (EU) has initiated a “Close Support Protection”system for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden per 31 Oct 08 reporting. The French navy will be the first to offer this service. The French Navy is able to provide protection teams onboard two merchant vessels at a time. Only two vessels will have the protection teams onboard upon request. The rest of the ships intending to follow this “group of protected vessels” can do so without the protection teams onboard. The presence of the warships will deter pirates from attacking any vessels in the group. Vessels can also call the nearby warships for assistance when attacked by pirates. In the next three months, the following slots are proposed: Point A (SW of the Gulf of Aden): 12°30N-045°00E; Point B (North of Socotra Island): 14°40N-053°00E. From A to B: 28 - 29 October, 21 - 22 November, 25 - 26 November, 4 - 5 December, 22 - 23 December. From B to A: 30 - 31 October, 23 - 24 November, 27 - 28 November, 6 - 7 December, 24 - 25 December. All rendezvous are on first day of slot at 0800 LT (A: GMT + 3, B: GMT + 4). Average speed is 14 knots. Technical agreement between ship-owners and French navy has to be established prior to the protection team being embarked. Civilian vessels willing to benefit from such escorts have to make contact 10 days before slot.*** Please note: last minute changes may arise. Ships have the option to follow the “group of protected vessels” by French navy or transit via the established maritime security patrol area in the Gulf of Aden. Masters using the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) and those following the ‘group of protected vessels’ are not relieved of their obligation and should continue to maintain a strict 24 hour lookout using all available means to get early warnings of an approaching threat. Some vessels have been attacked/hijacked in the corridor (IMB).
***
2. VENEZUELA: Sailboat (CHILL) boarded, captain killed 9 Nov 2008 at 1730 local time while anchored at position 10:17N – 064:45W at Isla Borracha. Three men onboard a small fishing piƱero approached the sailboat asking for water. When the captain came back up from below with water, they shot him in the chest. Another couple from a sailboat anchored with the (CHILL) was also onboard and the robbers shot a second man as well. The second manreportedly shot at the robbers with a shotgun, killing one and injuring another. The captain died while the second man is recovering at a hospital, according to officials. One suspect has been detained in the nearby town of Arapito, but has yet to be formally charged (AP, Noonsite). ***

Friday, November 21, 2008

Somali Pirates: Latest NATO Piracy Slide (as of 18 Nov 08)

Latest NATO Shipping Centre Piracy Slide (as of 18 Nov 08) follows. I added the suspected location of MV Sirius Star, the Saudi VLCC off the coast of Haradheere, otherwise the work is all NATO's:
The latest NATO Shipping Centre Somali Piracy information from here:
The total number of commercial vessels (including one tug)hijacked in Somali waters now stands at 14; over 200 merchant seamen are held by pirates. The use of mother-ships seems to be on the rise, and potentially, vessels are hijacked with the sole intention of using them as such.

In short, the trends in latest piracy incidents are as follows:

* Targeting larger cargo / oil / gas / chemical tankers
* Approaches / attacks conducted from 2-3 small speedboats with 3-5 armed persons each. The number of boats involved in each incident seems to be increasing.
The picture should enlarge and become clearer if you click on it.

Somali Pirates: A couple of more Russian warships to head to pirate waters

Reported here:
Russia says it will send more warships to combat piracy in the waters off Somalia.

The RIA Novosti news agency quotes the head of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky as saying the ships are needed to fight intensifying pirate activity.

A Russian destroyer, the Neustrashimy, is already patrolling the Gulf of Aden, along with ships from the United States, India, and other countries.

Meanwhile, countries bordering the Red Sea are holding an emergency meeting in Cairo to discuss strategies for fighting the pirates. Egypt is concerned the attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean will stop shipping companies from using the Suez Canal, one of the country's main profit centers.
***
Encouraged by millions of dollars in ransom payments, Somali pirates have been hijacking ships at an unprecedented rate. The International Maritime Bureau says more than 90 ships have been attacked this year, and at least 36 hijacked.

The pirates are believed to be holding 17 ships at the moment with some 300 crew members.

Thursday, November 20, 2008

Pirates of Somalia: Asymmetric Warfare

Back in 2004, when the pirates of Somalia were small time operators, there was a perceived threat to world trade in the Strait of Malacca, where pirates were very active. At that time, there was a series of articles by Eric Koo (see here for links)which contained the conclusion:
Piracy and maritime terrorism are forms of asymmetrical warfare that non-state actors use as instruments in disrupting the peace and security of states. It is therefore necessary for navies to revamp and find new definitions for their role in the modern security context.
Recently the pirates of Somalia have been engaging in a form of economic asymmetric warfare in which shipping passing along regular shipping routes has been attacked and held for ransom. This has had the effect of interfering with sea-going commerce, raising insurance rates on shipping companies and even causing some shippers to re-route their ships on longer, more expensive routes to avoid these pirates. There have even been articles about how the pirates of Somalia may caused disappointment around the Christmas holiday as they are slowing deliveries of gaming systems...

Others, more malevolent in thought, have noticed that this is a form of warfare. For example, take a look at this, titled "Black Africans give world a lesson in Asymmetric Warfare:
Superpowers are in shock over the news that Somali pirates have seized a super tanker three times the size of an aircraft carrier off the coast of Kenya! Perhaps we should recall the destructive actions of the USA around the globe but particularly in Somali. The national economy is completely ruined; faced with starvation or slavery, Somalis have developed a lucrative sub-economy from the proceeds of piracy.

It is only fitting that a super tanker laden with precious oil and destined for America is taken. A HUGE ransom will no doubt be paid and perhaps idiot America may learn to fully assess the long-term consequences of its mindless, violent actions? In contrast, China continues to develop oil and other African resources in partnership with local governments. The question remains, will MORON, ‘Wyatt Earp,’ finally learn that INVADED PEOPLE HAVE A TENDENCY TO FIGHT BACK; NO ONE TOLERATES FOREIGN INVADERS AND MURDERING THIEVES IN THEIR HOMELAND, Doh! Think on these things when you are kicked out of Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, Uncle.

Somalis may also be sending a clear message to the new, black, puppet/slave American President – one need not serve or acquiesce to foreign imperial powers. I feel an identity crisis coming on, Barack! We take this opportunity to reinforce the notion that Obama is a ‘white’ man!

