Al Qaeda in Turkey

A Washington Post piece reprinted in a Turkish paper as Al-Qaeda's Hand in Istanbul Plot:

By then, Aktas was in Syria with other organizers, one of whom crossed the frontier with a load of underwear meant to make him look like a merchant headed to market. They made their way to Aleppo, where Sakka, the Syrian al-Qaeda man, had a house. Hiding in it, they cheered the televised coverage of the bombings. They laid low for five months, then made their way into Iraq, according to evidence from two suspects interrogated in Iraq's notorious Abu Ghraib prison.
In Iraq, Sakka served as a senior lieutenant to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq. Sakka, his features altered by plastic surgery, was captured in the Turkish resort town of Antalya while allegedly making final preparations for an attack on a cruise ship. He apparently planned to survive by escaping on an underwater scooter.
The Abu Ghraib prisoners said Aktas later died in Fallujah, scene of repeated fighting between Sunni insurgents and U.S. troops.

CENTCOM rep coming to Milblog Conference 2007

Andi notes that USCENTCOM is sending a panelist to be on the "potluck" panel at the Conference. He or she will join LTC P, Murdoc, Noah Shachtman, Eagle1, Neptunus Lex. The moderator will be John Donovan.

Should be interesting...

CENTCOM has a couple of the world's hotspots on its map...

North Korean Missile/Cargo Ships

The DPRK may have some hidden assets as reported here:

A recent report by the U.S. Congress’ research unit Congressional Research Service (CRS) has raised questions about North Korea's ability to transform cargo ships into missile launch pads. The CRS report said that North Korea has developed a submarine- or ship-mounted ballistic missile system with a range of at least 2,500 kilometers. The North has also transformed ordinary cargo ships to launch the missiles, the report said.

South Korean military authorities and experts said Wednesday that while the deployment of a submarine-carried missile is unlikely, but it would be possible for Pyongyang to use a cargo ship as a launch pad. North Korea’s new ballistic missiles with a range of 2,500km to 4,000km are based on the decommissioned Soviet R-27 sub-launched missile.
***
Missiles can be carried in a launch pad that looks like an ordinary container and be fired by simply raising the container upright, experts say. A cargo ship would be excellent way to conceal a missile as the enemy would likely ignore it as a simple commercial vessel. Intelligence authorities note that the new North Korean 12-meter ballistic missiles would fit inside a standard container. The CRS report also said that using a commercial cargo ship would be the easiest way for North Korea to carry missiles.

More here on submrine launch threat.

The CRS report may be found here in an html version. It is also available as a pdf.

See my earleir post on the subject of merchant ships carrying missiles here. See also MissileThreat.com, inclduing its movie of a merchant missile attack on Hollywood here.

Drawing of missiles in containers is from The Chosun Ilbo article. Scud TEL on a ship is my own creation.

Sri Lanka Navy kills another Tamil Sea Tiger boat and 10 Tigers, too

Reported here:

"The Navy detected two boats at around 4:30 in the morning (2300 GMT Sunday) ... and we have engaged in the sea and from land," said Navy spokesman commander D.K.P Dassanayake. "We have destroyed one boat and recovered another fitted with weapons."

Maritime Monday 46 at Fred Fry International

Monday, Monday -- time for Fred Fry International: Maritime Monday 46.

Includes the latest gouge on ATP-2 (B) NCAGS. Which was once NCS and NCAPS... see here.

Anti-terrorist naval blockade in Philippines

Reported here:

More than 10 warships are around Sulu in what could be the single biggest naval blockade meant to trap Abu Sayyaf terrorists in their lair.

Armed Forces chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. said Saturday the naval blockade formed part of the "small unit tactics" designed to eventually wipe out local and foreign terrorists holed out in Sulu, as part of the military’s ongoing offensive dubbed Oplan Ultimatum.

He said the new tactic involves a coordinated land and sea approach to smashing the terrorists.

Believed trapped in the jungles of Sulu, aside from the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf, are Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah militants. The two groups are linked to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda global terror network and are on the US list of international terrorist organizations.

In an interview with The STAR, Esperon disclosed that BRP Rizal leads the Navy vessels in patrolling the Sulu Sea to seal off the terrorists’ potential escape routes. The military’s offensives have been going on since August last year.

Esperon was hesitant to call it a blockade "because the ships are moving around."

But reliable sources said the Philippine Navy was getting assistance from US forces for the blockade.

Given the size of the Navy ships involved, Esperon said, the actual blockade would stretch to only a kilometer – certainly not enough to cover the wide expanse of the Sulu Sea.
***
He also stressed that the USS Blue Ridge, which is in the country for humanitarian mission, is not part of the Sulu Sea patrol. The Blue Ridge is the flagship of the US Seventh Fleet.

"If they (US ships) are there in Sulu, they must be in the international waters. I don’t even know if they are there," Esperon said. The US Navy vessel, which docked at the Manila South Harbor recently, is also scheduled to visit Cebu and Gen.Santos City.

The Sulu offensive has led to the deaths of top terrorist leaders Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman.

Red burst on map is in general area of the blockade.

Mutiny on the Maungdam

A mutiny and murder at sea reported here:

Two Burmese, named Suyanai and Siaui, both 24 years old, were arrested by the Royal Thai Navy on the Thai fishing boat named Maungdam on which the two Burmese and seven other Burmese crew members had mutinied and tried to rob the boat from the Thai captain. The investigation reported that the Maungdam fishing boat had three Thai crew and nine Burmese crew for fishing in the Andaman Sea and the boat was near to the Similan islands about 40 nautical miles away from the shore, when the nine Burmese crew attacked their captain of the vessel with a sharp knife and pushed him off board. One of the Thai crew member was stabbed to death while a mechanic jumped into the sea, survived and was rescued by another fishing vessel. After being notified, the Royal Thai Navy sent out their ship and patrol boat and managed to arrest the pirates and found the Burmese were trying to set fire to the boat; finally two Burmese were arrested and the captain of the ship was found and brought to Takuapa hospital due to his serious injuries.

Arrow points to general area of incident.

Sunday Ship History: Watching the Sky from the Sea

It's the Cold War. The United States is trying to assess the Soviet threat and one of the conclusions it reaches is that long-range bombers may try to penetrate U.S. airspace. The U.S. and Canada build a line of radar sites across Northern Canada (the DEW line) for detection of possible inruders. Ah, but there is a limit to that line- the eastern and western sea approaches are uncovered. Part of the solution to filling in that radar gap- floating radar stations... otherwise known as radar picket ships (AGRs):

As the Inshore and Contiguous Barriers were becoming operational, the need for a third radar barrier farther out to sea as an extension of the DEW Line was recognized. Detailed planning for the Atlantic and Pacific extensions of the DEW Line began in 1955. The Atlantic Barrier became operational in 1956 and the Pacific Barrier in 1958.
***
The Atlantic Contiguous Barrier stretched along the East Coast from Cape Cod to North Carolina. The barrier consisted of five radar picket stations (Stations 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20) about three hundred nautical miles off the coast. Originally, each picket station reported to a separate East Coast Air Force base air defense direction center (ADDC), but over the years the Air Force reorganized its air defense forces. From 1959 onward, Stations 12 and 14 reported to the ADDC at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts, and Stations 16, 18, and 20 reported to the ADDC at Cape Charles Air Force Base in Virginia.

The radar picket stations on the Contiguous Barrier were, as noted, originally patrolled by DERs. The DERs were withdrawn on 31 March 1960 in favor of radar picket ships (AGRs), which had been converted from Liberty-type cargo vessels between 1957 and 1959.

For almost two years, beginning in late 1954, WV-2 airborne early warning aircraft, which were just entering the Navy inventory, supplemented the DERs on the Contiguous Barrier. In mid-1956 these highly capable aircraft were shifted to more demanding duties on the newly established North Atlantic barrier. ZPG-2W and ZPG-3W airborne early warning airships flying out of Naval Air Station Lakehurst, New Jersey, were another part of the Navy air defense effort from 1954 to 1962. Assigned to the Inshore Barrier, they provided radar coverage in the area between the DERs on the Contiguous Barrier and the ground-based radars of the Inshore Barrier.
***
The Pacific Contiguous Barrier stretched from Washington to central California. The barrier consisted of five radar picket stations, Stations 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, about three hundred nautical miles off the coast. As on the East Coast, each picket station originally reported to an ADDC, but reporting assignments changed over the years with Air Force reorganizations. From 1959 on, Stations 1 and 3 reported to the ADDC at McChord Air Force Base in Washington, Stations 5 and 7 reported to the ADDC at Hamilton Air Force Base in northern California, and Station 9 reported to the ADDC at Norton Air Force Base in southern California.27

As on the Atlantic coast, the radar picket stations on the Pacific Contiguous Barrier were originally patrolled by DERs, the first DER patrol being made in 1955. The DERs began to withdraw from the Pacific Contiguous Barrier in June 1958; the last one departed in April 1959, leaving those picket stations to AGRs. Navy WV-2s also patrolled the Contiguous Barrier, until assigned to the Pacific DEW Line extension in 1957.28 (hat tip to the author - Captain Joseph F. Bouchard, U.S. Navy)

This Sunday Ship History is about the AGRs, filling their important but mind-numbingly dull duty at sea, watching the sky.

The radar picket ship concept?

The Navy had learned, as we have noted, the value of radar picket ships during the last year of World War II, when destroyers equipped with air search radars had provided invaluable early warning of Japanese air attacks. Fast, heavily armed destroyers had been needed to escort the attack carrier task groups, which were always the first to sail in harm’s way, but smaller, more economical ships could be used as radar pickets for slower amphibious and replenishment groups. Design studies for the radar picket destroyer escort (DER) were begun in the last year of the war. Seven Buckley-class destroyer escorts (DEs) were converted to DERs in 1945, but by 1947 six had been decommissioned and the seventh relegated to reserve training duties. Although they were in commission for only a short time during the war, these ships had proved the radar picket destroyer escort to be an efficient and effective type.