American ruling elites thought it expedient to keep their population ignorant and ‘dumbed down.’ The dumber America gets the smarter the world! Western naval commanders are in awe of the audacity and tactical sophistication of Somali seafarers.
Perhaps it shouldn't be surprising that the attack on the incoming U.S. president mirrors the language recently spat out by al Qaeda's alleged number 2, who referred to the president-elect as a "house slave", as al Qaeda is all about one of the major aspects of asymmetric warfare - propaganda. To the extent that the U.S. might be seen as a nation of opportunity, al Qaeda loses a major talking point, one it apparently wants back.

Be that as it may, the apparent ease with which major commercial ships are captured by pirates with limited weaponry is causing reasonable people to finally take notice of the threat, including the suggestion of the potential for terrorists to capture ships and use them for nefarious purposes, an inclination not yet observed in the Somali pirates, who seem to be all about the money gained in ransoming back the ships they capture. See, for example, this article from Canada's Globe and Mail which contains a warning about potential terrorists capturing big ships:
Unlike their Barbary Coast forebears, Somalia's pirates aren't even interested in selling ships or their cargo - simply ransoming them for millions. But a graver danger lurks. If a handful of pirates can seize a freighter, a handful of terrorists could hijack a cruise ship or perhaps a liquefied natural-gas tanker.

"What I worry about is the bleed from criminal pirate activity to terrorist activity," said Peter Brookes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defence who served in the U.S. Navy.

Nonetheless, as indicated in earlier posts (see Asymmetric Warfare: Terrorists, Small Boats, Explosives and Unarmed, Unescorted Ships, for example), terrorists grabbing a ship at sea and driving it toward a chokepoint could pose a problem, though not for the reasons you might think - taking a ship and driving it to the U.S. and exploding it in a harbor would be very hard. On the other hand, as was first discussed here by CDR Salamander, the threat to major U.S. ships is not just the pirate/terrorist who decides to blow himself up:
In a comment to another post, CDR Salamander wrote: "150,000-ton at flank speed; how do you stop it once it turns your way? If you are toddling around a 7kts and she turns prior to her 5,000yd CPA to port? Oh, lets be nice and say he is only going 20kts (sneaky fellow is he). Being simple men, lets round things down to a 20kt average combined closure speed when he turns prior to CPA (he then goes to flank and you respond by a turn to starboard and hit the juice....but you are on a LHD, not a nuke and it takes awhile to speed up). Using our handy "6 minute rule", you have about 7.5 minutes to react there shipmate. Mmmmm. Its the mid-watch. It takes 45 seconds for Seaman Farmer and the OOD LTJG PilotWashout to realize what is going on, and 15 seconds for brain-mouth-helm to do anything (oh, and don't forget to tell the Skipper-oh there he is, in his undies yelling his head off). Lets say you are in the Babara Mandral, um I mean Bab-El-Mandab Straits …."
As I translated then:
As I understand his comment, he is expressing concern over bad things that could happen if "bad guys" were to seize control of a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) like the Yohteisan. He notes that a ship with that much mass presents difficulties to someone who wanders in its way.

If you are on another ship - perhaps a smaller warship, how would you try to stop the VLCC if it headed toward you or toward some ship that you were trying to protect? The second issue concerns whether you will be able to get your own ship out of the way is the VLCC suddenly was pointed at you... Suppose you are operating in a restricted sea lane (meaning a narrow area in which your maneuvering is restricted by the presence of navigation hazards, other ships or the like).

Due to some calculations, you determine that the VLCC, if it maintains its present course and speed, will pass harmlessly 5000 yards (2.5 nautical miles) off your port (left) side at its Closest Point of Approach (CPA). You are traveling at 7 knots (about 9 mph). The VLCC does something drastic, however, and does not maintain its safe course or speed. Instead, it increases speed (though it might take a while) and turns toward your intended path, so that the CPA now calculates to be a collision with you.

Now, there are people on watch on your ship, who might take a few minutes to realize that the VLCC has altered its course and speed. Given the distances and speed involved, you have about 7.5 minutes to do something to get out of the VLCC's way from the time the VLCC first makes its move (under the nautical rule of thumb that the distance a ship travels in 6 minutes (in nautical miles) is equal to the Ship's Speed (in knots) divided by 10 (the "6 minute rule"). Thus, if the closing speed is 20 knots, then in 6 minutes, the ships will close to within 1/2 mile of each other. That additional 1/2 mile will take 1.5 minutes. Thus, move to collision total time= 7.5 minutes).

Ships are not sports cars, and once the situation is developing, it will take some time for the ship to be able to react (which depends on the type of ship involved). Given the built-in human delays, mechanical delays, and all the other problems inherent in a crisis (such as effective communication -the "brain-mouth-helm" issue refers to the Officer of the Deck (OOD) (person on watch in charge of driving the ship at that moment having to figure out what's happening, formulate a plan to alter the situation and effectively announce that plan to the sailor who has the helm (ship steering wheel) so that the plan can be implemented by the sailor turning the wheel in the right direction). And remember that you are in restricted waters, so you might not be able to simply turn and "run away" in just any direction (in fact, in some cases the best course may be to turn toward the VLCC ...).

In addition, the situation may actually become complicated by the sudden arrival of your ship's commanding officer on the bridge as he tries to come to grips with the situation and formulate his own plan to get his ship out of the way of the VLCC. And matters can get really bad if you happen to be in, say, the narrow strait of Bab-el-Mandab, which has been categorized as a "chokepoint" . . .
***
The net effect of not being alert and making bad decisions could result, as I was taught very long ago, "in a collision at sea that could ruin your whole day." And, in the right place, at the wrong time, the days of lots of other folks, too.
Now, there are a number of factors that might militate against terrorists being able to accomplish a collision between to huge ships, but if you are looking for worst case scenarios...

In a world of such possibilities, commercial interests do need to look at their own protective systems for their ships, there are not enough ships in all the navies of the world to protect all ships at all times in all sea lanes.

Wednesday, November 19, 2008

U.S. Defense Department on the Pirates of Somalia

DefenseLink News Article: Military, Shippers Must Work Together to Deter Pirates, Official Says:
Military, Shippers Must Work Together to Deter Pirates, Official Says By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19, 2008 – Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell today defended the military effort to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and called on commercial ships to do more against this scourge of the sea.

The U.S. 5th Fleet forms the core of the American effort in the Maritime Security Patrol Area, but other nations are involved. “Any number of countries are out there now, patrolling and having a deterrent effect in a huge body of water,” Morrell said. The Gulf of Aden – where recent attacks have occurred – has about 1.1 million square miles of open water.

More than 20 nations – under command of a Danish flag officer – are coordinating their efforts in the region.

The increasing level of piracy is having an impact on commercial shipping. Insurance rates for ships transiting the area went from $900 a year ago to $9,000 today, officials said. The criminal activity also affects the safety of mariners and has slowed delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia – the ungoverned area from which the pirates are operating.

The United States is working with the commercial shipping industry and the International Maritime Organization to ensure that crews employ reasonable self-protection measures -- proactive look-outs, evasive maneuvers and embarked security teams, for example -- to discourage pirates from attempting to take their vessels.

Though the overall number of successful pirate attacks has decreased, numbers of attempted attacks have risen, Pentagon officials said. Of 95 reported attacks on merchant vessels in 2008, 39 have been successful. The pirates have kidnapped 330 mariners, representing seamen from 25 nations.

Some attacks are thwarted by the presence of coalition military forces, while simple defensive measures have thwarted others. Embarked security teams are one way to foil these attacks, and U.S. officials are working to convince shippers to have these teams.

“Companies don’t even think twice about using security guards to protect their goods on shore,” said Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman. “Protecting valuable ships at sea shouldn’t be any different.”

Though naval forces have the duty to protect international shipping lanes, shipping companies also have an obligation to secure their ships and to help prevent piracy incidents, Morrell said.

“There are shared responsibilities here,” the press secretary said. “I think we are stepping to the plate -- doing more than ever, for that matter. I think it's incumbent upon the companies to look more and more at what they can do to try to prevent these incidents from happening.”

The problem also includes a governance aspect, Morrell noted.

“This problem emanates not at sea. … It starts onshore, and clearly the Somali government needs help,” he said.

Somalia has no functioning government, and the warlords in the various regions do not have the capacity to deal with stopping piracy. Somalia needs more help from the United Nations and the African Union “to try to deal with some of the economic and governance problems that lead to the pirates,” Morrell said.
UPDATE: Added photo. Caption:
The Liberian-flagged oil tanker MV Sirius Star is at anchor Wednesday, Nov. 19, 2008 off the coast of Somalia. The Saudi-owned very large crude carrier was hijacked by Somali pirates Nov. 15 about 450 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya and forced to proceed to anchorage near Harardhere, Somalia. U.S. Navy photo by Aviation Warfare Systems Operator 2nd Class William S. Stevens (Released)

Pirates and the law: What law?

A few days ago, a well-meaning legal writer suggested here, that fighting the pirates of Somalia would be an "easy win" for the incoming president of the United States:
Might piracy be a relatively easy place for the Obama administration to demonstrate its approach to use of force, multilateralism, and international law? No use of force question is ever truly easy - law of unintended consequences always in effect - but clearly this is a rising issue, and one in which the vessels of many nations have been attacked and continue at risk.
Quite honestly I don't think the author understands the issues involved when sovereignty rights meet human rights in the middle of the world's shipping lanes. I would note that most states involved in the pirate thwarting effort seem to be mostly interested in preventing attacks than in capturing or attacking the low level pirates who are actually out at sea doing he handiwork of higher ups ashore. About the only pirates killed off Somalia have been those dumb enough to shoot at naval forces.

Today's Wall Street Journal has another look,written by lawyers, at pirates at Pirates Exploit Confusion About International Law:
One solution would be for the capturing state to press charges based on the much misunderstood and abused principle of "universal" jurisdiction. This is the notion that any state may criminalize and punish conduct that violates certain accepted international law norms. Although its application in most circumstances is dubious -- there is very little actual state practice supporting the right of one state to punish the nationals of a second for offenses against the citizens of a third -- piracy is one area where a strong case for universal jurisdiction can be made (if only because piratical activities often take place on the high seas, beyond any state's territorial jurisdiction).
***
Moreover, given the nature of naval operations, discerning who is a pirate is usually a much easier task than separating Taliban and al Qaeda members from innocent bystanders. This fact, all things being equal, should make the task of prosecuting captured pirates an easier process, both from the legal and public relations perspective.
I am not sure that the last quoted paragraph is entirely true. One of the problems in fighting the Somali pirates is the fact that it is hard to spot them until they actually attack a ship - and they usually only attack ships when it is clear that the ship they're attacking is not within easy range of a war ship. And once they've captured a ship and holding hostages, the ability to attack them dwindles unless hostage lives are to be put at risk. Otherwise, the pirates look a whole lot like all the other sea traffic bobbing around offshore...

And, as is obvious to mariners, but perhaps not so to landsmen, there is lot of sea out there off Somalia. Somalia has the longest coastline on the African continent and, as now seems evident, the pirates are willing to extend their reach up to 500 miles off shore, that's a whole lot more water than can be patrolled by 20 or 30 or 40 ships.

Once again I say, as I set out here, escorts and anti-pirate patrols might contain (somewhat) the pirates, but if you want them defeated, you need to take down their shore support. With Somalia, that means that you might end up owning the "Somalia problem" and I see no nation or group of nations ready to step forward to take on that challenge.

For those in need of a refresher in anti-piracy law, here are some pertinent sections from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
HIGH SEAS

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 86. Application of the provisions of this Part

The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State...
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Article 100. Duty to co-operate in the repression of piracy

All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

Article 101. Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depreda tion, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or air-craft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act des cribed in subparagraph (a) or (b).

Article 102. Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.

Article 103. Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.

Article 104. Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft

A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

Article 105. Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 106. Liability for seizure without ad equate grounds

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

Article 107. Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy

A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.
***
Article 110. Right of visit

1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:

(a) the ship is engaged in piracy...
***
Article 111. Right of hot pursuit

1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued ouside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established.

2. The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones.

3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State.

4. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship is within the limits of the territorial sea, or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.

5. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

Somali Pirates: Indian Navy takes out "Mother Ship"

Reported here:
An Indian naval vessel sank a suspected pirate "mother ship" in the Gulf of Aden and chased two attack boats into the night, officials said Wednesday, yet more violence in the lawless seas where brigands are becoming bolder and more violent.
***
multicoalition naval force has increased patrols in the region, and scored a rare success Tuesday when the Indian warship, operating off the coast of Oman, stopped a ship similar to a pirate vessel mentioned in numerous piracy bulletins. The Indian navy said the pirates fired on the INS Tabar after the officers asked it to stop to be searched.

"Pirates were seen roaming on the upper deck of this vessel with guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers," said a statement from the Indian navy. Indian forces fired back, sparking fires and a series of onboard blasts — possibly due to exploding ammunition — and destroying the ship.

They chased one of two speedboats that had been shadowing the larger ship, and which fled when it sank. One was later found abandoned. The other escaped, according to the statement.