The Navy decided it needed DERs again in 1949, when it was tasked to guard the seaward approaches to the northeastern United States as part of the limited LASHUP air defense system established in 1948. Rather than recommission the Buckley-class DERs, whose World War II–vintage electronics suites were now obsolete, the Navy decided to convert mothballed Edsall-class DEs, whose diesel engines gave them twice the endurance of the steam-powered Buckleys.

See here for more on WWII radar picket destroyers (among other things).

The DERs were replaced by converted Liberty ships, the AGRs:

The Guardian-class AGRs were converted from Liberty ships between 1957 and 1959 at the Philadelphia, Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Charleston Naval Shipyards. They were 441 feet in length, displaced 10,750 tons fully loaded, and were the last ships in the Navy to have triple-expansion, reciprocating steam engines. Originally designated YAGRs (ocean radar station ships), they were redesignated AGRs (radar picket ships) in September 1958. Equipped with the large AN/SPS-17 long-range air search radar, height-finding radar, TACAN, electronic surveillance systems, and extensive communications equipment, the AGRs had a crew of from thirteen to twenty officers and 138 to 150 enlisted men, under a lieutenant commander. A large combat information center contained radar repeaters, large vertical plotting boards, and dead-reckoning tracers for tracking contacts and controlling interceptors. Their only armament was two Mark 22 three-inch antiaircraft guns and .50-caliber machine guns. The large size of the AGRs enabled them to offer comfortable accommodations: one or two–officer staterooms, three or four–man chief petty officer compartments, large enlisted berthing spaces, an enlisted dining area that could seat half the crew at a sitting, and ample space for recreational activities.

The sixteen AGRs were divided equally between Atlantic and Pacific. Radar Surveillance Squadron 2 (RADRON 2) patrolled the Atlantic Contiguous Barrier and the SOUTHERN TIP station. Originally homeported in Newport, RADRON 2 shifted in September 1958 to Davisville, Rhode Island, on the western side of Narragansett Bay. In the Pacific, Radar Surveillance Squadron 1 (RADRON 1), based in San Francisco, patrolled the Pacific Contiguous Barrier.

Atlantic Contiguous Barrier patrols normally lasted three to four weeks; Pacific Contiguous Barrier patrols were slightly longer, four to five weeks. Inport periods between patrols were normally three or four weeks long, and the AGRs spent up to two hundred days per year under way. Like the DERs, the AGRs did not carry doctors, so medical emergencies had to be evacuated ashore. U.S. ports were nearby, but the slow speed of the AGRs sometimes delayed arrival within helicopter range of shore. The weather was no better for the AGRs than it was for the DERs. One writer has described the “stark and often ferocious waters” in which the AGRs patrolled:

Bad weather and sea conditions were the rule rather than the exception for the AGRs. The storms of the North Atlantic and North Pacific sometimes brought winds of 70 to 80 knots and seas of 40 to 50 feet in height. In the North Atlantic, the winter season brought temperatures below freezing; ocean spray whipping across the ships could, and often did, coat them inches deep in ice. In the spring and early summer, the additional hazard of icebergs and growlers were [sic] often a distinct possibility.
When on radar picket patrol, the AGRs operated under CONAD control and reported unidentified air contacts to the air defense direction center designated for their picket station. The AGRs occasionally made radar picket patrols off the east and west coasts of Canada and participated in exercises with Canadian naval and air defense forces. U.S. Air Force air intercept control officers were embarked regularly for familiarization and cross training. AGRs were also tasked with weather reporting and search and rescue duties, and they took part in Atlantic and Pacific Fleet ASW exercises.

Their story is not completely untold - see here and YAGR's Association. The latter site sets the tone for ships that sailed at slow speeds in predefined boxes:

To help avoid boredom on these long periods at sea, each ship came up with ingenious ways to entertain the crew. During periods at sea, fishing tournaments would be held, shooting practice, skeet shooting, swim call and, of course, sun bathing on the the southern stations would help pass the time. As they were converted freighters, there was plenty of space aboard ship. All ships had a movie theater set up in one of the cargo holds. The other cargo holds were put to good use as basketball courts, archery ranges, weight lifting rooms, libraries, wood working shops, volley ball courts or anything else the crews could come up with. One ship even had a small swimming pool.

Even with all the above, it was still tedious and boring duty.

SPS-17 radar photo and "rough seas" photo from USS Searcher site, which also boasts:

The Searcher was the only ship that could brag of having a swimming pool. It was around 30 ft square and 3 feet deep just forward on the main deck. I can remember cooling off in that salt water on hot days. Other recreational activities included fishing off the fantail (usually shark), a basketball half court and weight room, and a movie theater below decks.

Even operating with 220 psi boilers and reciprocating engines, the AGRs had some engineering issues, as indicated in this report on how USS Searcher lost her screw at sea after a yard period:

On dry dock, certain grave formalities must be gone through. For the AGRs one of these was the removal of the propeller from the tail shaft, checking the stern tube bearing for excessive wear, and checking the shaft keyway to ensure that the key had been "spooned". "Spooning" was very important as it was a method of insuring that stress concentrations would not be initiated in the key way. Slightly more than 100 of the 2700+ Liberty Ships built had lost propellers from tail shaft failure. Analysis by the American Bureau of Shipping indicated a critical vibration speed of about 102-105 RPM when the propeller came partially uncovered in a seaway and many shafts had broken starting at keyway stress points. To minimize the possibility of failure, The Navy limited the AGRs engine speed to 66 RPM, reduced from design full speed of 76 RPM. Stern tube clearances were acceptable and a visual check of the shaft taper showed "spooning" had been accomplished and the shaft had no apparent cracking. As a final test, the shaft taper was magnetic particle tested. A heavy coil of insulated cable attached to a large storage battery was wrapped around the taper, forming an electromagnet. The area to be tested (the keyway), was sprinkled with a magnetic powder. The powder would orient itself in the form of distinct lines, showing any cracks. The test showed no cracking, but the cable ends drew a large arc on the polished taper creating a large gouge on the machined surface. The mechanics assured me that everything was "all right" and that they would polish the surface with a stone before reinstalling the propeller. "Dumbo" bought the explanation. In fact, smoothing the surface had not corrected the stress concentration point that the gouge had created in the shaft itself.

Out of dry dock SEARCHER went off to complete her overhaul. In March 1964, SEARCHER lost her screw at sea.

Whoops.

Eventually, technology eliminated the need for these ships and they were retired. Though there are those of a certain level of paranoia (and not much in the way of prognostication skills) that wants them back. More info on the FPS-117 radar here.

These trusty ships put in a lot of sea time and their crews did their jobs in an environment made all the more demanding by iffy weather and an extra dose of tedium. They deserve a salute for a job well done.

I also commend to you a visit to the "picket ship" links here for more information on the ships, crews and their daily lives. For example, they got mail at sea both by transfer from other ships and by an occasional airdrop (see the P2 flying over?), as I learned here. And what great ship names- Skywatcher, Watchman, Investigator...

Weekly ICCCCS Piracy Report (to 6 Feb 07)

Latest ICC Commercial Crime Services Piracy Report (to 6 Feb 07) here. Highlight:

02.02.2007 1100 LT in position 10:40N - 062:07E, Arabian Sea.
A general cargo ship received a VHF call from a craft advising that she is a Korean fishing vessel and asked for fresh water. Master suspected piracy, raised alarm and steered away from the craft. Suspicious craft followed the ship. Master increased speed and at 1210 LT the craft gave up the chase. Soon after, another four small high speed crafts approached the suspicious craft whilst talking/laughing on VHF ch 14. The suspect craft was wooden, painted white and green with a speed of 15-20 knots with no fishing equipment on deck.

Red arrow on map pin in general vicinity of report.

Ship with ammonium nitrate cargo catches fire off Australia, questions raised re safety

Reported here:

A flag of convenience ship carrying volatile ammonium nitrate is being towed back to Newcastle after its engine room caught fire.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau said the engine or wiring of the Bahamas flagged Baltimar Boreas had caught fire, disabling the ship, after it left the Newcastle Port on Thursday night.

The fire had been extinguished and a tug had been sent to tow the ship back to Newcastle, where it was expected to arrive on Friday evening, an ATSB spokesman said.
***
"We want the government to come clean. We want to know why a foreign vessel is allowed to carry such high-risk cargo on the Australian coast, putting Australian port communities, our national security and the environment at risk.

"If this ship went up in smoke in Newcastle harbour it could take out the whole city. We want the government to tell the Australian people what is going on.

"Ammonium nitrate is used as an explosive in mining operations, as a fertiliser and is the weapon of choice for terrorists. It was ammonium nitrate that was used during the Bali bombings."

Now let's see, something about Texas City....

Ship pictures is Baltimar Venus (sister ship to Boreas) in Sydney. More on Baltimar ships here.

UPDATE: Newcastle Port aerial view and entry photos added. More on Newcastle here and here. World's largest coal port.

Richard Clarke has change of mind on Sparrows Point LNG?

Reported here, a seeming change of mind by former counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke:

In the past, Clarke has made statements (see here and here) indicating that an LNG facility could be a viable terrorist target and has gone so far as to write in his 2004 book, Against All Enemies: Inside the War on Terror, that an attack on a similar facility near downtown Boston — which has since closed down — would have “wiped out” the city’s downtown area.

Having examined the local proposal, Clarke is saying that an LNG plant in Sparrows Point would be a highly unlikely terrorist target and does not pose a security threat.

See also here on Sparrows Point. From the interview:

Q: What about the security concerns about the proposed Sparrows Point plant?