Somali Pirates: Thai Fishing Boat Captured

Reported as Somali pirates hijack Thai fishing boat, 16 crew. There are now 17 vessels being hled by Somali pirates:
A Thai ship with 16 crew members and an Iranian cargo vessel with a crew of 25 were hijacked Tuesday in the Gulf of Aden, where Somalia-based pirates appear to be attacking ships at will, said Noel Choong of the International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting center in Malaysia.

"It's getting out of control," Choong said.

The incidents raised to eight the number of ships hijacked this week alone, he said. Since the beginning of the year 39 ships have been hijacked in the Gulf of Aden, out of 95 attacked.

"There is no firm deterrent, that's why the pirate attacks are continuing," Choong said. "The criminal activities are flourishing because the risks are low and the rewards are extremely high."

The pirates used to mainly roam the waters off the Somali coast, but now they have spread in every direction and are targeting ships further at sea, according to Choong.

He said 17 vessels remain in the hands of pirates along with more than 300 crew members, including a Ukrainian ship loaded with weapons and a Saudi Arabian supertanker carrying $100 million in crude.

A multicoalition naval force has increased patrols in the region, and scored a success Tuesday when an Indian warship destroyed a suspected pirate ship that had opened fire off the coast of Oman.

The Indian navy said the pirates fired on the INS Tabar after the officers asked it to stop to be searched. Indian forces fired back, destroying the ship, and then chased one of the speed boats, which was later found abandoned. The other escaped, according to a navy statement.

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Somalia Pirates: Grain ship grabbed in Gulf of Aden

Reported as Hong Kong grain ship hijacked by pirates:
A Hong Kong cargo ship loaded with wheat bound for Iran has been hijacked by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, the official Xinhua agency said on Tuesday citing China's maritime search and rescue centre.

There were 25 crew members on board, none of them from Hong Kong or the Chinese mainland. The ship was carrying 36,000 tonnes of wheat to Iran's Bandar Abbas port, the report said.


This report includes a video concerning why sea-going military force can't stop the Somali pirates. Unless, of course, a serious convoy system is put in place or someone invades Somalia. See here for an earlier post on containing the Somali pirates.

UPDATE: Possible photo of newly captured ship Delight from Shipspotting.com, photo by Tim Becker.

Monday, November 17, 2008

Victory in Iraq Day, November 22, 2008




It's party time!

Victory in Iraq Day, November 22, 2008

All who stayed the course are invited to hoist a tall cool one - and for the men and women in places where they can't - from now until whenever, every bar I walk into the question will be asked: Are you a veteran? Free drinks for you on me if you answer "Affirmative."

Put it on your calendar. Bake a pie. I'm cooking ribs on the grill.

Update: And maybe, just maybe, I'll have something cold to drink.

Logistics, logistics, logistics

The Captain’s Journal asks How Many Troops Can We Logistically Support in Afghanistan?

A recent Pakistani supply route closure (since re-opened) raises the issue for the general public, but logistics is always on the minds of professional warriors.

Sustainability is the watchword.

How many C-17s do we have?

Monday Reading

Fred Fry's Maritime Monday 136 @gCaptain.com. Fred reviews the past week and gets you ready for new events. He also a a Belgian bunkering business.

CDR Salamander goes "open letter" to CNO on the new Navy Working Uniform here. It is not the worst uniform the Navy has looked at in the past 40 years (I reserve that for the ill-fated, unlamented double knits) but it comes very close. Very Third World, if you know what I mean. Personal for CNO: "It's okay to borrow from the Army."

I like the Coast Guard, and CGblog is attempting to get the Life-Savers to donate to Project Valour-IT, which is a great thing, no matter which service you support. If you like orange stripes on your ships, go and give. Thanks.(of course, if you like haze gray ships, you can donate to the Navy through the link here. And thanks for that, too.

Somalia Pirates: New south Somalia group?


That's the question posed in the November 14 Piracy Alert fron the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre here, following a series of new incidents away from the Gulf of Aden:
23.10.2008: 1737 UTC: Posn: 03:47S – 042:46E: 180nm of Mombasa, Kenya. * Pirates in two speedboats chased and fired on a container ship underway. Later, the speedboats aborted. Vessel sustained bullet-hole damages.

13.11.2008: 1245 UTC: Posn: 04:51.4S – 044:4.1E: off Kenya / southern Somalia. * Pirates heavily armed with automatic weapons and RPG in white speedboats chased and fired on a containers ship underway. Master took evasive manoeuvres and prevented boarding. Ship sustained damage and fire due to the gunshots and RPG.

14.11.2008: Kenyan waters * Unconfirmed report indicated that pirates attacked and hijacked a fishing vessel from Kenyan waters. They sailed the vessel into Somali waters. 24 crewmembers taken hostage onboard. Further details waited.

It appears that a different group of pirates believed to be Somali pirates may be operating further south of Somalia probably targeting ships enroute to Mombasa, Kenya, where ships would sail closer to coast to arrive port.

All ships are strongly advised to maintain a strict 24 hours visual and radar watch off Kenya and Somalia. Early assessment / detection will allow ships to take evasive measures to prevent boarding and request for assistance.
Given the reported capture of a VLCC in nearby waters (see here), that's good advice.

UPDATE: Based on IMB info and thecapture of the Saudi tanker, I developed the new "Danger Zone" map seen above.

Somali Pirates: Shipping Company Will Avoid Gulf of Aden

A Norwegian shipping group is going "risk adverse" on sailing its ships through the piracy rich Gulf of Aden and will re-route its vessels around Africa despite additional time and costs involved, as set out here:
Norwegian shipping group Odfjell will stop sailing through the Gulf of Aden to avoid pirates and will reroute its vessels around the Cape of Good Hope despite the higher costs, the company said on Monday.
Piracy off Somalia has plagued the shipping lane linking the Middle East Gulf and Asia to Europe and beyond through the Suez Canal. On Monday the U.S. Navy said pirates seized control of a large Saudi-owned oil tanker off east Africa -- the first oil tanker to be taken by pirates in the area.
"We will no longer expose our crew to the risk of being hijacked and held for ransom by pirates in the Gulf of Aden," Odfjell Chief Executive Terje Storeng said in a statement.

"The re-routing will entail extra sailing days and later cargo deliveries," he said. "This will incur significant extra cost, but we expect our customers' support and contribution."
Odfjell, which specialises in chemical tankers and has a fleet of 92 vessels, is one of a handful of companies which, according to experts, have already decided to reroute around the Cape, while several others are thinking of following suit.
The moves reflect the escalation of attacks from one every couple of weeks to as much as four in one day. Last week Somali pirates captured three ships including a chemical tanker chartered by another Norwegian shipping group, Stolt-Neilsen .
Odfjell said it was frustrated that governments and other authorities were taking a "limited interest" in the problem.
"Several chemical tankers have been hijacked at gunpoint, and although hostages up to now reportedly have been released seemingly unharmed, we do not know if this will be so in the future," it said.
"The efforts that are being made do not seem to put an effective end to what can best be described as ruthless, high level organised crime," Storeng added.
Sort of the ultimate vote of "no confidence" in the forces operating to protect shipping in the area...

UPDATE: In a somewhat related note, South Korea is making plans to send a war ship to join military forces already at sea in the loose anti-pirate coalition, as set out here.

Somali Pirates Grab Large Saudi Tanker



Reported here:
Pirates on Monday attacked and took control of the Saudi-owned very large crude carrier Sirius Star off the east coast of Africa, a spokesman for the US Navy 5th fleet said.

"The vessel is under the pirates' control," the spokesman told AFP following a statement saying that the tanker, which is owned by Saudi Aramco, came under attack more than 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya.

The ship carried 25 crew members from Croatia, Britain, Philippines, Poland and Saudi Arabia, the statement added.

The 318,000-tonne vessel, launched earlier this year, is flagged in Liberia and operated by Vela International.
Photo is from the ship-naming ceremony last year.

UPDATE: According to this report, the ship was not bound through the Gulf of Aden but was headed around the Cape of Good Hope and was nabbed 450 miles off the coast of Kenya. These are somewhat remarkable developments, as is the capture of such a large vessel.

More details in a U.S. NavCent press release:
The very large crude tanker Sirius Star was attacked more than 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya. The ship is flagged in Liberia, owned by the Saudi Arabian based Saudi Aramco, and operated by Vela International. The crew of 25 includes citizens of: Croatia, Great Britain, The Philippines, Poland, and Saudi Arabia.

This attack comes amid a decrease in the rate of successful pirate attacks on merchant vessels off the coast of Somalia. Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) data analysis has shown that the combination of both military and civilian involvement in the area has reduced the percentage of successful piracy attacks from 53% in August, to 31% in October.

“Our presence in the region is helping deter and disrupt criminal attacks off the Somali coast, but the situation with the Sirius Star clearly indicates the pirates’ ability to adapt their tactics and methods of attack” said Vice Adm. Bill Gortney, Commander, Combined Maritime Forces. “Piracy is an international crime that threatens global commerce. Shipping companies have to understand that naval forces can not be everywhere. Self protection measures are the best way to protect their vessels, their crews, and their cargo.”
***
As is evident with the attack on Sirius Star, increasingly daring attacks are being conducted by Somali pirates on a variety of merchant vessels. Tuesday, Nov. 11, a UK warship successfully thwarted a pirate attack on a Danish shipping vessel and boarded the pirate ship responsible. During the course of the boarding, the team engaged the pirates in self defense resulting in a number of fatalities. Such incidents highlight the complications associated with operating in this environment and the need for a permanent and effective land-based solution to the security situation in the region.
UPDATE: Route map for ship owner:


Rough area of attack is shaded pink - near the entrance to another sea chokepoint, the Mozambique Channel (click on images to enlarge):


UPDATE: Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff "stunned" by new range of pirates, it says here:
The top US military officer said Monday he was "stunned" by the reach of the Somali pirates who seized a Saudi supertanker off the east coast of Africa, calling piracy a growing problem that needs to be addressed.

But Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said there were limits to what the world's navies could do once a ship has been captured because national governments often preferred to pay pirates ransom.

"I'm stunned by the range of it, less so than I am the size," Mullen said of the seizure of the Sirius Star Sunday by armed men.

The huge, oil laden prize, which is three times the size of a US aircraft carrier, was some 450 miles east of Kenya when it was boarded, he said.

That is the farthest out at sea that a ship has been seized in the latest surge of piracies, according to Mullen.

The pirates, he said, are "very good at what they do. They're very well armed. Tactically, they are very good."

"And so, once they get to a point where they can board, it becomes very difficult to get them off, because, clearly, now they hold hostages.

"The question then becomes, well, what do you do about the hostages? And that's where the standoff is.

"That's a national question to ask based on the flag of the vessel. And the countries by and large have been paying the ransom that the pirates have asked," he said.

Somali Pirates: Japanese ship nabbed


A Japanese ship was grabbed on Saturday, as set out here:
A Japanese-owned chemical tanker was seized by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Japan's Foreign Ministry said, adding officials are trying to find out more information on the incident.

The 20,000 ton chemical tanker was seized on Nov. 15 off the coast of Yemen, Hiroshi Suzuki, the Foreign Ministry's assistant press secretary, said in a phone interview. The ministry is coordinating with other countries involved.

The ship is called the Chemstar Venus and has a crew of 18 Filipinos and 5 South Koreans, the Hokkaido Shimbun reported late yesterday. Iino Kaiun Kaisha Ltd., the owner of the ship, can't contact the vessel and is unable to confirm it was hijacked, Wataru Chomei, a general manager, said by telephone.

Project Valour-IT

Give to them that was hurt:



About the Project:
Every cent raised for Project Valour-IT goes directly to the purchase and shipment of laptops and other technology for severely wounded service members. As of November 2008, Valour-IT has distributed over 2700 laptops to severely wounded Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines across the country, and is now expanding its mission to include other technology that supports physical and psychological recovery.

Valour-IT accepts donations in any amount to support our mission, but also offers a sponsorship option for laptops. An individual or organization may sponsor a wounded soldier by completely funding the cost of a laptop and continuing to provide that soldier with personal support and encouragement throughout recovery. This has proved to be an excellent project for churches, groups of coworkers or friends, and members of community organizations such Boy Scouts.

Originally Valour-IT provided the voice-controlled software that accompanies the laptops, but now works closely with the Department of Defense Computer/electronic Accommodations Program (CAP): CAP supplies the adaptive software and Valour-IT provides the laptop. In addition, DoD caseworkers serve as Valour-IT’s “eyes and ears” at several medical centers, identifying patients in need of laptops and other technological support for their recovery.
If you want to support the Coast Guard, Army, Air Force or the Marines, go here.

Support our people.