A: First, let me talk a little bit about the process. We use a certain methodology to assess the security of a facility. We’ve just concluded our report of the AES Sparrows Point facility. The methodology says is there intent? And the answer is yes, there is intent. We know [Islamic extremist group] Al-Qaeda is interested in natural gas plants. Next we ask, do they have the ability? Yes. We’ll assume they can get into the country.

Q: Would [the Sparrows Point facility] fit their desire as a target?

A: [Al-Qaeda’s] desire as a target is a target that’s going to kill a lot of people. That’s their M.O. [Sparrows Point] is not that viable of a target.

Q: Why not?

A: The question of killing a lot of people if [the LNG tanks] blew up is very difficult to do.
Former White House counterterrorism chief Richard A. Clarke during an interview in Baltimore last week.

Q: Why?

A: It would have to result in a significant breech of more than one of the three tanks. And then they have to ignite it.

Q: What about people’s fears about the proposed project being so close to local neighborhoods?

A: Where this facility is to be put, there’s nothing within a mile. If an attack is going to occur, it will likely be at the dock, which is safe out to a mile. There’s a fuzzy area past the mile. But with the work [terrorists] would have to do to get out that far, it would have to result in at least a three-container breech. And it doesn’t pass the test of large casualties. The area within the mile radius is essentially depopulated. When you compare that to the facility which we looked at in Boston, were they to attack that, we have estimates that it would exceed over 100,000 casualties.

Q: What are the chances of a terrorist attack in Sparrows Point?

A: The probability of them [launching an attack] here is remote. The transit route is the [Chesapeake] bay, which is pretty broad, and the deep shipping channel comes right up the middle and there’s nothing around it.

Q: What about the video Risks and Dangers of LNG? Have you had the chance to look at that?

A: Yes. It assumes a lot of things. It imagines a floating vapor cloud, which we and experts in the U.S. government think is darn near impossible. We can’t imagine a scenario where you would have a cloud. If you breach a container [or ship], which is hard to do, the [LNG] would pool on the water. It’s not going to turn into a vapor cloud. If it’s a slow drip, which would take a long time, it would disperse as soon as it gets into the wind. There’s a very vivid scene in the movie with a vapor cloud. It’s very good special effects. But I think all experts think it’s unrealistic.

The "Risks and Dangers" video being discussed is from here. "Unrealistic" is an understatement...

Anti-whaling activists toss acid, injure humans

Reported here,:

Japan expressed outrage on Friday after anti-whaling activists poured acid on the decks of a whaling ship in the Southern Ocean and slightly injured two crew members, terming their activities "piratical, terrorist acts".

***
"These are completely piratical, dangerous acts," said the official, Hideki Moronuki. "They are also very dangerous, and we want them to stop this immediately."

Sea Shepherd said on its Web site that it had "successfully delivered" six litres of butyric acid to the ship's flensing deck, where whales are cut up, halting the crew's work.

Two Japanese crewmen were injured, one when he was hit in the face by an empty container of acid and the other when acid was squirted into one of his eyes.

Butyric acid, which Sea Shepherd said was non-toxic, is a corrosive chemical and contact can cause severe irritation and burns of the eyes and skin, leading to permanent damage.

Moronuki said one of the Japanese crewmen was having difficulty opening his eye and the full extent of his injuries had yet to be determined. The other had a cut on his face, but neither appeared to be seriously hurt.

Interesting set of priorities...

I have not fallen off the face of the earth

Just really busy for the last couple of days...


But hasn't the recent news cycle been something?

Malaysia to increase patrols in Strait of Malacca

Reported here:

Patrols in Malaysian waters, especially in the Straits of Malacca, will be beefed up this year.

"Substantial allocations have been set aside for the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) to buy helicopters and offshore patrol vessels, said MMEA director-general Datuk Mohammad Nik.

"Negotiations with the producer of the helicopters for patrols and for search-and-rescue operations are under way. Before the end of this year, we should have enough helicopters and specialised vessels to patrol our waters."

He was announcing that MMEA’s first anniversary celebration will be held at its eastern maritime regional office in Bandar Indera Mahkota, Kuantan, on Feb 15.

MMEA received a fleet of 70 boats from several government enforcement agencies like the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Fisheries and Customs Departments.

Most are over 25 years old. Some have been in service for 45 years.

"In order for us to be able to do our jobs effectively, we need at least 116 vessels," said Mohammad.

He added that MMEA will also add 4,000 officers and rank-and-file personnel to its existing force of 2,000.

"About 400 new personnel are already receiving military training at the naval training centre. Next month, we will have our first batch of 80 officers who are degree and diploma holders," he said.

In the past year, MMEA has checked more than 400 vessels, resulting in 200 seizures of their consignments or the detention of crew members.

"Our main focus is the Straits of Malacca as it is the busiest lane in terms of shipping activity."

Maritime Monday 45 at Fred Fry International

It's Maritime Monday #45 at Fred Fry International.