Sunday, November 16, 2008

Sunday Ship History: Mortars at Sea

In the New York Times February 10,1862, appeared something of a mystery:
The powerful flotilla of Mortar-Boats which has been, for some weeks past, fitting out at the Brooklyn Navy -yard, under the superintendence of Commodore Porter, is now nearly ready for sea, and may be expected to start for somewhere during the coming week. Concerning what particular rebel stronghold they are intended to beleaguer and bombard, official reticence, as yet as made no sign. Whether, indeed, Captain Porter himself is precisely aware of the point where is expedition is to make itself offensively felt, is exceedingly doubtful. One thing, however, is certain; if he does know, he keeps his information hermetically bottled up from all access tp inquisitive outsiders.
The article goes on to explain how the mortar boats operate and how mortars differ from the then conventional cannon:
Their use is to throw hollow shells, filled with explosive material, which, when falling on a building or into the works of a fortification, burst, and, with the fragments, destroy everything within reach."
The idea is somewhat akin to a slow pitch softball pitch- the projectile is launched nearly vertical - and descends nearly straight down. This was very different from the cannon of those days i which the shot went out essentially horizontal. The advantage of the mortar is that high walls and deep trenches pose little in the way of obstruction to a shell descending vertically.

Mortars as weapons of war are old weapons, well known to armies engaged in sieges.

Porter's sea mortars were generally 13-inch (measured across the bore) and could toss a 200 pound shell about 2-2/3 miles. Ship cannons in those days had effective ranges of a few hundred yards, maybe. The large mortar shells could also act as anti bunker weapons - their weight could cause them to sink into the ground to some depth before exploding. The NYTimes describes the mounting of the mortars on the schooners and brigs as follows:
...Capt Porter has has the decks of all his vessels underlaid with massive timber beams, interlaced and riveted, and extending (wher the main pressure of recoil occurs) almost through to kelson. The mortars themselves rest upon circular revolving platforms, of novel and ingenious construction. By means of a very simple arrangement of machinery these platforms can, whn the mortars are fired, be lifted from their rollars, and planted firmly in the solid beds beneath and when a change of aim is desirable, they can easily be elevated, and turned in any direction the gunners please. These platforms are a great improvment on those adopted in the British Navy.
You might recall that revolving turrets for guns had just been put to their first use on USS Monitor a couple of months before this Times piece appeared.

We now know that Porter's Mortar-Boats were headed, towed by steam ships, for the Gulf of Mexico, where the U.S. Navy was about to move forward on General Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan, where Commodore Farragut was looking for ways to get past Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip and move his fleet up the Mississippi River to link up with forces working with the Army and capture Vicksburg close the Mississippi to the Confederates. Porter had a vision which came to pass:
As it is written in Sea Power: A Naval history (2nd ed., E.B. Potter, ed, USNI, 1981, p.137):
Porter argued that a fleet of mortar boats could wreck forts Jackson and St. Philip to the point where deep-draft naval vessels could pass upriver and threaten the city.
Farragut collected a group of ships and gunboats. Porter had 21 mortar boats with 13" mortars. April 17, 1982 saw Porter moving up the river to get into position, 15 boats began shelling Fort Jackson, the other 6 taking on Fort St. Philip. Wooden buildings in the forts burned, counter battery fire sank some mortar boats, but the fort defenders, under constant mortar fire, couldn't prevent a couple of Farragut's gunboats breaching the river barrier enough for the bigger ships in Farragut's force to get upriver.
When through the barrier, New Orleans was assaulted and fell, and the Navy mortar boats moved up river, eventually participating in the siege of Vicksburg. In later days, some of these mortar boats bombarded Fort McAllister, Georgia (where the Confederate commander noted, "Their mortar fire was unusually fine, a large number of their shells bursting directly over the battery") and took part in several other actions.

In addition to these "mortar boats," the Navy had "mortar barges" built (see here for use along the Mississippi River. Details of these barges can be seen in the picture of model nearby. These barges were towed into place on river bank with range of their targets and left to lob rounds onto the opposing force. A print from the times showing the assault on island No. 10 is nearby. Caption:
Colored lithograph published by Currier & Ives, New York, circa 1862. It depicts the bombardment of the Confederate fortifications on Island Number Ten by Federal gunboats and mortar boats. Ships seen include (from left to right): Mound City, Louisville, Pittsburg, Carondelet, Flagship Benton, Cincinnati, Saint Louis and Conestoga. Mortar boats are firing from along the river bank.
After the Civil War, not much is heard about "Mortar-Boats" until . . . World War II, when the concept was revived in a effort to provide support for amphibious landings.

The WWII version consisted of modified Landing Craft Infantry (see also here). These ships became known as LCI(M)- Landing Craft Infantry (Mortar). According to U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft by Norman Friedman,
On 18 October 1944 CinCPac requested 30 . . .side-ramp LCI(L)s to be armed with three mortars and one 40-mm gun, the latter replacing the bow 20-mm.
***
In all these ships, the mortars were fixed on deck. BuOrd developed the 4.2-in mortar MK 1, on a 3-in gun mount, which could be trained and elevated.
Some ships had their bows "cut down to allow the mortars to fire forward at reduced elevation.

Whatever their design, in February 1945, a flotilla of these mortar ships joined the U.S. Naval force gathering off the Iwo Jima. There they saw action according to a battle plan:
From: Commander Amphibious Forces, United States Pacific Fleet (Commander Joint Expeditionary Force) *** LCI(M) MORTAR PLAN The rapid rate of fire, high trajectory and long range of the 4".2 chemical mortar were considered to have considerable value for beach preparation fire and for deep support subsequent to How-Hour. Consequently, as recommended following the Marianas operation, an effort was made to develop a craft mounting this weapon and capable of proceeding to the objective under its own power. Three 4".2 chemical mortars were mounted on an LCI and experiments successfully covered all phases of loading and firing. Additional conversions were made, further tests conducted and standard plans drawn up for delivery of mortar fire from designated positions on the flanks of the beaches and after How-Hour deep support, behind the beaches. *** The LCS(L)(3)'s and LCI(M)'s supported the landing by fire on the beach, behind the beach and on the flanks before and after H-hour. Some were under control of Shore Fire Control Parties after H-hour. The greater part of enemy fire came from the flanks. The 40-mm. fire of the LCI's at caves and cliff areas on the flanks was effective in reducing enemy machine gun fire on the beaches, while rockets and mortar shells helped to keep down short range enemy mortar fire. LCI(M)'s were very useful for delivering all-night harassing fire. Initially, three divisions were used nightly, gradually tapering off to one or part of one division. These LCI(M)'s usually came under fire from enemy coast guns and intermediate automatic weapon fire intermittently during the night, and it was necessary to detail a cruiser or destroyer to cover each division. None was hit but there were many near misses.
Mortar Support Units No. 1, No. 2, and No. 5, consisting of six mortar LCI's, were assigned to provide scheduled flanking and deep supporting mortar fire as follows: Units No. 2 and No. 5, using plan "A," fired from How-minus-Thirty-five to How-minus-Seven-minutes on the eastern slopes and approaches to Suribachi Yama while Unit No. 1, using the same fire delivery plan, delivered fire on the eastern flank high ground during the same period. At How-Hour Units No. 2 and No. 5 in column, entered and crossed the boat lanes from the west, turned shoreward into line and followed the Sixth assault wave toward shore.