A more interesting collection of ship stuff covering a week you'll not find elsewhere.

Sunday Ship History: Large Medium Speed RoRos

When the topic is logistics, the armchair warriors go off to the corners and talk about something else. But those who plan wars spend a great deal of time wondering about how the XXnd Divison is going to get all its people and things from place Y on the earth's surface to location Z.

And speed is always of the essence, because when you need the XXnd Division, you really need the XXnd Division and all its toys.

In the old days, the Navy was in charge of transporting things like divisions across the oceans of the world. The component that was in charge of having the ships to do so was the Military Sealift Command (MSC). In today's modern military, MSC is a part of the United States Transportation Command or Transcom. Transcom's mission:

Provide air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and time of war.

Down within the other missions MSC carries out is "surge shipping." "Surge shipping" is defined as:

Surge shipping is critical to the nation's combat readiness. Surge sealift includes three key resources which are kept in reduced operating status until they are needed in a crisis. These include: eight Fast Sealift Ships, eleven Surge LMSRs and 44 Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, Ships.

The FSS are the fastest cargo ships in the world--traveling at speeds up to 30 knots. Unlike most ships in the U.S. flag market, they are ideally suited to carry tanks, trucks and other out-sized military vehicles. Together, these huge roll-on/roll-off ships can carry nearly all the equipment needed to outfit a full Army mechanized division.

MSC's Surge LMSRs, while not quite as fast, can carry up to 380,000 square feet of cargo, the equivalent of eight football fields, at speeds up to 24 knots. The Surge LMSRs can be ready to sail in 96 hours, like the Fast Sealift Ships.

The RRF ships are maintained by the Maritime Administration in peacetime and come under the control of the MSC when activated in wartime or during other contingencies. The ships can be activated and ready to proceed to a loading port in four to 20 days, depending on their specified readiness status. RRF ships include roll-on/roll-off ships, crane ships, breakbulk ships, tankers and other ships not readily available in the U.S. commercial market. The RRF offsets industry's shortage of militarily useful ships.

By way of background, the FFS are all converted Sea-Land ships, steam powered and can go very fast, up to 33 knots. Inside the Navy, these ships are referred to as "SL-7s" (SL referring to Sea-Land). More about the SL-7s here. You might note that the SL-7s are getting a little long in the tooth.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm. some deficiencies in the ability of the U.S. shipping fleet became glaringly apparent when the U.S. was forced to rely on ships from other nations to get material to and from the theater. The FFS, while important, can't do the job by themselves. Thus began the push for more surge sealift and the development of the Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ships:

Military Sealift Command's newest class of ships - Large, Medium-speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships, or LMSR - will significantly expand the nation's sealift capability in the 1990s and beyond. Nineteen LMSRs were converted or built at U.S. shipyards by the year 2001. The LMSRs will provide afloat prepositioning of an Army heavy brigade's equipment and a corps' combat support, as well as surge capability for lift of a heavy division's equipment from the United States. As wide and long as the FSS, the LMSRs carry almost twice the cargo because of the hull design and number of decks. Pedestal cranes and both side and stern ramps mean that the LMSR is ideally suited for undeveloped ports or logistics over the shore.

The need for additional military sealift ships was identified in a Congressionally-mandated study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1990s. The Mobility Requirements Study focused on Department of Defense transportation during the Persian Gulf War. It highlighted the urgent need for greater sealift capacity to transport military equipment and supplies during wartime and other national contingencies. In response to the sealift shortfall, an ambitious Strategic Sealift Acquisition Program was introduced. Plans called for adding 19 LMSRs which will provide five million square feet of capacity early in the next century.

The LMSR program currently has 19 ships, 5 of which will be conversions of existing commercial container vessels, and 14 of which will be newly constructed ships. All 19 ships use common cargo handling systems, procured by the Navy. LMSRs are being built by three contractors. A performance type procurement description was used, therefore specific ship configurations differ as the respective builders interpret the mission requirements.(emphasis added)

While not as fast as the FFS, they do a fairly good 24 knots while pushing 956 feet of ship and 55,000 tons through the water.

The LMSRs come in three different classes, including the Bob Hope class, of which the lead ship saw its first action in the Kosovo follow-on:

Peace in Kosovo was signaled from far away. It was announced by the roar of diesel engines and the clanking of metal as the combat vehicles of the U.S. Army's peacekeeping task force arrived at the port of Thessaloniki, Greece. Uncle Sam was on the ground and headed for Kosovo.

There was no time to lose. With the air war over but disorder swirling in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, requested the urgent movement of promised peacekeepers from NATO nations. Each day and each hour counted—the U.S. Army was needed in Kosovo immediately to begin peacekeeping duties.

The vehicles began streaming like a long ribbon from the USNS Bob Hope on 30 June 1999. Three days later, the scene was repeated with the USNS Soderman. Later, the contract vessel Osprey arrived from Beaumont, Texas, with equipment from several continental United States (CONUS) Army installations to augment the task force.

The unloading at Thessaloniki was directed by soldiers and civilians assigned to several Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) ports under the 598th Transportation Group, which is headquartered at Rotterdam, The Netherlands. The transporters teamed up with soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), which is based in Germany, and together they quickly grouped the tracked and wheeled vehicles of all kinds into serials organized by unit.

Hundreds of 1st Infantry Division drivers fell in on their vehicles. Hours later, in the muted early morning hours, the vehicles were proceeding in long columns up the highway to Skopje, Macedonia. There, the main force of 1st Infantry Division soldiers, who had been airlifted from Germany, would join up with their vehicles. The move to Kosovo was on.

How does the use of LMSRs during Jan/Feb 2003 (build up for Iraq) compare to movement of cargo during to Desert Shield/Storm? See here:

Between late January and early February, TRANSCOM delivered within 30 days the same amount of supplies that took six months to get to the Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Storm, said Handy. He attributed the higher efficiency to the availability of better military cargo airplanes, specifically the C-17, and to the acquisition of 19 more container ships known as “large medium-speed roll-on roll-off.” TRANSCOM activated 36 LMSR ships for a possible conflict with Iraq.

“Purposeful investments made after Desert Storm allowed us to do this thing without so much of the agony,” said Handy.

The other classes of LMSRs is the Watson class, like the Bob Hope class, new builds and the "converted" LMSRs such as USNS Shughart (T-AKR 295). See here. The Watson ships are all "prepositioned" and the Hope and converted classes are "surge" oriented. All the ships except the Bob Hope and the Fisher are named after Medal of Honor recipients.

By the way, sometimes the military wants more speed and ideas other than ships come along. Some ideas include DARPA's "Walrus" as set out here:

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has launched the WALRUS Program, which will study the feasibility of a new air vehicle capable of transporting 500-1,000 tons of military payload across 6,000 miles within 4 days.

The US military identified deficiencies in its strategic airlift capability as far back as after the first Gulf War. Interest waned by the mid-1990's, but the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have again underscored the airlift need. Additionally, the need has been amplified by a key change in US military doctrine referred to as the "10-30-30" objective: to be able to deploy to a distant theater in 10 days, defeat an enemy within 30 days, and be ready for an additional fight within another 30 days. DARPA WALRUS envisions transporting an entire battle-ready Unit of Action from its operational US base to near enemy lines, termed "from fort to fight". The WALRUS air vehicle would dwarf every aircraft in existence today, with a total hull length anywhere from 600 to 1,000 feet.

Or, as DARPA itself notes:

The Walrus operational vehicle (OV) is envisioned to have the primary operational task of deploying composite loads of personnel and equipment (for example, the components of an Army Unit of Action) ready to fight within six hours after disembarking the aircraft. Walrus will operate without significant infrastructure and from unimproved landing sites, including rough
ground having nominal five-foot-high obstacles. It is intended to carry a payload of more than
500 tons 12,000 nautical miles in less than seven days at a competitive cost. Additionally,
Walrus will be capable of performing theater lift and supporting sea-basing and persistence
missions to meet a range of multi-Service needs.

More at theAeroscraft website. By way of reference, a C-5 transport can carry up to 145 tons of cargo. Or, as noted here:

One LMSR container ship, for example, can carry the equivalent of 302 C-17 loads. The average LMSR cargo can be unloaded in two to three days, a relatively fast turnaround. “I could not close 300 C-17 sorties in two to three days,” said Handy. Most major seaports can accommodate from two to four LMSR ships in a single day. Smaller ports can take one or two vessels a day.

When the need is to move mountains of stuff from one port to another, then there is nothing quite like the capacity of these great big ships. So, a salute to the logistics guys and the planners and the merchant mariners who man these very important strategic assets. And another to the military teams that ride along with the equipment, too.

Thought you might like to know.

UPDATE: The "Whale" as an endangered program and a "deflationary" report here.

Navy shipbuilding problems

Reported here:

Seven new ships are budgeted for this year, barely a third of the number built annually during the peak Reagan-era defense buildup. Fifteen will be decommissioned, including the San Diego-based Ogden, Trenton and Dolphin.

The result is a fleet of 276, the lowest total in nine decades.

“The number of ships we're producing is absolutely pathetic,” said Winslow Wheeler, an analyst for the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Defense Information and a frequent critic of Pentagon priorities. “It's a system out of control.”

Navy leaders and military analysts have warned that if Congress doesn't boost the Pentagon's shipbuilding budget – $11.6 billion this fiscal year – the Navy won't be able to meet its growing list of commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Latin America and the western Pacific.

***

To help pay for shipbuilding, the Navy has cut thousands of sailor billets from its rolls since 2003. It also has trimmed orders for new ships and stretched them out over more years.

Meanwhile, the nation's six shipyards – including General Dynamics NASSCO in San Diego – fear they'll have to lay off more workers if the Navy's pace of new projects doesn't speed up. The lack of steady work also prompts highly trained employees who design and construct warships to find other careers.