At about How-plus-Twenty-minutes, when 2,000 yards from shore all ships of these two units opened fire using plan B with mortar range set for 3,200 yards and swept a rectangular area 2,200 yards long by 1,000 yards deep as they moved in. Stopping and lying to 1,000 yards from shore, fire was then maintained 1,800 yards inland and parallel to the beach until How-plus-Sixty-minutes. At How-minus-Seven, Mortar Support Unit No. 1 shifted its line of fire farther to the east for safety to troops and resumed fire at How-plus-Ten-minutes firing at a reduced rate for neutralization until 1,300; 17,400 rounds of 4".2 mortar were scheduled for delivery in support of the landing by these three units.
***
On completion of their scheduled fire, Mortar Support Units NO. 1, No. 2, and No. 5 replenished mortar ammunition and joined Units No. 3 and No. 4 in area Roger awaiting assignment. Night harassing mortar fire requests from Headquarters Landing Force were fulfilled by assignment of Units No. 2 and No. 5 to cover prescribed areas throughout the night using standard plan A and varying the line of fire between specified limits. A total of 24,000 rounds of which 20 percent was WP, were delivered by these two units from reference points 1,000 yards off the northwest and southeast coasts of the island. Large caliber enemy counter fire was received by the northern unit, but was not intense or accurate enough to require the withdrawal of this unit.
***
One Mortar Unit continued to be assigned each night to deliver harassing fire. Enemy counter fire continued to require the assignment of a destroyer or cruiser to provide support for the harassing unit. On departure of Units No. 1, No. 2 and No. 5 from the area on February 26, Units No. 3 and No. 4 were reorganized into five-ship divisions. Due to the reduced size of the remaining units and their inexperience in plan A fire delivery, night harassing fires were hereafter delivered using plan C. On 28 February, two more mortar LCI's departed the area, leaving two four-ship units available for mortar fire. On 27 February and for several days thereafter individual mortar LCI's were assigned during daylight to provide direct support to battalions designated by Headquarters Landing Force.

The remaining area into which night harassing fire could safely be delivered, required the employment of only one mortar LCI on the night of 1 March. Thereafter harassing fires at night by these ships was discontinued. On 3 March all remaining mortar LCI's departed the area.

Ammunition expenditures by LCI types exclusive of pre-Dog-Day expenditures, were as follows:

4".2 mortar 60,000
***
MORTAR LCI's

This was the first operation in which LCI's mounting mortars have been employed by the Fifth Amphibious Force. Their primary mission, as conceived in the initial planning, was the delivery of heavy harassing fire at night to prevent the initiation of organized counterattacks. Their support with this fire was most gratifying and materially reduced the demands for harassing fire by destroyers and cruisers.

Two methods of delivering harassing mortar fire at night were employed at Iwo Jima: (1) Plan A of the standard mortar fire plans, in which five LCI's steam on an eliptical track around an LCI acting as reference ship. Ships fire singly in succession during the two minutes' run on the leg on which they are pointed toward the target area. (2) Plan C in which the six LCI's of a division lie to on a line, 200 yards between ships, and fire when the ship's head is between prescribed limiting lines of fire. Both plans have many advantages and disadvantages. Since it is next to impossible to hold an LCI on an accurate heading for a long period when dead in the water, plan C is unsuitable for interdiction fire where continuous and fairly accurate fire along a definite line is required. Harassing fire, which requires irregular volume and rate of fire with an unsystematic pattern and coverage of the area harassed, is especially typical of the fire to be expected of six LCI's dead in the water all on different headings between prescribed limits. Plan A, on the other hand, has all the fire delivery characteristics most suited for interdiction fire and least suited for harassing fire.

The 3,200-yard range limit of LCI mortar fire requires these ships to approach as close to shore as safe navigation permits in order to place their fire as far inland as possible. On a well defended island such as Iwo Jima, this close approach to shore drew considerable enemy fire even at night. LCI mortar ships found good use for their bow 40-mm. in delivery of counterbattery fire in self-protection, but this was found insufficient and it became necessary to assign one of the general support destroyers or cruisers to cover the nightly harassing mortar LCI unit. In making plans for delivery of night (or day) harassing fire by mortar LCI's, the plans should incorporate the employment of a destroyer, for counter-battery protection of the harassing unit. This ship should work with the Mortar Unit Commander on a common frequency.

On request, individual mortar LCI's were assigned to battalions for direct support, generally to those battalions whose flanks were along the shoreline as in the case of gunboat support. Preliminary reports indicate that this support was more in the form of harassing or neutralization fire for the battalion supported. In rough water, the accuracy of LCI mortar fire in deflection is greatly decreased by rolling and cannot be safely called for in areas close to own troops. LCI mortar fire for direct support should therefore only be expected to accomplish harassing or preparation neutralizing fire for an advance into areas within range of the LCI Mounted mortar.

While the accuracy in deflection of mortar fire from LCI's is greatly affected by rolling and variations in ship head, its accuracy in range is quite dependable and relatively unaffected by motion of the ship. It is therefore very suitable for neutralizing fire over the heads of troops when the line of fire is perpendicular to the line of troops. Its high trajectory makes it ideal for use when ships and troops located between the target and firing ships preclude the use of high velocity flat trajectory fire. At Iwo Jima, the neutralization of large areas inland from the beaches was effectively delivered by mortar fire from LCI's on a line parallel to and 1,000 yards from shore. This fire was not provided however, until How-plus-Twenty minutes. Using Plan B with desired modifications, mortar LCI's should be employed in the boat lanes to provide beach neutralization just prior to the time the first wave leaves the line of departure and during its run to the beach. They should precede the first wave by any desired distance, stop and lie to not less than 600 yards (minimum firing range) from shore, and continue mortar fire on the beach until the first wave is about 200 yards from shore. At this time the fire should be lifted about 200 to 500 yards inland and lifted in predetermined steps thereafter according to a prearranged time schedule based on anticipated troops advance. This type of moving close support was provided at Iwo Jima using 5"/38 AA Common fire with 1,200-foot second charges.
More:
From: Commander Mortar Support Group 52.6 (Commander LCI Flotilla Twenty-one)

Plan ABLE consists of sustained fire covering a comparatively narrow target area and capable of extension in range. This plan is best adapted for close supporting fire (flank protection), harassing and interdiction fire. This plan of fire is delivered from a predetermined reference point around which the ships circle, delivering fire when the firing ship is headed toward the target area. The ships circle in both clockwise and counterclockwise movements, depending on the tactical situation.