“That's a skill that, once it's lost, it'll be very, very difficult to get back,” said Fred Harris, president of General Dynamics NASSCO.

***

The Navy's biggest cost headache is the still-unbuilt DDG-1000 destroyer. The ship was conceived a decade ago as a $750 million replacement for the Spruance and, eventually, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that now form the backbone of the surface fleet.

Technologically, the sleek DDG-1000 is loaded: It will boast advanced radar, vertical-launch cells for Tomahawk and Sea Sparrow missiles, 155-mm guns with long-range, precision-guided projectiles and a super-efficient electrical generation system – all packed into a stealthy hull inspired by the Air Force's B-2 bomber.

But with a cost that has swelled to $3.6 billion, the ship keeps accountants awake nights. The Navy has cut its planned purchase of the ship from 30 to seven. Some defense analysts predict the Pentagon ultimately will buy only two or three.

“Cramming that much capability onto one ship is ludicrous,” said Bob Work, a defense analyst for the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C. “Everybody outside the Navy looked at it and said, 'You're crazy.' ”

As an alternative to souped-up ships such as the DDG-1000, the Navy in the late 1990s hatched the bare-bones Littoral Combat Ship.

Small enough to operate in the near-shore seas and estuaries that Navy officials call “brown water,” the littoral hull was designed without weapons systems. Instead, warfighting modules for functions such as antisubmarine or countermine warfare could be designed separately and loaded onto the ships as needed.

The no-frills design would allow the mass production of at least 55 littoral ships, at a cost of no more than $220 million apiece. It is the key to Mullen's 313-ship blueprint.

The first four littoral ships, all under construction, were bound for San Diego. Then last month, Navy auditors discovered that costs had nearly doubled on the third ship, which Lockheed Martin is building. The Navy ordered the contract suspended for 90 days while it investigates.

Despite the program's troubles, even some critics of the Pentagon think the strategy of introducing more streamlined and smaller ships will offer the Navy its best chance of forming a sufficient fleet in an era of crushing technology costs.

Apparently the concept of "barebones" has lost something in the translation.

My proposal: Kill the DDG-1000 class. Use the $6 billion saved on the first two of those ships to fund 200 (@ $30 million a pop) real LCS ships (like the Cyclone class PCs). (UPDATE: Up arm them!)Take the funding from the second two DDG-1000 and buy Swedish Visby class ships. Take the rest of the money and maintain and upgrade the current
Burke class DDGs. Throw in a few dozen "arsenal ships" and stand by to fire for effect.
Go with simple, proven power plants and if you need new weapons systems, take a look at the Army's MLRS and Tactical Missile System again.

Producing large numbers of LCSs, Visbys and arsenal ships ought to keep shipyards busy and workers in their jobs.

Give commands to LCDRs and challenge them to develop the new tactics needed to fight in the littorals.

Build a few "Wild Weasel" ships to take down enemy radars.... treat the ships like a carrier air wing - not every ship has to do everything, have some specialists. And train like the devil.

Have a good OPFOR headed by an evil genius. Give him the tools and money to develop the Navy equivalent of the Army's Desert Training Center at Fort Irwin. Do not allow "restart the clock, restart the problem." Find the warriors who will go into harm's way with a swagger. Reward them.

The next Nimitz is not pushing paper in Millington and doesn't want a shore tour in the Pentagon. He/she wants to be at sea, leading sailors and getting ready to fight our enemies.

And if you find me a CO who is willing to take $3 billion dollar ship into the lttorals, let me know...

Fast, cheap, heavily armed and in great quantities seems to be the ticket to me.

As for the shipyards, pay 'em a fixed price with incentives for bringing the ships in on time on price. Convince them there's profit in numbers.

No mercy.

Opinions are like...

UPDATE: How about the SAAR 5 at $260 million? Already made in the USA. $6 billion buys 20 of them.


UPDATE2: Or how about a whole bunch of these hydrofoils (with weapons upgrades)?

UPDATE3: And how about this system here? Can it be adjusted for shipboard use?

UPDATE4: More here

Naval Year In Review At NOSI

Naval Open Source Intelligence offers up a year in review here with a couple of biting comments on top ten stories:

-The continued irrelevance of the US Navy to Fourth Generation Warfare. Nearly 4 years after the invasion of Iraq, the US Navy is finally ready to send a brown water / riverine unit to Iraq to patrol the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. What took so long and why was there no sense of urgency?<

-The successful use of lawfare, by environmental groups, to impede US Navy use of low frequency active sonar systems.

Photoshopping propaganda busted

At Michael J. Totten: Busted ..

It's a tricky world.

H/T: American Thinker

Tuesday's referral to Maritime Monday 44 at Fred Fry International

Get thee to Fred Fry International: Maritime Monday 44. Sure, it was posted yesterday, but I've been out of town while Fred's been collecting all kinds of good maritime stuff that will get you through a week until next Monday.