Plan BAKER consists of a barrage fire covering a wide target area and capable of progressive movement in range. It is best adapted for neutralization fire and close support fire over and beyond our own troops. This plan of fire is delivered from a predetermined point with the ships that are firing disposed on a line of bearing parallel to the desired range median of the barrage or in line abreast formation.

Plan CHARLIE consists of independent or minor concentration fire covering point targets or targets of opportunity. It is best adapted for harassing fire, counter-battery fire, interdiction fire, and incidental destruction fire, particularly that requiring high trajectory. It is conducted by single or several ships whose fire may or may not be coordinated depending on assignment and is delivered from a reference point and bearing from the designated target area.

All target areas and fire plans in connection with the mission were contained in the Operations Plan, up to and including H-hour-plus-60. Subsequently, target fire and smoke missions were assigned.

At the outset of the mission it was assumed that preliminary naval and air bombardment had effectively silenced coastal defense and shore batteries that could possibly interfere with the carrying out of this group's mission. This assumption was subsequently found to be true. Sporadic mortar and machine gun fire was encountered however, which interfered with our operations on several occasions.
Mortars on Navy units reappeared during the Vietnam War when Navy Swift Boats were equipped with 81mm mortars which allowed those small units to provide limited fire support to shore units along the coast areas. A description of this unique weapon can be found here:
These 81mm mortars were unique to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard small craft of the Viet Nam and post war-era. The mortar itself is entirely different in design from all other mortars in U.S. service. This mortar is designed for direct and indirect fire. The difference between the Mk 2 Mod 0 and Mk 2 Mod 1 are mostly cosmetic and that the Mod 1 mounts an AN/M-2HB .50 Browning machinegun above its recoil cylinder and a 100 or 400 round ammunition box on its right side.

The mortar itself is mounted on a very robust tripod and uses clamps to control traverse and elevation angles. Unless fitted with NO FIRE zone mechanical stops, the mortar has 360 degrees of traverse and -30 degrees of depression and +71.5 degrees of elevation. Its rate of fire is 18 rounds/minute at 45 degrees elevation in DROP FIRE mode and 10 rounds/minute in TRIGGER FIRE mode. Sights for the mortar are attached to the left side of the elevation arc. Weight of the Mk 2 Mod 0 was 593 pounds; the weight increased to 677 pounds in the Mk 2 Mod 1 (with machinegun). Range of the 81mm (direct) was 1,000+ yards; (high angle, indirect) was 3,940 yards. Maximum effective range of the .50 Browning machine gun was 2,000 yards; maximum range was 7,440 yards.

The Mk 2 was developed by the NavWepSta Crane, Indiana, in the early 1960s to provide offshore patrol boats with a light weight direct and high-angle fire weapon that could engage both surface and shore targets. It was adopted by the USCG in 1962 where it was first mounted on their large WHEC cutters in the Atlantic and Pacific. These mortars were used to fire illumination flares to aid commercial and military aircraft forced to ditch at sea. Tests in the Caribbean showed the 81mm mortar illumination round was more effective than the 3"/50 gun's star shell. Not only was the illumination of the 81mm round better, but it fired at a higher rate and had less fouling problems than the 3"/50.

In mid-1964 the USCG recommended the fitting of a .50 Browning machinegun in "piggyback" fashion above the mortar's recoil cylinder. The prototype was built by the USCG at its Curtis Bay, MD, yard and it worked very well. The mortar's tripod mount was more than adequate for taming the .50 Browning's recoil. In late 1964, the Navy fired the Mk 2 Mod 1 at its Dahlgren, VA range. The Mk 2 Mod 1 was successful in its tests. Two Mk 2 Mod 1 units were then taken to sea aboard USCG 95-foot cutters for demonstration and operational evaluation. Both units passed with flying colors.

The Mk 2 Mod 0/1 was deployed by the hundreds aboard many kinds of craft in Viet Nam. A short, but by no means exhaustive list would be: APLs and YRBMs (non-self propelled barracks barges); USCG 82-foot cutters; USCG 95-foot cutters; Navy 50-foot coastal patrol craft (PCF); Navy 75-foot fast patrol boats (PTF, "Nasty"-class); Navy 95-foot fast patrol boats (PTF, "Osprey"-class); Navy patrol gunboats (PG, "Ashville"-class); miscellaneous riverine craft which were mostly converted LCM-6 landing craft: MON (monitor); CCB (command and control boat); Zippo (flame thrower boat); ASPB (assault support patrol boat); HSSC (heavy SEAL support craft); and advanced tactical support bases such as SEA FLOAT/SOLID ANCHOR (Nam Can) and BREEZY COVE (Song Ong Doc).
Photo of 81mm mortar from here. Caption:
CS2 Bob Burton loads the 81mm mortar of the CGC Point Jefferson WPB 82306, during a 1968 fire mission. (Photo donated by CSC Robert O. Burton, USCG (ret).
I believe the navy 81mm mortar is still in service.

As you can see, mortars in the Navy have a long and worthy history.

Friday, November 14, 2008

Friday Reading

CDR Salamander: Fullbore Friday with a look at a WWI naval action from when ships and their crews sailed in harm's way on purpose.

Fred Fry's Maritime Monday 135, which has enough maritime related links to keep you busy until this coming Monday, when you can start all over again...among the good stuff, Fred looks at BW Group tankers...

CGBlog looks at what the Coast Guard has to say about its acquisition program here: "The Coast Guard isn't there yet, but it's certainly making progress. Checks and balances. Transparency. Learning. Who can argue with that?"

Consul-at-Arms quotes and briefly discusses some comments on the potential release of Gitmo prisoners here. Taking no live prisoners is mentioned for future operations. I, personally, am holding out for the all-volunteer "Airborne ACLU Corps," who will jump into combat zones and offer legal advice to people who are shooting at our troops in order to protect their clients rights. . . this country has a surplus of liberal lawyers anyway, and way too many law schools. . . this program might help solve one part of the problem. . .and allow lawyers to get credit for community service under the new administration. I have a few "constitutional law" profs in mind who would make a good starting team for the AACLUC, especially those who don't seem to have read the Constitution.

The Skeptical Bureaucrat found a bumper sticker he liked on Veterans' Day. Me, too.